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Dette arbejdspapir belyser konsekvenserne for bistandsmodtageme i Afrika af genkomsten af ikke-DAC donorer i Afrika. Det g0res gennem en kategorisering af ikke-DAC donorerne, som papeger ligheder og forskelle mellem donorerne, isrer hvad angar form, indhold, st0rrelse og modalitet. Papiret papeger, at genkomsten af DAC donorer pa den ene side viI 0ge pengestmmmen til Afrika, isrer tillande, der kun i begrrenset omfang modtager DAC-bistand og at denne pengestmm er tret knyttet til handels- og investeringsstmmme. Pa den anden side viI den 0gede mrengde donorer 0ge transaktionsomkostningerne for modtageme i Syd samtidig med at den i mange tilfrelde viI modarbejde harmoniseringstendenser i bistanden. This working paper examines the consequences for the recipients of the return of non-DAC donors to Africa. It categorises non-DAC donors according to the form, content, size and modality of aid in order to reveal similarities and differences. On the one hand, the paper finds that the return of non-DAC donors ceteris paribus will increase the external financial flows to Africa. In particular, it will increase the flows to countries not targeted by the majority of DAC donors. Moreover, these flows are closely related to other financial flows, such as trade and investments. On the other hand, the paper finds that the return of non-DAC donors may conflict with plans to harmonise aid and will simultaneously raise transaction costs for the recipients.

Der dukker til stadighed nye forslag til finansiering af udvikling op. Forslagene er ikke blevet færre - eller mindre opfindsomme - i takt med at det er blevet åbenlyst, at opfyldelsen af 2015-målene kræver øget finansiering. Dette arbejdspapir skitserer baggrunden for disse forslags oprindelse og deres konkrete design. Forslagene systematiseres, diskuteres og vurderes. Papiret peger på, at innovativ finansiering handler om andet og mere end f.eks. lokal absorptionskapacitet og appreciering af lokal valuta. Det handler om politisk vilje, om transaktionsomkostninger, om forudsigelighed, om incitamentsstrukturer, om modsatrettede interesser, og om etiske problemer. Om et forslag er godt eller skidt, afhænger derfor i høj grad af, hvad formålet er, og om hvordan det relaterer sig til allerede eksisterende finansieringsformer.

Fra flere sider bliver udenlandske investeringer trukket frem som en væsentlig bidragyder til udviklingsprocessen i udviklingslande. Argumentet er, at visse udviklingslande, især i Afrika, har brug for langt større og mere stabile kapitalstrømme for at finansiere udviklingen. Udenlandske investeringer kan ifølge fortalere levere begge dele. Sideløbende hermed er der kommet stadigt større fokus på Syd-Syd investeringer i Afrika. Dette papir søger at sammenholde argumenterne for og imod udenlandske inverteringers potentiale for at bidrage positivt til Afrikas udviklingsproces. Papiret påpeger, at ikke alle typer investeringer er lige gavnlige, at bistand stadig spiller en meget vigtig rolle, og at virkningerne af Syd-Syd investeringer ikke er væsensforskellige fra virkningerne af andre investeringer. Investeringer kan altså katalysere en udviklingsproces. Det kræver dog visse forudsætninger, såsom tilpasset teknologi, lokale underleverandører, positiv påvirkning af betalingsbalancen. Som situationen er i dag, fremstår Afrika dog stadig som en region, hvor udenlandske investeringer søger at udnytte lokale ressourcer snarere end at opgradere lokal kapacitet.

This thesis examines the special case of Ghana, who until recently joined the oil producing countries. While this new discovery and extraction has ushered in joy amidst hopes and high expectations from the projected 490 billion-oil reserves by the World Bank. This same newly found sector has also spur up insecurity and vacillations amongst the general public. These fears re as a result of many factors amongst which is the negative publicity of how such natural resources have turn into curses on the continent. From this perspective, I argue that Ghana, which stands out on the continent with a very strong democratic institutions, vibrant civil society groups and its strong emerging economy are some of the factors that can work in its favor. Furthermore, I argue that Ghana’s rich history and massive experience gained from the handling of natural resources such as gold and specifically cocoa in this thesis, points out positive indicators on how this new discovery can be properly handled to avert any possible Natural Resource Curse syndrome.

China’s stance on the foreign policy principle of sovereignty, with its key-element non-interference, has changed over the past three decades and become more flexible. At the same time, development, economic growth and energy security have become China’s policy priority. The need for energy and the quest for new markets caused a deepening engagement with resource rich regions such as Africa. In its quest for new economic partners, China often neglects questions of transparency, social justice and environmental problems. This has put the Chinese government under increased criticism on the part of the West. The case of Sudan is one example for China’s ties with regimes that stand accused to neglect human rights. The particular nature and circumstances of Sino-Sudan relations have posed a challenge to China’s already changing sovereignty doctrine. China’s deepening economic interests in Sudanese markets, most importantly oil, and strong ties with the central government in Khartoum forced China to change its stance on non-interference when conflicts threatened Chinese investment and international image. When political realities changed due to the secession of Southern Sudan, causing the separation of the oil rich regions in the South from important oil transportation hubs in the North, maintaining non-interference became a serious policy conundrum.

