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Engaging in prosocial behavior is costly. By selectively directing prosocial behavior toward individuals with a high probability of reciprocating, we are able to offset these potential costs and maintain a sustainable prosocial system. Often, we determine whether an individual will make a good prosocial partner through the observation of their social behaviors. In the absence of such behavioral information, however, group membership can be an effective heuristic for guiding selectivity. Older children and adults show ingroup bias when engaging in selective social behavior, but studies with samples of children under the age of 4 years have been inconclusive. In part, this may be because studies have often relied on measures of prosocial behavior such as sharing or subjective liking, which are reliant on additional cognitive processes apart from selectivity considerations and which may still be undergoing development early in childhood. These tasks may mask younger children's capacity for selectivity in the ingroup context. The present study recruited 65 2-year-old children with the aim to test the capacity for toddlers to demonstrate group-based selective behavior in a minimal group task. Results suggest that children of this age preference both minimal group members and unlabeled similar others over dissimilar individuals when directing their selective helping, but not sharing, behavior. In sum, the findings suggest that even toddlers have a developing sense of ingroup bias in selective prosocial behavior, and that helping, as opposed to sharing, may be a more sensitive measure of children's group-oriented selective behavior at this age.

When young children recruit others to help a person in need, media reports often treat it as a remarkable event. Yet it is unclear how commonly children perform this type of pro-social behavior and what forms of social understanding, cognitive abilities, and motivational factors promote or discourage it. In this study, 48 three- to four-year-old children could choose between two actors to retrieve an out-of-reach object for a third person; during this event, one actor was physically unable to provide help. Nearly all of children's responses appropriately incorporated the actors' action capacities, indicating that rational prosocial reasoning--the cognitive basis for effective indirect helping--is common at this young age. However, only half of children actually directed an actor to help, suggesting that additional motivational factors constrained their prosocial actions. A behavioral measure of social inhibition and within-task scaffolding that increased children's personal involvement were both strongly associated with children's initiation of indirect helping behavior. These results highlight social inhibition and recognizing one's own potential agency as key motivational challenges that children must overcome to recruit help for others.

Although we can support Heyes' call for more research on mechanisms, we disagree that the problem has been ignored as Heyes suggests. We also doubt that basic learning mechanisms are alone sufficient to account for the broad range of findings in the selective social learning literature. Although phylogenetically shared learning mechanisms must support selective social learning, we believe that they must also be guided by top-down conceptual considerations that may be special to humans. Research to date has been focused on establishing the boundary conditions on selective social learning, with the goal of making generalizations that will constrain theorizing about the character of that special knowledge. This is critical to our understanding of both why and how selective social learning manifests in children.

This study investigates the diversity of early prosocial behavior by examining the ability of ninety-five 2- to 4-year-olds to provide aid to an adult experimenter displaying instrumental need, emotional distress, and material desire. Children provided appropriate aid in response to each of these cues with high consistency over multiple trials. In contrast to the consistency with which the children provided aid within each task, there were no cross-task correlations, and the tendency to respond to each of the cues revealed unique developmental trajectories. Taken together, these results provide preliminary support for the importance of examining the cues to which children are responding and of differentiating between varieties of aid when considering the development of prosocial behavior.

Studies of social cognitive reasoning have demonstrated instances of children engaging in eye gaze patterns toward correct answers even when pointing or verbal responses are directed toward incorrect answers. Findings such as these have spawned seminal theories, yet no consensus has been reached regarding the characteristics of the knowledge guiding these responses. We tested 2-year-olds' eye gaze and pointing behavior in an occluded falling event to examine these behaviors within the domain of physical reasoning. In the simplest variant of the task, all children showed correct gaze to the final location of a ball dropped down a curved tube, but only a subset of these children pointed to the correct location. (Others pointed reliably to a location directly below the release point.) With two tubes, all children directed the majority of looking and pointing responses to this erroneous location. The findings are considered in relation to existing models of representational change. (Contains 2 figures.)

