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This article explores the ‘organizational’ or ‘organization’ criterion for both noninternational armed conflict under international humanitarian law (IHL) and crimes against humanity under international criminal law (ICL) and considers how it affects the ability to address armed violence carried out by armed non- State actors. It considers whether armed groups operating under a non-conventional structure, or outside the IHL framework, fall outside the reach of ICL, thereby constituting a potential security gap. It concludes that it is important to ensure that the organization requirements under IHL and ICL remain distinct to ensure that in situations outside a non-international armed conflict, the law allows for both sides to be prosecuted.

Impeding humanitarian access and the starving of civilians is prohibited under international humanitarian law in times of both international and non-international armed conflicts. Such conduct is criminalised under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) when committed during an international armed conflict. However, without good reason, it is not a war crime when committed during a non-international armed conflict. Contemporary conflicts, such as that in Syria, show that this is a problematic omission. This article addresses the challenges in prosecuting the denial of humanitarian access during international armed conflicts and examines the options to prosecute before the International Criminal Court such denial in times of non-international armed conflict as other war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The author concludes that these options would not suffice and proposes to add to the ICC Statute the starvation of the civilian population, including through impeding humanitarian access, as a war crime for non-international armed conflicts.

Given the swift technologic development, it may be expected that the availability of the first truly autonomous weapons systems is fast approaching. Once they are deployed, these weapons will use artificial intelligence to select and attack targets without further human intervention. Autonomous weapons systems raise the question of whether they could comply with international humanitarian law. The principle of proportionality is sometimes cited as an important obstacle to the use of autonomous weapons systems in accordance with the law. This article assesses the question whether the rule on proportionality in attacks would preclude the legal use of autonomous weapons. It analyses aspects of the proportionality rule that would militate against the use of autonomous weapons systems and aspects that would appear to benefit the protection of the civilian population if such weapons systems were used. The article concludes that autonomous weapons are unable to make proportionality assessments on an operational or strategic level on their own, and that humans should not be expected to be completely absent from the battlefield in the near future.

The principle of proportionality is one of the core principles of international humanitarian law. The principle is not easy to apply on the battlefield, but is even harder to apply retrospectively, in the courtroom. This article discusses the challenges in applying the principle during international criminal trials. It discusses the principle itself, followed by an explanation of the general challenges of dealing with violations of international humanitarian law, and more specifically the rules related to the conduct of hostilities, during war crime trials. The way in which the principle has been used before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is examined, including an in-depth discussion of the recentGotovinacase. The second part consists of an evaluation of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and discusses the difficulties the International Criminal Court would face in cases dealing with violations of the principle of proportionality.

Maritime embargo operations implement economic sanctions adopted by the UNSC by means of naval forces at sea. In order to implement such sanctions in line with international law, it is essential for states that the legal basis in maritime embargo operations is clear. Since the UNSC has authorized states to use force in the enforcement of economic measures at sea, the precise legal basis of a certain category of maritime embargo operations has, however, been the subject of debate. Commentators have argued in a variety of ways to either categorize these military operations under Article 41, or Article 42 of the UN Charter, or even somewhere in between. This article first categorizes the different types of maritime embargo operations to underline that such maritime embargo operations can have different legal bases. Secondly, it considers under which circumstances maritime embargo operations can fall within the context of Article 41 or 42. It is argued that against the background of the evolved scope of Article 42 there may now be less reluctance to position explicit maritime embargo operations that also authorize the use of force within Article 42 of the UN Charter.

The traditional law of blockade has several technical requirements that if not met renders a blockade unlawful. These traditional requirements balance the interests of the belligerent and neutrals. A more contemporary view on the law of blockade, however, emphasizes that blockades are also subject to the restrictions and general obligations imposed by treaties and general principles of humanitarian law. Crucially, whether or not the consequences of a breach of humanitarian principles or humanitarian law render a naval blockade unlawful or not is however not at all clear. The recent use of naval blockades during the Israeli military operations has given rise again to the discussion as to what renders a blockade unlawful. The maturation of the law of blockade has seen an increasing willingness to embrace aspects of humanitarian law. However, the diversity of views from the international community as endorsed by the published reports on the flotilla incident demonstrates that there remains a lack of consensus and an active discussion on the state of the law of blockade.

