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Human beings as imperfect rational beings face continuous challenges, one of them has to do with the lack of recognizing and respecting our inner dignity in present times. In this collective paper, we address the overall theme—Philosophy of Education in a New Key (see Peters et al., 2020) from various perspectives related to dignity. We address in particular some of the constraints and possibilities with regard to this issue in various settings such as education and society at large. Klas Roth discusses, for example, that it is not uncommon that the value of human beings has to do with their price in, inter alia, their social, cultural, political and economic settings throughout the world. He argues that such a focus does not necessarily draw attention to the inner dignity of human beings, but that human beings ought to do so in education and society at large. Lia Mollvik discusses views of inner and outer dignity, and argues that there needs to be a balance in between them, and that the balance ought to be acknowledged in education. Rama Alshoufani discusses the classification of human beings in terms of various diagnoses related to the asserted dysfunction of the brain, and she argues that such classification does paradoxically not necessarily respect people with such diagnoses as ends in themselves. On the contrary, she argues that their inner dignity is not respected, but that it should be. Other such failures are due to the lack of inner dignity when it comes to Children’s rights as discussed by Rebecca Adami, and to the lack of recognition of human beings’ vulnerability as discussed by Katy Dineen. Fariba Majlesi criticizes a too strong emphasis on substantive notions of humanist education, which seem to hinder new ways of thinking; she argues that it is necessary to acknowledge the latter in and through education in order to preserve the dignity of human beings. Dignity, it is argued throughout the paper, has an inner moral worth, and is beyond price.

Kant argues that we have a duty to perfect ourselves morally and promote the happiness of others. He also argues that we have an innate propensity to evil. Our duty to perfect ourselves suggests th...

Kant begins his Lectures on Pedagogy by stating, ‘[t]he human being is the only creature that must be educated’ (Kant, 2007, 9:441), and he argues that it is through education that we can transform...

It is argued with Immanuel Kant that we as human beings ought to unify ourselves as efficacious, autonomous and creative beings, and that moral education is an open-ended and never-ending process. It is also argued that we wilfully deviate from unifying ourselves in the terms mentioned above due to our imperfect rational nature. This, however, does not suggest that we should not be able to unify ourselves in the terms suggested. On the contrary, the efforts to render ourselves efficacious, autonomous and creative should remain. It seems, however, that education in present times influences children and young people to render themselves efficacious with regard to specific desired ends, as well as being loyal and morally committed to how things stand, instead of making it possible for them to unify themselves in the above-mentioned sense. Education is therefore not an open-ended and never-ending process in moral terms.

This paper discusses the value and importance of examples in Kantian terms, and how students can cultivate their moral disposition through the use of examples in education. It is argued that students should not just copy or imitate examples automatically, nor appraise them unreflectively and uncritically. They should instead be enabled to think for themselves in the position of the other and consistently, through the use of examples. This paper also discusses the extent to which students in teacher education programmes in Sweden were enabled to cultivate a moral disposition through the use of literature which unveils a design of education in national, European and cosmopolitan terms. However, since it seems that they lacked such opportunities it is argued that they were not enabled to cultivate their moral disposition through the use of the above-mentioned literature.

Making Ourselves Intelligible-Rendering Ourselves Efficacious and Autonomous, without Fixed Ends

Robin Barrow claims in his ‘Moral education's modest agenda’ that ‘the task of moral education is to develop understanding, at the lowest level, of the expectations of society and, at the highest level, of the nature of morality … [that is, that moral education] should go on to develop understanding, not of a particular social code, but of the nature of morality – of the principles that provide the framework within which practical decisions have to be made’ [Barrow, R. 2006. Moral education's modest agenda. Ethics and Education 1, no. 1: 3–13.]. Barrow's words are noteworthy not only because he sets out to define the ‘modest’ agenda of moral education in terms of principles, but also because he asserts that education is important for teaching students to understand morality in such terms. However, even though he is arguing that understanding morality is important in terms of principles, he says little about their function or status, or how we cultivate ourselves so that we act in agreement with and are mo...

How can we understand human agency, and what does it mean to educate character? Inthis essay Klas Roth develops a Kantian notion, one that suggests we render ourselves efficacious andautonomous in ...

