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Previous research assumes that executive functions such as inhibition, shifting and updating explain individual differences in cognitive abilities. Of these three executive functions, updating was previously found to relate most strongly to fluid intelligence. However, this relationship could be a methodological artifact: Measures of inhibition and shifting usually isolate the contribution of this executive function to performance by contrasting conditions with high and low demands on these processes, whereas updating is measured by overall accuracy in working memory tasks involving updating. This updating measure conflates updating-specific individual differences (e.g., removal of outdated information) with variance in working memory maintenance. Re-analyzing data (N = 111) from von Bastian et al. (2016), we separated updating-specific variance from working memory maintenance variance. Updating contributed only 15% to individual differences in performance in the updating tasks, and it correlated neither with fluid intelligence nor with independent working memory measures reflecting storage and processing or relational integration. In contrast, the working memory maintenance component of the updating task correlated with both abilities. These findings challenge the view that updating contributes to variance in higher cognitive abilities.

In order to create a basis for consensus on which of the many empirical findings working memory (WM) research has produced, Oberauer et al. (2018) have collaborated on identifying and classifying benchmark findings that every theory of WM should strive to explain. We introduce the ‘BenchmarksWM’ R data package that includes datasets demonstrating the benchmarks with the aim to offer WM theorists, and computational modelers in particular, an easy way to test models by fitting theory-relevant data. The package provides (a) data in a unified format that facilitates processing, (b) detailed documentation of each dataset, and (c) a hierarchical structure of R documentation files in order to conveniently navigate through the content of the package.

Learning advances through repetition. A classic paradigm for studying this process is the Hebb repetition effect: Immediate serial recall performance improves for lists presented repeatedly as compared to nonrepeated lists. Learning in the Hebb paradigm has been described as a slow but continuous accumulation of long-term memory traces over repetitions [e.g., Page & Norris, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 364 , 3737–3753 (2009)]. Furthermore, it has been argued that Hebb repetition learning requires no awareness of the repetition, thereby being an instance of implicit learning [e.g., Guérard et al., Mem. Cogn. 39 , 1012–1022 (2011); McKelvie, J. Gen. Psychol. 114 , 75–88 (1987)]. While these assumptions match the data from a group-level perspective, another picture emerges when analyzing data on the individual level. We used a Bayesian hierarchical mixture modeling approach to describe individual learning curves. In two preregistered experiments, using a visual and a verbal Hebb repetition task, we demonstrate that 1) individual learning curves show an abrupt onset followed by rapid growth, with a variable time for the onset of learning across individuals, and that 2) learning onset was preceded by, or coincided with, participants becoming aware of the repetition. These results imply that repetition learning is not implicit and that the appearance of a slow and gradual accumulation of knowledge is an artifact of averaging over individual learning curves.

Attention is a multifaceted mechanism operating on space, features, and memory. Previous studies reported both decline and preservation of attention in aging. Yet, it is unclear if healthy aging differentially affects attentional selection in these domains. To address these inconsistencies, we evaluated the ability to focus attention in a battery of 11 tasks in a large sample of younger and older adults (n = 172/174). We addressed if (1) aging effects are consistent across different attention tasks, and (2) if there is domain-specific or domain-general age-related decline in focused attention. Both younger and older adults benefited from focusing attention on space, features, and memory representations. Within the same domain, some tasks showed a decline, whereas others showed improvement with aging; and, on average, attentional benefits were similar across age groups. These results are inconsistent with the claim that aging is associated with either domain-specific or domain-general deficits in focused attention.

