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The literature has pointed out the negative aspects of political dynasties. But can political dynasties help prevent autocratic reversals? We argue that political dynasties differ according to their ideological origin and that those whose founder was a defender of democratic ideals, for simplicity labeled “pro-democratic dynasties,” show stronger support for democracy. We analyze the vote by the French parliament on 10 July 1940 of an enabling act that granted full power to Marshall Philippe Pétain, thereby ending the Third French Republic and aligning France with Nazi Germany. Using data collected from the biographies of parliamentarians and information on their voting behavior, we find that members of a pro-democratic dynasty were 9.6 to 15.1 percentage points more likely to oppose the act than other parliamentarians. We report evidence that socialization inside and outside parliament shaped the vote of parliamentarians.

This article introduces the Haitian Independence Debt of 1825 to the odious debt and sovereign debt literatures. We argue that the legal doctrine of odious debt is surprisingly and perhaps indefensibly narrow, possibly because of historical contingency rather than any underlying logic or principle. The story of the Haitian Independence Debt of 1825 serves as an illustrative case study. In the context of telling that story, we provide estimates of the evolution of Haiti’s external debt-to-GDP ratio over 1825–2020, and discuss the implications of the independence debt for the economy of Haiti. We conclude by discussing the implications of Haiti’s Independence Debt for the doctrine of odious debt and the possibilities for Haiti to recover compensation.

info:eu-repo/semantics/published

‘Sovereign’ bonds issued by colonies are often supposed to benefit from an implicit imperial guarantee. This guarantee is usually presented as the main reason why yields on colonial bonds are exceptionally low. This paper investigates investors’ perception of this guarantee during the interwar period, a period during which the guarantor faced financial turmoil and some colonies began their journey towards independence. On the basis of an original database tracking the yields of six colonial bonds we show that, in general, market participants believed the guarantee would be honoured. This general observation needs, however, to be nuanced. In 1931 when Britain left the gold standard, investors felt the British guarantee was less valuable. Furthermore, when colonies were facing extreme financial distress, markets reassessed the likelihood the guarantee would be honoured. This was also the case when it became clear that India would become independent.

This article introduces the Haitian Independence Debt of 1825 to the odious debt and sovereign debt literatures. We argue that the legal doctrine of odious debt is surprisingly and perhaps indefensibly narrow possibly because of historical contingency rather than any underlying logic or principle. The story of the Haitian Independence Debt of 1825 serves as an illustrative case study. In the context of telling that story, we provide estimates of the evolution of Haiti’s external debt-to-GDP ratio over 1825-2020, and discuss the implications of the independence debt for the economy of Haiti. We conclude by discussing the implications of Haiti’s Independence Debt for the doctrine of odious debt and the possibilities for Haiti to recover compensation.

Sovereign governments often discriminate between creditors during debt default episodes. This paper explores how expectations of selective default affect sovereign bond trading and sovereign risk premia based on a historical laboratory: the German external default of the 1930s. We exploit a unique feature of the interwar sovereign bond market: identical German government bonds were traded on different creditor countries' secondary debt markets but investors expected creditors from various countries to be treated differently in case of default. We show that, when creditor countries' secondary debt markets are integrated, selective default expectations are not reflected in bond yields but affect the volume of bonds traded across markets. By contrast, when creditors' debt markets are geographically segmented, a large selective risk premium can be priced in sovereign bonds. This premium accounted for up to half of the total risk premium on German external bonds during the 1930s. We establish that creditor countries' seniority ranks can be explained by their economic power over the debtor government.

In 1898, in the wake of the Spanish-American war, Spain ceded the colony of Cuba to the United States. In keeping with the law of state succession, the Spanish demanded that the U.S. also take on Spanish debts that had been backed by Cuban revenues. The Americans refused, arguing that some of those debts had been utilized for purposes adverse to the interests of the Cuban people. This, some argue, was the birth of the doctrine of “odious debts”; a doctrine providing that debts incurred by a non-representative government and utilized for purposes adverse to the population do not need to be repaid by successor regimes. This Article tests the historical evidence in favor of the birth of the odious debts doctrine at the turn of the twentieth century by considering the treatment of perhaps the archetypal odious debt: the debt that Belgium’s King Leopold undertook to finance his horrific exploitation of the Congo Free State (“CFS”). In 1908, Leopold was forced to transfer sovereignty over the CFS to Belgium. If the doctrine of odious debts existed at the time, we should see evidence of it in the public debate about whether Belgium was obliged to take on King Leopold’s debts. Based on original archival research into political debates, litigation regarding Leopold’s estate, and contemporary prices and yields of Leopold’s bonds, we see no such evidence.