The ongoing maritime operations against piracy off the coast of Somalia have not only put naval enforcement against piracy at sea in the spotlight, but also the legal aftermath of what to do with pirates after their capture. While warships at sea within the current legal framework of UNCLOS and the UN Security Council amplifications specifically adopted for the case of Somalia can effectively perform their tasks, the question of what to do with the pirate suspects is still not satisfactorily resolved. As a consequence, attacks against merchant vessels and international trade run the risk of being ‘consequence free’, in which the perpetrators are not being held accountable. Participating nations are confronted with the fact that military operations against piracy, which is essentially a criminal offence, need a comprehensive approach to ensure accountability. To counter this criminal activity at sea nations try to strengthen the judicial infrastructure through national prosecution or transfer suspects for prosecution in the Horn of Africa region. As these options are not considered to be enough, and hampered by other non-legal factors, some nations call for an international court as a possible long term solution.

De theorie over extraterritoriale rechtshandhaving tijdens oefeningen in het buitenland is diep geworteld in het internationaal recht en is terug te voeren op de soevereiniteit van staten. Deze soevereiniteit komt tot uitdrukking in de rechtsmacht van een staat. Rechtsmacht is in principe territoriaal van aard en de uitoefening daarvan kan worden beperkt door immuniteiten onder het internationaal recht. Internationale inzet van militairen in het buitenland heeft als bijzondere dimensie dat zendstaten, tot op zekere hoogte, hun rechtsmacht over deze troepen willen kunnen blijven uitoefenen. Dit leidt in de praktijk tot het sluiten van Status of Forces Agreements waarin afspraken over rechtsmacht worden vastgelegd. Extraterritoriale rechtshandhaving blijft in deze overeenkomsten veelal impliciet en moet worden beoordeeld op basis van de principes en uitgangspunten van het internationaal recht.

This article examines the classification of the current armed conflict in Syria under international humanitarian law. The article first sets out the factual background identifying the principal parties and their alignments and motivations. It then proceeds to examine the question of classification of conflict under international humanitarian law and discusses the contentious issue of the effect of lack of consent by the government of a State in relation to foreign intervention in an ongoing non-international armed conflict when such intervention is directed against one or more armed groups operating from within that State’s territory. It then proceeds to apply these factual and legal considerations to the complicated situation in Syria and identifies the parallel armed conflicts underway in Syria and their classification and sets out arguments as to why classification matters.

This book offers a multidisciplinary treatment of targeting. It is intended for use by the military, government legal advisers and academics. The book is suitable for use in both military training and educational programs and in Bachelor and Master degree level courses on such topics as War Studies and Strategic Studies.The book first explores the context of targeting, its evolution and the current targeting process and characteristics. An overview of the legal and ethical constraints on targeting as an operational process follows. It concludes by surveying contemporary issues in targeting such as the potential advent of autonomous weapon systems, ‘non-kinetic’ targeting, targeting in multinational military operations and leadership decapitation in counter-terrorism operations.The deep practical experience and academic background of the contributors ensures comprehensive treatment of current targeting and use of force issues.

This chapter traces the evolution of international law related to the weaponization of nuclear and other radioactive materials, focusing in particular on the law pertaining to preventing acts of nuclear terrorism. International efforts to control atomic energy have evolved substantially since the only use of nuclear weapons, against Japan, in 1945. Unlike for chemical and biological weapons, whose legal regimes are centred on total bans of such weapons, the legal regime for nuclear weapons founded in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons codifies a situation in which certain States retain weapons, pledging to negotiate toward disarmament, while others forego them and submit to a system of verification to ensure no diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The recognition that physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities from acts such as theft and sabotage was also highly important to both non-proliferation and radiation safety, but was not provided for under the safeguards system set up to detect and deter diversion by States of nuclear material to non-peaceful purposes, precipitated the nuclear security framework, starting with physical protection recommendations developed under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Subsequent developments related to nuclear security have been driven primarily by two issues: first, concerns regarding vulnerability of a significant amount of nuclear and other radioactive material, not necessarily part of weapons programmes, particularly following the end of the Cold War; and second, the threat that terrorists would obtain and use such materials. The latter issue came to the fore in the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, displaying a new strain of mass-casualty international terrorism. These attacks were a transformative event for the area of nuclear security, leading to a number of actions aimed at strengthening the international legal framework. However, from the beginning, nuclear security has been formulated as fundamentally a national responsibility of States pursuant, where applicable, to certain international obligations. National sensitivities continue to affect the extent to which States are willing to enter into legally binding agreements. With that in mind, the present chapter looks at methods by which the law evolves and considers how they have been put into practice with respect to nuclear security in light of said national sensitivities and in response to perceived threats.

