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There is presently an increased enthusiasm for competition law enforcement around the world, driven primarily by concerns about the power of digital platform companies. Against this background, this article identifies the emergence of a 'techno-conservatism' that invokes a 'rhetoric of innovation' to stymy the field's ongoing shift towards a more interventionist paradigm. Drawing parallels between techno-conservatism and twentieth-century Chicago school conservatism, the article holds that appeals to innovation are a means of deterring enforcement against dominant companies in dynamic markets. This article contests the rhetoric of innovation, maintaining that it is possible to reconcile strong enforcement with care for innovation. It does so by raising three points. First, innovation often arises from smaller companies and deconcentrated markets. Secondly, many of the innovations associated with technology companies often have their origins in the public sector. Thirdly, innovation is not innately beneficial. It is not enough to defend dominance simply by pointing to 'more innovation'; thought must also be given to the qualitative nature of that innovation. Taken together, these three ideas represent a useful framework with which to counter the rhetoric of innovation and defend the momentum building in competition law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article evaluates the implementation of the cartel leniency programme by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) using comprehensive data covering all related decisions of the CCI from 2009 to 2021. All other things remaining the same prima facie discoveries of cartels should have resulted in a 'shock' to ex ante expected returns of cartels, thereby encouraging more leniency applications. But, we find no such results or rather no 'race' to the agency. A successful leniency programme requires a transparent and deterrent penalty, plus consistency in applying leniency provisions. However, inconsistencies in the choice of penalty base and uncertainties in determining final penalties while using mitigating and aggravating factors have led to a poor correlation of penalties with cartel gain or harm. Strategic or otherwise, this has encouraged appeals to the appellate authority, thereby reducing the effective penalty to levels below deterrence. Many acts of bid rigging have been penalized using less stringent criteria and, in a few circumstances, also provided the benefit of leniency. Further, while individuals concerned in leniency cases have always been penalized, the CCI has not been so consistent in non-leniency cartel cases. These asymmetries and 'other' costs create disincentives for exercising the leniency option. We offer suggestions for enhancing the possibility of a race to the agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lacking predictability of enforcement hinders the deterrent function of competition law. This article shows that academic analyses of optimal competition rules do not always treat this factor adequately, paying instead excessive attention to the problem of error. Sometimes, predictability is completely ignored as a relevant factor. At other times, it is taken into account but its effects are framed in a way that undermines their significance. This article further discusses three possible reasons why a part of competition law and economics scholarship engages in such mistreatment of predictability. First, it may be a result of writing convenience. Secondly, the role of predictability in selecting the optimal competition rule may simply be misunderstood. Thirdly, the role of predictability may be belittled intentionally in order to advocate rules benefiting the interests of competition practitioners and/or defendants. This article also briefly explores how problematic each reason is and what solutions might be available. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The internationalization of competition law in recent decades has been very successful. A very large number of jurisdictions have now adopted competition laws and apply them in marked similarity. And yet, at times, these laws, despite the similarity in wording and theory, lead to substantial differences when enforced. Differences in the meaning attributed to various concepts, to the goals of competition laws and to the methods of implementation, may result in inconsistency in the enforcement. The Latin American experience reveals a certain level of mutation process from the model laws through the flexibilization in their competition law enforcement, influenced by their own social values and beliefs, as well as their economic, political, institutional, and legal cultures. These cultural challenges need to be solved internally in each jurisdiction to allow competition law enforcement to further develop. Those jurisdictions where competition law enforcement has evolved the most are those that have adapted their competition laws to their cultural realities, while at the same time learning from the international experience. An interdisciplinary debate, at the local and regional levels, has showed to be an essential tool to help find possible solutions to the different challenges Latin American enforcers face. