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Updated May 10, 2022 Introduction Beginning in 2017, the United States has submitted a series of proposals to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners that would relax the regime's [...]

The article presents a primer for U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries. Topics discussed include requirements under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, exempted versus nonexempted agreements for cooperation, export licensing of nuclear reactors, parts of reactors and reactor fuel and Iran-related licensing restrictions, subsequent arrangements such as the U.S.-Japan Agreement and U.S.-India Agreement, termination of cooperation, and Part 810 agreements on nuclear material production.

The article focuses on the congressional review process for foreign arms sales proposed by the President, covering major defense equipment, defense articles and services, and retransfers to third-party states. Topics include the notification requirements under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the mechanisms for congressional review and potential disapproval of arms sales, including both government-to-government sales and commercially licensed sales.

The article offers information on the command and control of U.S. nuclear forces. Topics include the sole authority of the U.S. President Joe Biden to authorize nuclear weapon use, the structure and role of the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS), and the procedures and protocols involved in launching a nuclear attack.

The article highlights Iran's historical noncompliance with U.N. resolutions regarding its nuclear program and outlines the IAEA's ongoing efforts, notably the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), to address concerns and implement restrictions. It summarizes the legal framework, Iran's nuclear activities and the unresolved issues, emphasizing the IAEA's attempts to resolve outstanding concerns and Tehran's disputes about evidence.

Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles. Cluster munitions were developed in World War II and are part of many governments' weapons stockpiles. Cluster munitions have been used frequently in combat, including the early phases of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cluster munitions have been criticized for causing a significant number of civilian deaths. The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), which bans the use of cluster munitions, entered into force in 2010; the United States is not a party to this convention. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to argue that cluster munitions are a military necessity, but in 2008 instituted a policy to reduce the failure rate of cluster munitions (a major contributor to civilian casualties) to 1% or less after 2018. In November 2017, DOD issued a new policy that essentially reversed the 2008 policy. The 2017 policy permits combatant commanders, in extreme situations to meet immediate warfighting demands, to use cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard. In addition, the 2017 policy does not establish a deadline to replace cluster munitions exceeding the 1% rate and states that DOD "will retain cluster munitions currently in active inventories until the capabilities they provide are replaced with enhanced and more reliable munitions." A number of governments, UN agencies, and nongovernmental organizations have accused Russia of using cluster munitions during its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In July 2023 and again in September 2023, the United States announced cluster munitions transfers to Ukraine. Congress may consider whether these transfers signal a change in U.S. policy on cluster munitions, whether the United States is able to provide other types of cluster munitions to that country, and whether Ukrainian use of such munitions affects international and U.S.-sponsored demining efforts in the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on U.S. arms transfer restrictions and the cooperation within AUKUS, a trilateral security partnership between the U.S., Australia, and Great Britain. Topics include the two pillars of AUKUS, which involve providing Australia with a nuclear-powered submarine capability and jointly developing advanced military capabilities, as well as exemptions, treaties, and provisions related to international armaments cooperation.

The article presents a report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service on arms control and nonproliferation efforts as tools used by the United States for national security strategy. Topics discussed include information on varying perspectives on their effectiveness, their historical context, and their role in shaping U.S. relations with countries like Russia.

Ian F. Fergusson Specialist in International Trade and Finance Paul K. Kerr Specialist in Nonproliferation Difficulty with striking an appropriate balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the [...]

The article presents a report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service on U.S.-Saudi nuclear energy cooperation. Topics discussed include the potential for nuclear energy cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia's plans to diversify its energy sources with nuclear power, and the challenges related to nuclear safeguards and security in the region.

The article focuses on a report of U.S. Congressional Research Service on the strategic nuclear forces of U.S. specifically the concept of the nuclear triad. Topics include the long-range land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the historical development of the nuclear triad, and the modernization plans for each leg of the triad.

The article presents overview of the main laws and policies that may limit such sales on the basis of human rights concerns. It mentions Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 establish provisions governing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) to foreign consumers, including foreign governments. It also mentions sales to be for specific authorized military purposes and subject to end-use monitoring (EUM).

The article discusses a report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) on the unmanned aircraft systems. Topics include interest of U.S. military in remotely piloted aircrafts; history of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS); and potential issues for congress related to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).

The article presents questions and answers related to U.S. arms sales and human rights considerations including the administration's arms transfer policy, Department of Defense guidance and verification of authorized use.

The article discusses a report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service's China's past and current actions related to the proliferation of nuclear and missile technology to other countries, as well as its participation in international arms control and non-proliferation efforts. It highlights the U.S. government has expressed concerns about China's acquisition of U.S.-origin nuclear technology, as well as Chinese-based companies and individuals exporting goods.

Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles. Cluster munitions were developed in World War II and are part of many nations' weapons stockpiles. Cluster munitions have been used frequently in combat, including the early phases of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cluster munitions have been criticized internationally for causing a significant number of civilian deaths, and efforts have been undertaken to ban and regulate their use. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to view cluster munitions as a military necessity but in 2008 instituted a policy to reduce the failure rate of cluster munitions (a major contributor to civilian casualties) to 1% or less after 2018. In November 2017, DOD issued a new DOD policy that essentially reversed the 2008 policy. Under the new policy, combatant commanders can use cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard in extreme situations to meet immediate warfighting demands. In addition, the new policy does not establish a deadline to replace cluster munitions exceeding the 1% rate and states that DOD "will retain cluster munitions currently in active inventories until the capabilities they provide are replaced with enhanced and more reliable munitions." In February 2022, Russia allegedly used cluster munitions during its invasion of Ukraine. Although the allegations have apparently not been officially verified, a reported pending International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation of war crimes in the Ukraine might provide insights. Potential issues for Congress include potential policy impacts of allegations of Russian cluster munitions use in Ukraine, cluster munitions in an era of precision weapons, other weapons in lieu of cluster munitions, and the potential impact of DOD's 2017 revised cluster munitions policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a report from the Congressional Research Service on foreign arms sales proposed by the President Joe Biden. It highlights consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to third-party states of such items; and mentions that under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the President must formally notify Congress 30 calendar days before the Administration can take the steps to conclude a foreign military sale.

