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Under what circumstances can people convert natural resources into private property? John Locke famously answered this question by positing what has become known as the Lockean proviso: a person has the power to unilaterally appropriate natural resources 'at least where there is enough and as good left in common for others'. This Lockean proviso has been widely embraced by right-libertarians who maintain that a relevant act appropriates only if others are not left worse off. However, this proviso is multiply ambiguous with there being various ways of specifying its distinct elements. Daniel Attas has argued that all proposed specifications render the proviso either implausible or unsatisfied. However, there are three seemingly plausible specifications that he either fails to consider or does not adequately address. This paper attempts to show that these specifications are either unacceptable, go unsatisfied, or fail to support right-libertarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Background Do autistic people share the same moral foundations as typical people? Here we built on two prominent theories in psychology, moral foundations theory and the empathizing–systemizing (E–S) theory, to observe the nature of morality in autistic people and systemizers. Methods In dataset 1, we measured five foundations of moral judgements (Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity) measured by the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) in autistic (n = 307) and typical people (n = 415) along with their scores on the Empathy Quotient (EQ) and Systemizing Quotient (SQ). In dataset 2, we measured these same five foundations along with E–S cognitive types (previously referred to as “brain types”) in a large sample of typical people (N = 7595). Results Autistic people scored the same on Care (i.e., concern for others) as typical people (h1). Their affective empathy (but not their cognitive empathy) scores were positively correlated with Care. Autistic people were more likely to endorse Fairness (i.e., giving people what they are owed, and treating them with justice) over Care (h2). Their systemizing scores were positively correlated with Fairness. Autistic people or those with a systemizing cognitive profile had lower scores on binding foundations: Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity (h3). Systemizing in typical people was positively correlated with Liberty (i.e., hypervigilance against oppression), which is a sixth moral foundation (h4). Although the majority of people in all five E–S cognitive types self-identified as liberal, with a skew towards empathizing (h5), the percentage of libertarians was highest in systemizing cognitive types (h6). E–S cognitive types accounted for 2 to 3 times more variance for Care than did sex. Limitations Our study is limited by its reliance on self-report measures and a focus on moral judgements rather than behavior or decision-making. Further, only dataset 2 measured political identification, therefore we were unable to assess politics in autistic people. Conclusions We conclude that some moral foundations in autistic people are similar to those in typical people (despite the difficulties in social interaction that are part of autism), and some are subtly different. These subtle differences vary depending on empathizing and systemizing cognitive types.

As the use of nudges by governmental agencies becomes more common, the need for normative guidelines regarding the processes by which decisions about the implementation of specific nudges are taken becomes more acute. In order to find a justified set of such guidelines one must meet several theoretical challenges to Libertarian Paternalism that arise at the foundational level. In this paper, I identify three central challenges to Libertarian Paternalism, and suggest that Susan Hurley's political philosophy as presented in her Natural Reasons (1989) can be viewed as offering powerful responses to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing explanations of political intolerance and partisanship highlight how individuals' ideological commitments and the homogeneity of their political environments foster intolerance toward other political groups. This article argues that cultural, interactional conditions play a crucial role in how personal and environmental factors work – or do not work – in local groups. Based on a four-year ethnographic study and 12 focus group discussions with two culturally distinct civic associations of American libertarians, I show how groups' varying patterns of interaction, or "styles," establish distinct cultural settings, in which different attitudes and behaviors seem sensible and appropriate, particularly regarding other political groups. Thus, when libertarian groups established a "community style" of interaction, viewing the relationship among members in terms of friendship and community bonds, they also opened their social activities to non-libertarians, collaborated with them in political projects, and viewed politics as a matter of advancing shared interests with people from other political groups. Comparisons across and within field sites show how this relationship between style and political tolerance works in different libertarian groups and different social environments. These findings highlight the role of local factors in explaining variations in groups' levels of political tolerance and present a key