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Does INGO climate shaming translate into actual climate laws, or is it ineffective in altering the behavior of governments? This article provides the first systematic assessment of whether and under what conditions INGO climate shaming can influence national climate policymaking. Drawing on social movement and NGO literatures, we argue that INGO climate shaming can incur reputational costs for governments through two main pathways: public opinion and transnational politics. To test our propositions, we generate a unique dataset on INGO climate shaming, utilizing natural language processing (NLP) to extract INGO climate shaming events from media sources, covering the period 1990–2020. We find that climate shaming is generally effective in pushing government to introduce climate laws. Particularly, we find that climate shaming is consequential when governments are trade-dependent and have committed to global climate norms. Our findings provide substantive implications for the global climate governance literature., ¿Se traducen las vergüenzas climáticas de las ONG internacionales (INGO) en leyes climáticas reales, o son ineficaces para alterar el comportamiento de los gobiernos? Este artículo proporciona la primera evaluación sistemática de si las vergüenzas climáticas de las INGO pueden influir en la formulación de políticas climáticas nacionales y bajo qué condiciones. Basándonos en las literaturas de movimientos sociales y ONG internacionales, argumentamos que las vergüenzas climáticas de las INGO pueden incurrir en costos de reputación para los gobiernos a través de dos vías principales: la opinión pública y la política transnacional. Para probar nuestras propuestas, generamos un conjunto de datos único sobre las vergüenzas climáticas de las INGO, utilizando el procesamiento del lenguaje natural (PLN) para extraer eventos de vergüenzas climáticas de las INGO de fuentes mediáticas, cubriendo el período 1990-2020. Encontramos que las vergüenzas climáticas son generalmente efectivas para impulsar al gobierno a introducir leyes climáticas. En particular, encontramos que las vergüenzas climáticas son significativas cuando los gobiernos dependen del comercio y se han comprometido con las normas climáticas globales. Nuestros hallazgos proporcionan implicaciones sustanciales para la literatura de gobernanza climática global., Le dénigrement climatique des ONG internationales (INGO) se traduit-il en lois climatiques réelles ou est-il inefficace pour modifier le comportement des gouvernements? Cet article fournit la première évaluation systématique de la capacité du dénigrement climatique des INGO à influencer l‘élaboration des politiques climatiques nationales et les conditions sous lesquelles cela peut se produire. En nous appuyant sur les littératures des mouvements sociaux et des ONG internationales, nous soutenons que le dénigrement climatique des INGO peut entraîner des coûts de réputation pour les gouvernements par deux principaux canaux : l‘opinion publique et la politique transnationale. Pour tester nos propositions, nous générons un ensemble de données unique sur le dénigrement climatique des INGO, en utilisant le traitement automatique du langage naturel (TALN) pour extraire des événements de dénigrement climatique des INGO à partir de sources médiatiques, couvrant la période 1990-2020. Nous trouvons que le dénigrement climatique est généralement efficace pour pousser les gouvernements à introduire des lois climatiques. En particulier, nous constatons que le dénigrement climatique est significatif lorsque les gouvernements dépendent du commerce et se sont engagés à respecter les normes climatiques mondiales. Nos résultats offrent des implications substantielles pour la littérature sur la gouvernance climatique mondiale.

How do non-governmental organizations (NGOs) target governments for climate shaming? NGOs increasingly function as monitors of states climate performance and compliance with international climate treaties such as the Paris Agreement. Lacking formal sanctioning capacities, NGOs primarily rely on 'naming and shaming' to hold states accountable to their commitments in climate treaties and to ramp up their climate mitigation efforts. However, we know little about how and why NGOs engage in climate shaming. This article advances two arguments. First, we argue that NGO climate shaming is likely to be shaped by the international and national climate records of governments. Second, governments' climate actions can create contradicting expectations by both inviting and repelling NGO climate shaming. To test our arguments, we complied an original global data set on climate shaming events carried out by environmental NGOs. Our empirical analysis suggests that while NGOs are generally more likely to shame climate laggards, climate frontrunners may also be shamed if they engage in non-binding climate commitments. Key policy insights Climate laws and international climate treaties are central for our understanding of how NGOs target governments for climate shaming. NGOs are generally more likely to target climate laggards than frontrunners. Climate shaming is not only about whether but also how governments participate in global climate governance. Membership in climate institutions with non-binding commitments attracts NGO climate shaming. There is a risk that governments sign international climate treaties, without the intention to comply, in order to escape climate shaming.

