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This article examines the shifting lines between ethics and law in the policing and punishment of prostitution in nineteenth-century Tehran. It begins by exploring Tehran's urban policing and legal institutions before examining how illicit sexual acts were defined alternatively as sins or crimes, depending on the relative publicness of the act, in prescriptive and legal texts. It then turns to how this played out in practice by analyzing a first-hand account of a private party and a rare testimonial document signed by neighborhood residents complaining about a pimping and procurement ring in their midst. Prostitutes and pimps regularly evaded penal sanction through close contacts with the police, which prompted an array of government strategies to address prostitution. Finally, the article ends by discussing known cases of punishment for prostitution and pimping in Tehran, including two Tehrani prostitutes whose crimes drew the attention of Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper builds on Khan's work on Amazon by transferring her normative framework to Apple. It explores the company's anti-competitive business practices, main antitrust concerns, and the currently proposed reform measures from an innovative business ethics and law (i.e., ordoliberal) perspective. The paper argues that one of the key issues with Apple is the company's closed ecosystem combined with its role as an internet gatekeeper. The E.U.'s Digital Markets Act, which aims to open Apple's ecosystem – via data portability, interoperability, and multi-homing requirements – is a necessary step in the right direction. Yet, it is insufficient to prevent the lock-in effects of a 'walled product garden' and ensure complete device and platform neutrality. That is, additional steps must be taken to overcome Apple's dual role as a platform operator and service provider and inhibit the company from engaging in anti-competitive business conduct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses developments pertaining to the professional responsibility of Indiana lawyers between July 2022 and July 2023. Topics explored include the factors being evaluated by the Indiana Supreme Court (ISC) to determine sanctions in attorney discipline cases, the distinction between serial, spree, and egregious misconduct of lawyers, and the interpretation of the Rules of the Code of Judicial Conduct in Indiana.

What does racial justice--and racial injustice--look like with respect to artificial intelligence in medicine ("medical AI")? This Article offers that racial injustice might look like a country in which law and ethics have decided that it is unnecessary to inform people of color that their health is being managed by a technology that likely encodes the centuries of inequitable medical care that people of color have received. Racial justice might look like an informed consent process that is reformed in light of this reality. This Article makes this argument in four Parts. Part I canvases the deep and wide literature that documents that people of color suffer higher rates of illness than their white counterparts while also suffering poorer health outcomes than their white counterparts when treated for these illnesses. Part II then provides an introduction to AI and explains the uses that scholars and developers predict medical AI technologies will have in healthcare, focusing specifically on the management of pregnancy. Part III subsequently serves as a primer on algorithmic bias--that is, systematic errors in the operation of an algorithm that result in a group being unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged. This Part argues that we should expect algorithmic bias that results in people of color receiving inferior pregnancy-related healthcare, and healthcare generally, because medical AI technologies will be developed, trained, and deployed in a country with striking and unforgivable racial disparities in health. Part IV forms the heart of the Article, making the claim that obstetricians, and healthcare providers generally, should disclose during the informed consent process their reliance on, or consultation with, medical AI technologies that likely encode inequities. To be precise, providers should have to tell their patients that an algorithm has informed the recommendation that the provider is making; moreover, providers should inform their patients how racial disparities in health may have impacted the algorithm's accuracy. It supports this argument by recounting the antiracist, anti-white supremacist--indeed radical--origins of informed consent in the Nuremberg Trials' rebuke of Nazi "medicine." This Part argues that the introduction into the clinical encounter of medical AI--and the likelihood that these technologies will perpetuate racially inequitable healthcare while masking the same--is an invitation to reform the informed consent process to make it more consistent with the commitments that spurred its origination. This Part proposes that, given the antiracist roots of the doctrine of informed consent, it would be incredibly ironic to allow the informed consent process to permit a patient--and, particularly, a patient of color--to remain ignorant of the fact that their medical care is being managed by a device or system that likely encodes racism. This Part argues that informing patients about the likelihood of race-based algorithmic bias--and the reasons that we might expect race-based algorithmic bias--may, in fact, be a prerequisite for actually transforming the inequitable social conditions that produce racial disparities in health and healthcare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the famous debate between legal scholars H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller took place more than a generation ago, the issues involved have not lost their salience. The central question remains--What is the relation of law and morality?