mechanism—centered on interaction patterns—to supplement existing analyses of the relationship between political intolerance and changing forms of civic organizing in the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main purpose of this paper is to rationally reconstruct Nozick's account of unproductivity, especially vis-à-vis his characteristically libertarian, and hence uncompromising, ban on fraud. We posit that, when Nozick's theory is interpreted charitably, it does not yield to contradictory prescriptions concerning permissibility. That is, there does not have to be any inconsistency in the Nozickian ban on certain exchanges, with the ban tracking two properties of the said exchanges; that is, either (1) their unproductivity or (2) their fraudulence. When analyzing economic exchanges, our interest is focused on both productive and unproductive blackmail exchanges. However, we suggest that Nozick's banning exchanges along the lines of their unproductivity tallies poorly with his avowed libertarianism since his position predicts prohibiting unproductive and yet non-fraudulent exchanges. Hence, and we suggest resolving the said tension in a principled libertarian (deontological) manner; that is, by banning fraudulent exchanges and allowing non-fraudulent ones, ceteris paribus, while submitting that the properties of exchanges such that being productive or being unproductive are morally inert. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economists have played a powerful role in shaping modern Australia. Drawing on my experience as an academic economist and an economic policymaker, I outline ten principles to guide economists seeking to maximise their impact. These are to (i) Focus on well‐being, not just dollars; (ii) Think comparative advantage; (iii) Ignore sunk costs; (iv) Optimise, subject to constraints; (v) Use the best evidence; (vi) Consider expected value; (vii) Think in magnitudes, not just in signs; (viii) Channel a libertarian; (ix) Remember equity; and (x) Incentives matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Do autistic people share the same moral foundations as typical people? Here we built on two prominent theories in psychology, moral foundations theory and the empathizing–systemizing (E–S) theory, to observe the nature of morality in autistic people and systemizers. Methods: In dataset 1, we measured five foundations of moral judgements (Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity) measured by the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) in autistic (n = 307) and typical people (n = 415) along with their scores on the Empathy Quotient (EQ) and Systemizing Quotient (SQ). In dataset 2, we measured these same five foundations along with E–S cognitive types (previously referred to as "brain types") in a large sample of typical people (N = 7595). Results: Autistic people scored the same on Care (i.e., concern for others) as typical people (h1). Their affective empathy (but not their cognitive empathy) scores were positively correlated with Care. Autistic people were more likely to endorse Fairness (i.e., giving people what they are owed, and treating them with justice) over Care (h2). Their systemizing scores were positively correlated with Fairness. Autistic people or those with a systemizing cognitive profile had lower scores on binding foundations: Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity (h3). Systemizing in typical people was positively correlated with Liberty (i.e., hypervigilance against oppression), which is a sixth moral foundation (h4). Although the majority of people in all five E–S cognitive types self-identified as liberal, with a skew towards empathizing (h5), the percentage of libertarians was highest in systemizing cognitive types (h6). E–S cognitive types accounted for 2 to 3 times more variance for Care than did sex. Limitations: Our study is limited by its reliance on self-report measures and a focus on moral judgements rather than behavior or decision-making. Further, only dataset 2 measured political identification, therefore we were unable to assess politics in autistic people. Conclusions: We conclude that some moral foundations in autistic people are similar to those in typical people (despite the difficulties in social interaction that are part of autism), and some are subtly different. These subtle differences vary depending on empathizing and systemizing cognitive types. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article carries out the analysis and understanding of Ignacio Ellacuría's liberation theology starting from two moments: his response to Joseph Ratzinger's Instruction on some aspects of "liberation theology", as well as the critique and reading of the same by the theologian of capitalism Michael Novak --an influential figure in the libertarian liberals such as Javier Milei-- and the reading of the historical Jesus as of liberation in the Old Testament. This with the aim of highlighting the praxis of Christianity in the author, as well as its relevance for our present time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Murray Rothbard's "For a New Liberty," highlighting its significance in advocating for the replacement of government functions with market institutions. Rothbard contends that government intervention is the root cause of societal problems, proposing voluntary cooperative behavior as the ethical alternative and outlining how a stateless society could operate more effectively for everyone's benefit.

