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Outcomes Based Commissioning (OBC) – for example, Pay for Success (in the US) or Payment by Results (in the UK) – has been suggested as a way to provide ‘more’ social services for ‘less’ public resources. Such commissioning is often linked with an innovative financing tool called a Social Impact Bond (SIB). Using data from the Social Finance UK Database and focusing on SIBs in the US and UK, we evaluate whether the SIB approach aligns with the theoretical predictions of social innovation. The results provide limited evidence that SIBs facilitate capital injections from the private sector into the production of social goods as well as facilitate parts of the process of social innovation – namely, piloting and scaling. We conclude that there is significant variation, both between the US and UK and within the US, in social innovation ecosystems and the role played by SIBs.

Positive social capital-building outcomes were identified in a longitudinal evaluation of a veteran-specific initiative supporting desistance from crime and substance misuse. A secondary analysis of the qualitative data generated is presented here. We identify three transformational subjective re-alignments across the veteran cohort who sustained their engagement in the mutual aid initiative. These re-alignments are linked to the mobilization of bonding, bridging and linking sources of social capital. We directly align mutual aid practice dynamics with the micro-, meso- and macro-level distinctions highlighted in relational desistance explanatory frameworks. Our analysis provides new insights into the relationship between social capital building and desistance. We present a theoretically informed social capital-building process model highlighting the generalizability of our findings to wider (ex-) offender populations.

This chapter looks at the history of work from a social, economic and political perspective. It analyzes the beginning of work and of industrial relations, on a global scale. It goes on to speculate on in what way work will evolve in the immediate future, given technological change and ecological pressures.

The ultimate framing of the first iteration of RRI as enabling smart, inclusive, sustainable growth had as much to do with the financial crisis then engulfing the Eurozone as meeting the goals of the Lisbon Treaty. Now we have come to the end of Horizon 2020, it is presently unclear how RRI will continue to be addressed as it is mainstreamed into Horizon Europe. In this Perspective, we will argue that discussions about placing responsibility at the centre of innovation should not solely be aimed at promoting GDP-measured growth. Our vision must be longer, more global, more transformative. In this short piece, we explore the possibilities arising through extending ‘responsibility’ to an a-growth approach to innovation, one which emphasises the relational dimensions of responsible innovation through the concept of ‘well up’ economics. ispartof: Journal of Responsible Innovation vol:8 issue:2 status: Published online

This paper considers criminal justice policy in England and Wales since the Transforming Rehabilitation (TR) agenda implemented in 2013. TR rested on the proposition that probation services are best provided in a market context. Motivated by profit and extrinsic rewards, private sector consortia, and their employees, theoretically act efficiently to deter and rehabilitate offenders from crime. However, there is evidence that marketisation itself undermines the prospects of efficient social policy. Over-reliance on markets may undermine pro-social norms through emphasising individualism and extrinsic returns. Outsourcing is also associated with increasing inequality, which may also undermine pro-social norms. Further, the emphasis placed on self-interest in framing market-based incentive structures is associated with declining public welfare support for the economically marginalised and increased use of relatively expensive incarceration. In application, TR proved unsustainable. The innovation involves increasing reliance on the para-state sector, in which private profits rely on public payment. However, the profits expected under TR fell short of expectations, in part due to changes in wider society. The early cancellation of TR contracts highlights the inflexible nature of such public sector procurement. On the basis of theory and practice, we suggest a reconsideration of the government’s position on probation and set out reasonable steps to address shortcomings in the current system.

This chapter explores why market-based policies, promoted under the prevailing global paradigm of “economic liberalism”, are not sufficient in and of themselves to facilitate human wellbeing in a stagnant world economy. It describes how, in theory, markets deliver efficient allocations of private (commodified) goods and services, yet in practice the conditions for this efficiency are seldom met.

