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The paper presents an analysis of video-recordings of micro-situational events preceding the violent atrocity committed by Bosnian-Serbs in Srebrenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina in July 1995, killing more than 7,000 Muslim men. Theoretically and methodologically the paper makes three major contributions: (1) By looking at micro-interactions preceding violence the paper adds up to micro-sociological theories of violence and the question of what precipitates violence or prevents it from happening. It is shown how micro-situational interaction constitutes situational triggers or turning-points. (2) The paper argues that even if there are pre-planned plots or macro-structural background conditions which lead particular persons to be motivated to commit violence, they still have to pass through a precipitating point. The paper suggests that there is always a barrier of confrontational tension/fear in violence-threatening situation, even for the side which is more powerful. It is argued that there are specific micro-situational triggers which apply here. In violence-precipitating situations small moves or situational triggers decide as to where violence occurs and where people refrain from it. The paper therefore has important ramifications for the more general theory of micro-macro relationships. (3) The paper breaks new ground methodologically by analysing video-materials with Paul Ekman's research tools as well as micro-sociological theories of Collins, Katz, Kemper, and Scheff. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper sets out to present an analysis of the chain of strains that led to the German Revolution of 1918, which ended the Imperial Reich. The enquiry follows the analytical tradition of comparative historical sociology of revolutions that has come to be known as state breakdown theory. Two major contributions are made: First the paper broadens the analytical model of state breakdown theory, which focused on splits between state elites and the landed aristocracy in agrarian bureaucratic states. The analysis of the German Revolution goes beyond this concern by showing that state fiscal problems and elite struggles over reforms can also arise in modern industrial economies and undermine the power of the state apparatus. In particular conflicts among and between rival sectors of governmental administration, military, and industries are revealed. Second, the analysis shows that the revolution was not merely the theoretically trivial by-product of defeat in war. Instead, long-standing struggles of rival factions in the governmental administration, the military, and industries paralyzed the state apparatus. These elite splits based on a financial crisis of the state and opened the door for a spread of massive desertion and popular protests that ended the monarchical state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]