Behavioural science has been effectively used by policy makers in various domains, from health to savings. However, interventions that behavioural scientists typically employ to change behaviour have been at the centre of an ethical debate, given that they include elements of paternalism that have implications for people's freedom of choice. In the present article, we argue that this ethical debate could be resolved in the future through implementation and advancement of new technologies. We propose that several technologies which are currently available and are rapidly evolving (i.e., virtual and augmented reality, social robotics, gamification, self-quantification, and behavioural informatics) have a potential to be integrated with various behavioural interventions in a non-paternalistic way. More specifically, people would decide themselves which behaviours they want to change and select the technologies they want to use for this purpose, and the role of policy makers would be to develop transparent behavioural interventions for these technologies. In that sense, behavioural science would move from libertarian paternalism to liberalism, given that people would freely choose how they want to change, and policy makers would create technological interventions that make this change possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Libertarian "exit" imaginaries project new social, political, and economic structures separate from existing institutions in which "sovereign individuals" can opt-in to the governing system that fits their ideals. This paper traces libertarian exit imaginaries through a variety of territorial and technological projects. Demonstrating how these imaginaries evolve, it describes a recent proposal to build a semi-autonomous, blockchain-based smart city in Nevada. Reflecting on these projects, the paper highlights (1) their inevitable failure as they confront reality, (2) their role as spectacle, spreading libertarian ideology, and (3) their real-life impacts on distinct places and communities even when they fail or never materialize. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are numerous approaches and conclusions regarding church and state relations and how Christianity affects public policy. Yet the purpose of this study is to question some of the philosophical assumptions and biblical interpretations that Christians hold to which support the state as a morally legitimate authoritative institution in the first place. This article will argue that various presuppositions regarding the state's moral legitimacy are untenable, if not self-refuting. The philosophical commitments of a form of Christian Conservatism exemplified by Norman L. Geisler will be analyzed and critiqued by the Christian Libertarian Anarchist school of thought, represented by Gerard Casey. Geisler's views on first principles, God's moral law, social contracts, consent, anarchy, the distinction between vices and crimes, preconditions for virtue, and the common good will be examined. Then, Geisler's interpretation of classic biblical texts supporting the alleged moral legitimacy of the state will also be assessed. This article will contend that if one were to consistently apply some pertinent principles found in Geisler's prolegomena to theology when reasoning from natural revelation and the relevant biblical data, one will find that the conclusions are more compatible with the political theology of Christian Libertarian Anarchism. Hence the one who questions how Christianity affects public policy should take into consideration the reasons to deny that divine revelation affirms the state as a morally legitimate authoritative institution. If this is the case, the question ought to be reframed to determine how Christianity affects public policy within a state that has no legitimate moral grounds for authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to revisit Mauricio Tragtenberg's sociological critique in the field of communication and popular struggles, we discuss the foundations of libertarian and anarchist communication as principles for analyzing capitalist mediation and mediatization. To this end, we recover from Tragtenberg what he characterized as: "the emergence of electronic mass media", "their mobilizing potential in a new productive process" and the "contradictions inherent in the structure of the media". Postulates that have an impact on the analysis of digitalization and social datafication, and arguments for the defence of popular communication and critical propaganda for social transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reciprocal libertarianism is a version of left-wing libertarianism that combines self-ownership with an egalitarian distribution of resources according to reciprocity. In this paper, I show that reciprocal libertarianism is a coherent and appealing view. I discuss how reciprocal libertarians can handle conflicts between self-ownership and reciprocity, and I show that reciprocal libertarianism can be realised in a framework of individual ownership of external resources or in a socialist scheme of common ownership (libertarian socialism). I also compare reciprocal libertarianism with left-libertarian approaches: I argue that a reciprocity-sensitive version of left-libertarianism (reciprocal left-libertarianism) is coherent and morally superior to traditional left-libertarianism, on grounds of incorporating a distinctively solidaristic and recognition-oriented aspect of equality. The policy implications of reciprocal libertarianism will differ depending on which rights people can have over external resources, but all reciprocal libertarian