Innovation is generally considered to be the antidote to economic stagnation. But while the coupling of ‘responsible' and 'innovation’ has been much discussed, that of 'responsible stagnation' has gone largely unexplored. In this book, we take this concept seriously as a means to question the political economy of science, technology and innovation, both as policy and as process, and the problems which arise from unquestioned emphasis on innovation as the means to increase GDP. The book argues that examining what 'responsible stagnation' might contribute opens new space in the growing global discussion about RI, incorporating innovation in non-market oriented processes, goods and services which have strong societal benefit but do not necessarily contribute to GDP. It examines the conundrum of diminishing productivity returns and increased environmental and social hazards associated with attempts to increase GDP, and how taking a growth-agnostic approach contributes to recalibrating innovation around responsibility as its focal point. Drawing on insights from ecological and steady state economics, Science and Technology Studies, and social innovation across the world, this interdisciplinary group of scholars questions how the growth paradigm shapes and limits the innovation space, and how decoupling innovation from growth points toward myriad possibilities for facilitating human well-being in more environmentally and socially responsible ways.

The chapters in the book demonstrate the sheer scale of marketisation and privatisation that has occurred in criminal justice in the UK. There is evidence similar marketisation has occurred in other states around the world. As this book demonstrates, there are a whole array of other means by which the market has been used to shape the delivery of experiences of criminal justice. The chapters in this book expose a range of modes of governance and accountability that are at play and demonstrate the ways in which marketisation has impacted on criminal justice at macro-, meso- and micro-levels. Importantly, they have shown what the impact of this has been on the broader field, the individuals working within those fields and the service users that are subjected to systems of power delivered in newly formed markets. In this concluding chapter we attempt to draw some of the themes that run across the earlier chapters together and consider what the future might hold for criminal justice and marketisation.

This chapter outlines the process of political innovation through which governments have coordinated other agencies and sectors to achieve often complex goals, for example, through the transfer of political and/or financial risk, and through attempts to include and motivate non-state organisations in a range of ways. It is this pursuit of innovation which underpins both the reasoning behind privatisation and marketisation, and the continued efforts to manage its consequences, both expected and unforeseen. The essays in this volume consider the scale and impact of marketisation and privatisation in the area of criminal justice. concepts of marketisation are reflections of an increasingly monopolistic neo-liberal hegemony which promises citizens a utopian political project for ensuring individual freedom (subject only to market forces), and private and social enterprise opportunities to bid as the state transforms from provider to auctioneer of public goods and services. This chapter summarises the analyses offered in this edited collection and contextualises these perspectives to develop our knowledge and understanding of the process of privatisation and marketisation, the impact of it and the extent to which newly marketised and privatised services result in ‘justice’.

A major innovation in public sector commissioning in recent years is the recourse of the state to so called ‘Outcomes-based Contracts’ particularly Payment by Results (PbR) in the UK. A PbR contract contains three elements, a commissioner, a service provider and an outcomes metric. The outcomes metrics is designed, in theory, to align the incentive structures of the commissioner and the service delivery agency so as to achieve efficient results. Thus, PbR is theorised to allow public commissioners to pay a provider of services on the basis of specified outcomes achieved rather than the inputs or outputs delivered. A related innovation is that of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs). SIBs are distinguished from PbR contracts in that they supposedly allow financiers to contribute to the social innovation process by providing working capital. The return on the SIB is calculated using PbR methodology. Compared to a PbR contract, the SIB contract seeks to align the incentive structures, not only of commissioners and providers, but also financiers through an appropriate metrics-based payments scheme. PbR and SIBs have been referred to as key tools for delivering change. In this chapter we set out the theoretical and practical challenges arising from the development and application of PbR and SIBs and consider the evidence of their efficacy or otherwise.

