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Five studies examined implicit (IAT) attitudes toward the slurs n***er and n***a among Black and White Americans (total N = 3,226). Both groups showed strong implicit negativity toward n***er/a combined relative to socially acceptable contrast terms such as Black or African American. Controlling for baseline Black–White race attitudes, Black Americans who engaged in conscious reappropriation exhibited similar implicit negativity toward n***er/a as White Americans. When the rhotic and non-rhotic forms were directly contrasted, n***er was more implicitly negative than n***a, with Black Americans distinguishing the two more strongly than did White Americans. However, even Black American reappropriators showed implicit negativity toward n***a relative to Black. In sum, both n***er and n***a evoke automatic negative meaning in a broad sample of Americans today. At the same time, the relatively more positive meaning of n***a over n***er demonstrates the power of reappropriation to wrest control of word meaning.

Implicit attitudes are often defined as residing beyond conscious awareness. This definition has been challenged by robust evidence demonstrating highly accurate predictions of implicit attitudes. However, relevant tests have all been conducted using well-known targets (e.g., racial groups), about which participants possess ample relevant knowledge. Therefore, accurate predictions may have emerged from inferential mechanisms rather than privileged first-person awareness. Here we probe participants' (N = 4,448) ability to report their own experimentally created implicit attitudes across four studies where implicit attitudes and their explicit counterparts (representing an obvious source of inference) were manipulated to shift in opposite directions. Predicted and actual implicit attitudes were either unrelated to each other, or predictive accuracy was limited to participants whose implicit and explicit attitudes were aligned. Echoing classic and contemporary accounts, these data suggest that implicit attitudes are (largely) unconscious, and successful implicit attitude predictions are likely subserved by inference rather than introspection.

Four studies involving 2552 White American participants were conducted to investigate bias based on the race-based phenotype of hair texture. Specifically, we probed the existence and magnitude of bias in favor of Eurocentric (straight) over Afrocentric (curly) hair and its specificity in predicting responses to a legal decision involving the phenotype. Study 1 revealed an implicit preference, measured by an Implicit Association Test (IAT), favoring Eurocentric over Afrocentric hair texture among White Americans. This effect was not reducible to a Black/White implicit race attitude nor to mere perceptual preference favoring straight over curly hair. In Study 2, the phenotype (hair) IAT significantly and uniquely predicted expressions of support in response to an actual legal case that involved discrimination on the basis of Afrocentric hair texture. Beyond replicating this result, Studies 3 and 4 (the latter preregistered) provided further, and even more stringent, evidence for incremental predictive validity: in both studies, the phenotype IAT was associated with support for a Black plaintiff above and beyond the effects of two parallel explicit scales and, additionally, a race attitude IAT. Overall, these studies support the idea that race bias may be uniquely detected by examining implicit attitudes elicited by group-based phenotypicality, such as hair texture. Moreover, the present results inform theoretical investigations of the correspondence principle in the context of implicit social cognition: they suggest that tailoring IATs to index specific aspects of an attitude object (e.g., by decomposition of phenotypes) can improve prediction of intergroup behavior.

Evaluations along a positivenegative dimension can be measured either explicitly (via self-report) or implicitly (via re-sponse interference tasks). Whether implicit evaluations encode relational information (e.g., A causes B) or only co-occurrence information (AB) has been debated extensively. 1,082 participants observed a machine being activated bycausally responsible stimuli and dispensing rewards in the presence of merely associated, but not causal, stimuli. Eval-uations of causally responsible vs. associated stimuli were measured implicitly and explicitly. Explicit and implicitevaluations of causally responsible stimuli were more positive than those of associated stimuli, both in the presence (Study1) and absence (Study 2) of verbal instructions about the operation of the machine. Study 3 eliminated temporal primacyand overshadowing as explanations of the effect. Supporting propositional theories, these findings suggest that implicitevaluations are sensitive not only to co-occurrence but also to relational information, whether conveyed verbally or learnedsolely from experience.

