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This article examines the relevant legal precedent and empirical evidence concerning eyewitness identifications. It analyzes and critiques the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Perry v. New Hampshire, 1 which appears to allow evidence of eyewitness identifications made under suggestive circumstances to be admitted against the accused so long as the police are not responsible for the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. This article discusses ways to protect the rights of the misidentified in light of the Perry decision. In particular, the article argues that when law enforcement fails to use serial, double-blind identification procedures or reuses suspects in multiple lineups with the same witness--choices that have been empirically proven to increase the risk of misidentification--they create suggestive identification procedures, and the resultant identifications should be subject to judicial review under Perry. The importance of certainty statements and proper witness instruction are also analyzed under the rubric of due process. Finally, the adoption of bright-line rules for witness identification procedures are proposed as a practical way to protect innocent defendants while conserving judicial resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]