In this chapter we discuss the recent course of privatisation and marketisation in UK prisons and probation. Prior to the Transforming Rehabilitation, TR, agenda, its theoretical strengths and weakness were analysed in some detail in the literature. It is appropriate therefore to consider whether the aspirations implicit and explicit in TR have been achieved. Since 2010, the progress of marketisation in prisons and probation has been uneven. In prisons, Outcomes Based Commissioning, aka Payment by Results, PbR, contracts were proposed but are not used in any significant way; instead the emphasis has been on new and devolved models of commissioning rehabilitation services and the development of Reform prisons. In probation, marketisation – often involving elements of PbR – proceeded rapidly from a small-scale pilot to a national roll-out. However, this model has come in for significant criticism and now appears unsustainable in its current form. Government has cancelled existing contracts early and one provider has failed. We consider the various approaches taken in prison and probation policy and draw out the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches that have been tried, drawing on the available evidence. We finish with some thoughts on the future (or otherwise) of marketisation in this sector.

Governments in some of the world’s richest nations appear to be caught in a double challenge of declining social budgets even as social needs are increasing. In this context, Outcomes Based Commissioning (OBC), has been suggested as one way in which ‘more’ social services can be provided for ‘less’ public resources. This form of commissioning is often linked with a new financing tool for social services, referred to in the US as ‘Pay for Success and Payment by Results in the UK or as a ‘Social Impact Bond’ (SIB). However, to date, this approach is under-theorised and this is a limiting factor both for shaping a research and evaluation agenda around SIBs and in understanding how such instruments might develop in future. Without a theoretical rationale for SIBs, it is not straightforward to assess whether, and how well, they have achieved their goals, and how they might be developed further. In this paper we consider two broad approaches to theorising SIBs. One draws on public administration theories, the other on innovation theories. To date, SIBs have often been theorised as the logical next step in the New Public Management (NPM). But NPM itself is a contested theory and recent theoretical innovations in public administration, particularly the concept of New Public Governance might provide a more useful theoretical framework. A second broad approach through which to understand SIBs is their potential to improve the rate and dissemination of innovation. There are many different innovation models that might be applied to better understanding of SIBs. We look first at the concept of Open Innovation with its focus on distributed innovation processes in which knowledge flows across organisational boundaries and more recent articulations – Open Innovation 2.0 – which place greater emphasis on mixed economy collabarations involving: industry; government; universities; and communities and users (the so-called ‘quadruple helix’) to solve societal challenges. We go on to consider social innovation, with its clearer focus on using social means to deliver social outcomes and whether SIBs can be theorised through this lens. No one model is entirely satisfactory as an explanatory framework for SIBs and we conclude by suggesting that a supporting theory combining NPG with elements of Open Innovation 2.0 and social innovation might be a productive approach for shaping future research and, in addition, might suggest some future directions for the next generation of SIBs.

Economics are the method: The object is to change the soul (Thatcher, 1981)There is a growing disaffection with mainstream politics in the world’s liberal democracies. In particular, the UK has become an increasingly divided nation; as evidenced by, for example, increasing inequality, an emphasis on individualism, the so-called North/South divide and the polarised debate about the UK’s leaving the European Union. Many leading UK politicians claim their inheritance of the “Thatcher legacy” to legitimate their proposed policies, yet it is not clear what is that legacy. Thatcher’s policies, instituted in the 1980s and broadly pursued by subsequent governments, changed the economic and social outlook of the UK. Criticism of her record is taken to indicate one is a left-wing ideologue. Our contribution in the following is that we judge Thatcher’s policies by no standards other than her own. Utilising a holistic approach, we consider whether neo-liberal policies facilitated or undermined the UK’s achieving Thatcher’s stated moral outcomes: the growth of democratic capitalism and the strengthening of the moral economy. We demonstrate, in contrast to contemporary narratives of her “saving the country”, the neo-liberal economic experiment has failed to deliver, even on Thatcher’s own terms. This analysis has contemporary domestic and global implications as generally Thatcherite policies continue to be applied in the UK and in other nations around the world.

