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There are many ways to go wrong when evaluating new information, e.g. by putting unwarranted trust in non-experts, or failing to scrutinize information about threats. We examined how effective people were at evaluating information about the COVID-19 pandemic. Early in the course of the pandemic, we recruited 1791 participants from six countries with varying levels of pandemic severity, and asked them to evaluate true and false pandemic-related statements (assertions and prescriptions) sampled from the media. We experimentally manipulated the source of each statement (a doctor, a political/religious leader, social media, etc.). Overall, people proved to be epistemically vigilant: they distinguished between true and false statements, especially prescriptions, and they trusted doctors more than other sources. These effects were moderated by feeling threatened by the pandemic, and by strong identification with some sources (political/religious leaders). These findings provide optimism in the fight against misinformation, while highlighting challenges posed by politics and ideology.

In this article, I rely on religious existential philosophy to make sense of the moral restoration expressed by combat veterans who engage in reconciliation with former enemies after suffering from moral injury. Moral injury is the persistent feeling of having betrayed one's deepest moral values. Anthropological research and analyses of combat veterans' testimony suggest that moral injury may be associated with reconciliation, which is considered here as a manifestation of an inner transformation akin to existential philosophies of striving for moral authenticity. Specifically, it is argued that Thomas Merton's defense of living a morally authentic life, which constitutes a process of moving from spiritual woundedness to social engagement with the other, parallels the transition of combat veterans involved in postconflict reconciliation efforts. Given this correspondence, existential moral transformation is considered alongside the anthropology of peace for explaining moral injury as a precondition for reconciliation, notably after armed conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Glowacki's account overlooks the role of religion in the regulation of cooperation, tolerance, and peace values. We interrogate three premises of Glowacki's argument and suggest that approaching religion as an adaptive system reveals how religious commitments and practices likely had a more substantial impact on the evolution of peace and conflict than currently presumed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legal narratives about collective violence have given an outsized explanatory role to propaganda in conflicts such as the Rwandan genocide and the Yugoslav Wars. While post-conflict ethnographies have examined what Rwandans remember about propaganda and collective violence, similar studies have not been undertaken in territories of the former Yugoslavia. The present ethnographic study fills this gap. After introducing the theoretical and empirical problems that have stemmed from recent speech crime trials in international criminal law, I examine the causes of collective violence in the Yugoslav Wars as remembered by former combatants, survivors, and the greater populations of post-conflict regions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia. I show that remembered causes, including the role of propaganda, vary significantly between former combatants and the greater populations. Nevertheless, local perspectives, especially among former combatants and survivors, converge on the effects of populist movements following Yugoslavia's economic crisis and the rise of ethnic, religious, and nationalist leaders who engaged in inflammatory rhetoric and misinformation to mobilize war efforts. This article thus corroborates key findings from other post-conflict ethnographies which show that propaganda plays a secondary but significant role in the cultural manufacturing of state-sponsored ethnicity and cultural logics of violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What universal features of the mind interact with specific ecologies to produce expressions of violent religious nationalism? To shed light on this question, we focus on a case study of the Yugoslav Wars, asking: How did different religious groups in the Balkans move from cooperative relationships to violent ones? We argue that the most prevalent theories invoked to answer this question fail to adequately explain the change, namely, both the rise and fall of violent religious nationalism in the Balkans. To that end, we employ a systemic framework of religious change to examine historical data and ethnographic interview excerpts from ex-fighters and survivors of the Yugoslav Wars. This framework takes religion as it is practiced by communities to be a complex adaptive system, and models how religions adapt to local socioecologies. In employing this framework, three questions are addressed: (1) What features of cognition contributed to religiously motivated mass violence; (2) Which constituents of the religious system triggered those features; and (3) What socioecological factors were those constituents responding to? We argue that popular support for religious violence--and eventually its rejection--involved a set of higher-order functions, which McNamara calls the centralized executive self. This decision-making system was decentered by religious specialists who raised social pressures; group rituals that sustained community engagement; and identity-markers that signaled group commitments. While support for violence was a response to community threats during state-level succession, the eventual rejection of violence by religious leaders and communities was due to socioecological factors, such as rising health threats and declining birth rates brought about by the wars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various issues on topics including forgiveness, ethics and reconciliation.

Strictly clinical perspectives on intimate partner abuse focus on the psychological well-being of the victim and the structural factors of victimization, resulting in several unresolved questions regarding the role of public intervention. Because public intervention is the main predictor for preventing future assaults, the practical aim of this study is to increase public intervention by drawing from evolutionary psychology to identify and explain the central factors that minimize intervention. Our data show that most people express significant ambivalence and make anomalous decisions when confronted with various forms of intimate partner violence. We analyse a number of significant factors that decrease intervention behaviours and show how they are consistent with evolutionary theories of forgiveness-seeking and revenge-avoidance behaviours and cognitive mechanisms designed to avoid revenge-seeking scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]