views acknowledge the existence of social rights that people have as co-operators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Teoría de la Educación. Revista Interuniversitaria is the property of Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Amauta 'Todo lo Humano es Nuestro' is the property of Universidad del Atlantico and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Lingüística y Literatura is the property of Universidad de Antioquia, Facultad de Comunicaciones and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the US, higher conservatism has consistently been linked to lower receptiveness toward COVID‐19 safety precautions. The present studies extended these findings by examining how specific dimensions of conservatism contributed to this relationship. Three studies (total N = 1123) found that conservatives with higher Libertarian Independent attitudes reported less support for and participation in COVID‐19 safety precautions. These effects remained robust after controlling for demographics, general political orientation, COVID‐19 threat perception, and personality. These findings offer nuanced insight into how those with different conservative ideologies responded to COVID‐19 safety precautions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because an agent's constitutive luck may seem to preclude free will, it may seem to preclude moral responsibility. An agent is basically morally responsible for performing action A at time t only if there is another possible world with the same past up to t and the same laws of nature in which the agent does not perform A at t. A compatibilist can solve the constitutive luck problem for moral responsibility without worrying about basic moral responsibility. According to compatibilism, if determinism is true, then agents can be morally responsible for performing actions without being basically morally responsible for performing them. But a libertarian who thinks agents can be basically morally responsible for what they do must explain how basic moral responsibility is possible. ACT-endorsing libertarianism can both solve the constitutive luck problem for moral responsibility and explain how agents can be basically morally responsible for what they do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article titled "It is among us. Where does it come from and how far can the far right that we did not see coming go?" analyzes the emergence and success of La Libertad Avanza, an extreme right-wing political force in Argentina. The book proposes a discussion about the characteristics of this space, the ideas of its leaders, their activism, cultural insertion, and electoral base. It is divided into four chapters that address the history of right-wing movements in Argentina, libertarian youth activism, the "cultural battle" of this force, and the relationship between their discourse and the socio-economic conditions of their electoral base. The article raises questions about the demands and expressions of these youth and activists, as well as the relationship between La Libertad Avanza and other political identities, such as Peronism. Although the text presents some simplifications, it is considered a good starting point for the debate on this political phenomenon. [Extracted from the article]

In 1980s Norway, a group committed to libertarian ideology became influential within Fremskrittspartiet. This new party became known for its opposition not only to taxation and public spending, but also to non-western immigration. The libertarians within the same party, however, advocated open borders. The libertarians were ousted from the party in 1994, but libertarianism has remained a key plank in the party's otherwise national-conservative ideology. Crossovers and alliances between cosmopolitan libertarians and nationalistic anti-immigration groups have become commonplace, and through an analysis of the Norwegian libertarian movement, I argue that these are possible due to the idea of open borders only holding a peripheral position within libertarian ideology. The issue of open borders was given some attention in debates between libertarians and populists within FrP, but was not an important ideological concept for the intellectuals behind the libertarian journal Ideer om Frihet. The article thus argues that a commitment to what we may call cosmopolitanism does exist within libertarianism and may be used to make sense of core concepts such as individualism, freedom and markets, but is nonetheless expendable for most libertarians, as they were for the Norwegian libertarians who found a home in the country's most nativist political party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines the Swedish Freedom Front, created in 1989 by libertarians from the editorial committee of the Nyliberalen magazine. It argues that in its emphasis on cultural, sexual, religious and political freedoms, libertarianism contained a different ideological repertoire from neoliberalism. It compares the construction of a canon of translated neoconservative and neoliberal texts with a popular and vernacular register in youth culture, consumption, and media technologies. Finally, it argues that the ascendance of neoliberalism in the early 1990s fractured libertarian arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses, from the "demand" point of view, one of the most impressive phenomena of the political-electoral rise of the new Latin American right-wing: that of the self-styled "libertarians" of Argentina, grouped around the figure by Javier Milei. Based on data obtained from different surveys that were carried out between 2021 and 2022, we address