This chapter explores the relationship between the transformations that have occurred in a rapidly changing social media-driven world, young people’s consumption and their sense of self. Our aim is to assess the extent to which new processes of individualisation and high levels of uncertainty create an incentive for young people to redefine the way they use consumption as a vehicle for creating and navigating individual biographies. It is long established that consumption constitutes the primary arena within which young people try to construct their identities and establish themselves. However, in this chapter we consider the suggestion that social media representations function as a parallel arena that has profoundly altered the way in which young people use consumption to identify themselves with the world around them.

All right reserved. As public services budgets are cut, the 'Payment by Results' (or Pay for Success) model has become a popular choice in public sector commissioning. Social Impact Bonds are a variant of Payment by Results also promoted by proponents of social (or impact) investing. But how effective are these approaches? This short book asks whether the Payment by Results model is an efficient way to unlock new capital investment, help new providers to enter the 'market' and foster innovation, or whether the extension of 'neoliberal' thinking, complexity and the effects of managerialism undermine the effective delivery of social outcomes. Synthesising lessons from the UK and US for the first time, the book draws on published work in both countries together with insights from the authors' own research and consultancy experience to offer a balanced and bipartisan overview of a field where the evidence has been weak and there are strong ideological agendas in play.

This chapter discusses some key theoretical issues that are raised by outcomes-based commissioning. It begins by outlining three potential theoretical drivers of outcomes-based commissioning. First, Payment by Results (PbR)/Pay for Success (PFS) and Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) can be viewed as the logical next step in the New Public Management (NPM) reforms aimed at improving public sector efficiency. Second, they can be explained as an attempt by policy makers to deal with complexity in the social world. Third, they can be interpreted as a means by which policy makers seek to facilitate and develop new and existing philanthropic activity and social enterprise. The chapter goes on to consider the underlying theories and objectives of outcomes-based commissioning as well as how practice and theory may differ, focusing on issues relating to perverse incentives, conflicting policy objectives, risk management, and contracting. Finally, it examines questions of delivery and outcomes.

This chapter discusses the development of outcomes-based commissioning in the UK, focusing on Payment by Results (PbR) and Social Impact Bonds (SIBs). It first considers key policies that have underpinned outcomes-based commissioning in the UK since 2010 before analysing PbR programmes and SIBs in more detail, highlighting results and some of the important issues related to these areas of policy. It shows that the themes of New Public Management (NPM) and risk management are evident in the development of PbR and SIBs, whereas the theme of social innovation is present but less prominent. The chapter also provides an overview of the social investment market and two PbR programmes, namely, the Work Programme and the Troubled Families programme. Finally, it describes two SIBs: HMP Peterborough SIB and Nottingham Futures SIB.

Over recent years there has been increasing interest in ‘Payment by Results’ (PbR) — Pay for Success (PFS) or outcomes-based funding in the US — as a model for outcomes-based commissioning in the public sector. Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) — Pay for Success financing in the US — are a class of PbR where the finance needed to make the contract work is provided by private finance, rather than the service provider. This short book asks whether and under what circumstances PbR/PFS and SIBs/PSBs are an efficient way to unlock new capital investment and advance social goods. It considers whether PbR/PFS and SIBs/Pay for Success financing drive efficiency and innovation in the delivery of social outcomes, and whether attempts to reconcile corporate profits and social goods may lead to perverse incentives and inefficiency. It also analyses the impact of PbR and SIBs on not-for-profit and smaller players in the market for social outcomes.

This chapter reviews the current state of evidence on what works in outcomes-based commissioning using published evaluations of Payment by Results (PbR) and Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) in the UK and SIBs in the US. Findings from these evaluations are arranged under the following broad headings: designing and commissioning, development of markets, performance management, innovation, the role of incentives, and overall outcomes. The evaluations address issues such as the complexity of PbR commissioning models compared to other commissioning exercises, the impact of PbR on the market for social goods, and the development of new or enhanced performance management systems as a result of outcomes-based commissioning. Two areas of innovation are also highlighted: innovation in service design and delivery, and innovation in financing.