We show that the intention to remember information substantially improves recall of that information when maintained in working memory (WM), whereas it does not have the same effect on maintenance in episodic long-term memory (LTM). In eight experiments, participants processed lists of words according to a semantic orienting task in three instruction conditions: to remember, to forget, or an incidental-memory baseline with no instruction. The first two experiments showed better memory for intentional remembering compared to incidental memory for a typical test of WM, but not for a typical test of episodic LTM. The subsequent six experiments determined which of three variables distinguishing typical WM and episodic-LTM tests-delay of test, list length, and proactive interference-are responsible for this difference. The intention to remember improved free-recall performance for short lists (close to the capacity limit of WM), most strongly when tested immediately, and only in the presence of proactive interference. This result supports a functional distinction between WM and episodic LTM: Whereas episodic LTM keeps a nonselective record of experiences for future use, WM holds selectively only the information relevant for the current goal. In addition, we found a beneficial effect of intentional remembering on memory for the list position of words, which was obtained for longer lists and regardless of the delay of testing, probably reflecting episodic LTM. The instruction to forget had no effect compared to the incidental baseline, questioning the assumption of a targeted forgetting process on memory. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Recall performance in working memory (WM) is strongly affected by the similarity between items. When asked to encode and recall list of items in their serial order, people confuse more often the position of similar compared to dissimilar items. Models of WM explain this deleterious effect of similarity through a problem of discriminability between WM representations. In contrast, when lists of items that are all semantically similar are compared to lists of dissimilar items, semantic similarity does not negatively impact order memory, questioning the idea that semantic information is part of the WM content. This study reports four experiments in which semantic similarity was manipulated using lists composed of multiple semantic categories. These experiments revealed two main patterns. First, semantic similarity can increase, rather than decrease, order memory. Second, semantic knowledge reliably constrains the way items migrate; when migrating, items tend to do so more often toward the position of other similar items, rather than migrating toward other dissimilar items. These results challenge the way current models of WM represent similarity. The plausibility of different theoretical accounts and mechanisms is discussed.

Maintaining information in working memory often competes with concurrent processing of other information. This is reflected in the cognitive load effect, referring to the observation that processing tasks with a higher cognitive load result in lower memory performance. The cognitive load effect has been shown on many occasions in complex span tasks, which combine maintenance of memory items with a processing demand interleaved in between the presentation of the memory items. Two models of working memory, the Time-Based ResourceSharing (TBRS) model, and the Serial Order in a Box – Complex Span (SOB-CS) model, offer competing explanations for the cognitive load effect. Both lead to the prediction that the cognitive load effect should also be found in the Brown-Peterson task, in which the processing demand is inserted after the presentation of all of the memory items. Across three experiments, we show this prediction to be wrong. In addition, we uncovered (1) that the duration of the processing episodes has no impact on the presence or absence of a cognitive load effect, and (2) that the duration of free time, a variable intimately tied to cognitive load manipulation, affects memory performance in the same way with and without a processing demand: Free time is beneficial for memory when inserted in between the presentation of the memory items, but not when added after the presentation of the entire memory set. These results imply that both current explanations of the cognitive load effect are wrong. We propose several alternatives to account for these results.

Research on working memory has followed two largely independent traditions: One concerned with memory for sequentially presented lists of discrete items, and the other with short-term maintenance of simultaneously presented arrays of objects with simple, continuously varying features. Here we present a formal model of working memory, the Interference Model, that explains benchmark findings from both traditions: The shape of the error distribution from continuous reproduction of visual features, and how it is affected by memory set size; the effects of serial position for sequentially presented items, the effect of output position, and the intrusion of non-targets as a function of their distance from the target in space and in time. We apply the model to two experiments combining features of popular paradigms from both traditions: Lists of colors (Experiment 1) or of nonwords (Experiment 2) are presented sequentially and tested through selection of the target from a set of candidates, ordered by their similarity. The core assumptions of the Interference Model are: Contents are encoded into working memory through temporary bindings to contexts that serve as retrieval cues to access the contents. Bindings have limited precision on the context and the content dimension. A subset of the memory set – usually one item and its context – is maintained in a focus of attention with high precision. Successive events in an episode are encoded with decreasing strength, generating a primacy gradient. With each encoded event, automatic updating of working memory reduces the strength of preceding memories, creating a recency gradient and output interference.

One of the best-known demonstrations of long-term learning through repetition is the Hebb effect: Immediate recall of a memory list repeated amidst non-repeated lists improves steadily with repetitions. However, previous studies often failed to observe this effect for visuo-spatial arrays. Souza and Oberauer (2022) showed that the strongest determinant for producing learning was the difficulty of the test: Learning was consistently observed when participants recalled all items of a visuo-spatial array (difficult test) but not if only one item was recalled, or recognition procedures were used (less difficult tests). This suggests that long-term learning was promoted by increased testing demands over the short-term. Alternatively, it is possible that lower testing demands still lead to learning but prevented the application of what was learned. In four preregistered experiments (N = 981), we ruled out this alternative explanation: Changing the type of memory test mid-way through the experiment from less demanding (i.e., single item recall or recognition) to a more demanding test (i.e., full item recall) did not reveal hidden learning, and changing it from the more demanding to a less demanding test did not conceal learning. Mixing high and low demanding tests for non-repeated arrays, however, eventually produced Hebb learning even for the less demanding testing conditions. We propose that testing affects long-term learning in two ways: Expectations of the test difficulty influence how information is encoded into memory, and retrieval consolidates this information in memory.