different questions about what the vote for La Libertad Avanza expresses in terms of a possible political identity. Our findings show that i) we are not facing a fully constituted political subjectivity that fully coincides with the electoral "offer" proposed by the libertarian leader, ii) but that it is an adherence to some of his proposals of neoliberal economic content, which iii) expresses anger with almost the entire political class and that iv) does not necessarily imply an agreement with those more reactionary positions that define the "radical" character of this new political phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Descartes makes apparently contradictory claims about what we are able to do in response to clear and distinct perception of truth or goodness. An altogether novel interpretation of his concept of moral possibility has recently been advanced, aimed at resolving the contradiction. The argument here is that the basic text from which the interpretation is launched involves a serious mistranslation, and that in any case, the interpretation itself is implausible. The thrust is not merely corrective, however, for the issues raised have systematic repercussions on Descartes's views concerning freedom and the will, and on his method of doubt. They particularly affect libertarian interpretations of Descartes, three of which are discussed here, one in some detail. At the end, a more plausible account is indicated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of whether and how we have the control necessary for freedom and moral responsibility is central to all control accounts of freedom and moral responsibility. The problem of luck for libertarians aims to show that indeterministic agents are ill‐equipped with the control required for freedom and moral responsibility. In view of this, we must either endorse scepticism about the possibility of free and morally responsible agents, or make some form of, possibly revisionary, compatibilism work. In this paper, I shall offer a new solution to the problem of luck for libertarians. After outlining the problem of luck, I shall argue that, given a particular approach to mental causation, indeterminism can be viewed as an essential requirement of free and morally responsible action. After this, I shall distinguish between different types of inability and show how this provides us with a solution to the problem of luck. Finally, I shall consider some advantages and objections to the proposed solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Libertarianism about free will conjoins the thesis that free will requires indeterminism with the thesis that we have free will. Here the claim that we have experiential evidence for the libertarian position is assessed. It is argued that, on a straightforward reading, the claim is false, for our experiences as agents don't support the claim that free will requires indeterminism. However, our experiences as agents may still have a role to play in an overall case for libertarianism, insofar as they give us some (defeasible) reason to think that we have free will. This latter claim is defended against a pair of objections that have been leveled against it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Certain kinds of prediction, foreknowledge, and future‐oriented action appear to require settled future truths. But open futurists think that the future is metaphysically unsettled: if it is open whether p is true, then it cannot currently be settled that p is true. So, open futurists—and libertarians who adopt the position—face the objection that their view makes rational action and deliberation impossible. I defuse the epistemic concern: open futurism does not entail obviously counterintuitive epistemic consequences or prevent rational action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Physical determinism is a metaphysical thesis about the natural world whose consequences for freedom and moral responsibility have been widely discussed. In this paper, I articulate a different form of determinism, motivational determinism, which claims that all intentional action is causally determined by the prior motivational state of the agent. Motivational determinism was defended in a simple form by Hume, but has been neglected in recent philosophical literature. I show that there are important reasons that support the plausibility of MD. I then compare MD with libertarian and physical deterministic theories of agency and note that MD has various attractive features. I show that MD is much more threatening to moral responsibility than physical determinism. I conclude that MD is an interesting theory of human agency that deserves wide attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Widespread scholarly agreement has it that Descartes' theory of judgment favors a compatibilist interpretation. This essay explains and rebuts the standard arguments made on behalf of compatibilist readings, while explaining and defending a libertarian interpretation. Along with relevant Fourth Meditation doctrines and texts, my analysis encompasses a much discussed 1645 letter discussing his account. Although some scholars view the letter as departing from the account of the Meditations, I argue that the two works present a consistent view – allowing us to take at face value that the letter purports to elaborate Descartes' intended meaning in the associated Fourth Meditation passage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2005, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America's (ELCA) Churchwide Assembly authorized the formation of a task force to prepare a social statement on