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In Radical Skepticism & Epistemic Intuition Michael Bergmann attempts to overcome the threat of radical skepticism as it arises in several different forms. The key to Bergmann’s response to skepticism is his method of intuitionist particularism wherein we give our intuitions about particular beliefs being justified more weight than we do intuitions about the premises of arguments for skepticism. There are two general problems for Bergmann’s response to skepticism. First, he fails to accurately portray the key principle of the skeptical argument. As a result, much of the apparent motivation for looking to intuitionist particularism as opposed to other responses to skepticism is merely apparent. Second, intuitionist particularism faces significant problems when it comes to the Problem of the Criterion and the resolution of conflicting intuitions. However, a related intuitionist method, one incorporating explanationism, may be able to deliver what intuitionist particularism promises while avoiding its problems.

All people desire to know. We want to not only know what has happened, but also why it happened, how it happened, whether it will happen again, whether it can be made to happen or not happen, and so on. In short, what we want are explanations. Asking and answering explanatory questions lies at the very heart of scientific practice. The primary aim of this book is to help readers understand how science explains the world. This book explores the nature and contours of scientific explanation, how such explanations are evaluated, as well as how they lead to knowledge and understanding. As well as providing an introduction to scientific explanation, it also tackles misconceptions and misunderstandings, while remaining accessible to a general audience with little or no prior philosophical training.

This chapter further elucidates PE by explaining how it applies to multiple domains. Though the preceding chapter already touches upon some of these, here it is cashed out how PE can account for perceptual justification, memorial justification, testimonial justification, introspective justification, and a priori justification. Exploring the contours of PE in this way reveals just how powerful and unified the theory is. Along the way, it is argued that Declan Smithies’ forceful objections to PC fail to impugn PE. Additionally, it is shown that PE has the resources to respond to each of the challenges that Smithies claims are faced by any internalist theory with “global ambitions”––any theory that purports to be a comprehensive account of epistemic justification. (These challenges for instance include the problem of forgotten evidence and the problem of stored beliefs.) The discussion in this chapter makes it clear that PE is a comprehensive account of epistemic justification that achieves its global ambitions.

This chapter situates PE within the context of the broader debate between Epistemic Liberalism (which holds, roughly, that it is reasonable to grant that things are the way they appear to be unless there is reason for doubting it) and Epistemic Conservatism (the view that, roughly, it is not reasonable to grant that things are the way they appear to be unless there is independent reason to think that the appearances are reliable). PE is squarely within the Liberal camp. Therefore, after explaining some of the primary elements of Liberal/Conservative debate in epistemology, two of the primary challenges faced by Liberal views like PE are examined. The first is, again, the problem of bootstrapping, which any theory that allows for immediate justification seems to run into. The second is White’s Bayesian objection to PC (introduced in Chapter 1), according to which Liberalism, and so PE, is flawed because it is incompatible with probabilistic reasoning. It is shown that PE is not troubled by these challenges. The upshot of the chapter is that Liberalism, when exemplified in PE, is victorious over Conservatism.

McCain and Moretti develop a new appearance/seemings-based theory of epistemic justification. This theory, Phenomenal Explanationism, takes as a reasonable starting point the idea that how things appear provides evidence about how the world is. However, unlike other appearance-based theories, Phenomenal Explanationism does not rely on an overly simplistic account of evidential support where things appearing a particular way is sufficient for rationally believing they are that way. Instead, Phenomenal Explanationism takes the insight that appearances are evidence and imbeds it into a broader explanationist framework. In this broader framework the world appearing a particular way provides sufficient justification for believing the world is that way just in case the world being the way it appears best explains the total evidence. Although Phenomenal Explanationism draws inspiration from Phenomenal Conservatism and explanationist theories, it is superior to both in that it offers a satisfying, complete theory of epistemic justification.

This chapter provides grounds for thinking that PC is insufficient even as a theory of non-inferential justification. Two primary problems are raised for PC. First, PC needs an account of epistemic defeat. PC includes a “no-defeater” condition. However, it is shown that once one tries to get clear on the nature of defeat and how defeaters work within the framework of PC, it becomes apparent that one needs to appeal to something more than just the comparative strength of various seemings. Second, it is argued that PC falls prey to the problem of reflective awareness. If one reflects on one’s seemings, one’s justification deriving solely from them is destroyed. So, it seems that satisfying some condition other than PC is required for reflective agents to have stable non-inferential justification. It is also shown, however, that an unexpected consequence of the problem of reflective awareness is that PC is not really subject to bootstrapping problems.

This chapter articulates the anti-skeptical line of response afforded by PE. It is also shown that while the promised anti-skeptical bite of other appearance-based theories, such as PC, dissolves when one becomes reflectively aware of one’s own appearances, the same is not true of PE. This not only addresses a perennial concern for internalist theories but also completes the case for the superiority of PE over both PC and similar theories that do not take on board explanationist insights. This chapter shows that PE offers all that one might want from PC and much more. So, PE is an important theory of epistemic justification that is worthy of serious consideration.

This chapter incorporates a sophisticated version of PC (one that draws on the distinctions between kinds of appearances that explained in Chapter 3) into a broader explanationist framework to produce the view that is defended in this book: Phenomenal Explanationism (PE). Explanationism is an account of evidential support, i.e., of how and when evidence supports particular doxastic attitudes toward propositions. However, on its own, Explanationism does not say what evidence is or when one has a particular bit of information as evidence. This is true even when Explanationism is construed, as this chapter does, in terms of mentalist evidentialism. As a theory of evidential support, mentalist Explanationism leaves open which mental states constitute one’s evidence. Explanationism can thus be readily combined with different theories of evidence and evidence possession. If PC is understood as a theory of basic evidence, the sophisticated version of PC can be combined with Explanationism. This chapter introduces a specific version of Explanationism and describes how this variant of PC can be incorporated into it to produce PE. It also describes how PE accounts for both non-inferential and inferential justification (both deductive and inductive). Finally, it explores how PE overcomes the challenges to PC raised in Chapter 2.

A promising response to the threat of external world skepticism involves arguing that our commonsense view of the world best explains the sensory experiences that we have. Since our commonsense view of the world best explains our evidence, we are justified in accepting this commonsense view of the world. Despite the plausibility of this Explanationist Response, it has recently come under attack. James Beebe has argued that only a version of the Explanationist Response that provides an a priori justification of inference to the best explanation can hope to respond to two serious objections. Additionally, he has argued that providing such an a priori justification requires an acceptable account of a priori probability and that it is unclear whether such an account can be developed. In this paper I argue that Beebe fails to provide adequate support for either of these claims.