De vraag wat de term ‘in vreemde krijgsdienst’ betekent, is in de context van personen die als foreign terrorist fighter ]ten strijde trekken de laatste tijd een actueel onderwerp. De term wordt voornamelijk besproken in het licht van het vinden van maatregelen tegen personen die uitreizen en zich aansluiten bij terroristische organisaties, zoals de Islamitische Staat (IS). In dit verband opperen politici dat een herinterpretatie van de term opportuun is. De term zou verouderd zijn en niet meer aansluiten bij de huidige realiteit van hedendaagse conflicten, waarin de tegenstander doorgaans een strijdgroep in plaats van een staat is. Discussie bestaat echter ook over de strafbaarheid van personen die mogelijk aan de zijde van de internationale coalitie tegen IS meevechten. In die zin kan de term ‘in vreemde krijgsdienst’ nog vanuit andere perspectieven kan worden benaderd. In dit verband zijn twee vragen interessant om te stellen. Is een persoon die ‘in dienst treedt’ bij een gewapende groepering die aan de zijde van een staat vecht ‘in vreemde krijgsdienst’? En wat betekent dit voor de strafbaarheid van daden van geweld die in die context gepleegd worden? Is de foreign anti-terrorist fighter ook strafbaar? Dit artikel plaatst hierover enkele opmerkingen aan de hand van drie onderwerpen: ten eerste wat de Nederlandse wet strafbaar stelt met betrekking tot het in dienst treden bij een krijgsmacht van een vreemde mogendheid. Ten tweede het geweldsmonopolie, dat samenhangt met de vraag of daden gepleegd in vreemde krijgsdienst naar Nederlands recht strafbaar zijn. En ten slotte belicht ik de reikwijdte van de term ‘in vreemde krijgsdienst’.

Recent events related to the rise of ISIS have catapulted the ‘unwilling or unable’ test to the forefront of the legal debate concerning the fight against terrorism. The still controversial test offers a justification for unilateral use of force in self-defence on behalf of a victim state on the territory of a host state that is unwilling or unable to prevent a non-state actor located on its soil from carrying out attacks against the victim state. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the history, current status and content of the ‘unwilling or unable’ test with a view to highlighting the main concerns that come with it. This chapter argues that if the ‘unwilling or unable’ test is here to stay, governments and authors alike must make considerable effort to clarify its content, delineate its limits and set out its requirements in the context of the law of self-defence. Subject to evolving state practice, the ‘unwilling or unable’ test may fit into the necessity requirement of the law of self-defence. If so, emphasis should be put on the victim state’s duty to show, by way of a thorough assessment, the host state’s continuous and evident unwillingness or inability to prevent terrorist organizations from using its territory. This requirement should only come after the victim state has shown that the occurred or imminent armed attack creates an immediate need for action. In any case, measures based on consent, which would circumvent the need to apply the test, should always be prioritized. To present its argument, Sect. 4.2 will embark on a brief review of relevant (state) practice. Next, it will assess the current status of the test on the basis of the conducted review. Section 4.4 will look into the anatomy of the ‘unwilling or unable’ test and Sect. 4.5 will analyse the use of the test in relation to the US-led intervention in Syria to neutralize ISIS targets.