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. banking sector had nearly 70% fewer banks in 2022 relative to 1989, primarily because of mergers. We develop a methodology to estimate cross-market spillover effects of bank mergers and test whether the operations of incumbents facing consolidating competitors in one market are affected in other markets. We find that nonmerging banks within a market that are one standard deviation more exposed to mergers in other markets increase deposits by 2.1% relative to their less exposed competitors. Our methodology may be applied elsewhere to assess the aggregate impacts of industry consolidation and illustrates challenges with product-based or geographic market definitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Innovation plays a crucial role in defining competitive dynamics. Given this fact, one might expect 'innovation' to play a consistent role in antitrust law. The present article conducts a systematic content analysis of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union to test this hypothesis. The findings suggest that EU courts treat innovation inconsistently in competition law cases, often assigning different weight to innovation in similar contexts and neglecting central parameters agreed upon in the literature. To address this inconsistency, the article proposes measures to maintain the predictability of competition law analysis while giving innovation a more central role in the definition of relevant markets, evaluation of market power, and assessment of practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The five largest firms by market capitalization, Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta, and Microsoft have massively acquired companies during the last decades, mainly but not exclusively young tech startups. Interestingly, most of the acquired products are discontinued post-acquisition. In this paper, we have collected data on the acquisitions of the big techs for a period of 7 years spanning from 2015 to 2021 and we analyze the evolution of the acquired firms' products post-acquisition. To analyze the decision to continue or not a product post-acquisition, we classify acquisition in four categories: products that are still offered under their initial brand name, products integrated in the acquirer's ecosystem, products that are no longer available and products that are killed by the acquirer. We use these classifications to provide detailed information and statistics on the discontinuation decision of the acquiring firm and we run Probit estimation to explain their determinants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disputes about market definition are often regarded to be dispositive of litigated merger cases. Yet the market definition process is illogical—circular at best but actually far worse because it distorts or discards much of the available information on a proposed merger's effects. Against this background, the 2023 Merger Guidelines present a paradox. On one hand, they double down on market definition through what may be their most important change: tightening and augmenting the so-called structural presumption, under which high market shares are sufficient to presumptively block a merger. The importance of market definition is thereby elevated because one cannot know what market shares to use unless a market is defined. On the other hand, the 2023 Merger Guidelines' longest segment—on market definition and market shares—demotes the familiar methods (including the hypothetical monopolist test) and expresses a clear preference for the use of direct evidence on a proposed merger's effects. But direct evidence, as is well known, is a substitute for market definition, not a way to define a market in which market shares can then be calculated. This change thus disables the structural presumption. The analysis here identifies and deepens the resulting conundrum by elaborating the disconnect between the proper economic analysis of mergers and the market definition paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the European Commission's decision to fine Apple for abusing its dominant position in the market for music streaming apps on its App Store. The Commission found that Apple's anti-steering provisions prevented app developers from informing users about alternative and cheaper music subscription services. The Commission ordered Apple to remove these provisions and comply with the Digital Markets Act (DMA), which requires Apple to allow app developers to communicate and promote offers in-app, permit third-party app stores, and provide access to the App Store on fair terms. Apple's compliance proposal has been criticized for potentially stifling the development of alternative app stores. The Commission has opened non-compliance investigations to determine if Apple's proposal falls short of its obligations under the DMA. The article explores the relationship between fairness and contestability in the provision of app store services and discusses the need to regulate the division of surplus between gatekeepers and business users. The author suggests that compliance with DMA requirements may not guarantee fairness and that the Commission may need to regulate how surplus is divided to ensure fair treatment of business users. [Extracted from the article]

