Search

In this interview, a former biological weapons chief inspector for UNSCOM describes the importance of biological monitoring in Iraq, its challenges, and its successes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the 2003 Iraq War, the Iraq Survey Group confirmed that Iraq had no remaining weapons of mass destruction and validated UNSCOM's findings, but as Duelfer puts it, at the time, "UNSCOM did not know how good it was." The weapons that were in existence were to be destroyed, either under UNSCOM supervision or by UNSCOM itself, and then UNSCOM would undertake on-site inspections to verify the declarations and destruction activities. There are also suggestions, by Stephen Black ([1]), for instance, that UNSCOM triggered renewed global efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, as it demonstrated that even in the most antagonistic circumstances, international inspections can reveal an illicit biological weapons program. Many people will remember Colin Powell's historic speech to the UN Security Council describing Iraq's mobile production facilities for making biological weapons. [Extracted from the article]

In this article, the authors offer a short primer that outlines UNSCOM's historical context and the logistics of its work – central aspects contributing to the Special Commission's successes in searching for Iraq's hidden biological weapons program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As genomic technologies develop and converge with AI, machine learning, automation, affective computing, and robotics, an ever more refined record of our biometrics, emotions, and behaviors (https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2018/02/28/589477976/biometric-data-and-the-rise-of-digital-dictatorship) will be captured and analyzed. These game-changing developments will deeply impact how we view health and treat disease, how long we live, and how we consider our place on the biological continuum. They will also radically transform the dual-use nature of biological research, medicine, and health care and create the possibility of novel biological weapons that target particular groups of people and even individuals. Managing the fast and broad technological advances now under way will require new governance structures that draw on individuals and groups with cross-sectoral expertise – from business and academia to politics and defense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]