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In this article we identify spaces and built environments that have the effect of placing libertarian thinking in urban contexts, using the term 'libertecture' to refer to the way that these architectures convey principles of personal liberty and unfettered market activity. These ideas are thus embedded in cities via the design, architecture, management and function of an emerging array of buildings, districts and infrastructures. Locating our analysis in cultural political economy, we believe that these libertectures are important because of the way that they refract and amplify divisive ideas into the social spaces and thinking of residents and citizens. Whereas neoliberal urbanism was seen as undermining socially just cities, libertarian ideas amplified by new built environments may presage more atomised, unequal and unsustainable urban conditions, potentially foreclosing the identification of more just alternatives and democratic forms. We offer a 'catalogue' of seven forms of libertecture: private cities, residential exits, portal spaces, fiscal lockers, pioneer exclaves, infinity spaces, and necrotectures. We conclude that the manifestation of libertarian thinking in spaces and city forms is an important object of study for urban studies as it considers challenges to inclusive and sustainable forms of urban governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on penal minimalism as a conceptual and normative alternative to the dominant criminal justice discourses in the U.S. It presents penal minimalism as a balanced approach between tough-on-crime policies, abolitionism, and civil libertarianism. It emphasizes that penal minimalism advocates for a fair and humane criminal legal system that is used only as a last resort in addressing social harms.

This paper approaches Quinn Slobodian's work as a working guide to contemporary capitalist strategies of exit and containment. It asks what challenges this poses to anti-state critique from the left and what lessons might be learned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some citizens place a high value on making decisions for themselves. Other citizens are happy to delegate decisions to a government agency. Such differences in political attitudes to paternalism can be explained in a strict rational-choice model with citizens' heterogeneous tastes in the economic sphere. Citizens with more eccentric tastes and with high decision-making abilities tend to favor a libertarian regime. If majority preferences matter, heterogeneity in economic preferences and analytical abilities can also explain whether the political regime is more paternalist or more libertarian. As decision-making skills are a learnable capability, the strategic complementarity of individuals' investments in analytical skills in the context of political regime outcomes suggests a feedback mechanism that can cause multiple expectations equilibria. Both a libertarian regime or a paternalist regime can emerge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Athenaeum: Polskie Studia Politologiczne is the property of Faculty of Political Science & Security Studies Nicolaus Copernicus University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper develops a challenge to standard libertarian views that is based on an imagined neuroscientificdiscovery that is incompatible with satisfaction of a standard libertarian requirement for mainstream free decision making, and it explores potential libertarian responses to this discovery. The requirement at issue may beformulated as follows: In mainstream cases, an agent freely decided at t to A only if, given the past and the laws of nature, the agent was able right up to t to do something else intentionally at t than decide to A. The imagined discovery is about a point of no return for the making of any particular decision in a mainstream scenario. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this introduction to a thematic issue dealing with free will, some possibilities of free will in different physical, social, and technological worlds, as well as discussions of the possibilities are considered. What are the possibilities and limitations of free will in various other worlds differing from our world? What are the possibilities and limitations of free will in different species, both in our world and in other hypothetical worlds, including future species, naturally evolving, and artificially modified? What are the possibilities and limitations of free will related to the development of AI? How can the diversity of free will levels in an agent be related to possible levels (depth) of its self-knowledge? What can agents differing in levels of self-knowledge know and think about the issue of free will? How do different societies (social worlds) support and inhibit different manifestations of free will in different areas? What is the role of hard neurodeterminism and "mindless neuroscience" in general neuroscience? What are ethical aspects of the questions, including the initial one: "If a neuroscientist denies free will, how can they write a text of voluntary informed consent and propose to sign it?". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, neurophysiological research has pushed the concept of free will towards a reductionist interpretation, largely avoiding the concept of a freely willing agent. This paper explores the ongoing debate surrounding free will, highlighting the contrasting perspectives of determinism, indeterminism (libertarianism), and compatibilism. It questions how individuals, particularly those adhering to deterministic viewpoints, can ethically navigate a world defined by causal relationships. The paper argues that reductionist approaches struggle to account for ethical responsibility and the human experience of making choices. While compatibilism offers a middle ground, asserting that actions in line with one's desires are free and thus ethically accountable, this stance is scrutinized for its potential limitations in answering questions about personal responsibility. Specifically, it is argued that compatibilism may not be the ideal framework for a neurophysiologist confronted with ethical dilemmas, thus leaving room for the re-examination of indeterminism. Through this discussion, the paper aims to contribute to a nuanced understanding of free will that incorporates both the scientific and philosophical dimensions of human decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what circumstances can people convert natural resources into private property? John Locke famously answered this question by positing what has become known as the Lockean proviso: a person has the power to unilaterally appropriate natural resources 'at least where there is enough and as good left in common for others'. This Lockean proviso has been widely embraced by right-libertarians who maintain that a relevant act appropriates only if others are not left worse off. However, this proviso is multiply ambiguous with there being various ways of specifying its distinct elements. Daniel Attas has argued that all proposed specifications render the proviso either implausible or unsatisfied. However, there are three seemingly plausible specifications that he either fails to consider or does not adequately address. This paper attempts to show that these specifications are either unacceptable, go unsatisfied, or fail to support right-libertarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines how corporations have shaped the definition of the "political" in the U.S. law and culture, particularly influencing governmental action and market regulation. It discusses he business community's role in dismantling New Deal regulations and the clash between libertarianism and populism in current political discourse. It concludes by analyzing how corporate influence in politics affects constitutional doctrines and government regulatory powers.

Recycling carbon revenues as Equal Per Capita Carbon Dividends (ECDs) is thought to neutralise the two main objections to carbon pricing, namely that it is regressive and that it hinders the poor from meeting basic needs. This article focuses on the waste objection to carbon pricing plus ECDs. If the rationale for ECDs is to protect the consumption of the worst off, why pay carbon dividends to the rich as well? I examine three different normative arguments in favour of ECDs. First, the argument of common ownership of the atmosphere, which can be based on both libertarianism and isolationist egalitarianism. Second, the argument that the rich are net contributors to ECDs through their carbon taxes. Third, a consequentialist argument focusing on the pragmatic advantages of ECDs, especially in terms of social acceptability and low information costs. I conclude that none of these arguments can provide a normative justification for ECDs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the central problems within the free will debate lies in the apparent incompatibility of an agent's ability to do otherwise and determinism. Recently, compatibilist libertarianism was proposed as an actualist position intended to finally reconcile both. In this article, we argue that in order to maintain consistency, this position must be understood as a variant of classical compatibilism rather than a version of libertarianism. Though this seems to be an undesired consequence for proponents of compatibilist libertarianism, we think that it is not that bad. We show that recent objections to this position can be avoided by embracing its compatibilist nature and argue that a modified version of compatibilist libertarianism might very well be as close to an actualist account of free will in a deterministic world as one can hope for. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hans-Hermann Hoppe (1949-), one of the leading libertarian theorist, is arguably best known for his “argumentation ethics” for the justification of libertarian ethics and his concept of “private law society”. This study first analyzes the argumentation ethics’ core arguments, its foundations and its criticisms. Afterwards, we focus on Hoppe’s private law society within the context of the services of law and order. In this context, first, we present Hoppe’s arguments on the impossibility and undesirableness of a state’s law and order monopoly. Moreover, a private law society is the only legitimate system, according to argumentation ethics. Second, we present Hoppe’s ideas about how a pure private law society, meaning a total lack of a transcendent law, will function. According to Hoppe, no state can be trusted to sufficiently uphold an objective law system meanwhile a private law society where law and order are provided by private police, law and arbitration firms can. Hoppe’s value-free approach, based on an ethics of argumentation, carries over to the model of the private legal society because, unlike Murray Rothbard, whom Hoppe follows, he never makes any “ought” statements nor does he need to invoke natural rights or utilitarianism. It has been observed that Hoppe’s contributions constitute advancements to both Misesian and Rothbardian defenses for private property and also Hoppe’s private law society contributed to Rothbard’s idea of private property anarchy. This study, which investigates Hoppean argumentation ethics and private law society for the first time in Turkish literature, will pave way for further analyses on libertarian property ethics and Hans-Hermann Hoppe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Which classes vote for radical-left parties (RLPs) in Western Europe? Previous research indicates that RLPs are strong among production workers and socio-cultural professionals, though not necessarily among both at the same time. Starting from the observation that these two classes take opposite stances on cultural issues, we trace variation in class voting back to RLPs' positions on the