Why should we deliberate? I discuss a Kantian response to this query and argue that we cannot as rational beings avoid deliberation in principle; and that we have good reasons to consider the value and strength of Kant's philosophical investigations concerning fundamental moral issues and their relevance for the question of why we ought to deliberate. I also argue that deliberation is a wide duty. This means that it has to be set as an end, that it is meritorious, and that we cannot specify exactly what acts can be identified with it or are required for its realization. I begin by discussing why we cannot avoid deliberation in principle, that deliberation is a wide duty and why we ought to set it as an end. In the second part I argue how deliberation can be acknowledged in cosmopolitan education, and how we can inquire into the quality of communication in terms of deliberation in such an education or elsewhere.

Do we need principles of the unification of our agency, our mode of acting? Immanuel Kant and Christine Korsgaard argue that the reflective structure of our mind forces us to have some conception of ourselves, others and the world-including our agency-and that it is through will and reason, and in particular principles of our agency, that we take upon ourselves to unify and test the way(s) in which we make our lives consistent. I argue that the principles suggested-the hypothetical imperative and the categorical imperative-function to unify our understanding of ourselves and others as agents as efficacious and autonomous and that the extent to which those concerned render themselves efficacious and autonomous in cosmopolitan education or elsewhere is due to the extent to which they act in accordance with and are motivated by the suggested principles and in particular the categorical one. I first discuss how the principles function to unify our agency and how the categorical imperative functions as a test of maxims for our actions, how the will is the source of our morality, and how we are forced to have practical identities. I end with some remarks on what it means to acknowledge the mentioned principles in cosmopolitan education.

(2011). Cosmopolitan Identity and Education. Educational Philosophy and Theory: Vol. 43, Philosophical Perspectives on Cosmopolitanism and Education. Guest Editors: Klas Roth and Nicholas C. Burbules, pp. 205-208.

It happens that people recognize that they are not in agreement with each other and experience a loss of relation in circumstances of various kinds. And when they do, philosophy can begin. Stanley Cavell, however, not only says that philosophy can begin. He expresses a stronger claim, saying that ‘‘philosophy begins in loss, in finding yourself at a loss, as [Ludwig] Wittgenstein more or less says. Philosophy that does not so begin is so much talk.’’1 And when it begins, according to Cavell, it can untangle conceptual confusions and clarify linguistic practices; it can be tailored to diagnose the history of individuals and groups with the specific aim of articulating the voice of the individual; and it can make it possible for the individual to strive for perfection. However, philosophy does not always begin when people recognize that they are not in agreement with each other or when they experience loss; philosophy cannot get off the ground or come to resolution unless people are willing or have a chance to begin a philosophical inquiry. And when it does not begin, people may find themselves or others to be less open-minded, striving to maintain certain practices, traditions, and narratives instead of making it possible for themselves and others to live alternative or new ways of life, to think differently and continue the endless struggle for transformation. People may even believe or come to believe that they have overcome loss or think it is possible to overcome it. However, I find it reasonable to believe, as Cavell does, that ‘‘loss is as such not to be overcome, it is interminable, for every new finding may incur a new loss.’’ He concludes that ‘‘the price is necessarily to give something up, to let go of something, to suffer one’s poverty’’; it is to begin philosophy.2 This suggests that you come to understand the need to recover from loss, the need for change and transformation of society and the self, and that you are willing to strive for perfection. This struggle is, however, a process that can never be completed because it is always, according to Cavell, possible to conceptualize yet another higher self to reach for. Moreover, to begin philosophy can also mean that you come to acknowledge what is human and what characterizes humanity, and that, according to Cavell, you come to realize that ‘‘the human creature’s basis in the world as a whole, its relation to the world as such, is not that of knowing, anyway not what we think of

The notion of `truth' is one of the most important concepts within critical thinking and critical pedagogy as well as in other traditions or theories, and truth is seen by many as the outcome of inquiry. In this article I will argue for an alternative notion of truth to those that will be discussed in it and that such a view has to be included in a new critical language in education. I discuss a realist notion, a postmodernist social constructivist notion, a relativist notion, a deflationist and a cautionary discursive conception of truth put forward by Habermas, and contend that they are problematic in the light of my interpretation of Donald Davidson's philosophy of language. I also argue that truth cannot be a goal of inquiry, but that understanding and justification are legitimate goals. Finally, I contend that it is reasonable to include notions such as understanding, justification and deliberation in Davidson's terminology in a new critical language of education.