Do international shaming efforts affect citizens’ support for government policies? While it is a frequent claim in the literature that shaming works through domestic politics, we know little about how and when international criticism affects domestic public opinion. We address this question through an originally designed survey experiment in Sweden, which (i) compares the effects of international shaming in two issue areas—human rights and climate change, and (ii) tests whether government responses to criticism moderate the impact of shaming. Our main findings are fourfold. First, we find substantial effects of international shaming on domestic public opinion. These effects hold across both issue areas and irrespective of whether citizens support government parties or not. Second, human rights shaming has a stronger impact on citizens’ support for government policies than climate shaming. Third, shaming is most effective among citizens who are more supportive of climate action, human rights, and international cooperation. Finally, our findings are mixed with respect to the effect of government responses. While government responses do not moderate the effects of human rights shaming, they seem to mitigate the effects of climate shaming.

When does social pressure in the form of “naming and shaming” induce states to concede their prerogatives by providing potentially compromising information to international organizations (IOs)? We provide answers to that question in what we believe is the first systematic study of the impact of social pressure on state reporting practices, as an act of member procedural compliance. We develop related hypotheses by drawing on realist theory and theories of social pressure and test them, in the 1992–2011 period, by analyzing government reporting on multiple conventions to the International Labor Organization (ILO). We find that governments tend to respond negatively to ILO “naming” (as we define it) for some, but not all, ILO conventions. More specifically, we conclude that governments tend to resist reporting on domestic social conditions – here, related to inequality, discrimination, and exploitation – but more readily report on issues (conventions) that are tied directly to the ILO’s core mission, where government culpability is also clearer. We conclude further that shaming – by “shortlisting” governments and holding them to account in public sessions – boosts compliance on some issues.

How and when do intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) promote incorporation of international norms in domestic politics? In this article, I assess the impact of the International Labour Organization (ILO) on national labour regulations. I advance a new argument regarding how and when labour regulations are shaped by the ILO. More specifically, I argue that the ILO can shape labour regulations during the preparatory process of international labour standards. I theorize that the preparatory period of international labour conventions constitutes a propitious condition for mechanisms of elite socialisation, learning and domestic mobilisation. To test our argument, we focus on national dismissal regulations covering the period 1970-2013. The findings provide evidence in line with my argument that states improve their regulations during the adoption process. However, I find no evidence that states improve their regulations after formal adoption. The results have substantive implications for our understanding of IGOs and labor standards in particular.

How do international non-governmental organizations select countries for naming and shaming? I argue that three focal actors influence non-governmental organizations' shaming decisions: inter-governmental organizations, governments, and non-governmental organization members. Moreover, drawing on existing research, non-governmental organizations might respond differently to focal actors' preferences, by either targeting states that have been criticized by focal actors or, alternatively, targeting those who have escaped their scrutiny. To test these propositions, the article conducts multiple interviews and gathers original data on shaming within the International Trade Union Confederation during period 1991-2011. The main findings are threefold. First, focal actors, except governments, have a significant influence on International Trade Union Confederation shaming. The members' preferences regarding which states should be singled out have the strongest impact. Second, the International Trade Union Confederation is likely to adopt a bandwagoning strategy by shaming states that have been targeted by focal actors, rather than focusing on states that have escaped their criticism. Third, as a result of the bandwagoning approach, the International Trade Union Confederation mainly targets states with poor labor rights conditions.

While a dominant position in research on compliance holds that enforcement is necessary for states to abide by their international commitments, many international organizations (IOs) do not have recourse to such coercive means. This article offers the first systematic analysis of one prominent alternative to material coercion: compliance reporting by IOs. It develops an argument for why reporting by IOs should lead states to correct non-compliant behavior, and when those effects should be particularly strong. It tests this argument in the context of the International Labour Organization (ILO), which offers a unique setting for evaluating the impact of reporting in the absence of coercion. The principal findings are threefold. First, reporting has significant and durable effects on state respect for labor rights. Second, reporting affects compliance both immediately and when repeated over longer periods of time. Third, reporting has stronger effects on improvements in labor rights when target states are democratic and resourceful, and have a stronger presence of labor NGOs. By contrast, it does not matter to reporting's effect whether states are highly economically dependent on the outside world or whether reporting is coupled with active shaming of non-compliant states. Taken together, our results suggest that existing research has not fully appreciated the potential of monitoring systems based on reporting to generate compliance with international rules. While hard enforcement may still be important, especially in areas where incentives to renege are strong, the findings of this article suggest that it is not the exclusive path to compliance.

Diplomacy is a chief instrument of foreign policy. Through high-level diplomatic visits, governments can facilitate cooperation and signal the quality of their relations with other states. Because host countries cannot receive an indefinite number of visits, they must make strategic decisions, prioritizing some countries over others. This reveals information about their foreign policy priorities as well as diplomatic hierarchies and practices in the system as a whole. But what determines high-level diplomatic visits? Existing scholarship disagrees. In this research note, we assess the determinants of high-level diplomatic visits to the U.S. Theoretically, we draw on previous studies and formulate structural, domestic, and practice-oriented accounts of high-level visits as tools of foreign policy. Empirically, we gather original data on diplomatic visits to the U.S. by foreign leaders from 1946 to 2012. Our main results are two-fold. First, high-level diplomatic visits to the U.S. are primarily determined by structural factors such as economic relations. Second, we find clear differences in invited country profiles during and after the Cold War, demonstrating that high-level visits are used strategically to promote shifting foreign policy priorities.