-which both Hart and Fuller understood as the relation of"positive law" to an idea of justice known as "natural law." This article offers a fresh perspective on the debate by explaining the implicit political assumptions and philosophical commitments of the two legal scholars, which most critics have ignored. It also attempts to uncover the missing ingredients in the debate by turning to Aristotle's insights about the relation of law to political regimes and Aquinas's analysis of the inherent connections between human law and higher law. These insights are crucial for understanding law's relation to morality, politics, and ultimate reality, and they reveal the limitations of Hart's analytical jurisprudence and Fuller's procedural jurisprudence. I conclude with some contemporary reflections on the relation of positive law to higher law in such areas as human rights advocacy and international law which re-open perennial questions about law and morality. My aim overall is to bring classical ideas into dialogue with modern problems in order to broaden the horizons of legal studies beyond analytical and procedural jurisprudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do lawyers have an ethical duty to cultivate client trust? Sociologist Matthew Clair's ethnographic study of the Boston-area court system, Being a Disadvantaged Defendant: Mistrust and Resistance in Attorney-Client Interactions, focuses on the ways criminal defendants engage with, withdraw from, and resist attorney-client interactions. Composed of Clair's observations and analysis, along with the actual words of clients and attorneys, it is a powerful--if somewhat unusual--addition to the professional responsibility (PR) curriculum for the professor looking to incorporate social science research on race and class into the law curriculum, and to inspire in-class discussions beyond the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Clair's article offers opportunities to discuss both traditional legal ethics subject matter like the allocation of authority and communication in the attorney-client relationship, as well as complex topics too often neglected in the PR curriculum, like the role of race and class in said relationships. This Article, coauthored by a professor and student, discusses the whys, hows, and lasting impact of using Mistrust and Resistance as an assigned reading in a course on professional responsibility. After discussing the pedagogical justifications for including Clair's article in the course and practical considerations about how and when to assign it, the Article then describes student, professor, and guest speaker reactions to Mistrust and Resistance. This Article--like any good professional responsibility class--attempts to connect professional identity formation, the value of students' practical experience, quality of client experience, bias, and public perceptions of the legal profession to better understand the ethical duties facing attorneys. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to legal anti-positivism, legal duties are just a subset of our moral duties. Not every moral duty, though, is legal. So what else is needed? This article develops a theory of how moral duties come to be law, which I call the constitutive reasons account. Among our moral reasons are legal reasons—and those reasons make moral duties into legal duties. So the law consists of moral duties which have, as one of their underlying reasons, a legal reason. Such legal reasons arise from a relationship with the body for which it is the law of. The legal reasons in America, then, are the moral reasons flowing from a relationship with the United States. These reasons include consent, democracy, association and fair play. They are law's constitutive reasons. By looking for them, we can better explain why some moral duties form part of the law, while others do not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I argue that Dworkin's one-system view of law and morality is not as easy to refute or dismiss as some would suggest. In a recent article, Dindjer criticizes a new kind of opposition to legal positivism characterized by both its opposition to a two-system view of law and morality and its promotion of a one-system alternative picture. By re-examining Dworkin's criticisms of the two-system view and by providing additional reasoning of my own, I show that Dworkin's one-system interpretative approach is not just sensible but also promising in refocusing contemporary debates in general jurisprudence on a moral and political reading of the structural features of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is not easy to find a fair balance between inappropriate speech on the one hand and the appearance of constraint and inaccessibility on the other. Also judges must deal with this difficult task. They must take care not to endanger values that are protected to secure the functionality of justice. This article deals with questions of why and how judges can fulfil this task and what might happen if they fail to do so. The article argues in favour of temperate speech using arguments from the fields of judicial ethics and normative ethics. It also offers examples of intemperate speech that might be dangerous to justice. Last but not least, the article mentions the relevance of judicial temperate speech for the concept of open justice thanks to which the judiciary might seek public confidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues against a moralist interpretation of the purpose of statutory anti--discrimination law. On this interpretation, there are instrumental reasons to legally prohibit discriminatory acts to achieve a collective goal that the state ought to pursue as a matter of political morality. But the fact that a discriminatory act is morally wrong according to interpersonal morality additionally gives a separate non-instrumental or moralist reason to legally prohibit it. According to moralism, the best interpretation of anti--discrimination law's purpose ascribes both moralist and instrumental justifying reasons for the law's main features. Most writing in the philosophical literature on anti--discrimination law proceeds under a dominant, yet inarticulate, assumption that moralism is true. Indeed, I explain that we might be persuaded to invoke moralist reasons to confer intelligibility on why the law prohibits directly discriminatory acts, why certain traits are included in the prohibited grounds of discrimination, why legal regulation is limited to certain spheres of private life such as employment and housing, and why the law is enforced through a mechanism of private recourse. I argue, however, that the attractions of moralism are illusory. We ought to invoke only instrumental reasons to explain these features of the law. A thoroughgoing instrumentalist account of anti-discrimination law as a tool for achieving an egalitarian political goal offers a unifying account of legal prohibitions of direct and indirect discrimination