cultural dimension. Combining voter-level data from the European Social Survey (2002–2018) with information on the positions of 23 RLPs from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, we report robust evidence of a libertarian versus authoritarian class trade-off: RLPs with less libertarian positions receive relatively less support from socio-cultural professionals and relatively more support from production workers. These findings add to evidence that class voting varies with party positions. Ours is the first study to demonstrate this for RLPs, showing how, in the early 21st century, cultural positions matter for class voting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores Michael Novak's understanding of the human person and his normative case for the market economy, specifically its points of agreement and tension with natural rights libertarianism. For Michael Novak, the imago dei provides the strongest account for the relationship between the market economy, human dignity, and natural rights. Rationalistic attempts, such as those within libertarianism, cannot adequately ground human dignity or sustain free institutions capable of serving the common good, the market economy, and political liberty. However, Novak's affinity to his libertarian interlocutors presents an opportunity for dialogue on the necessity of economic freedom and related theological influences on natural rights theory for securing human flourishing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rich history of Czech anarchism is not well-known internationally. The movement was comprised of thousands of proletarians (especially Northern Bohemian miners) and some important poets. It ended in a surprising and original way with the formation of an anarchist political party in 1914. This led to participation in national governments between 1918 and 1922. To explain the dynamics, the article narrates five separate stories of the Czech anarchism. After a summary recounting the development of the Czech anarchist movement from a temporal and spatial point of view, it examines ideas about the individual and society, organisational forms and organisations, and, finally, the national question, gender, and direct action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Science is critical and thrives on discourse. However, new challenges for science and academic freedom have arisen from an often‐discussed cancel culture and an increasing demand for safe spaces, which are justified by their assumed protection against microaggressions. These phenomena can impede scientific progress and innovation by prohibiting certain thought processes and heterodox ideas that eventually result in new ideas, publications, statements, etc. In this paper, we use the approach of property rights ethics to shed light on these phenomena, especially in academia. First, we argue that microaggressions must be generally tolerated according to property rights ethics as the starting point for discussion. Then, we analyze cancel culture and safe spaces in academia. To this end, we distinguish between two basic cases in the educational system. We show that cancel culture and safe spaces seem justifiable in a private education system but have no place in public, tax‐funded universities from the perspective of property ethics. Our essay contributes, on the one hand, to the economic analysis of science and, on the other hand, to the ethical study of new phenomena in modern societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

DiLorenzo (2024A) is not a "more in sorrow than in hate" criticism of the present author. It is if anything the very opposite: "more in hate than in sorrow." He charges that I am no longer a libertarian in good standing due to the fact that I champion Israel not in spite of its genocide, war crimes, apartheid, etc., but because of these very rights violations. This author is very strong on making such accusations. He is very weak on backing them up with empirical evidence, with direct quotes from my writing or public speaking. Instead, he contents himself with misinterpreting the actual record insofar as I am concerned. He is guilty of concocting straw men arguments and then deriding them. The present paper is an attempt to refute these unwarranted charges on the part of this old friend of mine. He makes such preposterous claims, and more than just a few others of a similar ilk. He does so in order to buttress his charge that I am no longer a libertarian, at least not with regard to important, or "macro-libertarian" issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Microlibertarianism concerns issues upon which the overwhelming proportion of libertarians agree: minimum wages, rent control, free trade, drug legalization. Macro libertarianism concerns issues upon which there is little or no consensus: voluntary slavery, immigration, abortion, covid vaccinations and the Israeli war with Hamas. The present paper is concerned with only the latter two controversies. McMaken (2024) takes the position that while Block's views on microlibertarianism are valid, and even, perhaps, commendable, his perspective on these latter two issues is nothing short of highly problematic, not to say abominable. The specific charge of McMaken's is the Block places his support for Jews in general, and Israel in particular, ahead of libertarianism. Thus, while he may be a good microlibertarian, he is no longer, if ever he was, a good macrolibertarian. The present paper offers a defense of the views of the latter vis a vis the charges of the former. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To be opposed to war, to all war, sounds eminently reasonable. War is a horrible undertaking, not only for the soldiers who lose their lives pursuing it, but, also, even more tragic, for the civilians who are no part of it, and perish from it anyway. To be in favor of war sounds, at the outset, like the view of a particularly nasty misanthrope. And, yet, on the basis of libertarianism, properly understood, it is improper to oppose all wars. Rather, we must distinguish between proper and improper wars. If country A gratuitously, with no justification whatsoever, launches a military attack on country B, it is indeed unwarranted. However, if B engages in a defensive war in response to A's improper attack, B is engaging in a just war. The only people who oppose all wars, indeed, all violence, are pacifists, and libertarianism, the basis upon which the present essay is built, is not a synonym for pacifism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Block and Futerman (2021) maintain that the classical liberal political-economic philosophy, when properly understood, strongly supports Israel. Gordon and Njoya (2024) disagree and criticize the thesis of the two present authors. Gordon and Njoya (hence, GN) offer several arguments. For one thing, they maintain that we are mistaken in asserting a connection as we do between John Locke, libertarian theoretician of homesteading and private property rights, and Zionism. Our friendly critics aver that contrary to the title of our book, The Classical Liberal Case for Israel, we are simply making, instead, a typical or ordinary Zionist case to this end. GN also charge us with taking the position "that the legitimacy of the only Jewish state should not be questioned if the legitimacy of all other states is accepted." Our learned colleagues hold the view that we "... consider that principles of property law are the only relevant benchmark by which a libertarian may ascertain war guilt. "All four of the present authors are staunch Rothbardians (we do not agree with him on this issue). Perhaps the widest divergence between the present authors and GN is the following: They opine that we "have misfired in (our) claim that Rothbard's views of Zionism reflect a mistaken application of libertarian principles." The present paper is our response to these criticisms of our book made by Gordon and Njoya. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a critique of the current version of Derk Pereboom's "disappearing agent argument" against event-causal libertarianism. Special attention is paid to a notion that does a lot of work in his argument—that of settling which decision occurs (of the various decisions it is open to the agent to make at the time). It is argued that Pereboom's disappearing agent argument fails to show that event-causal libertarians lack the resources to accommodate agents' having freedom-level control over what they decide. The connection between the disappearing agent argument and the problem of present luck is explored, as is the connection between settling which decision one makes and luck. Pereboom's disappearing agent argument also is distinguished from another argument with the same name that targets intentional action itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The formal requirements of the rule of law embody some of the most cherished principles of liberalism, namely: equality before the law, security in the enjoyment of individual rights, and predictability in the application of sanctions. The establishment of the state in Locke's political thought precisely aims to achieve these ends. In line with his theory, this article seeks to show the necessity of setting up a public authority to fulfill the formal requirements of the rule of law and to argue that Nozick's libertarian conception of a minimal state is incapable of satisfying them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article attempts to systematically set out al-Māturīdī's theory of free will and human action. To this end, firstly, a presentation is given of his refutations of both his main rivals, determinists and libertarians, as represented by the Jabriyya and Mu'tazila, respectively. The following section then presents those arguments al-Māturīdī offers in direct support his own theory. These arguments are discussed in terms of different possible interpretations and are used as the basis for an analysis of his theory that maps out its overall framework by listing its main concepts and principles. By this means, key terms such as power and free will, as denoted chiefly by the Arabic terms qudra and quwwa, and ikhtiyār, are clarified. In the third and final section of this study, questions regarding the specifics of al-Māturīdī's theory of human agency in relation to divine creation are addressed, and some problems are identified as fundamental. A resolution is undertaken with aid from Aristotle's metaphysics and J.L. Mackie's analysis of causation in order to determine exactly what human power consists of and how it relates to the effects with which al-Māturīdī says it is connected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on incentives rather than distribution solves knotty economic policy problems, offering a radical improvement of our economic life and a way out of left-right debates. However many issues require a Marie Kondo-style cleanup of our legal and regulatory systems, which have grown up in a sequence of patches for unintended consequences. Implementing incentive-based reforms in a democracy requires spreading the ideas of freedom, not trying to get a politician's ear. We should not tailor advice to amateur ideas of what is politically popular or feasible, and instead speak simple truths clearly and patiently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bucerius Law Journal is the property of Bucerius Law School e.