Targeting is used in military doctrine to describe a military operational way, using (military) means to influence a target (or addressee) in order to achieve designated political and/or military goals. The four factors italicized are used to analyse non-kinetic targeting, thereby complementing our knowledge and understanding of the prevalent kinetic targeting. Paradoxically, non-kinetic targeting is not recognized as a separate concept; kinetic and non-kinetic are intertwined facets of targeting. Kinetic targeting refers to the targeted application of military force based on the release or concentration of kinetic energy against opposing forces or objects with (primarily) lethal effects in the physical domain, whereas non-kinetic targeting describes the targeted application of (other military and non-military) capabilities against addressees to generate (additional) non-kinetic effects in the non-physical and physical domain . This chapter attempts to provide a better demarcation between kinetic and non-kinetic targeting, first by reviewing recent developments in military operations and targeting and introducing a ‘full spectrum approach ’. It then enumerates and analyses a number of typical non-kinetic capabilities : information activities, key leader engagement, lawfare, criminal legal action, security detention, assets freezes, and cyber operations. The chapter concludes that although non-kinetic targeting does not exist as a stand-alone concept, it is vitally important in contemporary military operations. It provides opportunities to engage and affect additional target audiences (including supporters) with less devastating effects (including constructive effects) by offering additional means to conduct operations, stressing the crucial role of non-kinetic elements like information, perception, cohesion, understanding, and will.

On 30 September 2014 the long-awaited Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between Afghanistan and the US and the post-2014 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Afghanistan and NATO were signed, ending a process that dragged on for almost two years. While the media often stress that the agreements allow the US and NATO to continue their military presence in the country, the two agreements actually define the legal rights and obligations of the foreign forces in Afghanistan post 2014. The two agreements, although not dramatically different from their predecessors, reflect to a certain extent the character of the new military mission and the changing relations between Afghanistan and the international community supporting the country.

The prospect of the use of so-called autonomous weapon systems has raised significant legal and moral concerns. This chapter contributes to the debate by providing an alternative perspective to the current dominant focus on the technological capabilities of future weapons. The author argues that machines do not have to be able to distinguish and make proportionality calculations. No rule in IHL requires weapons to do so. It is ‘merely’ the effects of attack decisions that need to be in accordance with relevant norms. Human judgement is required to decide under what circumstances to allow a particular system - with its specific abilities - to operate. NATO’s targeting process serves as an example how weapons may be used effectively and responsibly, partly by its incorporation of legal norms. The author concludes that weapons programmed to perform targeting tasks without direct human input may be lawfully used in many situations if the state employing the system would follow similar steps as described in NATO’s targeting doctrine and if humans continue to make the critical decisions about when and how to employ the system given the conditions ruling at the time.

This chapter examines the application of international humanitarian law to cyber warfare in the sense of rising to the level of an armed conflict. Building upon the work of the Tallinn Manual on the Application of International Law to Cyber Warfare, it places particular emphasis on the application of the principle of proportionality and the duty to take precautions in conducting an attack in relation to attacks carried out in the cyber domain. In doing so, a preliminary examination is made of the likelihood of cyber warfare actually taking place and the scenarios which seem most likely for this to occur. It then goes on to examine how the aforementioned principle of proportionality would apply in relation to attacks whereby physical effects resulted and to attacks which simply had the effect of destroying or degrading digital data. It concludes by finding that while many cyber-attacks would not qualify as attacks under IHL, some would and that the law is applicable by analogy in much the same way it applies to conventional attacks by kinetic weapons.

The "Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation" initiative broke new ground at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the effort to harmonize and strengthen the global nuclear security regime. This report discusses the significance of the initiative, the importance of expanding its signatories, and the need to demonstrate its implementation. The report benefits from the insights and experience of Nuclear Security Governance Expert Group (NSGEG) members and draws upon major themes of discussion at NSGEG workshops in Vienna, Austria (2014) and Washington, D.C. (2015). These workshops were sponsored by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Partnership for Global Security, and the Stanley Foundation as part of a continuing discussion on nuclear security governance.

With the nuclear security summit process winding down but much work remaining, it is vital to initiate a process by which states can continue and expand on the substantial progress that already has been made.

