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This report considers different pricing models for a platform based rental system, such as Airbnb. A linear model is assumed for the demand response to price, and existence and uniqueness conditions for Nash equilibria are obtained. The Stackelberg equilibrium prices for the game are also obtained, and an iterative scheme is provided, which converges to the Nash equilibrium. Different cooperative pricing schemes are studied, and splitting of revenues based on the Shapley value is discussed. It is shown that a division of revenue based on the Shapley value gives a revenue to the platform proportional to its control of the market. The demand response function is modified to include user response to quality of service. It is shown that when the cost to provide quality of service is low, both renter and the platform will agree to maximize the quality of service. However, if this cost is high, they may not always be able to agree on what quality of service to provide.; Cet article examine différents modèles de tarification pour un système de location basé sur une plateforme, comme Airbnb. Un modèle linéaire est supposé pour la réponse de la demande au prix, et des conditions d’existence et d’unicité pour les équilibres de Nash sont obtenues. Les prix d’équilibre de Stackelberg pour le jeu sont également obtenus, et un schéma itératif est fourni, qui converge vers l’équilibre de Nash. Différents systèmes de tarification coopérative sont étudiés et la répartition des revenus basée sur la valeur de Shapley est discutée. Il est montré qu’une répartition des revenus basée sur la valeur de Shapley donne un revenu à la plateforme proportionnel à son contrôle du marché. La fonction de réponse à la demande est modifiée pour inclure la réponse de l’utilisateur à la qualité de service. Il est démontré que lorsque le coût de la qualité de service est faible, le locataire et la plateforme s’accordent pour maximiser la qualité de service. Cependant, si ce coût est élevé, ils ne peuvent pas toujours s’entendre sur la qualité de service à fournir.

International audience; This paper considers different pricing models for a platform based rental system, such as Airbnb. A linear model is assumed for the demand response to price, and existence and uniqueness conditions for Nash equilibria are obtained. The Stackelberg equilibrium prices for the game are also obtained, and an iterative scheme is provided, which converges to the Nash equilibrium. Different cooperative pricing schemes are studied, and splitting of revenues based on the Shapley value is discussed. It is shown that a division of revenue based on the Shapley value gives a revenue to the platform proportional to its control of the market. The demand response function is modified to include user response to quality of service. It is shown that when the cost to provide quality of service is low, both renter and the platform will agree to maximize the quality of service. However, if this cost is high, they may not always be able to agree on what quality of service to provide.