In this paper I show how Article 26 of the Declaration of Human Rights developed from its earlier versions, including basic ideas for education, to aims and purposes, and its final adaptation incor ...

Institutions worldwide respond to the need to recognise the value of educating children and young people to handle or solve conflicts in communication. But how do they or we know that an event is correctly interpreted as a conflict? How can people analyse the quality of deliberation when handling or solving conflicts in communication in education? I discuss these questions and argue that the notion of conflict cannot be defined only in terms of incompatibility, clash, opposition and/or disagreement; it also has to encompass negativity in the approach to the other. I also argue that the quality of deliberation can be analysed through a deliberative pedagogical approach, which takes into account structural features of deliberation and required dispositions of the participants, and that our knowledge of conflicts emerges holistically and is interpersonal and objective. I begin by giving an account of some institutional responses to conflicts. Then I discuss the notion of conflict and define it, inter alia, in terms of incompatibility, disagreement and negativity. Finally, I discuss ideas for analysing the quality of deliberation in communication when handling or solving conflicts in education.

Education in many countries is used to initiate children and young people into publicly accepted forms of knowledge and to further a common identity among members and citizens of the nation‐state. This study discusses both an uncritical initiation to such knowledge and the value of criticality as an educational goal in terms of critical thinking, critical pedagogy, and revolutionary pedagogy. It contends that global transformation is challenging national education: such use is untenable in relation to a holistic view of understanding. It argues further that the holistic view challenges an account of democratic competence in terms of critical thinking, critical pedagogy, and revolutionary pedagogy. It opens up the possibility of democratic deliberation in post‐national education.

Present arrangements for the control and administration of schools in Sweden foster freedom of choice and the interests of different value communities more than ideals such as democratic deliberation. I argue that children and young people should be given the opportunity to deliberate in ‘discourse ethics’ terms during their compulsory schooling, and I suggest that their right to engage in such deliberation is contained in the national curriculum. A discourse ethics approach to democratic deliberation pays attention to whether, and to what extent, individuals are free and able to participate in joint democratic deliberation.

Introduction: The Highest Good-the Moral Endeavor of Education, Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant 1. Kant's Contribution to Moral Education, Chris W. Surprenant 2. Kant and Rousseau on Moral Education, Joseph R. Reisert 3. Rousseau, Kant, and the Pedagogy of Deception, Phillip Scuderi 4. "Not a Slow Reform, but a Swift Revolution": Kant and Basedow on the Need to Transform Education, Robert B. Louden 5. Kant on Education, Anthropology, and Ethics, Manfred Kuehn 6. Educating through Perplexity: Kant and the German Enlightenment, Richard Velkley 7. Bringing Morality to Appearances: Kant's Theory of Education, Gary B. Herbert 8. Culture and Paradox in Kant's Philosophy of Education, Jorgen Huggler 9. Kant's Invitation to Educational Thinking, Lars Lovlie 10. Examples of Moral Possibility, Paul Guyer 11. Moral Education and the Ideal of Humanity, Richard Dean 12. Enabling the Realization of Humanity: The Anthropological Dimension of Education, Alix Cohen 13. From Discipline to Autonomy: Kant's Theory of Moral Development, Paul Formosa 14. Kant as Moral Psychologist? James Scott Johnston 15. Kant on the Humanities, Susan Meld Shell 16. Freedom and Autonomy in Knowledge-Based Societies, Klas Roth