‘Killer Robots’, ‘Lethal Autonomous Robotics’, ‘Terminator-style robots’ - enkele termen die verbonden worden aan autonome wapensystemen. Vrijwel direct worden zulke systemen in verband gebracht met Hollywood films zoals The Terminator en i-Robot; gewelddadige films waarin robots zich doorgaans tegen hun schepper keren om vervolgens de wereld over te nemen. Zulke opvattingen voeden het publieke debat met emotie waardoor er voorbij wordt gegaan aan de nodige behandeling van feiten. Hoog tijd om een aantal zaken uit elkaar te halen en helderheid te scheppen. In dit artikel behandel ik het publieke debat over autonome wapensystemen en stel ik een alternatieve benadering voor. Ik focus mij op het element van menselijke controle binnen het targeting proces met als doel te bekijken welke factoren of condities bepalen of de inzet van autonome wapensystemen acceptabel zou kunnen zijn. Dit leg ik uit aan de hand van de introductie van het concept: Meaningful Human Control.

De oprichting van het Defensie Cyber Commando markeert een stap in de militaire ontwikkeling in het digitale domein. De regering beschikt vanaf medio 2015 over dit digitale militaire vermogen. Bij dit vermogen horen niet slechts capaciteiten, maar ook conceptuele en mentale componenten. Een capaciteit is immers nutteloos als de wil om deze in te zetten ontbreekt en als besluitvormingsprocessen onbekend zijn. In deze bijdrage analyseren en beschrijven we de politieke besluitvorming voor en de parlementaire informatieverstrekking over de inzet van deze cybercapaciteiten.

Binnen het thema cyber security valt de term "cyber warfare" met enige regelmaat. Dat geldt ook voor aanvallen en aanvallers (en de Engelse varianten). Soms bedoelt men daar criminaliteit mee, soms spionage of activisme via internet. Dit losse taalgebruik draagt niet bij aan een goed begrip van digitale oorlogvoering (cyber warfare) zoals dit binnen het ministerie van Defensie leeft. Met zes stappen - noties - valt te duiden wat cyber warfare is, waar het zich afspeelt, wat het doel zou zijn, hoe het wordt uitgevoerd, en wie daarover beslist. Maar eerst moet de plaats van cyber warfare binnen het bredere spectrum van cyber security worden bepaald.

International support for a new multilateral treaty banning nuclear weapons is increasing. What implications would such a treaty have for the Netherlands? This policy brief describes the legal and political context of such a treaty and examines the implications of two scenarios: one in which the Netherlands will join such a treaty, and one in which it will remain outside such a treaty. Without discussing the feasibility of such a treaty or the advisability for the Netherlands to join or not, it concludes that any decision in this regard will be a political choice rather than a clear-cut best option.

Het Kamerdebat in april over bewapende onbemande vliegtuigen was uitermate verward en verwarrend. Het ging niet alleen over deze ‘drones’, maar ook de rol van inlichtingendiensten, Amerikaanse contra-terrorisme-operaties en robotisering kwamen in de discussie veelvuldig aan bod. Hoog tijd om een aantal zaken uit elkaar te halen en helderheid te scheppen. Acht ijkpunten die houvast moge bieden.

Elke grote technische ontwikkeling die wordt ingezet voor de oorlogvoering zal vanuit verschillende disciplines zoals politieke, filosofisch-ethische en juridische, mede onderworpen worden aan een rechtmatigheidsdiscussie. Vandaag zijn dat onbemande drones in de context van de strijd tegen het terrorisme; honderd jaar geleden, in aanloop naar de Eerste Wereldoorlog, was het de onderzeeboot.

This paper discusses how to identify the moment when the law dealing with situations of armed conflict (jus in bello or international humanitarian law) ceases to apply and makes way for the law governing the period after the conflict ends. Neither the end of non-international armed conflicts nor the end of the temporal scope of international humanitarian law is defined in treaty law. At the same time, the case law and literature largely ignore this issue. It is proposed in this paper to use the criteria and identifying factors for the lower threshold at the start of non-international armed conflicts, to determine when such conflicts end and when international humanitarian law no longer applies. The author describes the challenges in using these criteria and factors, and sets out a modified framework that can serve to identify when the fighting between the parties to the conflict drops below the threshold of intensity and organisation and when it thus ceases to be a non-international armed conflict.