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) is a recent European Union (EU) antitrust development aimed at ensuring contestability and fairness in EU digital markets. It reduces barriers to entry and balances market power between gatekeepers and their business users. The DMA works in conjunction with EU and national competition law and is enforced by the European Commission and national competition authorities. The DMA's enforcement is expected to lead to more enforcement in the digital sphere, and cooperation and coordination between the Commission and Member States will enhance expertise and exchange of information. While global regulation of digital markets is ideal, significant jurisdictions like the US are currently reluctant to regulate digital markets specifically. However, there is increasing awareness and legislative proposals in various countries, indicating a growing recognition of the need for digital regulation. [Extracted from the article]

How does common ownership affect creative destruction? What are the underlying mechanisms? Do the effects of increased common ownership vary among different customer segments? Using product-level data, we show that, on average, firms with greater common ownership introduce new products at a faster rate and discontinue existing products at a similar pace. The observed economic impacts intensify over time, reflecting the gradual nature of knowledge spillovers and the learning curve. Subsequent to an increase in common ownership, portfolio firms tend to both add and drop products that are dissimilar to those of their rival firms, with the net effect of decreasing between-firm product dissimilarity. We also find that the effects are more relevant for product modules with greater technological likeness, lower barriers to market entry, and greater numbers of product market players. Product variety is substantially greater in product lines catering to higher-income households. Overall, the result highlights the procompetitive effects of increased common ownership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) aims at promoting contestable and fair markets for core platform services by setting out obligations for designated gatekeepers. As the DMA does not clearly define these objectives, it comes into conflict with national legislation with overlapping objectives. This may include unfair competition laws and sector-specific regulation. Article 1(5) DMA addresses this conflict by stipulating that Member States may not impose further obligations on gatekeepers for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. The effect this has is that national provisions vis-à-vis gatekeepers may not be applicable anymore, and competences are centralized on the European level more broadly than potentially envisaged by the European legislature. This centralization of competences runs the risk of inadvertently privileging gatekeepers by blocking national laws that are, however, still applicable to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and other firms competing with gatekeepers. This article suggests solutions to mitigate such a risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate over the goals of competition law and the standard by which to apply it have been around, more or less, ever since competition laws were first enacted. In principle, they influence every decision made by a competition enforcer or a court, whether this decision is around cartels, mergers, abuse of dominant position or even advocacy. In recent years competition authorities have been operating in an environment which is unprecedently challenging. Enforcement in digital markets and labour markets, as well as the interplay between competition and environmental policy and the green transition, shift competition enforcement to undiscovered territories. With these contemporary challenges, enforcers are far more frequently faced with the need to have a clear perception of the goal of competition law and the standard according to which to apply it to make enforcement decisions. the need for clarifying, or even redefining, the goals of competition law and the standards by which these goals are achieved, should be seriously considered by the enforcers as well as by the policy makers, who, from a democratic perspective, should be the ultimate decision makers on policy issues. The need for legal certainty presents yet another argument in the same direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) Commission proposes to 'green up' its enforcement of Article 101(3) TFEU to allow producers to collectively overcome so-called first mover disadvantages that would result from inefficient market regulation. The Commission's reboot focuses on the last three exemption conditions. First, the consumer benefit condition is customized to use collective consumer benefits to determine whether consumers receive a 'fair share' of the benefits established under the efficiency condition. Here, the Commission bypasses the Dutch proposition to also take account of non-consumer benefits when investigating whether consumers are compensated for anticompetitive harm. Second, the indispensability condition is tasked to filter out greenwashing. Third, the residual competition condition is trusted to allow private collective action insofar it does not eliminate competition on price and/or innovation. Discussing both EU and Dutch proposals, this article finds that greening up Article 101(3) brings competition policy outside the limiting principles that define objective and effective competition enforcement in terms of voluntary exchange. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This comprehensive review of ex post merger studies assesses the price effects of horizontal transactions to determine whether there are common post-merger price effects, both overall and in specific markets. The aim is to derive implications for policy makers and competition authorities in terms of effective merger enforcement and competition policy. By combining and further analysing the results of 52 retrospective studies on 82 mergers or horizontal transactions, it can be shown that the sector in which the respective transaction takes place alone is not a strong indicator of the direction of price-related merger effects. In contrast, the 'size' or 'importance' of a transaction as well as market concentration seem to be correlated with post-transaction price increases, especially in already highly concentrated markets. Overall, this meta-study shows the importance of ex post case studies for improving ex ante merger control: although generalizations can only be made with caution, the subsequent analysis of a case and its ex post observable outcome can provide useful information for future merger enforcement in general, either in the same industry and/or with similar case characteristics, as well as for competition policy regulators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the law on conditional rebates. It sets out the changes introduced by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Intel decision and how these have been applied in the General Court Intel Renv case. It is explained that the changes are part of a broader move to bring EU competition law in line with a Consumer Welfare Standard (CWS). An analysis of the new test then reveals that it is flawed for five reasons: the new test ignores the fact that low prices and exclusion are separable. The test incorporates the As-Efficient Competitor test, which only protects firms with low costs, not those that are more competitive as a whole. The test introduces a new standard of harm, which means that the law no longer prevents the restriction of competition, but rather prevents making it impossible for a firm with the same costs as the dominant undertaking to compete, which is a different standard. The new standard diminishes the deterrent effect of the law. Finally, compared with the original test, the CJEU test fails to maximize consumer surplus (despite that being the aim of the CWS). Therefore, there is no reason to retain the test and it is recommended that it is reversed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that mergers among market laggards (new entrants or innovation challengers) should be treated differently than those involving leaders (established players or first-mover innovators). We show that these mergers can be rivalry-enhancing, either by accelerating entry or promoting innovations, leading to lower quality-adjusted prices and higher consumer surplus. This is more likely to happen when entry (or innovation) costs are relatively high, so that entry (or innovation) is profitable only when it is limited to a few players. In these circumstances, if laggards enter, they will do so probabilistically and inefficiently since each of them would have to condition its entry to scenarios in which other laggards stay out, which may not be possible since entry decisions are secret. By removing or mitigating this coordination failure, a merger among laggards may lead to more entry (or innovation). Such a merger will also be more likely to benefit consumers when the products of laggards and leaders are sufficiently differentiated—that is, when competition is not too intense absent the merger. Importantly, we find that in the presence of fixed entry costs and endogenous entry, fixed cost synergies are relevant for assessing the welfare effects of mergers. These efficiencies enhance the social value of mergers among laggards insofar as they make entry into the market for the merged entity less costly, thereby expanding the spectrum of products available to consumer and increasing their welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emerging countries usually rely on the innovation of enterprises within the regional innovation ecosystem to enhance the national innovation level. However, existing literature lacks insight into how antitrust policies might influence innovation within them. We estimate the impact of the implementation of the Anti-Monopoly Law on enterprise innovation within Zhongguancun Science and Technology Park, China's prominentregional innovation ecosystem. Using a cross-industry difference-in-difference design, we show that greater exposure to competition shock materially boosted enterprise innovation. Antitrust policy promotes enterprise innovation by increasing the R&D investment, human capital, and export. The promotion effect of antitrust is relatively strong in the sample of electronic information industry, firms with low levels of financing constraints, and those that undertake open innovation. Our findings elucidate the nexus between competition and innovation in regional innovation ecosystems and underscore the pivotal role of antitrust policies in the development of Zhongguancun Science and Technology Park.

