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Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Gliomas are tumors of the primary central nervous system associated with poor prognosis and high mortality. The 5-year survival rate of patients with gliomas received surgery combined with chemotherapy or radiotherapy does not exceed 5%. Although temozolomide is commonly used in the treatment of gliomas, the development of resistance limits its use. MicroRNAs are non-coding RNAs involved in numerous processes of glioma cells, such as proliferation, migration and apoptosis. MicroRNAs regulate cell cycle, PI3K/AKT signal pathway, and target apoptosis-related genes (e.g., BCL6), angiogenesis-related genes (e.g., VEGF) and other related genes to suppress gliomas. Evidence illustrates that microRNAs can regulate the sensitivity of gliomas to temozolomide, cisplatin, and carmustine, thereby enhancing the efficacy of these agents. Moreover, traditional Chinese medicine (e.g., tanshinone IIA, xanthohumol, and curcumin) exert antiglioma effects by regulating the expression of microRNAs, and then microRNAs inhibit gliomas through influencing the process of tumors by targeting certain genes. In this paper, the mechanisms through which microRNAs regulate the sensitivity of gliomas to therapeutic drugs are described, and traditional Chinese medicine that can suppress gliomas through microRNAs are discussed. This review aims to provide new insights into the traditional Chinese medicine treatment of gliomas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organizations often promote procedural justice by increasing the transparency of managerial decisions and encouraging employees' voice in the decision process. We experimentally investigate how implementing these control policies in hierarchical organizations (owners vs. managers vs. employees) affects managers' resource-allocation decision and employee effort. We predict and find that managers allocate more resources to employees, lowering owners' return, when the allocation decision is transparent than when it is not transparent, despite being incentivized to increase owners' return. Further, managers allocate more resources to employees when employees can voice their desired outcome than when employees' voice is not allowed, but only if the allocation decision is transparent. Managers' intention to exchange gifts with employees mediates these effects. We also find that, when employees have a voice, their effort is influenced by whether the allocation reaches their desired level. The implications of our findings for management control theory and practice are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.03.010 Byline: Xi (Jason) Kuang (a), Roberto A. Weber (b), Jason Dana (c) Keywords: Coordination games; Advice; Equilibrium selection Abstract: This study investigates whether the effectiveness of non-binding advice in coordination is influenced by knowledge of the adviser's motive. Using pure coordination games in which a non-playing adviser makes a recommendation of which strategy to play, we find that if the advice appears to be 'self-interested' (i.e., the adviser has a monetary stake in the advice being followed), it is less effective than if the same advice is given by a neutral independent party with no economic interest in the game. The implications of our results for the effectiveness of advice in real-world economic and organizational situations are discussed. Author Affiliation: (a) College of Management, Georgia Institute of Technology, 800 West Peachtree St. NW, Atlanta, GA 30308-0520, United States (b) Department of Decision and Social Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburg, PA 15213, United States (c) Psychology Department, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL 61820, United States Article History: Received 27 September 2004; Accepted 30 March 2005

Prior experimental studies have investigated factors affecting the honesty of managerial reporting in contexts where managers have no discretion in determining what information to acquire before making their reports. In many organizations, however, responsibility for acquiring information is delegated to local managers. Such delegated decision rights give managers discretion regarding what information to supply to the accounting system on which their reports are based. We predict that discretion may promote opportunistic reporting behavior because it allows managers to avoid relevant information and, in turn, report so as to maximize personal wealth without being knowingly untruthful. We investigate this prediction via two experiments. Results of Experiment One suggest that whether discretion in information acquisition affects reporting behavior is influenced by an individual’s preference for honesty (i.e., ethical type). We conduct Experiment Two to investigate whether this is the case. Results show that, although discretion does not affect the reporting behavior of participants with low or high honesty preferences, participants with moderate honesty preferences tend to exploit discretion in order to avoid relevant information and report opportunistically. Our results suggest that the ability to exploit opportunities afforded by discretion in information acquisition is a potential cost when weighing the costs and benefits of assigning decision rights to managers. Our results also highlight the importance of considering a manager’s ethical type when assigning decision rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]