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This paper examines the role of costly audit signals in future external financing activity of financially constrained firms. We document that when facing higher financial constraints, firms pay higher audit fees and have their audit reports completed sooner. Equally important, we find that costlier and timelier audits are associated with a greater amount of future financing raised by equity-seeking, but not debt-seeking, constrained firms. Our results are robust to controlling for various audit characteristics and risk factors. Additional analyses show that equity-seeking constrained firms that underwent costlier audits exhibit more favorable outcomes with respect to long-run stock performance and investment efficiency following seasoned equity offerings. Our findings suggest that while financially constrained firms are pressured to make cuts across various expenditure categories, negotiating lower audit fees in the face of higher financial constraints may not be a wise strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how constraints on firms’ financing capacity relate to managers’ discretionary accounting choices. Three hypotheses of earnings management - the opportunism hypothesis, the rational expectations hypothesis, and the signaling hypothesis - predict that constrained firms engage in greater upward earnings management than unconstrained firms when selling equity. Using a sample of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) announced between 1983 and 2014, I find support for this prediction. The relation between financial constraints and earnings management is robust to including controls such as offer size, growth opportunities, analyst following, and chief executive officer equity holdings, as well as to using the instrumental variable approach. Investors’ reaction around and following the SEO announcement supports the rational expectations hypothesis. I find that aggressive earnings management by constrained issuers is associated with lower SEO announcement returns but is not followed by negative abnormal returns in the long run. The evidence suggests that constrained issuers’ aggressive use of income-increasing accruals is an outcome of managerial myopia caused by capital market pressure, not managerial opportunism intended to mislead investors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]