The use of information technologies for the public interest, such as COVID-19 tracking apps that aim to reduce the spread of COVID-19 during the pandemic, involve a dilemma between public interest benefits and privacy concerns. Critical in resolving this conflict of interest are citizens’ trust in the government and the risks posed by COVID-19. How much can the government be trusted to access private information? Furthermore, to what extend do the health benefits posed by the technology outweigh the personal risks to one's privacy? We hypothesize that citizens’ acceptance of the technology can be conceptualized as a calculus of privacy concerns, government trust, and the public benefit of adopting a potentially privacy-encroaching technology. The importance that citizens place on their privacy and the extent to which they trust their governments vary though out the world. The present study examined the public’s privacy calculus across nine countries (Australia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) focusing on social acceptance of contact-tracing technologies during the COVID-19 pandemic. We found that across countries, privacy concerns were negatively associated with citizens’ acceptance of the technology, while government trust, perceived effectiveness of the technology, and the health threats of COVID-19 were positively associated. National cultural orientations moderate the effects of the basic factors of privacy calculus. In particular, individualism (value of the individual) amplified the effect of privacy concerns, whereas general trust (trust in the wider public) amplified the effect of government trust. National culture therefore requires careful attention in resolving public policy dilemmas of privacy, trust, and public interest.

Working memory supports the guidance of current thoughts and actions with temporarily selected representations deriving from either long-term memory or information recently perceived in the environment. It is characterized by the rapid establishment of bindings between these representations and/or with representations of context to create new temporary structures, by the ability to manipulate these structures, and by the ability to shift flexibly between a maintenance mode and an updating mode. This chapter is organized around a framework proposed by Miller, Galanter, and Pribram in their 1960 book that introduced the concept of working memory to the then-nascent field of cognitive psychology. It emphasizes a distinction between “plans” – hierarchical sets of rules used to achieve a goal – and “data” – the contents of working memory. These map, respectively, onto the contemporary formulation of procedural and declarative working memory. From this perspective we consider the current state of theoretical and computational models, including: the distinction between memory-systems vs. state-dependent models; differing accounts of capacity limitations; the relation of working memory to long-term memory; and the relation of working memory to attention and cognitive control. We conclude with a consideration of the neural bases of working memory, emphasizing results from lesion and neurophysiological experiments, carried out with humans and nonhuman primates, that make contact with the theoretical and computational considerations introduced above. Important topics include the working-memory functions of the prefrontal cortex, the delay-period representation of information (including alternatives to sustained, elevated delay-period activity), and the neural bases of the control of working memory.

When encoding task-relevant information in working memory (WM), we can use prior knowledge to facilitate task performance. For instance, when memorizing a phone number, we can benefit from recognizing some parts as known chunks (e.g., 911) and focus on memorizing the novel parts. Prior knowledge from long-term memory (LTM), however, can also proactively interfere with WM contents. Here, we show that WM selectively recruits information from LTM only when it is helpful, not when it would interfere. We used variants of the Hebb paradigm in which WM is tested through immediate serial recall of lists. Some lists were repeated frequently across trials, so they were acquired in LTM, as reflected in increasing serial-recall performance across repetitions. We compared interference conditions in which that LTM knowledge could interfere with holding another list in WM to a neutral condition in which that knowledge could be neither beneficial nor harmful. In Experiments 1-3, lists in the interference conditions shared their items with the learned lists but not their order. We observed no proactive interference. In Experiments 4 and 5, the interference lists' first three items overlapped exactly with the learned lists, and only the remaining items had a new order. This made LTM knowledge partially beneficial and partially harmful. Participants could use LTM flexibly to improve performance for the first part of the list without experiencing interference on the second half. LTM-mediated learning of the first part even boosted memory for the unknown second part. We conclude that there is a flexible gate controlling the flow of information from LTM and WM so that LTM knowledge is recruited only when helpful. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Working memory performance is often assumed to benefit from different maintenance control strategies such as rehearsal, refreshing, elaboration, and grouping. In studies assessing strategy self-reports, some strategies were indeed associated with better recall. Nevertheless, experimental studies assessing the effect of instructing maintenance strategies compared to a no-instruction baseline lend no evidence for the effectiveness of these strategies for working memory. Explanations for this contradiction could be that instruction implementation engenders dual-task costs, or that strategy instructions reduce adaptive strategy switching. Across two experiments, we investigated the frequency and variability of strategy use with trial-wise self-reports in serial recall of word lists. Further, we examined potential instruction costs by comparing performance in trials with self-reported vs. instructed use of the same strategies. Self-reported strategy use varied from trial to trial, with elaboration and rehearsal being the most frequent. Self-reported elaboration was correlated with better performance than reading and rehearsal. For the most prevalent strategies – elaboration and rehearsal – there were no costs of instructed strategy-implementation. Our results speak against dual-task costs, and for an advantage of adaptively choosing one’s own strategy from trial to trial.