Targeting is used in military doctrine to describe a military operational way, using (military) means to influence a target (or addressee) in order to achieve designated political and/or military goals. The four factors italicized are used to analyse non-kinetic targeting, complementing our knowledge and understanding of the kinetic prevalence. Paradoxically, non-kinetic targeting is not recognized as a separate concept: kinetic and non-kinetic are intertwined facets of targeting. Kinetic targeting refers to the targeted application of military force based on the release or concentration of kinetic energy against opposing forces or objects with (primarily) lethal effects in the physical domain, whereas non-kinetic targeting describes the targeted application of (other military and non-military) capabilities against addressees to generate (additional) non-kinetic effects in the non-physical and physical domain. This chapter attempts to provide a better demarcation between kinetic and non-kinetic targeting, first by reviewing recent developments in military operations and targeting and introducing a ‘full spectrum approach’. It then enumerates and analyses a number of typical non-kinetic capabilities: information activities, key leader engagement, lawfare, criminal legal action, security detention, assets freezes and cyber operations. The chapter concludes that although non-kinetic targeting does not exist as a stand-alone concept, it is vitally important in contemporary military operations. It provides opportunities to engage and affect additional target audiences (including supporters) with less devastating effects including constructive effects), by offering additional means to conduct operations, stressing the crucial role of non-kinetic elements like information, perception, cohesion, understanding and will.

Nederland heeft de afgelopen jaren met drie stafofficieren bijgedragen aan de NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission die van 30 juni 2011 tot en met 30 september 2013 in Afghanistan actief is geweest. Dit commando heeft vanuit de Counter Insurgency gedachte een bijdrage geleverd aan de bestrijding van de Taliban en het herstel van de Rule of Law door onder meer de inzet van Field Teams verspreid over Afghanistan. Door de unieke opzet en uitgangspunten van de NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission kan het concept zijn waarde hebben bij toekomstige operaties waar militairen tijdelijk moeten bijdragen aan de Rule of Law.

Dat Nederland neutraal bleef tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog betekende niet dat Nederland een passieve houding kon aannemen ten aanzien van het conflict dat zich aan de grenzen afspeelde. Om de neutraliteit te behouden richtten de Nederlandse inspanningen zich in zeer grote lijnen op het beschermen van de handel op zee, het behoud van de neutraliteit van Nederlands-Indië1 en de verdediging van de grenzen van het rijk in Europa.

This article contributes to the operationalisation of military cyber operations in general, and for targeting purposes, either in defence or offence, in particular. The role of cyber operations in military doctrine will be clarified, its contribution to fighting power conceptualised, and the ramifications on targeting processes discussed. Cyberspace poses unique challenges and opportunities; we distinguish new elements that may be used for targeting inter alia for active defence purposes, namely cyber objects and cyber identities. Constructive or disruptive cyber operations aimed at these non-physical elements provide new ways of attaining effects. Assessing the outcome of these cyber operations is, however, challenging for planners. Intertwined network infrastructure and the global nature of cyberspace add to the complexity, but these difficulties can be overcome. In principle, the targeting cycle is suitable for cyber operations, yet, with an eye to (a) the effectiveness of offensive and defensive operations, and (b) legal obligations, special attention will be required regarding effects in general, and collateral damage assessment in particular.

De Nederlandse regering heeft tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog het een en ander ondernomen om de neutraliteit actief te waarborgen. Deze maatregelen hadden enerzijds te maken met de uitvoering van de internationaalrechtelijke regels ter behoud van de neutraliteit en anderzijds ook met het militair recht. Auteur geeft in zijn bijdrage een korte schets van enkele aspecten van het militair recht tijdens de Nederlandse neutraliteitsjaren tussen 1914 en 1918 en stipt de staatsrechtelijke ontwikkelingen, het militair strafrecht en de oorlogsrechtelijke maatregelen die zijn genomen aan de zeezijde en ten aanzien van de opvang van geïnterneerden aan. De militaire rechtspositie laat auteur hierbij buiten beschouwing.