Prosocial behaviors are a diverse group of actions that are integral to human social life. In this study, we examined the ability of 18- and 24-month-old infants to engage in three types of other-oriented behaviors, specifically helping, sharing, and comforting. Infants in both age groups engaged in more prosocial behavior on trials in which an unfamiliar adult experimenter required aid (experimental conditions) than on those in which she did not (control conditions) across two of the three prosocial tasks (i.e., helping and sharing). The infants engaged in these behaviors with similar frequency; however, there was no correlation between the tasks. The implications for the construct of prosocial behavior and the presence of a prosocial disposition are discussed. (Contains 1 footnote and 3 figures.)

In the present study, we examined if young infants can extract information regarding the directionality of biological motion. We report that 6-month-old infants can differentiate leftward and rightward motions from a movie depicting the sagittal view of an upright human point-light walker, walking as if on a treadmill. Inversion of the stimuli resulted in no detection of directionality. These findings suggest that biological motion displays convey information for young infants beyond that which distinguishes them from nonbiological motion; aspects of the action itself are also detected. The potential visual mechanisms underlying biological motion detection, as well as the behavioral interpretations of point-light figures, are discussed. (Contains 1 footnote and 3 figures.)

Research examining the development of social cognition has largely been divided into two areas: infant perception of intentional agents, and preschoolers' understanding of others' mental states and beliefs (theory of mind). Many researchers have suggested that there is continuity in social cognitive development such that the abilities observed in infancy are related to later preschool ability, yet little empirical evidence exists for this claim. Here, we present preliminary evidence that capacities specific to the social domain contribute to performance in social cognition tasks both during infancy and in early childhood. Specifically, looking time patterns in an infant social cognition task correlated with preschool theory of mind; however, no such relationship was found for infants in a nonsocial cognition task.

Many recent studies have explored young children's ability to use information from physical representations of space to guide search within the real world. In one commonly used procedure, children are asked to find a hidden toy in a room after observing a smaller toy being hidden in the analogous location in a scale model of the room. Three-year-old children readily find the hidden toy, although children at 2.5 years often have difficulty with the task. This experiment examined the causes of 2.5-year-olds' difficultly with this symbol system by incorporating testing procedures previously used with chimpanzees. Results indicate that young children's poor performance primarily stems from a difficulty achieving symbolic insight (i.e., recognizing the model-room representational relationship) but is also strongly affected by deficits in inhibitory control. (Contains 2 figures, 3 footnotes and 2 tables.)

In developmental psychology, the widespread adoption of new methods for testing children does not typically occur over a matter of months. Yet, the COVID-19 pandemic and its associated social distancing requirements created a sudden need among many research groups to use a new method with which they had little or no experience: online testing. Here, we report results from a survey of 159 researchers detailing their early experiences with online testing. The survey approach allowed us to create a general picture of the challenges, limitations, and opportunities of online research, and it identified aspects of the methods that have the potential to impact interpretations of findings. We use the survey results to present considerations to improve online research practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Infants expect objects to be solid and cohesive, and to move on continuous paths through space. In this study, we examine whether infants understand that human beings are material objects, subject to these same principles. We report that 5-month-old infants apply the constraint of continuous motion to inanimate blocks, but not to people. This suggests that young infants have two separate modes of construal: one for inanimate objects and another for humans.

The ability of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) to recognize the correspondence between a scale model and its real-world referent was examined. In Experiments 1 and 2, an adult female and a young adult male watched as an experimenter hid a miniature model food in 1 of 4 sites in a scale model. Then, the chimpanzees were given the opportunity to find the real food item that had been hidden in the analogous location in the real room. The female performed significantly above chance, whereas the male performed at chance level. Experiments 3 and 4 tested 5 adult and 2 adolescent chimpanzees in a similar paradigm, using a scale model of the chimpanzees' outdoor area. Results indicate that some adult chimpanzees were able to reliably demonstrate an understanding of the relationship between a scale model and the larger space it represented, whereas other subjects were constrained by inefficient and unsuccessful search patterns.