The Digital Markets Act is a new European Regulation which entered into force on October 2022. It will apply to "gatekeepers", namely undertakings providing core platform services, with the aim of fostering "fairness" and "contestability" in the digital sector. If these objectives appear at first sight both relevant and legitimate, this paper sheds light on the dark side of this Regulation by arguing that it will undermine the Rule of Law. Indeed, for several reasons which will be discussed, the Digital Markets Act will impede or limit the respect of principles which are deeply rooted in the legal tradition of European countries. This leads to an important question: is the cure worse than the disease? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Commission has proposed a new regulatory tool to govern of digital markets. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) intents to limit the market behavior of so-called gatekeepers to ensure contestable and fair digital markets. We review the provisions of the DMA both from a legal and from an economic perspective. Notwithstanding a number of benefits, we identify several issues with the current proposal. When looking at the core provisions of the proposal from an economic perspective, a number of of contention arise: many of the provisions seem to be quite narrow in scope and it seems difficult to extrapolate more general rules from them; the economic harm of some of the provisions is both uncertain and in principle debatable; the alleged (self-executing; non self-executing) distinction between different types of obligations cannot be verified; and, in addition, Art. 5–7 DMA seem to contain three distinct regulatory instruments; last but not least, while the DMA seeks to control existing gatekeepers, the "tipping" of markets and the rise of further gatekeepers is not guaranteed by the proposed regulation, this in turn leads to a larger critical analysis of the gatekeeper as the DMA's norm addressee. While the goals and nature of the DMA have gained in clarity throughout the legislative process, its scope remains somewhat obtuse. On the one hand it seems set on regulating gatekeepers as they exist today, on the other, it also aims to bring about systemic change in the digital single market. How it expects to achieve the latter is not entirely clear. On closer examination, the DMA also contains a complex enforcement regime that not only depends on the compliance of gatekeepers but may also forestall the envisioned speed and efficacy of the instrumment. In this light and by critically looking at the nature of ex ante and ex post measures in broader competition policy, we conclude that a reform of the competition policy regime would better suit the overalls aims of reining in big tech in future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Keywords: Merger; Acquisition; M&A; Efficiency; Productivity; Antitrust; Consumer Welfare; Competition; Neo-Brandeis; K21; L40 EN Merger Acquisition M&A Efficiency Productivity Antitrust Consumer Welfare Competition Neo-Brandeis K21 L40 242 246 5 08/11/23 20230701 NES 230701 I. INTRODUCTION Business growth, whether scaling up existing operations or adding new capabilities to better serve consumers through product improvements or integrated offerings, requires companies to add new assets and labour. They found that high-productivity firms tend to buy underperforming assets from low-productivity firms and make the acquired assets more productive after acquisition.[18] On an average, acquired power plants experienced a 4 per cent efficiency increase 5-8 months after acquisition. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF MERGER EFFICIENCIES There is a wide body of research attempting to measure the effects of mergers on the performance of the acquiring and target firms. [Extracted from the article]

This article examines the bad and ugly as the US federal agencies seek to rejuvenate competition. The bad is legislative hiatus to update the antitrust laws for the digital economy. The ugly is when courts push their own economic beliefs, without regard for the congressional intent and aims of the antitrust laws. Regardless of who wins, the rule of law (and those most dependent on the antitrust law) suffer. To correct America's market power problem, the article proposes restoring the constitutional balance, where the courts adjudicate, the legislature legislates, and enforcers enforce. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

29 For some recent incremental proposals, see eg, Tougher Enforcement Against Monopolists Act, S.R. 2039, 117th Cong (2021); Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act, S.R. 225, 117th Cong (2021). 3 Of course, there is plenty of room for criticism and improvement I within i welfarism, and a vast amount of this is being done, as it has been done for some time: but that is the stuff of evolution, not revolution. Keywords: Antitrust; Revolution; Neo-Brandeisian; Welfarism; K21; L40 EN Antitrust Revolution Neo-Brandeisian Welfarism K21 L40 185 190 6 08/11/23 20230701 NES 230701 Is there really, as the title of this symposium suggests, an "Antitrust and Anti-Monopoly Realignment?" Antitrust, Revolution, Neo-Brandeisian, Welfarism, K21, L40, L40. [Extracted from the article]