The article reports that the United States has maintained a triad of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles since the early 1960s, consisting of long-range land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range heavy bombers. The number of nuclear warheads on these vehicles peaked in the late 1980s has been decreasing ever since due to U.S.-Russian arms control agreements and post-Cold War changes in requirements.

The article reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by U.S. President. It mentions under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) the U.S. Congress must be formally notified 30 calendar days before the Administration can take the final steps to conclude a government-to-government foreign military sale of major defense equipment.

Updated August 18, 2015 Contents Introduction and Current Status Renewal of U.S.-China Agreement China's Nuclear Arsenal China and Safeguards Highlights of New Agreement Congressional Concerns Nuclear Exports and Jobs Chinese [...]

Summary On November 24, 2013, Iran and the six powers that have negotiated with Iran about its nuclear program since 2006 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, [...]

Summary In order for the United States to engage in civilian nuclear cooperation with other states, it must conclude a framework agreement that meets specific requirements under Section 123 of [...]

The article focuses on budget of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the contributions of the U.S. Topics discussed include IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) provides assistance such as radiation technology and nuclear safety; Congress appropriates assessed U.S. contributions to the IAEA' regular budget under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and safety inspection of nuclear facilities or related materials.

July 21, 2014 Summary Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools [...]

April 28, 2014 Summary In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these [...]

April 16, 2014 Summary Congress has at times expressed concern regarding ballistic missile and nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea, and Syria. This report focuses primarily on unclassified and declassified [...]

January 13, 2014 Summary The 113th Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system. The balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export [...]

December 20, 2013 Summary In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these [...]

December 11, 2013 Summary In the early hours of November 24, 2013, in Geneva, Switzerland, Iran and the six powers that have negotiated with Iran about its nuclear program since [...]

The article focuses on synthetic opioid overdose deaths in the U.S. reach historic levels, some policy stakeholders have sought U.S. action in designating fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). It mentions Congress may consider developing legislation to improve upon perceived shortcomings in the U.S. government's approach to addressing fentanyl. It also mentions combating such foreign production and U.S.-destined trafficking flows.

The article presents a report of the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CSR) that talks about process and procedures that apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the U.S. President. It mentions the U.S. Congress must be formally notified 15 calendar days before the Administration can proceed with the sale in the case of sales to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states.

The article focuses on Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board and the United Nations Security Council. It mentions nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It also mentions nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council compose the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program.

The article reports that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is monitoring and verifying Iranian compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and is to report on these activities regularly. It mentions Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear-weapon states parties to forego developing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons. It also mentions missions of IAEA on promoting nuclear power, nuclear safety, and nuclear security.

The article focuses on the killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) Commander, who regarded as one of the most powerful and important officials in Iran, has potentially dramatic implications for the U.S. It mentions the relations between Iran and the U.S. have been mostly confrontational since 1979; and also mentions that Iran supports a number of armed groups in Iraq, including U.S. designated terrorist organizations such as Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH).

September 12, 2013 Summary Syria has produced, stored, and weaponized chemical agents, but it remains dependent on foreign suppliers for chemical precursors. The regime of President Basilar al Asad possesses [...]

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (10) The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would ban all nuclear explosions. It opened for signature in 1996 but has not yet entered into force. Previous [...]

Contents What Are Cluster Munitions? History Cluster Munitions Criticisms Failure Rate Lack of Self-Destruct Capability International Attempts to Regulate Use U.N. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of [...]

Contents Overview United States China France India Israel North Korea Pakistan Russia United Kingdom Contacts Author Contact Information May 1, 2013 Summary Seven nations--China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, the United [...]

Contents Overview of the U.S. Export Control System The Dual-Use System The Export Administration Act (EAA) Administration Implementing Regulations Licensing Policy Enforcement and Penalties Military Export Controls Arms Export Control [...]

Contents Background Nuclear Weapons Responding to India? Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty Delivery Vehicles Nuclear Doctrine Command and Control Security Concerns U.S. Assistance and Pakistani Nuclear Security Proliferation The A. Q. [...]

Summary The use or loss of control of chemical weapons stocks in Syria could have unpredictable consequences for the Syrian population and neighboring countries as well as U.S. allies and [...]

October 25, 2012 Summary Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially in the hands of radical states and terrorists, represent a major threat to U.S. national security interests. Multilateral regimes were [...]

Summary In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated [...]

Selected Weapons Deliveries to Developing Nations, 2004-2011 Other useful data for assessing arms transfers are those that indicate who has actually delivered specific numbers of specific classes of military items [...]

Contents What Is a 'Section 123' Agreement? Requirements Under the Atomic Energy Act Exempted vs. Non-exempted Agreements Congressional Review Export Licensing Subsequent Arrangements Examples of Subsequent Arrangements U.S.-Japan Agreement U.S.-India [...]

Contents Overview of the U.S. Export Control System The Dual-Use System The Export Administration Act (EAA) Administration Implementing Regulations Licensing Policy Enforcement and Penalties Military Export Controls Arms Export Control [...]