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12. The best at the top?:Candidate ranking strategies under closed list proportional representation

Author

Crutzen, Benoît S.Y., Konishi, Hideo, Sahuguet, Nicolas, Crutzen, Benoît S.Y., Konishi, Hideo, and Sahuguet, Nicolas

Abstract

Under closed-list proportional representation, a party’s electoral list determines the order in which legislative seats are allocated to candidates. When candidates differ in their ability, parties face a trade-off between competence and incentives. Ranking candidates in decreasing order of competence ensures that elected politicians are most competent. Yet, party lists create incentives for candidates that may lead parties not to place their best candidates at the top of the list. We examine this trade-off in a game-theoretical model in which parties rank their candidates on a list, candidates choose their campaign effort, and the election is a team contest for multiple prizes. We analyze how the candidates’ objectives, voters’ attention and media coverage, incumbency, the number of parties competing in the election, and the electoral environment influence how parties rank candidates.

Published
2024

16. Allocation rules of indivisible prizes in team contests

Author

Konishi, Hideo, Sahuguet, Nicolas, Crutzen, Benoît S.Y., Konishi, Hideo, Sahuguet, Nicolas, and Crutzen, Benoît S.Y.

Abstract

We analyze contests in which teams compete to win indivisible homogeneous prizes. Teams are composed of members who may differ in their ability, and who exert effort to increase the success of their team. Each team member can obtain at most one prize as a reward. As effort is costly, teams use the allocation of prizes to give incentives and solve the free-riding problem. We develop a two-stage game. First, teams select a prize-allocation rule. Then, team members exert effort. Members take into account how their effort and the allocation rule influence the chance they receive a prize. We prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. We characterize the optimal prize-assignment rule and individual and aggregate efforts. We then show that the optimal assignment rule is generally not monotonic.

Published
2023

36. The Best at the Top? Candidate Ranking Strategies Under Closed List Proportional Representation

Author

Crutzen, Benoit S Y, Konishi, Hideo, and Sahuguet, Nicolas

Subjects
C72, D72, ddc:330
Abstract

Under closed-list proportional representation, a party's electoral list determines the order in which legislative seats are allocated to candidates. When candidates differ in their ability, parties face a trade-off between competence and incentives. Ranking candidates in decreasing order of competence ensures that elected politicians are most competent. Yet, party lists create incentives for candidates that may push parties not to rank candidates in decreasing competence order. We examine this trade-off in a game-theoretical model in which parties rank their candidate on a list, candidates choose their campaign effort, and the election is a team contest for multiple prizes. We show that the trade-off between competence and incentives depends on candidates' objective and the electoral environment. In particular, parties rank candidates in decreasing order of competence if candidates value enough post-electoral high offices or media coverage focuses on candidates at the top of the list.

Published
2021

43. Free trade networks

Author

Furusawa, Taiji and Konishi, Hideo

Subjects
Free trade -- Analysis, Business, international, Economics
Abstract

The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network formation game. We consider an n-country model in which (possibly asymmetric) countries trade differentiated industrial commodities. We show that if all countries are symmetric, the complete FTA network is pairwise stable and it is the unique stable network if industrial commodities are not highly substitutable. We also compare FTAs and customs unions (CUs) as to which of these two regimes facilitates global trade liberalization, noticing that unlike CUs, each signatory of an FTA can have another FTA without consent of other member countries. Keywords: Free trade agreements; Customs unions; Network formation game; Pairwise stability; Complete FTA network JEL classification: F15

Published
2007

44. Free Trade Agreements with Environmental Standards

Author

Konishi, Hideo, Nakada, Minoru, Shibata, Akihisa, Konishi, Hideo, Nakada, Minoru, and Shibata, Akihisa

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the effects of a free trade agreement (FTA) with environmental standards between Northern and Southern countries with explicit considerations for transferring clean technology and enforcing reduced emissions. Southern producers benefit greatly from having unimpeded access to a Northern market, but they are reluctant to use new high-cost, clean technology provided by the North. Thus, environmentally conscious Northern countries should design an FTA where Southern countries are provided with sufficient membership benefits but must follow tighter enforcement requirements. Since including too many Southern countries dilutes the benefits of FTA membership, it is in the best interest of the North to limit the number of Southern memberships while strictly enforcing emissions reduction. This may result in unequal treatment among the Southern countries. We provide a quantitative evaluation of FTA policies using a numerical example.

Published
2020

46. Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems

Author

Konishi, Hideo and Anver, M. Utku

Subjects
Game theory, Business, Economics
Abstract

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.001 Byline: Hideo Konishi (a), M. Utku Anver (b) Abstract: It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching problems, pairwise-stable matchings may not be immune to group deviations, unlike in many-to-one matching problems (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we show that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability when one side has responsive preferences and the other side has categorywise-responsive preferences. A credibly group-stable matching is immune to any 'executable' group deviations with an appropriate definition of executability. Under the same preference restriction, we also show the equivalence between the set of pairwise-stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition-proof Nash equilibria of an appropriately defined strategic-form game. Author Affiliation: (a) Department of Economics, Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Ave., Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA (b) Department of Economics, Koc University, Rumelifeneri Yolu, Sariyer, 34450 A[degrees]stanbul, Turkey Article History: Received 3 February 2004; Revised 1 February 2005 Article Note: (footnote) [star] This paper has been circulated under the title 'Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems.' We are most grateful to two anonymous referees of the journal for their exceptionally high-quality services. One referee pointed out an error in one of our results in the first version. The other referee's detailed constructive criticisms led to a completely revised version. Conversations and communications with Al Roth and Federico Echenique were very useful. We thank Bhaskar Dutta, Jordi Masso, Eiichi Miyagawa, William Thomson, Anne van den Nouweland, and the participants of conferences and seminars at BC, Rochester, UBC, Duke, Rice, SMU, Toronto, Brown, Osaka, and Montreal. We also thank Margarita Sapozhnikov for her research assistance. Any errors are our own responsibility. Anver gratefully acknowledges the support from the NSF.

Published
2006

49. Concentration of competing retail stores

Author

Konishi, Hideo

Subjects
Stores -- Analysis, Business, Economics, Government
Abstract

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2005.08.005 Byline: Hideo Konishi Keywords: Consumer search; Market size effect; Price cutting effect; Taste uncertainty Abstract: The geographical concentration of stores that sell similar commodities is analyzed using a two-dimensional spatial competition model. A higher concentration of stores attracts more consumers with taste uncertainty and low price expectations (a market-size effect), while it leads to fiercer price competition (a price-cutting effect). Our model is general enough to allow for the coexistence of multiple (possibly) asymmetric clusters of stores. We provide sufficient conditions for the nonemptiness of equilibrium store location choices in pure strategies. Through numerical examples, we illustrate the trade-off between the market-size and price-cutting effects, and provide agglomeration patterns of stores in special cases. Author Affiliation: Department of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, 02467, USA Article History: Received 25 January 2005; Revised 28 July 2005

Published
2005

50. Coalition formation as a dynamic process

Author

Konishi, Hideo and Debraj, Ray

Subjects
Econometric models -- Evaluation, Economics -- Evaluation, Equilibrium (Economics) -- Research, Coalition (Social sciences) -- Research, Business, Economics
Abstract

A process of coalition formation (PCF) is connected with unique absorbing state to the core, and equilibrium PCFs with multiple absorbing states to the largest consistent set. PCF is an ongoing , dynamic process, with payoffs generated as coalitions form, disintegrate, or regroup.

Published
2003

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