Proper inventory management is crucial for art galleries. Yet, despite its importance, inventory management has been overlooked in the literature. We distinguish four main strategies used by art dealers to manage their inventory and use this classification to set the inventory strategy of Goupil, Boussod & Valadon, a major art gallery active in France at the end of the 19th century, into perspective. Goupil’s books cover the sale of more than 25,000 artworks between 1860 and 1914. Rapidity to sell was a key element in Goupil’s strategy. Out of the sold artworks, almost 75% were sold within a year. Goupil required a slightly higher mark-up for artists from which he held a large inventory. Mark-up for artists in residence and the likelihood to sell their artworks at a loss were lower, signaling a preoccupation for their long-term market., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

The value of a painting is influenced above all by the artist who created it and his reputation. Painters nowadays are easy to identify and are used to signing their artworks. But what about those whose names have not survived the test of time? This paper contributes to the understanding of art valuation and art brands on the auction market. It focuses on a particular subset of anonymous artists labelled with so-called provisional names (“Master of …”). After considering the origins and reception of the practice of creating names for unrecorded artists, we empirically investigate the market behaviour of this niche segment. Based on comparative price indexes and hedonic regressions, we show that masters with provisional names have not only become autonomous brand names that are highly valued by the art market; they also outperformed named artists between 1955 and 2015. In the second phase, we analyse the provisional-name linked elements valued by the market. We find that art market participants pay attention to the creator of the provisional name, its long-term recognition and market visibility, and the typology of the names.

Despite its importance as a financial centre, the historical literature dedicated to the Swiss financial industry remains scarce. Analyses focusing on cantons and cities of the country are even more limited in number. This is unfortunate and is, in all likelihood, linked to the reluctance of financial institutions to share information in a country where banking secrecy has been at the core of the past success of these institutions. Despite this willingness to share as little as possible, some archival funds have gradually become available, most notably after businesses went bankrupt, changed hands, or simply disappeared. The present article relies on these sources to analyse the evolution of the Geneva stock exchange during the interwar period, which saw a gradual decline of its activity. Independent brokers strived to keep their oligopoly over banks. At the same time, Swiss German banks tried to penetrate the canton-controlled marketplace by using their federal rights and strength to become unavoidable actors. They could ultimately help local bankers gain direct access to the Geneva stock exchange, obliterating the power of brokers who were left with no other choice than to appeal to the Canton of Geneva to defend their position.

Because of the scarcity of data, there are few quantitative analyses dealing with clandestine markets, despite their prime importance during wartime. This article exploits a unique database of daily prices of gold coins traded in occupied Paris in order to gain insights into the price formation on such a market. First, using data from Switzerland, we show that arbitrage took place, despite the costs and risks involved, and led to a gradual (but incomplete) convergence of gold prices. Furthermore, a study of price seasonality reveals that less strict borders controls during the weekends made the volatility of returns higher at the start of the following week. Second, on the basis of an event study, we provide evidence that laws related to black markets did not have a significant impact on the gold price, except for the most severe law passed on 8 June 1943 which greatly increased the sentences for involvement. Finally, we assess whether the so-called coin premiums existed on this clandestine market, and show that the large price variations for one gram of fine gold contained in different coins were due to market participants’ preferences for specific gold coins., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

When a conflict breaks out, warring states’ bond prices generally experience sharp declines. As military defeat may prompt the winner to ask for reparations, bonds issued by the losing party are usually even more affected. By contrast, during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), the prices of the bonds issued by the South African Republic never fell below 96% of par and this despite the fact that the public believed South African defeat could not be avoided. We attribute this observation to investors’ belief that a British victory would lead to the assumption of the South African debt by the victor. Historical precedents and archival evidence show that this was by no means a foregone conclusion. Our analysis reveals the important role played by Rothschild, the underwriter. When the bond was first issued, Rothschild signalled that should a war break out the bond would be repaid. Once the war became reality, Rothschild was instrumental in making sure Great Britain would take over the loan.

Does financial globalization lead to contagion? We scrutinize linkages between international stock markets in a long historical perspective (1880-2014). Our results highlight that without globalization, contagion cannot exist. However, if cross-market correlations are very high, globalization kills contagion. We show that financial contagion was absent from stock markets in both the period of deglobalization of 1918-1971 and the era of "extreme" globalization of 1972-2014 but was present in the period of "moderate" globalization of 1880-1914. Our results suggest that contagion could become a significant problem if financial markets return to a more moderate level of globalization.