This book has examined some technical, economic and political questions about outcomes-based commissioning as well as key theoretical debates, arguing that outcomes-based commissioning in its various guises may be theorised as a logical extension of New Public Management (NPM) or marketisation. It has also shown that outcomes-based commissioning might be theorised as policy makers' response to complexity and risk management, and/or as a means of facilitating philanthropists and other private sector actors in social innovation. This chapter draws conclusions from the evidence that has been reviewed, discusses the theoretical issues that have been identified, and considers future directions for Payment by Results (PbR) and Social Impact Bonds (SIBs).

Warmer, drier summer weather brought by global climate change should encourage use of outdoor leisure facilities. Yet few studies assess the effect of current weather and climate conditions upon visits to leisure attractions. Statistical time series models are used to analyse the short-run impact of weather and the long-run impact of climate upon visits to Chester Zoo, England. Temperature has a non-linear effect on visit levels. Daily visits rise with temperature up to a threshold around 21 °C. Thereafter visitor numbers drop on hot days. Visits are redistributed over time in accordance with the weather. Visitors discouraged by rainy weather one day turn up later when the weather improves. Otherwise, visitor behaviour is mainly influenced by the annual rhythm of the year and the pattern of public and school holidays. Out-of-sample tests suggest almost 70 % of the variation in visit levels can be explained by the combination of weather and time of year. Climate change is likely to redistribute visitors across the year. But it does not follow that “summer” visitor behaviour will transfer to spring and autumn. Day length, existing patterns of human activity and availability of leisure time constrain visit levels regardless of better weather. The main implication of potential climate change is the need for physical adaptation of the tourist environment as temperatures rise and rainfall diminishes in summer.

Social innovation discourses see in social challenges opportunities to make societies more sustainable and cohesive through inclusive practices, coproduction and pro-active grassroots initiatives. In this paper we are concerned first that the concept has been stretched in so many directions that it is at breaking point. We illustrate this by documenting the varied uses of social innovation in different academic and policy discourses. Second, we assume that, if social innovation is to be a useful concept for policy-makers, then it must tell us something about what adjustments are needed to develop an effective political economy that is social innovation ready. Finally, we argue that what is needed is more theoretical and empirical work to help social innovation to develop into an effective policy tool.

In recent years the UK government has emphasized evidence-based policy, as a part of which the Payment by Results (PbR) approach has increasingly been promoted. Payment by Results allows the government to pay a provider of services on the basis of specified outcomes achieved rather than the inputs or outputs delivered. Linked to PbR is the innovative source of funding social interventions know as Social Impact Bonds (SIBs). We discuss the potential benefits of PbR and survey its use across the UK public sector. Then, concentrating in particular on the Criminal Justice System (CJS) we outline three methodological challenges to the implementation of PbR: gaming, measuring outcomes and identifying fiscal benefits. We then identify a number of challenges to the implementation of PbR. We conclude that PbR has a place in commissioning services, but that its role in the CJS is likely to be limited and unlikely to succeed as a socially efficient means of attracting new sources of funding. We finish by considering two alternatives to PbR: justice reinvestment and personalization.

Modern, liberal societies face a number of overarching challenges: demographic changes, increasing inequality, unemployment and under-employment, political instability, austerity and ecological, social and economic unsustainability are challenging established paradigms of political-economy. \ud Current political discourse emphasises market-based approaches to these stressors: we contend it is rather the disciplines of the social sciences, arts and humanities that have more to say about the resolution of these externalities. In the following we seek to broaden the discourse regarding the role of these disciplines in interpreting and beginning to address social challenges. \ud Our consideration of human values as a complement of monetary values is illustrated practically by three indicative projects conducted by the authors. In each case, we focus on the qualitative impact of these disciplines’ approaches on the participants and their environment. We suggest these activities have transformative potential through providing a platform for reflexion, collaboration and the building of communities.