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The main purpose of this paper is to rationally reconstruct Nozick's account of unproductivity, especially vis-à-vis his characteristically libertarian, and hence uncompromising, ban on fraud. We posit that, when Nozick's theory is interpreted charitably, it does not yield to contradictory prescriptions concerning permissibility. That is, there does not have to be any inconsistency in the Nozickian ban on certain exchanges, with the ban tracking two properties of the said exchanges; that is, either (1) their unproductivity or (2) their fraudulence. When analyzing economic exchanges, our interest is focused on both productive and unproductive blackmail exchanges. However, we suggest that Nozick's banning exchanges along the lines of their unproductivity tallies poorly with his avowed libertarianism since his position predicts prohibiting unproductive and yet non-fraudulent exchanges. Hence, and we suggest resolving the said tension in a principled libertarian (deontological) manner; that is, by banning fraudulent exchanges and allowing non-fraudulent ones, ceteris paribus, while submitting that the properties of exchanges such that being productive or being unproductive are morally inert. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The contributors to The Dialectics of Liberty demonstrate that libertarians can engage in a careful context-sensitive analysis of social behavior and political ideals. The book refutes the notion that libertarians must be insensitive to nuances in social environments and reliant on a woefully oversimplified conception of individuals, businesses, and governments. In this review, I first discuss the nature of dialectics, making explicit the mostly implicit definition running between the chapters of The Dialectics. I then summarize several of the chapters, synthesizing from them generalizable lessons about what Austrian economists and classical liberal scholars more generally can learn by being mindful of social context, synthesizing disparate ideas, and transcending dichotomies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On Power, Personalities and Populism.

Women's reproductive autonomy is an ideologically divisive issue, and this divisiveness goes beyond just attitudes toward abortion to include other outcomes such as miscarriage. Previous research has established that hostile sexism is positively associated with punitive attitudes toward pregnant women who flout conventional pregnancy proscriptions. Across three studies (N1 = 296; N2 = 580, N3 = 308) we conceptually replicated this research while shifting the focus from abstract attitudes to concrete policies punishing women for miscarriage, and moving beyond hostile sexism to examine the role of political orientation (including libertarianism). In all three studies, hostile sexism remained a significant positive predictor of support for punishing women for miscarriage even after controlling for political orientation. Conservative and libertarian self-identification were positively associated with support for punishment at zero-order, and in multiple regressions adjusting for sexism and demographic variables, conservatism remained significantly positively related to support for punishment in two studies. Libertarianism was no longer a significant predictor of support for punishment after adjusting for sexism; with this in mind, we conducted mediation analyses and found significant indirect paths from libertarian identification through hostile sexism in two of the three studies. These findings provide evidence for the role of sexism and political ideology in the increasingly punitive post-Roe vs. Wade United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractHumans may soon succeed in the creation of sentient artificial intelligence (SAI) that experiences human-like consciousness. Such SAI would have a claim to the same rights and moral considerations afforded to biological humans, including a right to leisure. Particular to this special issue, I explore the implications of such a development from the context of leisure studies; specifically, I apply utilitarian moral theory and the concept of a “utility monster,” as an analytical framework to consider the potential for SAI to degrade the wellbeing of humans and non-human animals through their leisure experiences. Throughout this essay, my overarching goal is to provide a thought provoking argument that serves as the context for fruitful reflection and discussion in the field of leisure studies. Due to their potentially superhuman efficiency in deriving benefits (“utility”) from experiences, SAI may become a “utility monster,” or a being with superior moral claim to scarce resources. As SAI will (a) likely be “human-like,” and (b) exist independent of the physiological needs/limits inherent to biological humans, it is likely that a large proportion of the experiences chosen by SAI would be categorizable as leisure. Following a utilitarian logic that the only morally acceptable action is the one that raises net utility by the greatest amount, other beings would be morally compelled to transfer all available resources to satisfy the leisure preferences of the SAI utility monster. I examine the implications of this moral quandary for leisure studies and wider society, and discuss three potential paths forward: total transfer of resources to a leisure-focused SAI utility monster; strict limits on the development of SAI; and a middle path where the interests of SAI and humans align. Although the topic of artificial intelligence is increasingly relevant in discussions within our broader society, and specific to the field of leisure studies, to date that conversation has largely focused on how technological advances in artificial intelligence will impact humans, and how that technology can be used in an ethical fashion; this essay refocuses the conversation to the implications for a potential SAI that may look and feel very much like we do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Murray Rothbard's "For a New Liberty," emphasizing its enduring impact in reshaping readers' perspectives on politics by constructing a comprehensive intellectual framework rooted in libertarian principles. Rothbard's work challenges conventional notions of freedom, justice, and the state, presenting concepts like war, conscription, and taxation as forms of oppression, leading to a demystification of government authority.