The Swedish government seems to be telling us to believe that schools should ‘impart the more unvarying forms of knowledge that constitute the common frame of reference that all in society need’ (Lpo-94 1994, p. 5), that the ‘school has the important task of imparting, instilling and forming in pupils those fundamental values on which our society is based’ (ibid., p. 3), and that those should underlie the basic approaches of learning in a democratic pluralistic society. This rationalisation of learning seems to increase the student’s understanding, and to be a reason for the agent’s - that is, the student’s - action as an informed and responsible member of a democracy. However, public education is increasingly challenged by altered conditions in our post-national societies. Economic, technological and political issues are no longer exclusively a national-state matter, but a transnational and global one. Cultural homogeneity is being increasingly challenged by increasing recognition of difference. Should teachers then only impart ‘the more unvarying forms of knowledge’ to and instil the ‘fundamental values’ of our society in children and young people in order to educate them as informed and responsible citizens? Imparting and instilling do not self-sufficiently legitimise or rationalise learning in a deliberative sense. Democratic deliberation offers a more full-fledged view of learning in deliberative democratic and pluralistic societies or so I will argue.

This chapter develops a nexus between globalisation, values and human rights, within cultural perspective. It is argued that there is a need to re-conceptualise the nexus between globalisation and values education in Australia. The authors remind us that those universal human rights standards are rooted in many cultures. As such, they make it possible to develop a model of Human Rights for Australia, which links both multiculturalism and reconciliation.

That education for responsibility can be interpreted in different ways follows from the simple fact that we humans can ‘combine a limited repertoire of concepts in a potentially infinite number of ways’ (Davidson, 2004, p. 13). In this chapter, I discuss an epistemological, ethical and deliberative interpretation of the question of how it is possible to educate people so that they become responsible citizens. My overall purpose is to argue for a deliberative interpretation. Responsibility, in the epistemological interpretation, means learning more about the other and the world and us, being loyal to members of the nationstate and developing the capacity to be critical. Hence, the success of education for responsibility is evaluated against how far children and young people learn knowledge, are loyal to other citizens of the nation-state and develop their critical capacity. An ethical interpretation of responsibility suggests something different. It suggests a call upon the primacy of our ethical relation to the other as Other, which goes beyond our understanding and knowledge of the other. It proposes a radical openness to the Other as an absolute difference and a necessary asymmetry between others as Others. To be responsible for the other means that you are actively responsible for your responsibility for the other as an absolute, infinite and unknowable Other; a responsibility that precedes our knowledge and understanding of the other. This suggests, for advocates of postmodern ethics, that we give up the idea that we should learn more about the other as a correct ethical response to the Other. The success of education for responsibility then becomes a matter of whether teachers and students take their responsibility for their responsibility for the other as Other instead of just learning about others. In the deliberative interpretation, responsibility means that you are both accountable to and responsible for the other when rationalising actions. ‘Accountable to’ means that you have an obligation to explain your reason(s) for your action and to support your claims about the validity of your descriptions of the situation, the world, people and yourself and the validity of your explanations and reasons given. ‘Responsible for’ involves your obligation to ask the other for his/her reason(s) for his/her action(s) as well. The success of education for responsibility is then evaluated against how far children and young people are accountable to and responsible for each other and critically investigate the sincerity, righteousness and truthfulness of actions.

Introduction: Education in the Era of Globalizing Capitalism: Ilan Gur-Zeev and Klas Roth.- 1: Dialogue, Difference, and Globalization: An Interview with Nicholas Burbules: Klas Roth.- 2: Moral Education, Liberal Education, and the Voice of the Individual,: Paul Standish.- 3: A Kantian Conception of Human Rights Education: Pradeep A. Dhillon.- Ambiguities of Cosmopolitanism: Difference, Gender and the Right to Education: Sharon Todd.- (Dis)locating Imaginative and Ethical Aims of Global Education: Elizabeth E. Heilman .- Education for Responsibility: Knowledge, Ethics and Deliberation: Klas Roth.- Education for Deliberative Democracy: Lars Lovlie.- Multicultural Metaphors: J. Mark Halstead.- Racism: The Birth of a Concept: Walter Feinberg.- Education as Subjectivity: Three Perspectives on the Construction of Subjectivity and the Position of Knowledge: Birgit Nordtug.- Sports Education Facing Globalizing Education: Ilan Gur-Ze'ev.- Toward a Critique of Paideia and Humanities: (Mis)Education and the Global Ecological Crisis: Richard Kahn.- Hope and Education in the Era of Globalization: Olli-Pekka Moisio and Juha Suoranta.