This thesis examines what influence United Nations peacebuilding missions have on the sovereignty of fragile states in Africa. The starting point for the analysis is the nature of the fragile state and an examination of how the condition of fragility influences the presence of sovereignty in these states. The thesis distinguishes itself by recognising the relationship between the two entities and establishes an understanding of fragile state’s sovereignty as a tool for negotiation when it comes to international intervention. It is the argument of the thesis, that UN peacebuilding with its added dimension of statebuilding illustrates an added dimension to the understanding of sovereignty in fragile states. In the environment of UN peacebuilding interventions, sovereignty in fragile states becomes more than just an interaction with external donors, but becomes an informal arrangement of shared sovereignty. The thesis starts of by establishing a conceptualised understanding of the fragile state. This framework is used as the foundation for further analysis of sovereignty and for understanding the interventionist approach of UN peacebuilding missions. The conceptualisation of the fragile state is compiled by including perspectives from various authors on the functions and performance of the state and by including an understanding that the historical context is influential in the current condition of the fragile state. It is the argument of this thesis that the character of the fragile state is of paramount importance when establishing an understanding of the condition of sovereignty in these countries. The fragility of the state is understood to influence the state’s domestic and interdependence sovereignty to the point where they are virtually non-existent. This in conjunction with the fact that fragile states are among the poorest countries in the world, sets the state in a position where international assistance is necessary in order to manage territory and gain access to external resources. This means that the fragile state has become a new kind of sovereign state that is independent in law, insubstantial in reality and hugely materially dependent on other states for general functions and welfare. In an international community where the fragile state has gained increased attention in recent years, the adverse circumstances of the fragile state and the very lack of domestic sovereignty have become instruments for attracting external resources. As such sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, have become entities for negotiation of the pace and scope of the external intervention and not indisputable principles of international relations. Sovereignty in fragile states can thus be seen as a matter of interaction rather than an absolute and indisputable fact of international relations. UN peacebuilding interventions should be seen in the light of the fact that the fragile state, in recent years, has become a centre of focus for international relations as international security has grown to be seen as interconnected. The fragile state is here seen, as the exemplification of the connection between security and development. In this thesis UN peacebuilding is seen as the extension of the international community’s, though primarily the West’s, project of ideology expansion. Furthermore, UN peacebuilding is seen as demonstrating a widening of traditional intervention areas. With its current focus on building state capacity, UN peacebuilding has moved into domestic policy areas and as demonstrating a degree of co-authorship over the national project of statebuilding. It is argued that the focus on building state capacity in conjunction with liberal demands of good governance and democratisation has been instrumental in moving the condition of sovereignty in fragile states from a condition of interaction to one of shared sovereignty. UN peacebuilding alongside the character of the fragile state can thus be seen as having influenced the structure of sovereignty in fragile states to the point that it has become a matter of shared sovereignty. As such UN peacebuilding is seen to influence sovereignty in fragile states beyond its already augmented form. In the short to medium-term this can be seen as decreasing the scope, latitude and policy options of the fragile state. However, if the peacebuilding project is successful and then withdrawn, it has the potential to increase domestic sovereignty areas over the long-term.

China’s engagement in Africa – from Strategy to Practice is an analysis of China’s economic engagement in three African countries, Gabon, Nigeria and Zambia. The thesis seeks to create knowledge of how China’s strategy for Africa relates to its practical work on the continent. This, we hope, will result in new perspectives on how to create development in Africa. Our main findings are as follows: We found that China’s approach to development is fundamentally different to our Western understanding of the same. This shows the reasons why China chooses to focus on much the same areas as the Western donors. For example while both China and the Western donors focus on health, education and industrialization the Chinese view these as means to achieve economic and societal development but not social or dependant on political reforms as opposed to the western view that economic development, while also a goal, is supposed to bring with it poverty reduction and good governance. In relation to China’s practical work in our chosen cases, Gabon, Nigeria and Zambia, our main findings were that trade with China does not lead to diversification of our cases’ economies, which we have come to view as central to the countries’ chances of future economic growth. On the other hand we have also found that this same economic relationship with China could give rise to this diversification through Chinese investment and loans in the areas health, education, infrastructure and agriculture. However, these loans and investments in these areas have not in our cases, led to any such diversification or long term economic development. This, we find, has little to do with China’s approach and more to do with the internal capacity of the states in our cases. Furthermore, if this deficiency of capacity is not remedied, we find that this will also become a problem for China’s future gain from this engagement. China can, however, not now, within the scope of the African Strategy as it is, do much about this lack of capacity because this would be a direct violation of one of the core principles of Chinese foreign policy, the principle of non-intervention. Therefore we end this thesis, skeptical of the ability of the African Strategy in creating long term development in African countries that lack state capacity. Therefore we view the African Strategy as it is as a means to positive change but the long term gains depend on China’s continued enforcement of the principle of non-intervention.