that coheres with a justification for the law's protection of certain prohibited grounds and its application to the typical regulated spheres. I show how this conclusion has the important implication that, to the extent that anti-discrimination law's private recourse enforcement method is inconsistent with the law's overall instrumental purpose of reducing inequality, it ought to be reformed to place the onus of enforcement more squarely on administrative officials. In the final analysis, anti-discrimination law's point is not to embody the morality of anti-discrimination as between private persons. It is to function as a means for realizing public justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues against a moralist interpretation of the purpose of statutory anti--discrimination law. On this interpretation, there are instrumental reasons to legally prohibit discriminatory acts to achieve a collective goal that the state ought to pursue as a matter of political morality. But the fact that a discriminatory act is morally wrong according to interpersonal morality additionally gives a separate non-instrumental or moralist reason to legally prohibit it. According to moralism, the best interpretation of anti--discrimination law's purpose ascribes both moralist and instrumental justifying reasons for the law's main features. Most writing in the philosophical literature on anti--discrimination law proceeds under a dominant, yet inarticulate, assumption that moralism is true. Indeed, I explain that we might be persuaded to invoke moralist reasons to confer intelligibility on why the law prohibits directly discriminatory acts, why certain traits are included in the prohibited grounds of discrimination, why legal regulation is limited to certain spheres of private life such as employment and housing, and why the law is enforced through a mechanism of private recourse. I argue, however, that the attractions of moralism are illusory. We ought to invoke only instrumental reasons to explain these features of the law. A thoroughgoing instrumentalist account of anti-discrimination law as a tool for achieving an egalitarian political goal offers a unifying account of legal prohibitions of direct and indirect discrimination that coheres with a justification for the law's protection of certain prohibited grounds and its application to the typical regulated spheres. I show how this conclusion has the important implication that, to the extent that anti-discrimination law's private recourse enforcement method is inconsistent with the law's overall instrumental purpose of reducing inequality, it ought to be reformed to place the onus of enforcement more squarely on administrative officials. In the final analysis, anti-discrimination law's point is not to embody the morality of anti-discrimination as between private persons. It is to function as a means for realizing public justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on providing a series of practical legal ethics tips to enhance the effectiveness of legal practice. Topics include the importance of consistent client communication and timely billing, strategies for managing electronic communications and representation agreements, and the necessity of robust calendaring and conflict-checking processes to avoid ethical issues.

According to a popular picture, criminal law lives up to the demands of its internal morality when its norms have counterparts with the same content in morality—when it conforms to what we call the mirror principle. This article argues that the popular picture must be redrawn by relying on a second principle, which we call the instrumental principle. Criminal law conforms to the instrumental principle when the existence of its norms helps to prevent or ameliorate moral wrongdoing. Our argument is that the instrumental principle forms part of the internal morality of criminal law, and supplies a justification for criminal laws that depart from the mirror principle. We further suggest that criminal law's internal morality is asymmetrical: though departures from the mirror principle are sometimes justified by the instrumental principle, departures from the latter are not justified by the former. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Furthering an integrative ethics-as-practice framework, this paper explores the professional practices, self-understanding and ethics of lawyers working in the Germanic legal context. Existing studies of the legal profession often argue that changing conditions in law have led to a 'constrained morality' and an 'erosion of ethos' among lawyers. While the current study acknowledges shifts in lawyers' ethos, it challenges the claim of an erosion or 'lack' of morality. The narratives of the interviewed practitioners rather suggest that socio-discursively constituted professional practices, identity and ethics are complex and contingent. Focusing on the 'moral rules in use' and how lawyers negotiate ethical matters 'from within' evokes ongoing ambiguities and struggles inscribed in ethical (self-)positions, pointing, as such, to the limits of assessing lawyers' conduct as 'ethical' or 'unethical'. The study thereby extends both normative and practice-based business and professional ethics studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The most discussed theory of law of the twentieth century – HLA Hart's theory from The Concept of Law – is fundamentally psychological. It explains the existence of legal systems in terms of an attitude taken by legal officials: the internal point of view. Though much has been said about this attitude (what statements express it, what it is not, how Hart ought to have conceived of it, etc.), we nonetheless lack an adequate account of the attitude itself. This paper presents and defends an account of the internal point of view and shows how, when understood as the account suggests, this attitude can play the several roles that Hartian positivists need it to play. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the need to produce a new examination of Law, Ethics, and Technology (LET) to allow law to respect, parallel, and support continuing technological innovation and associated social change and advance in a meaningful, progressive, and constructive manner. Topics include the importance of technology and social technologies to secure social organisation or function and to deliver social objectives, examples of social technologies, and philosophy of technology.

