Search

The paper focuses on fictional discourse, discourse about fiction and dynamic relations between them: the immediate impulse came from the recent analysis of parafictional statements proposed by François Recanati. A confrontation of basic theoretical assumptions (section I, II) will be followed by an alternative analysis: unlike Recanati’s version, it will not assume a switch to the mode of pretence as an ineliminable part of parafictional statements (III, IV). The aim will not be to replace one analysis by its rival but to show that the same sentence can be used not only to perform various functions, but also to perform the same (here: parafictional) function in various ways – and generally to demonstrate the variety of language games going on in this sphere (V). Special attention will be paid to their specific dynamics, including the fluctuation between the “serious” and fictional modes of speech (VI).

The paper is a critical reaction to Christopher Gauker’s general attack on the Gricean way of thinking about linguistic communication and, in particular, on the role it assigns to the phenomenon of recursive mindreading. The author rejects the claim that the Gricean analysis of meaning something by an utterance is psychologically totally unrealistic, in particular because of the role which the element of recursive mindreading plays in the conditions in definiens. In this connection, the author defends a certain account of philosophical analysis, its functions and the proper interpretation of its results (Ch. 2). On the same basis, the author critically examines Gauker’s rejection of Grice’s analysis of conversational implicatures, as well as of the very reality of Gricean implicatures as a communicative phenomenon (Ch. 3). He concludes that Gauker’s alternative to Grice’s theory of implicatures, leaving no space for recursive mindreading, does not address the same questions as Grice’s theory, and its contribution to the explanation of the nature of communicative interaction is rather limited (Ch. 4). In opposition to a widely shared view, the author argues that Gricean semantics is compatible with the assumption that higher-order thoughts, required by recursive mindreading, are inaccessible to autistic speakers. There is still a good sense in which they can be regarded as meaning something by their utterances and performing speech acts (Ch. 5). The last part of the discussion concerns Gauker’s criticism of the “generalized Griceanism” in M. Tomassello’s work, in particular of the role that Tomassello assigns to the recursive mindreading in his analysis of coordination problems. Concerning this role, the author arrives at rather sceptical conclusions, for different reasons than those underlying Gauker’s criticism (Ch. 6).

The paper focuses on fictional discourse, discourse about fiction and dynamic relations between them. The immediate impulse came from François Recanati and his recent analysis of parafictional statements (performed by uttering sentences like "In Conan Doyle's stories, Sherlock Holmes is a detective who solves mysteries"). Confrontation of basic theoretical assumptions concerning functions of fictionals names, status of fictional characters, the role of pretence, etc. (Sections 1 and 2) results in an alternative analysis: unlike Recanati's version, it does not assume the switch to the mode of pretence as an ineliminable part of parafictional statements (3, 4). The author's aim is not to replace one analysis by its rival but to show that the same sentence can be used not only to perform various functions, but also to perform the same (here: parafictional) function in various ways--and generally to demonstrate the variety of language games going on in this sphere (5). Special attention is paid to their specific dynamics, including fluctuation between "serious" and fictional mode of speech and re-evaluations of the status of previous utterances, serving to preserve the continuity of conversation or restore it on a new basis (6). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Pediatrie pro Praxi is the property of SOLEN sro and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper explores the functions of names of fictional characters, like Emma Bovary, at various levels of fictional discourse: the author suggests an analysis of their textual, paratextual, intertextual and metatextual use, as well as of the negative existential claims which include fictional names. In polemics with widely shared views he argues that proper interpretation of neither of these uses requires introducing fictional characters as abstract entities into our ontology and that neither of them is (typically) made in the mode of pretense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper critically interprets the analysis of characteristic features of the postmodern narrative fiction in Lubomír Doležel's Heterocosmica (1998) and Heterocosmica II (2014). In particular, the author focuses on Doležel's approach to metafiction and cumulation of contradictions as moves undermining (in a literarily productive way) the constitution and authentication of fictional worlds. Despite the explanatory power of Doležel's analysis, the author points out that the same instruments (as well as some others analyzed by Doležel, like metamorphosis or construction of parallel and hybrid worlds) can be used with mimetic functions (in a rather non-traditional sense): in such cases, they cannot be reduced to moves within the postmodernist „ontological game". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]