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3. A Simple Graph-Theoretic Model for Selfish Restricted Scheduling

Author

Elsässer, Robert, Gairing, Martin, Lücking, Thomas, Mavronicolas, Marios, Monien, Burkhard, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Dough, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Deng, Xiaotie, editor, and Ye, Yinyu, editor

Published
2005
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4. Nash Equilibria, the Price of Anarchy and the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture

Author

Gairing, Martin, Lücking, Thomas, Monien, Burkhard, Tiemann, Karsten, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Dough, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Caires, Luís, editor, Italiano, Giuseppe F., editor, Monteiro, Luís, editor, Palamidessi, Catuscia, editor, and Yung, Moti, editor

Published
2005
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5. The Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Social Cost

Author

Gairing, Martin, Lücking, Thomas, Mavronicolas, Marios, Monien, Burkhard, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Dough, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Fiala, Jiří, editor, Koubek, Václav, editor, and Kratochvíl, Jan, editor

Published
2004
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6. Nash Equilibria in Discrete Routing Games with Convex Latency Functions

Author

Gairing, Martin, Lücking, Thomas, Mavronicolas, Marios, Monien, Burkhard, Rode, Manuel, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Dough, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Díaz, Josep, editor, Karhumäki, Juhani, editor, Lepistö, Arto, editor, and Sannella, Donald, editor

Published
2004
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7. A New Model for Selfish Routing

Author

Lücking, Thomas, Mavronicolas, Marios, Monien, Burkhard, Rode, Manuel, Goos, Gerhard, editor, Hartmanis, Juris, editor, van Leeuwen, Jan, editor, Diekert, Volker, editor, and Habib, Michel, editor

Published
2004
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9. Extreme Nash Equilibria

Author

Gairing, Martin, Lücking, Thomas, Mavronicolas, Marios, Monien, Burkhard, Spirakis, Paul, Goos, Gerhard, editor, Hartmanis, Juris, editor, van Leeuwen, Jan, editor, Blundo, Carlo, editor, and Laneve, Cosimo, editor

Published
2003
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10. Which Is the Worst-Case Nash Equilibrium?

Author

Lücking, Thomas, Mavronicolas, Marios, Monien, Burkhard, Rode, Manuel, Spirakis, Paul, Vrto, Imrich, Goos, Gerhard, editor, Hartmanis, Juris, editor, van Leeuwen, Jan, editor, Rovan, Branislav, editor, and Vojtáš, Peter, editor

Published
2003
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29. Business IoT

Author

Lücking, Thomas, primary, Pradler, Hanna, additional, Huntjens, Math, additional, Haas, Christian, additional, and Krotsch, Steffen, additional

Published
2018
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30. Akquisitionsverhalten in Hochtechnologiebranchen – Die Rolle von Produktdiversifikation, technologischem Wandel und dem Schutz von geistigem Eigentum

Author

Lücking, Thomas

Subjects
Technologieunternehmen, Mergers and Acquisitions, ddc:330, Spitzentechnologie
Abstract

Frequent acquisition activities in high-technology industries are due to the intense competition, driven by short product life cycles, more complex products/services and prevalent network effects. This dissertation theoretically analyzes the circumstances leading to technology-driven acquisitions and empirically tests these within a clearly defined market scenario., Die zahlreichen Unternehmensakquisitionen in Hochtechnologiebranchen sind einem intensiven Wettbewerb geschuldet, der durch immer kürzere Produktlebenszyklen, komplexere Produktdesigns und extreme Netzwerkeffekte geprägt ist. Die vorliegende Forschungsarbeit hat zum Ziel, die genauen Umstände, die zu technologiegetriebenen Akquisitionen führen, in Form von relevanten erklärenden Einflussfaktoren theoretisch herzuleiten und empirisch zu untersuchen.