In tests of working memory with verbal or spatial materials, repeating the same memory sets across trials leads to improved memory performance. This well-established “Hebb repetition effect” could not be shown for visual materials in previous research. The absence of the Hebb effect can be explained in two ways: Either persons fail to acquire a long-term memory representation of the repeated memory sets, or they acquire such long-term memory representations, but fail to use them during the working memory task. In two experiments (N1 = 18 and N2 = 30), we aimed to decide between these two possibilities by manipulating the long-term memory knowledge of some of the memory sets used in a change-detection task. Before the change-detection test, participants learned three arrays of colors to criterion. The subsequent change-detection test contained both previously learned and new color arrays. Change detection performance was better on previously learned compared with new arrays, showing that long-term memory is used in change detection.

Mixed models are gaining popularity in psychology. For frequentist mixed models, Barr, Levy, Scheepers, and Tily (2013) showed that excluding random slopes – differences between individuals in the direction and size of an effect – from a model when they are in the data can lead to a substantial increase in false-positive conclusions in null-hypothesis tests. Here I demonstrate through five simulations that the same is true for Bayesian hypothesis testing with mixed models, often yielding Bayes factors reflecting very strong evidence for a mean effect on the population level even if there was no such effect. Including random slopes in the model largely eliminates the risk of strong false positives, but reduces the chance of obtaining strong evidence for true effects. I recommend starting analysis with testing the support for random slopes in the data, and removing them from the models only if there is clear evidence against them.

How does the intent to remember or forget information affect working memory (WM)? To explore this question, in four experiments, we gauged the availability of the to-be-forgotten information directly. Participants remembered six words presented sequentially in separate frames. After each word offset, the frame turned either blue or orange, indicating a to-be-remembered or to-be-forgotten word, respectively. In all experiments, consistently poor recognition performance for to-be-forgotten words and facilitation of to-be-remembered words demonstrated that intent has a strong impact on WM. These directed-forgetting effects are remarkably robust: They can be observed when testing the to-be-forgotten words up to four times (Experiment 1, n=341), for both item and binding memory (Experiment 3, n=124), and even when information has to be maintained in WM up to 5s until the memory cue is presented (Experiment 2+4, n=302+321). Our study establishes a new method to jointly study the effects of intent on WM content for both relevant and irrelevant information and provides evidence for directed-forgetting in WM. Our research suggests that a combination of two processes cause directed-forgetting in WM: One process reduces memory strength of earlier memory representations as a function of subsequently encoded events. Another process rapidly encodes or boosts memory strength only when the person intends to remember that information.

Some scientific propositions are so well established that they are no longer debated by the relevant scientific community, such as the fact that greenhouse gas emissions are altering the Earth's climate. In many cases, such scientifically settled issues are nonetheless rejected by segments of the public. U.S. surveys have repeatedly shown that the rejection of scientific evidence across a broad range of domains is preferentially associated with rightwing or libertarian worldviews, with little evidence for rejection of scientific evidence by people on the political left. We report two preregistered representative surveys (each N > 1000) that (1) sought to explain this apparent political asymmetry and (2) continued the search for the rejection of scientific evidence on the political left. To address the first question, we focused on Merton's classic analysis of the norms of science, such as communism and universalism, which continue to be internalized by the scientific community but which are not readily reconciled with conservative values. Both studies show that people's political worldviews are associated with their attitudes towards those scientific norms, and that those attitudes predict people's acceptance of vaccinations and climate science. The norms of science may thus be in latent conflict with the worldviews of a substantial segment of the public. To address the second question, we examined people's views on the role of inheritance in determining people's intelligence, given that the belief in the power of learning and environmental factors to shape human development is a guiding principle of leftwing thought. We find no association between core measures of political worldviews and people's view of heritability of intelligence, although two subordinate constructs, nationalism and social dominance orientation, were associated with belief in heritability.