While recent decades have witnessed a rise in the use and forms of Global Performance Indicators (GPIs), there is little systematic evidence on their effects. In this article, we address the effects of GPIs through a specific focus on international organizations’ (IOs) reporting on state compliance with international rules. We focus on the International Labour Organization (ILO), which offers a unique case for evaluating the impact of performance indicators in the absence of enforcement. We develop an argument for why reporting by IOs should lead states to correct non-compliant behavior, and when those effects should be particularly strong. Our principal findings are three-fold. First, ILO reporting has significant and durable effects on state respect for labor rights, especially in addressing severe cases of non-compliance. Second, reporting affects state behavior quite immediately, but can also lead to improvements when repeated over longer periods of time. Third, reporting has stronger effects on improvements in labor rights when the target states are democratic and have the resource capacity to correct violations. These findings have important implications for our understanding of GPIs and the effect of IO reporting on state compliance.

This review examines the promises and pitfalls of multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs) for sustainable development. We take stock of the literature on the creation, effectiveness, and legitimacy of MSPs and focus on recent research on MSPs committed to achieving the 2030 Agenda and United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The 2030 Agenda conceives of MSPs as vehicles to achieve large-scale sustainability transformations. Yet, research on MSPs under earlier sustainable development initiatives found that they had limited effectiveness and significant legitimacy deficits. We show that recent research on SDG partnerships suggests they reproduce many of the shortcomings of their predecessors and so are unlikely to foster synergies and minimize trade-offs between areas of sustainable development to deliver transformations on a global scale. We also examine recent research on the prospects of governing MSPs to enhance accountability and ensure better institutional designs for achieving transformations, highlighting challenges arising from international political contestation.

Previous studies have established that naming and shaming is more likely to produce compliance when states are democratic. But what explains the variation among democracies? The literature does not provide clear answers to this question. In this paper, I ask how and when IO naming and shaming influences the behavior of democratic governments. To explore these questions, the paper conducts a comparative case study of two “most-similar” cases – Greece and Hungary – that have responded differently after being targeted by the ILO. Whereas ILO naming and shaming produced compliance in the Greek case, it failed to do so in the Hungarian case. Drawing on the theories of social pressure and international politics, I outline three mechanisms of influence: a) elite response b) domestic politics, and c) transnational politics. Moreover, I theorize the conditions under which IO naming and shaming is most likely to be a powerful tool in democratic states. Using process tracing, I systematically analyze these mechanisms and conditions in order to explain the variation in outcomes. There are two principal findings of this study. First, the elite response channel is not a necessary condition for inducing change in democratic states. Second, the analysis suggests that ILO naming and shaming produced compliance in the Greek case due to the strong and united domestic groups. The lack of such groups explains the negative outcome in the Hungarian case. The findings provide new insights into how IO naming and shaming may work in democratic states and lend support to previous quantitative studies that stress the presence and capabilities of domestic groups for successful naming and shaming.

While a dominant position in research on compliance holds that enforcement is necessary for states to abide by their international commitments, many international organizations (IOs) do not have recourse to such coercive means. This article offers the first systematic analysis of one prominent alternative to material coercion: compliance reporting by IOs. We develop an argument for why reporting by IOs should lead states to correct non-compliant behavior, and when those effects should be particularly strong. We test this argument in the context of the International Labour Organization (ILO), which offers a unique setting for evaluating the impact of reporting in the absence of coercion. Our principal findings are three-fold. First, reporting has significant and durable effects on state respect for labor rights. Second, reporting affects compliance both immediately and when repeated over longer periods of time. Third, reporting has stronger effects on improvements in labor rights when target states are democratic and resourceful.

Why do some states name and shame norm-violating states in international organizations (IOs) while other states abstain? Inter-state naming and shaming is typically viewed as a political tool to punish adversaries and reward allies. In this study, I propose a regime type explanation for inter-state shaming in international politics. I pose two inter-related questions. First, are democracies more prone to condemn norm-violations than non-democratic countries? Second, are democracies likely to shame each other in cases of norm violations? In search of answers, I use a unique dataset on inter-state shaming the International Labour Organization (ILO) for the period 1991-2011. In line with my main argument, the results suggest that democracies are more likely than non-democracies to engage in the shaming of norm violators, while providing no evidence for special relations between democracies. In addition, this study unpacks other factors influencing the inter-state shaming. The findings have implications for how we understand state interactions in international politics.