Payment by results allows the government to pay a provider of services on the basis of the outcomes their service achieves rather than the inputs or outputs the provider delivers. Social impact bonds (SIBs) are a form of payment by results which allow the financing of social outcomes via private investment. It is suggested that payment by results and SIBs will drive greater efficiency, innovation and impact in tackling social problems through focusing reward on outcomes and providing minimal prescription as to how these outcomes should be achieved. It is suggested that this may be achieved while also reducing risk for government. Here we set out the challenges likely to arise in developing payment by results models and SIBs in the criminal justice system of England and Wales. These include the uncertainty arising from defining outcomes, estimating the potential impact of interventions, measuring and attributing change, valuing benefits, demonstrating a fiscal return and getting interventions to scale. We conclude that, to a government trying to deliver ‘more for less’, payment by results may offer an attractive solution in some parts of the public sector. However, the case for this approach in the criminal justice sector, where the evidence base is contested and potential savings difficult to quantify and realize, is not yet proven.

Recent years have seen high levels of public spending on criminal justice but to relatively little effect. Prison numbers have risen sharply and public confidence in the criminal justice system remains relatively low. Although crime has fallen there is limited evidence to suggest that this is because of increased criminal justice activity. Justice reinvestment (JR) is a concept that has been widely touted as an approach that might help UK authorities deliver ‘more for less’ at a time when public sector spending is being cut. It has been used widely in the USA with seemingly promising results. Although elements of JR have been tried in the UK, a full-scale implementation has yet to be attempted. Such an attempt will have to give careful consideration to a variety of practical implementation challenges and methodological issues which range from the potential unification and devolution of criminal justice budgets, to the transferability of a predominantly USA-originating evidence base to the UK. This article identifies a number of such issues and attempts to set out an agenda for academic discourse on JR.

This article considers important developments over the last decade which have laid the foundations for a new approach to criminal justice policy; an approach in which economic analysis is central. These developments include aspects of the policy debate on sentencing; the government’s commitment to evidence-based policy; investment in the economics profession across government; and the rise of the Justice Reinvestment movement. While many of the opportunities presented for economic analysis of sentencing policy have not yet been exploited, there is reason to believe that they will be over the next few years. Various reasons are discussed including the current economic situation, which makes increasingly untenable the continuing commitment of government to increasing prison capacity without consideration of more efficient alternatives. The article concludes by suggesting some steps that the new government might take to ensure that the benefits of an economically efficient approach to criminal justice policy are realized.

This paper presents two case studies on the impact of climate change on upland landscapes in England (footpath erosion in the Lake District National Park, and moorland wildfires in the Peak District National Park) and considers the negative implications for the visitor economy in these areas. Areas of natural beauty such as the examples presented have an important role to play in attracting visitors, and sustaining the visitor economy will therefore depend on maintaining the quality of the environment in the face of both visitor pressure and the impacts of climate change.

Forecasting levels of stocks held by manufacturing industry is problematic. Stocks are the most volatile component of GDP. The data itself is subject to chronic revision. Yet, forecasting inventory changes in the supply chain is crucial for firms trying to manage output. The paper reports a successful approach to forecasting UK manufacturing stock behaviour sponsored by a leading European metals manufacturer. The model exploits the seasonality of stock build-ups and run-downs. (Existing econometric approaches rely on seasonally adjusted data.) The forecasting performance of our model is compared to alternative time series approaches. Use of raw, unadjusted data implies markedly different specifications from those in the established literature. In particular, we find no significant evidence of a structural break in UK stockholding behaviour in our sample period and the absence of cointegration between stocks and output suggests the conventional error correction approach is spurious, as well as giving poor forecasts.

Payment by results (PbR) in the delivery of public services has the capacity to make them more efficient and, possibly, more effective. The implementation of the approach in the wrong places and in...