Novelty-gated encoding is the assumption that events are encoded more strongly into memory when they are more novel in comparison to previously encoded events. It is a core assumption of the SOB model of serial recall (FarrellLewandowsky, 2002). We present three experiments testing some predictions from novelty-gated encoding. Experiment 1 shows that the probability of recalling the third item in a list correctly does not depend on whether it is preceded by phonologically similar or dissimilar items. Experiment 2 shows that in lists of items from three classes (nonwords, spatial locations, and abstract drawings) the probability of recalling an item does not depend on whether it is preceded by items from the same or another class. Experiment 3 used a complex-span paradigm varying the phonological similarity of words that are read aloud as distractors in between memory items. Contrary to a prediction from novelty-gated encoding, similar distractors did not impair memory more than dissimilar distractors. The results question the assumption of novelty-gated encoding in serial recall. We discuss alternative explanations for the phenomena that this assumption has previously helped to explain. The present evidence against novelty-gated encoding might point to boundary conditions for the role of prediction error in the acquisition of memories.

There is a recent surge of interest in maintenance processes in working memory, such as articulatory rehearsal, elaboration, and attentional refreshing. Yet, we know little about the central attentional demand of these processes. It has been assumed that articulatory rehearsal does not require central attention at all (Vergauwe, Camos, & Barrouillet, 2014), being in essence a cost-free strategy. In contrast, elaboration and attentional refreshing are assumed to incur large and continuous costs on central attention. We tested these assumptions in three experiments in which participants were presented with a varying number of words to rehearse. Participants were instructed to rehearse the words aloud, or to elaborate them by creating interactive images. Attentional refreshing was examined in a condition in which words were to be maintained during articulatory suppression. During retention participants carried out a series of choice reaction tasks, which were used to measure central attentional demands of the maintenance strategies. Articulatory rehearsal had costs on processing RTs that lasted for 10 s. Maintenance of words during articulatory suppression did not yield persistent costs on central attention, implying that participants did not continuously refresh the words. Finally, the current results cast doubt on the idea that elaboration requires central attention for an extended period of time. All experimental scripts and data sets reported here are available online ( https://osf.io/69p8j/ ).

Most studies of visual-working memory employ one of two experimental paradigms: change-detection or continuous-stimulus reproduction. In this study, we extended the Interference Model (IM; OberauerLin, 2017), which was designed for continuous reproduction, to the single-probe change-detection task. In continuous reproduction, participants occasionally report the non-target items instead of the target. The presence of non-target response is predicted by the Interference Model, which relies in part on the interference of non-target items to explain the set-size effect. By presenting a probe matching a non-target item, we can investigate the amount of interference from non-target items in change detection. As predicted by the Interference Model, we observed poorer performance in rejecting a probe matching a non-target item compared to a new probe (i.e., a cost due to intrusions from non-targets). We fitted the IM along with the Variable Precision, the Slot-Averaging, and the Neural-Population model to the data from two change-detection experiments. The models were equipped with a Bayesian decision rule based on the one used in Keshvari, van den Berg, and Ma (2013). The Interference Model and the Neural-Population model successfully predicted the set-size effect and the non-target intrusion cost, whereas the Variable Precision (VP) and Slot-Averaging (SA) models failed to predict the intrusion cost at all. Even with additional assumptions enabling VP and SA to produce intrusion costs, the IM still performed better than the competing models quantitatively.

Working memory provides a medium for building and manipulating new representations that control our thoughts and actions. To fulfil this function, a working memory system needs to meet six requirements: (1) it must have a mechanism for rapidly forming temporary bindings to combine elements into new structures; (2) it needs a focus of attention for selectively accessing individual elements for processing; (3) it must hold both declarative representations of what is the case, and procedural representations of how to act on the current situation; (4) it needs a process for rapid updating, including rapid removal of outdated contents. Moreover, contents of working memory (5) need to be shielded from interference from long-term memory, while (6) working memory should be able to use information in long-term memory when it is useful. This chapter summarizes evidence in support of these mechanisms and processes. It presents three computational models that each implement some of these mechanisms, and explains different subsets of empirical findings about working memory: the SOB-CS model accounts for behaviour in tests of immediate serial recall, including complex-span tasks. The interference model explains data from a common test of visual working memory, the continuous-reproduction task. The set-selection model explains how people learn memory sets and task sets, how these sets are retrieved from long-term memory, and how these mechanisms enable switching between memory sets and task sets.