genetics and faith. Although the Churchwide Assembly voted to adopt the social statement in August of 2011 by a wide margin, there had been an earlier controversy. In June 2010, an article in the Dakota Farmer questioned whether the ELCA was accusing farmers of "sin" for planting genetically engineered crop seeds. At least two churches in rural North Dakota cited this factor as a reason for leaving the ELCA. Seven synods with strong farmer constituencies proposed resolutions challenging the social statement. This paper explores how the opposition used agrarianism and libertarianism to attack the ELCA's use of the Christian concept of the common good in the social statement. This case reveals the challenges that the Church faces when contributing to ethical deliberations on controversial issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent antitrust discourse in the U.S. is dominated by references to Brandeis and the New Brandeis movement. While it is laudable that many researchers acknowledge Brandeis' work and recognize its business-ethical importance, it is also a missed opportunity to refer to him en passant and not investigate his philosophy in more depth. The following sections attempt to fill this gap in the academic literature by critically evaluating—and comparing—Brandeis' social philosophy with the one of the New Brandeis movement. The research questions of this paper are twofold: First, it analyzes the parallels and differences between Brandeis and neo-Brandeisianism. Second, it addresses the question of which references to his work are valid and legitimate and which ones are not. The paper shows that Brandeis' work encompasses much more than just competition policy; reducing him to antitrust issues (only) does not do him justice as it ignores significant parts of his social philosophy. The paper also shows that Brandeis was skeptical of big business and big government. In contrast, the new Brandeis movement focuses solely on antibigness in the economy while ignoring Brandeis' demand(s) in the political sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Widespread scholarly agreement has it that Descartes' theory of judgment favors a compatibilist interpretation. This essay explains and rebuts the standard arguments made on behalf of compatibilist readings, while explaining and defending a libertarian interpretation. Along with relevant Fourth Meditation doctrines and texts, my analysis encompasses a much discussed 1645 letter discussing his account. Although some scholars view the letter as departing from the account of the Meditations, I argue that the two works present a consistent view – allowing us to take at face value that the letter purports to elaborate Descartes' intended meaning in the associated Fourth Meditation passage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among the many criticisms carried by the Yellow Vests movement, criticisms related to representative government as a mode of exercising power occupy a prominent place and find resonance within the broader contemporary crisis of representative democracy. In the face of this crisis, the Yellow Vests movement has put forward many alternative propositions for direct democracy. This contribution focuses on the local experiment of assembly direct democracy that has taken place in the municipality of Commercy, a town in the Meuse region of Eastern France, from the beginning of the Yellow Vests movement to the municipal elections of March 2020. The contribution studies the specific strategy the movement adopted, that of running for elections to give power to the assembly that gathers the town residents. As the movement created a form of direct democracy – the assembly – to mark its opposition to representative democracy, and then used the paradigmatic mechanism of representative democracy – the elections – to give power to the assembly, it enables an understanding of how a movement navigated the dialectical relationship between representative and direct democracy in the framework of a libertarian municipalist electoral strategy and the tensions that have arisen in the process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The establishment of the Republic of Brazil in 1889 intensified discussions of anticlerical content that were fostered, among others, by freethinkers, freemasons, socialists, and anarchists, mainly due to the arrival of religious congregations in the country, identified with ultramontane catholicism. Therefore, in this article, we will deal with the propaganda to combat the Church promoted by the anarchist press with the labor movement, which, through the newspaper A Lanterna (1901-1904; 1909-1916), also brought anti-religious propositions in its framework. So, the anarchists played an essential role in the press and in the creation of fighting entities that instigated the social debate about the interference of the catholic clergy in civil society (clericalism), followed by solid criticism of religious institutions (and religion itself) that, according to the libertarian perspective, freedom of thought and social transformation were seen as obstacles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article delves into the complexities of attributing moral responsibility to AI systems, addressing philosophical challenges associated with the conditions necessary for moral responsibility, such as agency, rational decision-making. The discussion extends to the impact of determinism on free will and moral responsibility, including incompatibilists, compatibilists, libertarians, and hard determinists, with implications for the ethical considerations surrounding AI responsibility.

