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When the solar wind interacts with the ionosphere of an unmagnetized planet, it induces currents that form an induced magnetosphere. These currents and their associated magnetic fields play a pivotal role in controlling the movement of charged particles, which is essential for understanding the escape of planetary ions. Unlike the well-documented magnetospheric current systems, the ionospheric current systems on unmagnetized planets remain less understood, which constrains the quantification of electrodynamic energy transfer from stars to these planets. Here, utilizing eight years of data from the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) mission, we investigate the global distribution of ionospheric currents on Mars. We have identified two distinct current systems in the ionosphere: one aligns with the solar wind electric field yet exhibits hemispheric asymmetry perpendicular to the electric field direction; the other corresponds to the flow pattern of annually-averaged neutral winds. We propose that these two current systems are driven by the solar wind and atmospheric neutral winds, respectively. Our findings reveal that Martian ionospheric dynamics are influenced by the neutral winds from below and the solar wind from above, highlighting the complex and intriguing nature of current systems on unmagnetized planets., Comment: 20 pages, 6 figures

Recent attention on secure multiparty computation and blockchain technology has garnered new interest in developing auction protocols in a decentralized setting. In this paper, we propose a secure and private Vickrey auction protocol that addresses the challenge of maintaining auction correctness while preserving the confidentiality of bidders' information. Our protocol leverages secure multiparty computation (SMPC) techniques that enable decentralized computation of the final payment price without disclosing additional information. The total computational complexity of our proposed protocol, including preparation, is $O(n^2 k)$, and the complexity for the main auction is $O(n k)$. Furthermore, we show that our protocol is resistant to collusion and the auction outcome is publicly verifiable, which prevents dishonest bidders from altering this outcome.

A decentralized blockchain is a distributed ledger that is often used as a platform for exchanging goods and services. This ledger is maintained by a network of nodes that obeys a set of rules, called a consensus protocol, which helps to resolve inconsistencies among local copies of a blockchain. In this paper, we build a mathematical framework for the consensus protocol designer, specifying (a) the measurement of a resource which nodes strategically invest in and compete for to win the right to build new blocks in the blockchain; and (b) a payoff function for such efforts. Thus, the equilibrium of an associated stochastic differential game can be implemented by selecting nodes in proportion to this specified resource and penalizing dishonest nodes by its loss. This associated, induced game can be further analyzed using mean field games. The problem can be broken down into two coupled PDEs, where an individual node's optimal control path is solved using a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, and where the evolution of states distribution is characterized by a Fokker-Planck equation. We develop numerical methods to compute the mean field equilibrium for both steady states at the infinite time horizon and evolutionary dynamics. As an example, we show how the mean field equilibrium can be applied to the Bitcoin blockchain mechanism design. We demonstrate that a blockchain can be viewed as a mechanism that operates in a decentralized setup and propagates properties of the mean field equilibrium over time, such as the underlying security of the blockchain., Comment: 28 pages, 13 figures