Economists have suggested it was optimal to signal the odious character of bonds when they were issued. However, since the odious debt doctrine has not been recognized by any court, one could argue that denouncing odious debts is useless. Exploiting a unique historical episode, this paper quantifies the impact of protests on odious debts. In 1906, the Russian government floated a bond in Paris to cover the costs of its war against Japan but also to raise money to crush the political movements wishing to reform Russia’s political system. Issued without parliamentary consent, this loan met with fierce opposition. Press campaigns in Great Britain, France and Germany denounced its odious character. If failure or success is determined solely by the ability to prevent a loan from being issued, then the campaign failed. We argue, however, that failure or success should be determined in light of the financial costs imposed on the issuer for future loans and even the ability to force a postponement of these loans. We show that these campaigns increased the yields of all Russian bonds traded in Paris, and thus Russia’s future borrowing cost. Yields on the 1906 loan, which was specially targeted by the campaigns, rose even more. However, once the press campaigns stopped, yields experienced a declining trend, highlighting the important role the press may have on odious debts., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

In the Belle Époque, Belgium recorded an unprecedented trade boom, but growth in output per capita was lackluster. We seek to reconcile this ostensible paradox. Because of the sharp decline in both fixed and variable trade costs, the trade boom was as much about the expansion in the number of products delivered and markets served as it was about shipping more of the same old products. We use a new highly disaggregated data set on bilateral exports at the product level to illustrate these claims. In line with new trade theory, the effect of trade on productivity was mediated by sector-level firm heterogeneity and product differentiation. In new technology sectors, like tramways, the high degree of firm heterogeneity amplified the effect of trade on productivity. But in other sectors, mainly old staple industries like cotton textiles, a high level of firm uniformity muted the effect of trade. Into the twentieth century, old staples trumped new technology sectors, per capita income growing modestly as a result.

Sovereign debt crises are not a new phenomenon. Thus, history offers useful insights into the complex nature of sovereign debts and ways of addressing debt crises. This chapter explores sovereign debt problems and the responses to such problems in historical perspective. The chapter discusses historical episodes of sovereign debt defaults, how such defaults were settled and the impact of sovereign debt defaults on international relations. It also deals with the issues of odious debts, colonial ‘sovereign’ debts, reckless lending and borrowing and fairness to repay.

Economists have been blamed for their inability to forecast and address crises. This article attributes this inability to intertwined factors: the lack of a coherent definition of crises, the reference-class problem, the lack of imagination regarding the nature of future crises and sample-selection biases. Specifically, economists tend to adapt their views on crises to recent episodes, and omit averted and potential crises. Threshold-based definitions of crises run the risk of being ad hoc. Using historical examples, this article highlights some epistemological shortcomings of the current approach.

According to the syndicated loan pricing puzzle (Carey and Nini, 2007) interest rates charged to corporate borrowers are lower in Europe than in the U.S. Our investigation suggests that controlling for region-specific credit ratings makes the Europe–U.S. gap insignificant, and solves the puzzle. We speculate that the puzzle originates from the lack of uniformity of accounting standards.

Following Waterloo, managing French public finances represented a daunting task as the country had lost a substantial part of its population and territory and had to pay huge amounts as reparations to the victors. Despite this, in just ten years, France managed to issue substantial amounts of debt with a spread, compared to the British consol, falling from more than 400 to 100 basis points. We argue that the Duke of Wellington was key in creating an environment in which Baring had an incentive to lend to France and all actors had an incentive to see French debts reimbursed., SCOPUS: re.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

History provides many insights to address the issue of sovereign debt defaults. This article first presents a detailed account of defaults in historical perspective. It then discusses the solutions devised in the past to address sovereign debt crises and puts these into perspective with today’s answers when crises occur. Finally, the paper stresses the role of history when the events studied do not occur frequently and when archival data may shed new light on the process of the resolution of crises. The impact of odious debts declarations, of state succession, and of international relations on sovereign defaults and on their settlement is thus also addressed. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.

The emergence of the gold standard has for a long time been viewed as inevitable. We analyze agents' expectations using the spread between gold and silver bonds issued by the Indian government. We find that bimetallism was credible until France surprised markets by suspending domestic operation of bimetallism, triggering a run away from silver. Thereafter, markets began demanding a premium to hold silver bonds, indicating their belief that silver would depreciate in the future as more countries moved on gold.

Sovereign debts differ from other financial instruments because repayment ultimately depends on the issuers' willingness to pay. In turn, willingness to pay may be influenced by political, diplomatic or economic considerations. Based on an original database of Romanian bonds traded in Paris, this article shows that international diplomacy played an important role in the Romanian debt valuation.