The article examines the problems inherent in the confluence of cancel culture and morals clauses and the best solution to prevent injustice. Topics discussed include trademark law and dilution by tarnishment, legislative intervention to limit morals clauses, and cases and statutes dealing with morals clauses. Also considered are contract and tort law, and Anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) legislation.

The article offers information about Justice Steven H. David, member of the Indiana Supreme Court and who has a distinguished career in the military, private practice, corporate world, and trial bench. It mentions that Justice David defines the law as a system of rules of conduct established by the sovereign government of a society to correct wrongs, maintain stability, and deliver justice, and emphasizes the importance of upholding the rule of law despite criticism.

This paper answers two questions. First, on the assumption that risk of harm is of moral significance, does risk's moral significance lay in its being harmful? Second, is risk of harm itself harmful? I argue that either risk is not harmful or that risk is harmful only in a small range of cases. If risk is not harmful, and yet risk is of moral significance, risk's moral significance cannot lie in its being harmful. And if risk is harmful only in a small range of the cases in which risk is of moral significance, risk's moral significance cannot lie in its being harmful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A handy summary of Florida's federal and state judicial ethics codes does not exist. As a result, Florida attorneys and judges often must invest considerable time and effort when a question of judicial ethics arises. To assist such queries, this article provides a comprehensive description of both the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The opportunity to know the law is one of the bedrocks of legality. It is also a powerful and attractive reason for giving statutory language the meaning it has in everyday discourse. To do otherwise would be to hide the law from those it governs. Or so the argument goes. Despite its intuitive force, the fair notice argument for textualism is vulnerable to two challenges. The first challenge is to the notion that fair notice requires congruence between ordinary and legal meaning. There is no normative gauge for determining the time and expense people ought to spend learning their legal obligations or the amount of skill they should be expected to possess. And fair notice is not necessarily impaired by recourse to extratextual sources so long as the rules of interpretation tell officials and citizens which materials to consult and which approach to adopt when reading law. The second challenge arises from the relationship between law, morality, and notice. Social expectations and ethical norms may provide the requisite notice. Alternatively, they may render notice less essential. Fair notice is either superfluous or satisfied where the community regards the proscribed behavior as wrongful and the punishment fitting. Conversely, the demands of fair notice are heightened when the behavior reached by the statute is innocuous or when the sanctions for violation are disproportionate. The vigor of these two challenges is empirically tested through a survey experiment fielded on a probability sample of the United States adult population by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. The results indicate that lay judgments of fair notice are influenced by the severity of the legal consequences. They also suggest that conditional on outcome, judicial reliance on legislative purpose and history offends popular notions of fair notice only when the law tells courts to privilege the ordinary meaning of statutes. The findings call into question conventional wisdom about textualism, fair notice, and the rule of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a normative analysis of some of the most controversial incidents involving police—what I call police-generated killings. In these cases, bad police tactics create a situation where deadly force becomes necessary, becomes perceived as necessary, or occurs unintentionally. Police deserve blame for such killings because they choose tactics that unnecessarily raise the risk of deadly force, thus violating their obligation to prioritize the protection of life. Since current law in the United States fails to ban many bad tactics, police-generated killings often are treated as "lawful but awful." To address these killings, some call on changes to departmental policies or voluntary reparations by local governments, yet such measures leave in place a troubling gap between ethics and law. I argue that police-generated killings merit legal sanctions by appealing to a relevant analogy: self-generated self-defense, where the person who engages in self-defense started the trouble. The persistent lack of accountability for police-generated killings threatens life, police legitimacy, and trust in democratic institutions. The article closes by identifying tools in law and policy to address this challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can we restore the public's faith in government institutions, particularly the courts? With the public's opinion of the legal system at an all-time low, the legal profession faces a crisis of confidence. This Article argues that the appearance of impropriety standard should be categorically applied to regulate all members of the legal procession to restore the public's faith in the profession. The standard is intended to prevent the public's loss Of confidence by disciplining members of the profession who appear to act improperly even if they do not violate specific ethics rules. When applying the standard, courts generally ask whether the conduct