In 2013, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) voted unanimously to close an investigation of Google, despite agency staff concluding that the company had significantly harmed competition.[4] Massive mergers sailed through, including the Penguin and Random House deal, and the merger of American Airlines and US Airways. One was that, after decades of effective enforcement, Americans had stopped paying attention to monopoly and turned to other issues.[29] The second was that, by the 1980s, the Democratic Party had abandoned its commitment to small business, which had been a key part of the party's coalition since the New Deal.[30] This left a crucial constituency without a political home from which to organize a defence of America's anti-monopoly policies. Keywords: Antitrust; Competition policy; Democracy; Consumer welfare; Economic inequality; Monopoly; Small business; K21; L40; N00 EN Antitrust Competition policy Democracy Consumer welfare Economic inequality Monopoly Small business K21 L40 N00 236 241 6 08/11/23 20230701 NES 230701 I. INTRODUCTION It is an extraordinary time in antitrust. Antitrust, Competition policy, Democracy, Consumer welfare, Economic inequality, Monopoly, Small business, K21, L40, L40, N00. [Extracted from the article]

Keywords: Antitrust; Competition; Federal Trade Commission; Monopoly; Monopolization; Sherman Act; K21; L4; L40; L41 EN Antitrust Competition Federal Trade Commission Monopoly Monopolization Sherman Act K21 L4 L40 L41 191 196 6 08/11/23 20230701 NES 230701 I. INTRODUCTION Government enforcement of section 2 of the Sherman Act is often associated with the "big" case. Regardless of the case outcome, it continues to serve as the precedent cited by the Supreme Court for the required elements of the monopolization offence[18] and by almost every court to face a monopolization claim. Surescripts sought summary judgment on both of the FTC's claims of unlawful monopolization. This section profiles two of the FTC's current monopolization cases. [Extracted from the article]

Keywords: Antitrust; FTC; Competition policy; K21; L40 EN Antitrust FTC Competition policy K21 L40 272 277 6 08/11/23 20230701 NES 230701 I. CONCEPTUALIZING AND OPTIMIZING CHANGE Institutional structure helps shape the nature of accountability.[1] Literature in economics,[2] political science,[3] finance,[4] and management[5] all utilize principal-agent models. The good news is that better alignment between agency leadership and staff (leadership needs to better listen to staff) and more respect for analytical tools can fix these problems. In the case of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), however, if Congress does not trust the Commission to listen to staff (we discuss below why that is a reasonable belief), then Congress has even less reason to trust the Commission. While many of the current leadership's most fervent supports have criticized antitrust policy as insufficiently accountable to the democratic process,[28] the FTC has assumed authority to make competition rules without explicit Congressional authorization (and indeed based on a broad reading of a case from the 1970s that certainly would not survive judicial scrutiny today).[29] Odder still is the selective textualism of the FTC. [Extracted from the article]

19 Federal Trade Commission, 'Policy Statement Regarding the Scope of Unfair Methods of Competition Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act' (10 November 2022) Commission File No P221202 1, 9-10 < https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc%5fgov/pdf/P221202Section5PolicyStatement.pdf > accessed 17 April 2023. 23 Lina Khan, 'Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws - Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights' (20 September 2022) US Federal Trade Commission < https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc%5fgov/pdf/P210100SenateAntitrustTestimony09202022.pdf > accessed 17 April 2023. Keywords: Antitrust; Consumer Welfare Standard; Chicago School; Neo-Brandeis; Department of Justice; Federal Trade Commission; K21; L40; L41; L51 EN Antitrust Consumer Welfare Standard Chicago School Neo-Brandeis Department of Justice Federal Trade Commission K21 L40 L41 L51 203 208 6 08/11/23 20230701 NES 230701 I. INTRODUCTION The Biden Administration is seeking to redefine US antitrust policy that it views as largely responsible for historical underenforcement of antitrust laws in the USA.[1] To achieve this, President Biden appointed progressive reformers to leadership positions[2] and lawmakers are proposing amendments to the antitrust laws.[3] These reforms could be described as a battle for the very soul of antitrust though such policy shifts in antitrust enforcement are not unprecedented.[4] Arguably a victor of a previous antitrust policy battle was the Chicago School with its core underlying assumption that markets self-correct.[5] Allied to that view was its emphasis on economic theory and analytical methods that rely heavily on economic analysis, especially the consumer welfare standard (CWS). [Extracted from the article]

