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Agency theoretical literature in accounting has frequently stressed possible difficulties in pursuing stewardship and valuation usefulness simultaneously. However, recent empirical evidence has revealed a significantly positive correlation between the two objectives. These empirical findings provide support for the IASB/FASB's decision to encompass stewardship in valuation usefulness in their revised conceptual framework. The objective of our paper is to identify factors influencing the stewardship/valuation relationship by using an analytical model. In a Linear Exponential Normal (LEN) setting we focus on the characteristics of an accounting system, in particular relevance, freedom from error and freedom from bias, the latter two according to IASB/FASB being components of representational faithfulness. We show that accounting quality, comprising relevance and freedom from error, has similar effects on valuation and stewardship usefulness. However, we identify conditions under which there is no perfect mapping from stewardship to valuation. Moreover, discretion in the accounting system has different consequences for both objectives as it does not affect valuation usefulness while it entails potentially negative effects on stewardship. Thus, we raise doubts in relation to the standard-setters' view that stewardship is automatically met by a focus on valuation usefulness.

"Der Beitrag analysiert Interessenkonflikte aus der Sicht der Betriebswirtschaftslehre. Nach einer Begriffsabgrenzung und der Darstellung typischer Ausprägungen werden Interessenkonflikte in den Kontext der 'principal-agent'-Beziehung gestellt. Kriterien zur Identifikation einer Grenzlinie zwischen aus ökonomischer Sicht tragbaren ('legitimierbaren') und nicht-tragbaren Interessenkonflikten werden entwickelt; rechtliche und ökonomische Mechanismen zur Eindämmung von Interessenkonflikten werden unter diesem Blickwinkel beleuchtet." (Autorenreferat), "The paper analyses conflicts of interests from a business economics perspective. It tries to shape out a borderline between types of conflicts of interests (and behaviour patterns in the course of a conflict of interest) which can be, from an economic viewpoint, qualified as 'legitimate' and other types which can be not. The basis of conclusion is agency theory and implicit contracting." (author's abstract)