in question creates an appearance of impropriety "in the mind of an ordinary knowledgeable citizen." Critics argue that this "vague" test allows judges to levy disciplinary sanctions based on their idiosyncratic views of ordinary citizens. As such, some jurisdictions apply the standard on a selective basis for only judges and government lawyers, based on the assumption that their appearances of impropriety are more damaging to the public's confidence. Using a series of original survey experiments, this Article offers the first empirical evidence that determines which ethical dilemmas consistently undermine the public's confidence in the legal system and thereby provides an empirical grounding for the formerly "vague" standard. Furthermore, this Article finds that the selective application of the standard is misguided. The assumption that judges and government lawyers do greater damage to the public's confidence than private lawyers is empirically unfounded. This Article suggests that, to restore the public's faith in the legal system, the standard should regulate all members of the profession for most ethical dilemmas, even when they do not violate specific ethics rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The right to be forgotten has been widely discussed from a legal perspective. Courts have analyzed the existence and constitutional compatibility of the right in the national legal order of several jurisdictions around the world. However, even if the right to be forgotten is not a universally recognized right, by understanding how the law approaches tensions that arise between the right to freedom of expression and the rights to seek, impart and receive information, on one hand, and a right to be forgotten, underpinned by the rights to honor, privacy and personal data protection on the other, journalists can extract ethical guidelines that can orient them in the correct use of archival information about individuals to report on current events. This work begins by explaining how legal debates can help inform ethical discussions about journalism. Then, by exploring the legal development and justifications for the right to be forgotten and identifying key elements of this emerging right, we engage in a discussion around the use of archives and memory in journalism and then identify the elements that journalists should consider in relation to the use of archival information in their profession in a way that allows them to fulfill their journalistic duties without ignoring the legal context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article describes Justice Steven H. David's commitment to the "Rule of Law" and his impact on the legal community as a mentor and advocate for justice. It discusses how Justice David and the author worked together to raise awareness of racial injustice in Indiana after the murder of George Floyd and the subsequent civil rights protests.

Supreme Court rhetoric, scholarly discussion, black letter law, and ethical rules have perpetuated a myth that individual rights protect the autonomy of defendants within the criminal legal system. To expose this myth, I examine six rights that the Court has enshrined as essential decision points for criminal defendants due to the rights' purported expressive and consequential functions: (1) the right to self-representation; (2) the right to plead guilty; (3) the right to waive a jury; (4) the right to testify; (5) the right to waive appeals; and (6) the right to maintain innocence at a capital trial. I conclude that each of these rights fails to protect defendant autonomy. I then argue that genuine displays of autonomy under the criminal legal system take the form of resistance to the law, legal advocates, and the legal system. Thus, the autonomy of criminal defendants occurs not because of law but in spite of it. As such, scholarly discussions of the personal autonomy of criminal defendants should focus not on rights and rules but on acts of resistance. The current autonomy rights discourse is harmful because it obscures the system's defects by framing discussions around individual rights instead of structural limitations. This lends itself to solutions involving procedural tinkering to better actualize individual rights instead of radical structural reform or abolition. By obscuring these structural defects and stressing the system's protective qualities, the autonomy rights discourse presents the system not only as legitimate, but as functional, and potentially even successful. As such, a new scholarly frame is warranted: autonomy as resistance to law and the legal system. By illuminating the ways in which autonomy in the criminal legal system resembles autonomy under the American institution of slavery, the autonomy as resistance frame exposes the need for radical structural change and facilitates a reimagining of the criminal legal system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the complimentary concepts of ethics, morality, and law. To a certain extent, these related concepts share some common features. Ethics as a discipline is concerned with what is morally good and bad, and right or wrong, while morality deals with standards and rules of good conduct in society, and law, as a cognitive process, regulates social life through the promulgated rules crafted by a legitimate authority. But how are the differences or similarities between these interrelated concepts expressed? First, the main difference between law and morality appears in the mode of expression. Morality is expressed through the conduct of the individual and his relationship with others, whereas the law applies to the external behavior of individuals in their relation to one another as citizens. Morality is in some way an integral part of law, and every legal system, and to that extent is inseparable from it. Second, although