Keywords: Antitrust; Cartels; Serial Collusion; K21; K42; L40 EN Antitrust Cartels Serial Collusion K21 K42 L40 215 222 8 08/11/23 20230701 NES 230701 In some product markets suppliers interact with one another only as sellers of one product. Scenario 1: Rogue division managers of serial colluding firms met without any experience in initiating or implementing a cartel, and without any advice or guidance from anyone at their firms, and were able to agree on effective cartel structures. Collusion is likely to be more profitable, more stable, and more frequent when a set of collusion-minded firms are linked in various ways.[1] Links can be forged by multi-product, multi-national firms in competition across product markets and geographic markets. FIRM PARTICIPATION IN APPREHENDED CARTELS We examined the entire record of cartel prohibition decisions by the European Commission. [Extracted from the article]

This is a time of passionate debate on the fundamental goals of competition law. Should there be a single overarching goal for all competition law and policy? Should that goal be framed in purely economic terms? Should antitrust focus on protecting the competitive process, preventing unfair market conduct, or the abuse of superior bargaining position? Should antitrust promote and protect democracy, address social and racial injustice, or address climate change and sustainability? How should multiple goals be administered, weighed, and traded off in enforcement priorities and litigation? There is a progressive turn in the USA at the moment. But regardless of the nature and direction of the desired change, there is the equally important issue of how to achieve lasting change that survives the inevitable change in enforcement personnel and political leaders over time. In this essay, I focus on how to achieve that lasting change regardless of the goals and direction of change that any particular jurisdiction seeks to adopt. Most of the specific examples come from current developments in the USA, but are illustrative of the process of lasting change in competition. Enforcement agencies are key players in this process, but are constrained by the constitutions, treaties, legislation, and court decisions of their jurisdictions. Any campaign for change therefore depends on the wise use of the full substantive and procedural powers assigned to them by the political branches of the government. Successfully achieving substantial change rarely happens by accident, and most often requires a combination of such factors as: (i) creatively using the full statutory powers assigned to the agencies, (ii) striving for a unified whole-of-government approach to competition policy and (iii) deeply engaging the general public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rising economic inequality presents society with unprecedented challenges. Direct instruments designed to address these worrying trends have often under performed. As a result, we find ourselves on a potentially dangerous and downward path. In this article we explore whether, in parallel to other efforts to mitigate the rise of inequality, there can be a role for competition law in the quest to reduce the widening inequality gap. We begin by outlining the possible relationship between competition law enforcement, market power, and economic inequality. We supplement the theoretical discussion with a review of empirical analysis of these linkages. We look at macro and micro data and emphasize the role of labour compensation as a key mechanism which links competition law enforcement, competition dynamics, and economic inequality. We then reflect on the policy implications and possible means to utilize competition enforcement in a manner that could reduce economic inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first democratic government of South Africa prioritized the transformation of society on a non-racial, democratic, and local foundation. The expectation was that all law in South Africa would contribute to, amongst other things, economic transformation and redress the imbalances created by past racial divisions, and more important foster the participation of the previously marginalized people to participate in the mainstream economy. The Competition Act is part of this fabric. In the twenty years that have passed, South Africa has become a leader in the developing world. This article provides a critical review of how competition law has pursued black empowerment with a particular focus on current challenges and opportunities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A string of judgments by Indian courts have downgraded the Competition Commission of India's position in the adjudicatory hierarchy by requiring it to await the findings of sectoral regulators before initiating its own investigation. This article argues that the reasons advanced for deferring the Commission's jurisdiction are erroneous. Further, the judicial test for deferral of the Commission's jurisdiction is fraught with deficiencies and would inordinately delay or de facto divest the Commission of its jurisdiction. Some recent cases are trying to break away from this trend. One final battle though remains to be fought. With the emergence of competition issues in data protection and privacy related cases and the imminent establishment of data regulator(s) in India, the Commission will soon have an opportunity to push courts to re-examine and re-interpret existing judicial principles and reclaim its relative position in the adjudicatory hierarchy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]