Copyright of Iuris Tantum is the property of Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores, AC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Teoría de la Educación. Revista Interuniversitaria is the property of Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Dwayne Moore raises the physical indeterminism luck objection to libertarian theories of free will, which claims that because agents lack control over the indeterministic physical processes that cause choices, agents lack control over those choices. Moore considers the libertarian strategy of identifying these processes with agential states, such as efforts of will, in order to secure agential control over the outcome of these processes. According to Moore, this strategy faces an insurmountable obstacle in the form of a quausation problem. He argues that naturalistically minded libertarians like Kane are committed to the idea that agential states cause what they do only in virtue of their physical properties. This implies that the agential properties are causally irrelevant to the outcome of these indeterministic processes in which case they cannot help to secure agential control over the outcome. I argue that if Kane is a nonreductive physicalist, he has a way of dealing with the quausation problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of philosophers and theologians have recently challenged the common assumption that it would be impossible for God to cause humans actions which are free in the libertarian or incompatibilist sense. Perhaps the most sophisticated version of this challenge is due to W. Matthews Grant. By offering a detailed account of divine causation, Grant argues that divine universal causation does not preclude humans from being ultimately responsible for their actions, nor free according to typical libertarian accounts. Here, we argue that the kind of divine universal causation that Grant proposes is incompatible with a plausible interpretation of Robert Kane's influential conception of ultimate responsibility. This conclusion is significant since Grant seeks to harmonize his divine causal account with Kane's articulation of ultimate responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Libertarianism enshrines individual autonomy as its central political principle, but it has been criticized for applying this principle selectively. Reproductive decisions can stress the concept of individual autonomy by placing into conflict the claimed rights of each biological parent to choose. Two studies (N1 = 296; N2 = 580) show that among U.S. participants, libertarianism is associated with opposition to women's reproductive autonomy and support for men's. Libertarianism was associated with opposition to abortion rights and support for men's right both to prevent women from having abortions (male veto) and to withdraw financial support for a child when women refuse to terminate the pregnancy (financial abortion). Adjusting for the association between libertarianism and conservatism, only the relationship with opposition to abortion rights was rendered nonsignificant. Mediation analyses suggest that hostile sexism may account for libertarians' selective support for men's and not women's reproductive autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dominiak (2022) takes the position that, according to the libertarian philosophy, there should be no such thing as unjust enrichment. If there is, the beneficiary should be legally obligated to jettison his gains in favor of the benefactor. The present paper takes issue with that stance; it maintains that while there is indeed, of course, unjust enrichment, and in many cases the beneficiary must indeed give up his benefits, there are also counter examples in which this is not indicated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of our article is to identify what, in the thinking of the libertarian and egalitarian philosopher Ruwen Ogien, enables us to unmask and interrogate the latent paternalism that still persists in the practices of healthcare professionals. Although recent advances in models of care have made more room for the voice of those being cared for and for their free selfdetermination, they have not put an end to paternalism in healthcare. We present here the various key points of Ogien's argument aimed at criticising paternalism in healthcare, in order to be aware of the latent paternalism and recognize that it gives rise to epistemic and social injustices that must be reversed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of the Faculty of Divinity of Ankara University / Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi is the property of Ankara Universitesi Ilahiyat Fakultesi Dergisi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

COVID-19 has brought about reflections on the relationships between people and their governments. Compared to some Westerners' libertarian thinking that the state took advantage of the pandemic to deprive individuals of their freedom, people from countries with Chinese cultural heritage tended to be more collaborative, as they believed the situation was rooted in unseen changes in the environment. This article argues that this thinking characterizes a conceptualization of environmental freedom which was based on the thesis of vital energy, or qi氣. Chinese had developed the classical I Ching to predict the changes of the environment in the form of flowing qi, in order to make informed decisions for political actions. Liu Bowen of the Ming dynasty integrated this. This paper aims to demonstrate its significance in the contemporary world by rethinking its constitution through Carl Jung's theory of the synchronistic principle. Moreover, we illustrate how to conduct and interpret the result of divination predicting the COVID-19 pandemic, with a focus on how the government can choose to produce the greatest good in the face of such a quandary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]