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The aim of this study is to analyze and assess the impact of institutional factors on political trust in various levels of government (federal, regional and local) in modern Russia. Data and methods. The study is based on microdata from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) “Life in Transition Survey” (LiTS). We examined such institutional factors of political trust as perceived government performance and level of corruption, as well as the level of interpersonal trust. The subjective decile of household wealth was an additional explanatory variable in our analysis. We estimated the model parameters using linear regressions with instrumental variables. Results and their application. First, we found that in 2016 the perceived effectiveness of the federal government was the main determinant of Russian trust in the president. At the same time, the perceived level of local corruption was a major factor of Russian citizens’ (mis)trust in local authorities. Second, we found that poor households turned out to be the most loyal groups of the population towards the Russian president, and we explained this phenomenon by the active redistributive policy of the federal authorities. Third, we revealed a significant positive relationship between political and interpersonal trust at the micro level. In conclusion, we made recommendations on the effective management of political trust in modern Russia.

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Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The comparative study of housing decommodification lags behind classical welfare state research, while housing research itself is rich in homeownership studies but lacks comparative accounts of private and social rentals due to missing comparative data. Building on existing works and various primary sources, this study presents a new collection of up to forty-eight countries' social housing shares in stock and new construction since the first housing laws around 1900. The interpolated benchmark time series generally describes the rise and fall of social housing across a residual, a socialist, and a Northern-European housing group. The decline was steeper than for the classical welfare state, but the degree of erosion was surprisingly small in some countries where public housing associations remained resilient. Within the broader housing welfare state, social housing correlates positively with rent regulation and allowances, but negatively with homeownership subsidies and liberal mortgage regulation. A multivariate analysis shows that social housing is rather explained by housing shortages and complementarities with rental and welfare policies than by typical welfare state theories (GDP, political parties). Generally, the paper shows that conventional housing typologies are difficult to defend over time and argues more generally for including housing decommodification in welfare state research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The German economy continues to stagnate. After it appeared to finally be growing at the start of 2024, it experienced a slight setback in the second quarter. Although incomes are rising and inflation is now near the two-percent target, people in Germany are saving their money. As investments and exports faltered due to the sluggish industrial sector, the upturn has been delayed for the time being. Overall economic output is likely to stagnate in 2024, but it will likely pick up at the end of the year; growth of 0.9 and 1.4 percent is expected in 2025 and 2026, respectively. Private consumption, which will increase more slowly than expected but still provide a stimulating effect, will primarily support this growth. As interest rates continue to fall worldwide, foreign trade and investments are also supporting growth. The global economy has returned to its recovery path, but expanded more weakly in the second quarter compared to the first. Growth in China in particular has stalled somewhat, and there are also signs of an upcoming economic slowdown in the United States. Following growth of 3.8 percent in 2024, the global economy is expected to expand by only 3.5 percent in 2025, but develop more dynamically again in 2026. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The German economy began recovering at the beginning of 2024 and has developed better than initially expected. A sharp rise in construction investment, albeit more of a flash in the pan as a result of mild winter weather, along with strong goods exports helped the economy onto its recovery path and masked the disappointing development of private consumption, which sank unexpectedly. However, consumer sentiment has since brightened considerably: Following the recent special payments, employees in many sectors are now earning more on a permanent basis due to pay raises, which increases income security. In conjunction with the inflation rate now being stable at below the three-percent threshold, real wages are rising significantly. Added to this is the turnaround in interest rates initiated by the European Central Bank, which is making saving less attractive and loans more affordable. The UEFA European Men's Football Championship, which is being held in Germany this year, is also likely to boost consumption, albeit slightly. In addition to private consumption, foreign trade will prove to be the second mainstay of the German economy in the forecast period. On the one hand, imports are increasing as the domestic economy becomes stronger. On the other hand, the German export industry will also experience a significant boost, as industrial production is likely to pick up worldwide. Due to the high share of intermediate products and investment goods, exports "made in Germany" are particularly dependent on the global industry's economic situation. In Germany, too, industrial companies will begin investing more in their capacities from 2025 at the latest. Construction investment will then also rise again. Overall, the outlook is somewhat more positive than it was in the spring: Instead of stagnating, DIW Berlin now expects the German economy to grow by 0.3 percent in 2024 and by 1.3 percent in 2025. One risk factor for the forecast is that the full extent of the damage from the flooding in southern Germany is still unclear. In some places, production capacities could remain impaired for longer than expected. At the same time, it is also conceivable that repair and reconstruction work could increase economic output. Overall, however, the effects in one way or the other are likely to remain manageable. In addition, the tug-of-war over the next federal budget could once again become a factor contributing to uncertainty, possibly even more so than was already to be expected after the results of the EU elections in Germany. The global economy will also gain some momentum over the forecast period. The euro area is finally overcoming its weak phase for good and international trade is picking up speed. The interest rate turnaround in the major advanced economies will likely have a positive effect on residential construction and corporate investments from the second half of 2024. Overall, the global economy is expected to grow by 3.7 percent in 2024 and by 3.6 percent in 2025. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The German economy will likely contract in the first quarter of 2024 due to still heightened inflation and weak demand, which was already weighing on German economic output in 2023. Inflation, which is falling in both Germany and the euro area overall, is expected to return close to the European Central Bank's two-percent target, suggesting that a turnaround in interest rates can be expected in early summer. Better financing conditions and the slowdown in price momentum are likely to somewhat boost both private consumption as well as corporate investments over the course of 2024. Nevertheless, there is currently still a great deal of uncertainty, particular in regard to the future economic policy environment, which is causing households and companies to remain cautious in Germany. In addition, fiscal policy stimuli as well as foreign demand are lacking. German GDP will virtually stagnate and, carried by private consumption and public investments in equipment, increase more markedly by 1.2 percent in 2025. The global economy will continue to develop more robustly than Germany; it is projected to increase by 3.5 percent in both 2024 and 2025, which should gradually strengthen German exports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In 2020, Berlin introduced a rigorous rent-control policy responding to soaring prices by capping rents: the Mietendeckel (rent freeze). The German Constitutional Court revoked the policy only one year later. Although successful in lowering rents during its duration, the consequences for Berlin's rental market and close-by markets are per se not clear. This article evaluates the short-term causal supply-side effects in terms of prices, quantities, and landlords' strategic behavior. We develop a theoretical framework capturing the key features of first-generation rent control policies and Berlin-specific aspects. Using a rich pool of detailed rent advertisements, predictions are tested, and further empirical causal inference techniques are applied for comparing price trajectories of dwellings inside and outside the policy's scope. Mechanically, advertised rents drop significantly upon the policy's enactment. A substantial rent gap along Berlin's administrative border emerges, and rapidly growing rents in Berlin's (unregulated) adjacent municipalities are observed. Landlords started adopting a hedging strategy insuring themselves against the risk of contractually long-term fixed low rents following a potentially unconstitutional law. Whereas this hedge was beneficial for landlords, the risk was completely borne by tenants. Moreover, the number of available properties for rent dropped significantly, a share of which appears to be permanently lost for the rental sector. This hampers a successful housing search for first-time renters and people moving within the city. Overall, negative consequences for renters appear to outweigh positive ones. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance. Funding: This research benefits from funding by the FNR Luxembourg National Research Fund [CORE Grant 3886] (ASSESS) and the OeNB Anniversary Fund [Grant 18767] (LocHouse). M. Fongoni further thanks the Department of Economics at the University of Strathclyde for support and acknowledges funding from the French government under the "France 2030" investment plan managed by the French National Research Agency [Reference ANR-17-EURE-0020] and from the Excellence Initiative of Aix-Marseille University - A*MIDEX. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4775. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The (re-)introduction of tenancy regulation in the form of rent controls, tenant protection or supply rationing is back on the agenda of policymakers in light of rent inflation in many global cities. While rent controls promise short-term relief, economists point to their negative long-run effects on new construction. This study presents new long-run data on both rent regulation and housing construction for 16 developed countries (1910–2016) and finds that more restrictive rental market legislation generally has a negative impact on both new housing construction and residential investment. This is especially true for strict rent controls and housing rationing measures in the post-1960 period. Tenancy security can on average also dampen construction activity. The negative effect is overall less significant and strong in magnitude than expected and may have been offset by exemptions for new construction, by compensating social housing construction and by a flight of new construction into the owner-occupied sector. Still, on average, rent controls came at the cost of less construction activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Welfare is traditionally understood as social security decommodifying labour markets or as social investment policies. In the domain of housing, however, welfare for homeowners is largely hidden in the tax codes' fiscal exemptions. Based on a content analysis of legislation, this article introduces a novel yearly database of 37 countries between 1901 and 2020 to uncover the "hidden welfare state" of taxes on imputed rent, deductibility of mortgage payments, housing capital gains tax, and value-added tax on newly built dwellings. Summary indices of homeownership attractiveness and neutrality of the tax code show that fiscal homeownership policies have been in decline until the 1980s and risen ever since. They are in place where finance is liberally and labour restrictively regulated. Contrary to the classical welfare state, they are not associated with an economic logic of industrialism or left-wing governments. They rather are an alternative to rent regulation used by Common-law jurisdictions or smaller countries. As welfare for property owners, the logic of fiscal homeownership welfare diverges from the classical welfare for the labouring classes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]