Published
2013

35. Nash Equilibria, the Price of Anarchy and the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture.

Author

Caires, Luís, Italiano, Giuseppe F., Monteiro, Luís, Palamidessi, Catuscia, Yung, Moti, Gairing, Martin, Lücking, Thomas, Monien, Burkhard, and Tiemann, Karsten

Abstract

Motivation-Framework. Apparently, it is in human’s nature to act selfishly. Game Theory, founded by von Neumann and Morgenstern [39, 40], provides us with strategic games, an important mathematical model to describe and analyze such a selfish behavior and its resulting conflicts. In a strategic game, each of a finite set of players aims for an optimal value of its private objective function by choosing either a pure strategy (a single strategy) or a mixed strategy (a probability distribution over all pure strategies) from its strategy set. Strategic games in which the strategy sets are finite are called finite strategic games. Each player chooses its strategy once and for all, and all players’ choices are made non-cooperatively and simultaneously (that is, when choosing a strategy each player is not informed of the strategies chosen by any other player). One of the basic assumption in strategic games is that the players act rational, that is, consistently in pursuit of their private objective function. For a concise introduction to contemporary Game Theory we recommend [25]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2005
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36. A Simple Graph-Theoretic Model for Selfish Restricted Scheduling.

Author

Xiaotie Deng, Yinyu Ye, Elsässer, Robert, Gairing, Martin, Lücking, Thomas, Mavronicolas, Marios, and Monien, Burkhard

Abstract

In this work, we introduce and study a simple, graph-theoretic model for selfish scheduling among m non-cooperative users over a collection of nmachines; however, each user is restricted to assign its unsplittable load to one from a pair of machines that are allowed for the user. We model these bounded interactions using an interaction graph, whose vertices and edges are the machines and the users, respectively. We study the impact of our modeling assumptions on the properties of Nash equilibria in this new model. The main findings of our study are outlined as follows: - We prove, as our main result, that the parallel links graph is the best-case interaction graph - the one that minimizes expected makespan of the standard fully mixed Nash equilibrium - among all 3-regular interaction graphs. The proof employs a graph-theoretic lemma about orientations in 3-regular graphs, which may be of independent interest. - We prove a lower bound on Coordination Ratio[16] - a measure of the cost incurred to the system due to the selfish behavior of the users. In particular, we prove that there is an interaction graph incurring Coordination Ratio . This bound is shown for pure Nash equilibria. - We present counterexample interaction graphs to prove that a fully mixed Nash equilibrium may sometimes not exist at all. Moreover, we prove properties of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium for complete bipartite graphs and hypercube graphs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2005
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37. On the Problem of Scheduling Flows on Distributed Networks.

Author

Goos, Gerhard, Hartmanis, Juris, van Leeuwen, Jan, Diks, Krzysztof, Rytter, Wojciech, Lücking, Thomas, Monien, Burkhard, and Rode, Manuel

Abstract

We consider the problem of scheduling a given flow on a synchronous distributed network. This problem arises using diffusion-based approaches to compute a balancing flow, which has to be scheduled afterwards. We show that every distributed scheduling strategy requires at least 3/2 times the minimum number of rounds. Furthermore we give a distributed algorithm for flows on tree networks, which requires at most two times the optimal number of rounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2002
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38. Subresultants.

Author

Gonnet, Gastón H., Panario, Daniel, Viola, Alfredo, Gathen, Joachim, and Lücking, Thomas

Abstract

The Euclidean Algorithm was first documented by Euclid (320-275 BC). Knuth (1981), p. 318, writes: "We might call it the granddaddy of all algorithms, because it is the oldest nontrivial algorithm that has survived to the present day." It performs division with remainder repeatedly until the remainder becomes zero. With inputs 13 and 9 it performs the following: This allows us to compute the greatest common divisor (gcd) of two integers as the last non-vanishing remainder. In the example, the gcd of 13 and 9 is computed as 1. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2000
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39. On Spectral Bounds for the κ-Partitioning of Graphs.

Author

Elsässer, Robert, Lücking, Thomas, and Monien, Burkhard

Subjects
PARALLEL computers, GRAPH theory, COMPUTER systems
Abstract

When executing processes on parallel computer systems a major bottleneck is interprocessor communication. One way to address this problem is to minimize the communication between processes that are mapped to different processors. This translates to the k-partitioning problem of the corresponding process graph, where k is the number of processors. The classical spectral lower bound of (V/2k) Σ[sup k, sub i=1] λ[sub i] for the k-section width of a graph is well known. We show new relations between the structure and the eigenvalues of a graph and present a new method to get tighter lower bounds on the k-section width. This method makes use of the level structure defined by the k-section. We define a global expansion property and prove that for graphs with the same k-section width the spectral lower bound increases with this global expansion. We also present examples of graphs for which our new bounds are tight up to a constant factor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2003
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