ethics and morality are often used interchangeably, the difference between them, as we will examine further, is more than a matter of terminology, as the terms clarify the relationship of individual values to those within the social and legal order. Finally, regarding legal ethics, the importance of this discipline lies in shaping lawyers' behavior and professional conduct that are principles they should conform to as members of both the social and legal communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this Article is to present a normative argument for mercy as a legitimate consideration in judicial proceedings, defining it as a distinct and independent element not encompassed by normal concerns of justice, retribution and individuation of sentencing. The Article addresses two meanings of mercy in the judicial context, both of which have-in the view of the author-a rightful part in the process of judgment and sentencing. These are "mercy" in the weak sense, i.e., a deliberative state of mind which accompanies the judicial proceedings ("Lesser Mercy"), and "mercy" in the strong sense, i.e., the judicial prerogative of taking into account, under appropriate circumstances, mercy towards the defendant once convicted, as a deviation from strict retribution ("Greater Mercy"). The Article presents the different approaches one may find in academic literature pertaining to the validity of considering mercy in court, and the relationship between justice and mercy. The Article begins with the basic moral intuition as to the merit of mercy. From this point of departure, the Article deals with the various criticisms raised against the legitimacy of considering mercy in the judicial context. In the normative analysis, the Article points to the need of formal justice to accommodate the particularistic circumstances of every incident. Although some have argued that this function should be met by equity, the Article argues that mercy is better suited because rational-analytical considerations may prove insufficient in this context. The Article also argues that the judge's prerogative to determine under which circumstances to employ mercy towards the defendant does not contradict the responsibility and duty of the judge to impartiality. On the contrary, mercy lives harmoniously with and epitomizes the social values that every judge should represent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author reflects on critical legal pedagogy in the U.S. Topics discussed include her reason for offering a preview of blackletter law in the development of critical thinking and legal analysis on the first day of her contracts class in law school, implication of the training undergone by law students on the distinctions between law, morality and justice, and ways to reflect social transformation in legal education such as incorporating critical perspectives into educational materials.

There seems to be a large and growing lack of trust in the business of finance, and without ethics, the laws, no matter how long or short they are, will not hold. Companies and agencies need to incentivize ethical behavior. Fiduciary standard aside, we must gain the trust of our clients in order for the system to work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that the fetters on the exercise of unilateral contractual discretionary powers that were defined in Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd and the limits on damages clauses as redefined in Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi are imposed to prevent the abuse of contractual rights or freedoms and this is suggestive that a broader principle against the abuse of rights might be at work in English contract law. Whilst English law has traditionally been understood as rejecting a free‐standing and general doctrine of abuse of rights, the article explains why this should not be regarded as an obstacle to the proposed analysis. In both the context of contractual discretion and damages clauses, the central importance of abuse is evident from the tests that are applied, the factors that the authorities tell us are relevant to their application and both the high bar for the court to intervene and the flexibility of the relevant standards, which filter out only the most egregious and inadmissible cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Author's Synopsis: At each nomination of a United States Supreme Court justice, a discussion is renewed about textual interpretation and legal reasoning. This Article will show-by analyzing a classic estate planning problem considered by two eighteenth-century giants, Samuel Johnson and his amanuensis, James Boswell-that the principles giving rise to these questions are mostly unchanged. The colloquy illustrates the intersection of law, morals, and manners (customs) in the exercise of power. This, of course, is what judges and lawyers do for a living. Judges exercise power in deciding cases using and weighing various principles and reasoning techniques. Lawyers advise clients in a similar way. The issue of Boswell’s entail, as considered by Johnson, is a window into the world of eighteenth-century legal thinking. Johnson provides Boswell great insight and wisdom. At the same time, Johnson provides us, the modern reader, with an appreciation of just how enduring these classic lines of legal thinking are. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on crucial implication of this conception of the rule of law and doctrine of legal sources. It mentions original account of the source of natural law, which entailed an original account of its obligatory nature and when it comes to the epistemology of natural law. It also mentions adduce human sociability to solve the problem of how large and stable societies are possible and natural rights appeal to prudential reasons.

