Search

This dissertation examines under what conditions social movement parties will transition into political parties in contested states. Contested states – which function like normal states yet only have de facto independence - pose unique puzzles to political scientists. Despite often-high functioning democratic institutions and robust civil societies, they are unincorporated into the international order. This is because parent states – states that claim the contested states as their own – blocks contested states’ formal recognition. But contestation is not only a matter of international recognition, but also a question of domestic politics. In contested states, the dominant political cleavages are the existential questions of “who” and “where” they are. In this political context, many commonly held assumptions within comparative politics no longer hold. By analyzing political parties that emerge out of Taiwan’s 2014 Sunflower Movement, I show how and why movement party formation in contested states works differently. Protests, parties, and its parent state, the PRC, are key actors in Taiwan’s political development. To explain movement party emergence, I focus on two key relationships: protesters to political parties and protesters to the parent state. First, when protesters see established parties as too moderate and corrupt, it increases the likelihood that they will form a new party out of the movement. Second, when protesters feel that the parent state uses domestic institutions to threatens the sovereignty of Taiwan, it further increases the likelihood of movement party formation. In presenting this theory, I draw on data from multiple years of fieldwork including hundreds of interviews with activists, politicians, and party founders. I utilize comparative historical methods to trace the metamorphosis of movement to party, and present extensions to other cases. My results contribute to social scientific understanding of the relationship between social movements an

This dissertation examines under what conditions social movement parties will transition into political parties in contested states. Contested states – which function like normal states yet only have de facto independence - pose unique puzzles to political scientists. Despite often-high functioning democratic institutions and robust civil societies, they are unincorporated into the international order. This is because parent states – states that claim the contested states as their own – blocks contested states’ formal recognition. But contestation is not only a matter of international recognition, but also a question of domestic politics. In contested states, the dominant political cleavages are the existential questions of “who” and “where” they are. In this political context, many commonly held assumptions within comparative politics no longer hold. By analyzing political parties that emerge out of Taiwan’s 2014 Sunflower Movement, I show how and why movement party formation in contested states works differently. Protests, parties, and its parent state, the PRC, are key actors in Taiwan’s political development. To explain movement party emergence, I focus on two key relationships: protesters to political parties and protesters to the parent state. First, when protesters see established parties as too moderate and corrupt, it increases the likelihood that they will form a new party out of the movement. Second, when protesters feel that the parent state uses domestic institutions to threatens the sovereignty of Taiwan, it further increases the likelihood of movement party formation. In presenting this theory, I draw on data from multiple years of fieldwork including hundreds of interviews with activists, politicians, and party founders. I utilize comparative historical methods to trace the metamorphosis of movement to party, and present extensions to other cases. My results contribute to social scientific understanding of the relationship between social movements an

Why do some separatists rebel sooner than others? Independence is a context in which states exhibit political instability and weakness, yet not all groups take advantage of this opportunity and attempt to secede. Rationalist explanations of rebellion which focus on factors of wealth or opportunity over-emphasize the ability of groups to take advantage of certain moments and under-emphasize how groups perceive wealth or opportunity. Emotive explanations emphasize the importance of subjective determination and relative conditions. Yet while these studies point to political exclusion or perceptions of backwardness, they do not account for how groups end up in a position or why they come to this conclusion. Without considering education, these explanations miss what shapes the underlying conditions for rebellion that affect group positionality and perceptions of it. What students learn influences the nature of grievances and opportunities for social mobility.I address two necessary conditions for when separatist rebellion occurs: development of a national identity and perceptions of inclusion based on this identity. I argue that colonial education policies structure group perceptions of inclusion in the new state, becoming particularly salient in the lead-up to independence. Penetrative education policies encourage the development of a national identity by strengthening the attachment of minority groups to the colonizer and bonds within the same community. As a result, rebellion tends to happen sooner because it is easier for groups to identify conditions of discrimination. In contrast, shallow education policies do not strengthen reliance on or association with the colonizer and instead promote political fragmentation within groups. Without encouraging the development of a national identity, shallowly educated groups are less likely to feel targeted on the basis of that identity. This ultimately delays rebellion. I utilize archival data from colonial officials and semi

Why do some separatists rebel sooner than others? Independence is a context in which states exhibit political instability and weakness, yet not all groups take advantage of this opportunity and attempt to secede. Rationalist explanations of rebellion which focus on factors of wealth or opportunity over-emphasize the ability of groups to take advantage of certain moments and under-emphasize how groups perceive wealth or opportunity. Emotive explanations emphasize the importance of subjective determination and relative conditions. Yet while these studies point to political exclusion or perceptions of backwardness, they do not account for how groups end up in a position or why they come to this conclusion. Without considering education, these explanations miss what shapes the underlying conditions for rebellion that affect group positionality and perceptions of it. What students learn influences the nature of grievances and opportunities for social mobility.I address two necessary conditions for when separatist rebellion occurs: development of a national identity and perceptions of inclusion based on this identity. I argue that colonial education policies structure group perceptions of inclusion in the new state, becoming particularly salient in the lead-up to independence. Penetrative education policies encourage the development of a national identity by strengthening the attachment of minority groups to the colonizer and bonds within the same community. As a result, rebellion tends to happen sooner because it is easier for groups to identify conditions of discrimination. In contrast, shallow education policies do not strengthen reliance on or association with the colonizer and instead promote political fragmentation within groups. Without encouraging the development of a national identity, shallowly educated groups are less likely to feel targeted on the basis of that identity. This ultimately delays rebellion. I utilize archival data from colonial officials and semi