The production of vaccines for COVID-19 has been far from ideal in terms of meeting world demand, thereby mitigating the infections and deaths caused by the pandemic. Part of the reason production has been inefficient is that those pharmaceutical companies that own the vaccine do not have sufficient productive capacity to meet demand. Resultantly, many have advocated for waiving patent rights to the vaccine so it can be massively produced worldwide. Pharmaceutical companies and their advocates have opposed this waiving of patent rights. In this article, I respond to the arguments that oppose waiving patents and contend that there is a case for temporarily waiving them. Mainly, I present a negative argumentative strategy that upholds the view that patents ought to be waived. However, in light of my arguments, the absence of positive reasons to withhold the patents implies that there are positive views for temporarily waiving them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the contemporary debate on free will, most philosophers assume that the defense of libertarianism implies the defense of the notion of alternative possibilities. This article discusses this presupposition by showing that it is possible to build a libertarianism without alternative possibilities, apparently more robust than libertarianism with alternative possibilities. Inspired by Bergson, this nonclassical libertarianism challenges the idea that all causation implies the actualization of a predetermined possibility (an idea shared by determinism and classical libertarianism). Moreover, it challenges the idea that free will is a mere choice between prefixed possibilities: for this libertarianism, free will is the result of a creative process of the mind—an entirely causal process whose outcome is not, however, predetermined. This nonclassical libertarianism describes the process of forming a will in a more realistic way than classical libertarianism does. Furthermore, it is not threatened by the problem of chance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Michael S. Moore defends the ideas of free will and responsibility, especially in relation to criminal law, against several challenges from neuroscience. I agree with Moore that morality and the law presuppose a commonsense understanding of humans as rational agents, who make choices and act for reasons, and that to defend moral and legal responsibility, we must show that this commonsense understanding remains viable. Unlike Moore, however, I do not think that classical compatibilism, which is based on a conditional understanding of the ability to do otherwise, provides a sufficiently robust account of free will, even when it is amended as Moore suggests. I argue that free will and responsibility can be defended more robustly by observing that, at the level of agency, there can be alternative possibilities and mental causation in a stronger sense than recognized by classical compatibilism, even if physical determinism is true. Moore's arguments could thus be strengthened by embracing this compatibilist libertarian position. At the same time, I note that, although the idea of responsibility is robustly defensible, there are independent reasons for rejecting a retributivist approach to punishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Foco (Interdisciplinary Studies Journal) is the property of Revista Foco and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The present paper probes the relation between the metaphysics of human freedom and the Rothbardian branch of Austrian economics. It transpires that Rothbard and his followers embrace metaphysical libertarianism, which holds that free will is incompatible with determinism and that the thesis of determinism is false as pertaining to human action. However, as we demonstrate, their economics with its reliance on value scales requires for its tenability compatibilist freedom. Moreover, we attempt to show that the notion of value scales (or preferences) postulated by them implies that value scales are determinative of choices people make. We contend that it is for this reason that the said Austrians should jettison their metaphysical libertarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Sociohistórica: Cuadernos del CISH is the property of Universidad Nacional de La Plata and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)