Human attention is subject to fluctuations. Mind-wandering (MW) – attending to thoughts unrelated to the current task demands – is considered a ubiquitous experience. According to the Control Failure x Concerns view (McVay & Kane, 2010), MW is curbed by executive control, and task-irrelevant thoughts enter consciousness due to attentional control lapses. The generation of off-task thoughts is assumed to increase with higher number of personal concerns. Challenging this view, older adults report less MW than younger adults. Here, we addressed the hypothesis that older adults report less MW due to a lower ability to notice attention lapses and to appraise their current on-task focus. In an age-comparative study (N = 40 younger and N = 44 older adults) using a battery of three tasks spanning working memory, reading comprehension, and sustained attention, we assessed the correlation between the degree of self-reported on-task focus and task performance on a trial-by-trial basis. Younger and older adults' degree of on-task attention measured through thought probes was correlated equally strongly with performance across trials in all tasks, indicating preserved ability to monitor attentional fluctuations in healthy aging. Self-reported current concerns' number and importance did not differ across age, and they did not predict self-reported attention across tasks. Our study shows that lower rates of MW in aging do not reflect lower validity of older adults' attentional appraisal or lower levels of current concerns.

Attentional control as an ability to regulate information processing during goal-directed behavior is critical to many theories of human cognition and thought to predict a large range of everyday behaviors. However, in recent years, failures to reliably assess individual differences in attentional control have sparked a debate concerning whether attentional control, as currently conceptualized and assessed, can be regarded as a valid psychometric construct. In this consensus paper, we summarize the current debate from theoretical, methodological, and analytical perspectives. First, we propose a consensus-based definition of attentional control and the cognitive mechanisms that potentially contribute to individual differences in attentional control. Next, guided by the findings of an in-depth literature survey, we discuss the psychometric considerations that are critical when assessing attentional control. We then provide suggestions for recent methodological and analytical approaches that can alleviate the most common concerns. We conclude that, to truly advance our understanding of the construct of attentional control, we must develop a theory-driven and empirically supported consensus on how we define, operationalize, and assess attentional control. This consensus paper presents a first step to achieve this goal; a shift toward transparent reporting, sharing of materials and data, and cross-laboratory efforts will further accelerate progress.

Some issues that have been settled by the scientific community, such as evolution, the effectiveness of vaccinations, and the role of CO2 emissions in climate change, continue to be rejected by segments of the public. This rejection is typically driven by people's worldviews, and to date most research has found that conservatives are uniformly more likely to reject scientific findings than liberals across a number of domains. We report a large (N>1,000) preregistered study that addresses two questions: First, can we find science denial on the left?Endorsement of pseudoscientific complementary and alternative medicines (CAM) has been anecdotally cited as being more consonant with liberals than conservatives. Against this claim, we found more support for CAM among conservatives than liberals. Second, we asked how liberals and conservatives resolve dilemmas in which an issue triggers two opposing facets of their worldviews. We probed attitudes on gender equality and the evolution of sex differences---two constructs that may create conflicts for liberals (who endorse evolution but also equality) and conservatives (who endorse gender differences but are sceptical of evolution). We find that many conservatives reject both gender equality and evolution of sex differences, and instead embrace ``naturally occurring'' gender differences. Many liberals, by contrast, reject evolved gender differences, as well as naturally occurring gender differences, while nonetheless strongly endorsing evolution.

The process of spontaneous refreshing plays a central role in current models of working memory but is yet to be observed directly. In a recent study, Rey and colleagues (Rey, Versace, & Plancher, 2018) introduced a novel approach to investigate the mechanisms underlying refreshing: They presented tones previously associated with a visual mask during the free time of a complex span task, and found that this impaired memory, presumably because reactivation of the masks disrupts refreshing. Here we aimed to replicate their finding under more controlled settings with more observations per participant. We failed to replicate the previous findings, thereby questioning the robustness of the original effect.

There is a broad agreement that psychology is facing a replication crisis. Even some seemingly well-established findings have failed to replicate. Numerous causes of the crisis have been identified, such as underpowered studies, publication bias, imprecise theories, and inadequate statistical procedures. The replication crisis is real, but it is less clear how it should be resolved. Here we examine potential solutions by modeling a scientific community under various different replication regimes. In one regime, all findings are replicated before publication to guard against subsequent replication failures. In an alternative regime, individual studies are published and are replicated after publication, but only if they attract the community’s interest. We find that the publication of potentially non-replicable studies minimizes cost and maximizes efficiency of knowledge gain for the scientific community under a variety of assumptions. Provided it is properly managed, our findings suggest that low replicability can support robust and efficient science., There has been much concern about the “replication crisis” in psychology and other disciplines. Here the authors show that an efficient solution to the crisis would not insist on replication before publication, and would instead encourage publication before replication, with the findings marked as preliminary.