This article considers the first year of the COVID-19 crisis in Jamaica. It examines the challenges faced by the Jamaican state and its people and considers some of the main measures introduced by the Government to reduce the impact of the pandemic on a small, open, tourism-dependent country. The situation in the first year of the crisis in Jamaica, argues the author, has set the foundation for challenges and solutions for the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that we should respond more severely to repeated wrongdoing than we do to first-time misconduct is one of our most deeply held moral principles, and one of the most deeply entrenched principles in the criminal law and sentencing policy. Prior convictions trigger, on average, a six-fold increase in the length of punishment in states that use sentencing guidelines. And most of the people we lock up in the U.S. have at least one previous conviction. This Article shows that given the current law and policy of collateral consequences, and the social conditions they engender, judges and sentencing commissions should do exactly the opposite of what they currently do: impose a recidivist sentencing discount, rather than a premium. This thesis is counterintuitive and politically unpalatable. It goes against the grain of criminal law and policy dating back as far as we know it, virtually the entire scholarly literature, and millennia of social tradition. But this Article shows that it follows logically from fairly ordinary moral premises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conservative constitutionalism is committed to "originalism," that is, to interpreting the Constitution according to its original public understanding. This defining commitment of constitutional interpretation is sound. For decades, however, constitutional conservatives have diluted it with a methodology of restraint, a normative approach to the judicial task marked by an overriding aversion to critical moral reasoning. In any event, the methodology eclipsed originalism and the partnership with moral truth that originalism actually entails. Conservative constitutionalism is presently a mélange of mostly unsound arguments against the worst depredations of Casey's Mystery Passage. The reason for the methodological moral reticence is easy to see. It came into being as an understandable strategy to halt the Warren Court's judicial activism. The conservative diagnosis was simple, and largely correct: judicial philosophizing not called for by the constitutional text or by a sound interpretation of it lay at the root of these judicial excesses. The treatment that conservatives prescribed hit the mark they sighted. Where resort to moral reasoning seemed inescapable, conservatives turned to some species of conventional moral belief, usually to what some group thinks, or once thought. Conservative constitutionalists have been committed to an "objectivity" wherein facts about what some believe to be morally sound folded into a regimen of restricted legal reasoning from text, history, structure, and precedent. This conservative constitutionalism is well-suited to damage control whenever legal elites are in thrall to unsound moral and political philosophies. Conservative constitutionalism can even stymie for a time the introduction of new mistaken premises. But now, more than 50 years into the revolution, contemporary constitutional conservatism is incapable of wresting control of the law back from the regime-changing project of autonomous self-definition. We have passed a tipping point where damage control amounts to no more than a slow-walking surrender. Conservative constitutionalists need only choose originalism, which will lead them to recognize the necessity for strategic resort to critically justified metaphysical and moral truths, as the Constitution directs. In fact, the contemporary judge can be faithful to the Founders only by sometimes relying on moral and metaphysical truths that lie beyond the Constitution. These truths include, crucially, answers to such foundational questions as: When do persons begin? What is religion? Which propositions about divine matters are answerable by use of unaided human reason? What is the meaning of that "marriage" that Supreme Court cases for over a century have spoken of, when it declares that everyone has a "fundamental right to marry"? The truth about constitutional law is that, sometimes, the problem with an errant Supreme Court opinion is not that it relies on philosophy, but that it relies upon bad philosophy. Then the conscientious judge is obliged to replace bad philosophy with good philosophy. And the linchpin of that good philosophy is the "liberty," not of self-creation ex nihilo, but of selfconstitution in a morally ordered universe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Th is article proposes a refl ection on the relationship between ethics, law and new technologies. Th e relevance of the debate is testifi ed by numerous initiatives and measures, both European and international, which aim to off er answers, necessarily not defi nitive but evolving, to phenomena such as the development of the internet of things, the incessant extraction and use of big data and, more generally, advances in artifi cial intelligence and robotics. From this perspective, issues such as respect for privacy and human dignity are raised, to be balanced with the right to inform and be informed as a sign of an eff ectively shared knowledge. What emerges is the need for a deep critical consideration of the guarantee of individual and collective spheres of action, removed from the domination of market interests, in the affi rmation of prevailing and non-negotiable rights. Equally indispensable is the critical attention given to the limits to be placed on human manipulation and alteration, and on the relationship between human being and machine. Th is assumes a particular ethical, legal and prescriptive meaning aimed at guaranteeing the pluralism of values and dialogue typical of every democratic society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Th e issue of the regulation of artifi cial intelligence (AI) is one of the signifi cant challenges faced by the EU at present. Most researchers focus on the substantive scope of AI regulation, including state law, ethical norms and soft law. In addition to the substantive and legal scope of the regulation, it is worthwhile considering the manner of such regulation.1 Since AI is an algorithmic code, it seems correct to regulate (restrict) AI not so much with traditional law established in natural (human) language as with one implemented into algorithms. Th ey may operate as a tool supporting traditional legislation (RegTech), but it is possible to go further with the issue and create regulation algorithms which implement the law as the eff ective law. However, this requires a new approach to law and legislation – the law as algorithmic code. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility, Alfred Mele invokes radical reversal cases in which one agent is covertly manipulated to be just like another agent in relevant respects to defend a version of the following "externalist" thesis: how agents acquire their springs of action, such as desires and beliefs, bears on whether they are morally responsible for their actions. I assess proposed rationales for the crucial verdict that agents in such cases are not responsible for their germane actions. I argue for the superiority of Mele's rationale and propose that these cases also support accepting an externalist constraint on other normative appraisals, such as those of practical rationality. Key words: Moral obligation; practical rationality; radical reversal cases; ultimate origination; zygote argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I explore various themes in Alfred Mele's Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility (OUP 2019). I develop four points. First, I argue that Mele's historical requirement for moral responsibility for developed morally responsible agents should be coupled with a nonhistorical theory of initially developing agents (like toddlers). Second, I argue that one might resist Mele's negative historical requirement (wherein agents must lack certain responsibility-defeating histories) with a minimal positive historical requirement according to which an agent has a history wherein she did not undergo any responsibility-defeating events, like being severely manipulated.Third, I also explore the idea that one who defended a nonhistorical view, such as Harry Frankfurt's, might rely on a different conception of what moral responsibility is. This might explain why some resisting Mele would not have the intuition that in certain cases a manipulated agent is not responsible. Finally, I question how we should think of the role of intuition in thought experiments figuring centrally in Mele's work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is part of a symposium on Alfred Mele's Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility. It is Mele's response to John Fischer, Ishtiyaque Haji, and Michael McKenna. Topics discussed include the bearing of manipulation on moral responsibility, the zygote argument, the importance of scenarios in which manipulators radically reverse an agent's values, positive versus negative historical requirements for moral responsibility, the scope of moral responsibility, the value of intuitions, bullet-biting, and how we develop from neonates who are not morally responsible for anything into morally responsible agents. A variety of scenarios featuring various kinds of manipulation are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a critical notice of Alfred Mele's, Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility. I agree with Mele that moral responsibility is a historical phenomenon, but give some considerations (based on analogous phenomena) in favor of a positive, rather than negative, historical condition for moral responsibility. I focus on Mele's Zygote Argument, which is intended to present a challenge for compatibilism. I contend that the challenge can be met, and I offer an error theory of the appeal of the Zygote Argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This précis kicks off an invited symposium on Alfred R. Mele (Manipulated Agents: a Window to Moral Responsibility, Oxford University Press, 2019). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at the thread throughout Nancy's work on the notion of the decision and judgment. In a period when we must rethink not only the sovereign decision but all manner of traditional jurisprudential and ethical modes of thinking the decision, Nancy's considerations of freedom help us reflect on thinking the decision otherwise and thus could prove revolutionary for how we think crime and punishment and calculating with the incalculable of each and every trauma we dub a crime. At a time when the geographies of the prison–industrial complex overtake the West, perhaps no other thinking is more central to undoing its practices and sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many of Dworkin's interlocutors saw his 'one-system view', according to which law is a branch of morality, as a radical shift. I argue that it is better seen as a different way of expressing his longstanding view that legal theory is an inherently normative endeavor. Dworkin emphasizes that fact and value are separate domains, and one cannot ground claims of one sort in the other domain. On this view, legal philosophy can only answer questions from within either domain. We cannot ask metaphysical questions about which domain law 'properly' belongs in; these would be archimedean, and Dworkin has long argued against archimedeanism. The one-system view, then, is best understood as an invitation to join Dworkin in asking moral questions from within the domain of value. Finally, I argue that Dworkin's view can be understood as a version of 'eliminativism', a growing trend in legal philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are two distinct ways for someone to place conditions on their morally valid consent. The first is to place conditions on the moral scope of their consent—whereby they waive some moral claim rights but not others. The second is to conditionally token consent—whereby the condition affects whether they waive any moral claim rights at all. Understanding this distinction helps make progress with debates about so-called "conditional consent" to sexual intercourse in English law, and with understanding how individuals place conditions on their morally valid consent in other contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]