From the earliest ages testable, children and adults show similar mean-levels of implicit social attitudes. Nevertheless,meaningful change may exist in how attitudes are acquired across the lifespan. This project explored developmental changein implicit attitude formation by comparing the separate and joint effects of two learning modalities: evaluative statements(ES; purely verbal information about upcoming stimulus pairings) and repeated evaluative pairings (REP; exposure topairings of category members with valenced images). Like adults (N=2,198, Mage=37 years), children (N=281, Mage=9years) rapidly formed robust implicit attitudes towards novel groups following ES and ES+REP interventions. Unlikeadults, children showed no learning following REP. Follow-up studies suggest that inattention to category membership orstimulus valence are unlikely to account for no learning in REP. These findings demonstrate the early-emerging power ofverbal instructions to create implicit attitudes, while also revealing developmental change in the capacity for supposedlylow-level associative learning.

Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) demonstrated that exposure to positive Black exemplars (e.g., Colin Powell) and negative White exemplars (e.g., Jeffrey Dahmer) can reduce implicit pro-White/anti-Black evaluations, as measured by an Implicit Association Test. Here, we report seven preregistered online experiments conducted with volunteer U.S. participants (N = 6,953) that sought to replicate and probe the boundary conditions of this finding. Contrary to expectations, we found no shift in implicit racial evaluations in two close replication attempts (Experiments 1–2). Experiments 3–4 ruled out the possibility of insufficiently strong exemplar valence and subtyping as explanations for the failures to replicate. In Experiment 5, implicit racial evaluations did exhibit malleability in response to two different procedures relying on repeated evaluative pairings and evaluative statements, suggesting that they are capable of change. With insight from these studies, Experiments 6–7 were mounted with modifications to the Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) procedure. Significant reductions in implicit pro-White/anti-Black evaluations were now observed when race, valence, and the contingency between the two were highlighted. In addition, across all experiments, the magnitude of shift in implicit racial evaluations was significantly predicted by participants' ability to recall the Black–positive and White–negative contingencies experienced during the exemplar exposure task. Together, these data suggest that exposure to counterattitudinal exemplars can shift implicit racial evaluations toward neutrality, but such malleability strongly depends on contingency awareness. We discuss implications for social cognitive theory, theoretically informed debiasing interventions, and different paths toward resolving initial replication failures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People can predict their scores on the Implicit Association Test with remarkable accuracy, challenging the traditional notion that implicit attitudes are inaccessible to introspection and suggesting that people might be aware of these attitudes. Yet, major open questions about the mechanism and scope of these predictions remain, making their implications unclear. Notably, people may be inferring their attitudes from externally observable cues (e.g., in the simplest case, their demographic information) rather than accessing them directly. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that, in past work, predictions have been obtained only for a small set of targets, attitudes toward which are demonstrably possible to infer. Here, in an adversarial collaboration with eight preregistered studies (N = 8,011), we interrogate implicit attitude awareness using more stringent tests. We demonstrate that people can predict their implicit attitudes (a) across a broad range of targets (many of which are plausibly difficult to infer without introspection), (b) far more accurately than third-party observers can based on demographic information, and (c) with similar accuracy across two different widely used implicit measures. On the other hand, predictive accuracy (a) varied widely across individuals and attitude targets and (b) was partially explained by inference over nonintrospective cues such as demographic variables and explicit attitudes; moreover, (c) explicit attitudes explained considerably larger portions of variance in predictions than implicit attitudes did. Taken together, these findings suggest that successful predictions of one's implicit attitudes may emerge from multiple mechanisms, including inference over nonintrospective cues and genuine introspective access. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Across seven preregistered studies in online adult volunteer samples (N = 5,323), we measured implicit evaluations of social groups following exposure to historical narratives about their oppression. Although the valence of such information is highly negative and its interpretation was left up to participants, implicit evaluations of oppressed groups shifted toward positivity, including in designs involving fictitious, well-known, and even self-relevant targets. The sole deviation from this pattern was observed in an experiment using a vignette about slavery in the United States, in response to which neither White nor Black Americans exhibited any change in implicit race attitudes. In line with propositional perspectives, these findings suggest that implicit evaluations (including, notably, implicit evaluations of well-known and self-relevant social groups) tend to change toward positivity in response to extremely negative information involving past oppression. However, macro-level phenomena, such as public awareness of histories of oppression, can modulate such updating processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]