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There are no planets intermediate in size between Earth and Neptune in our Solar System, yet these objects are found around a substantial fraction of other stars. Population statistics show that close-in planets in this size range bifurcate into two classes based on their radii. It is hypothesized that the group with larger radii (referred to as "sub-Neptunes") is distinguished by having hydrogen-dominated atmospheres that are a few percent of the total mass of the planets. GJ 1214b is an archetype sub-Neptune that has been observed extensively using transmission spectroscopy to test this hypothesis. However, the measured spectra are featureless, and thus inconclusive, due to the presence of high-altitude aerosols in the planet's atmosphere. Here we report a spectroscopic thermal phase curve of GJ 1214b obtained with JWST in the mid-infrared. The dayside and nightside spectra (average brightness temperatures of 553 $\pm$ 9 and 437 $\pm$ 19 K, respectively) each show >3$\sigma$ evidence of absorption features, with H$_2$O as the most likely cause in both. The measured global thermal emission implies that GJ 1214b's Bond albedo is 0.51 $\pm$ 0.06. Comparison between the spectroscopic phase curve data and three-dimensional models of GJ 1214b reveal a planet with a high metallicity atmosphere blanketed by a thick and highly reflective layer of clouds or haze., Comment: Published online in Nature on May 10, 2023

Editor's Note: In recognition of SPE's 50th anniversary this year, JPT is conducting interviews with several Society luminaries about their careers, their relationship with SPE, and the changes they have seen in the oil and gas industry and the Society over the past several decades. When and why did you join SPE? I came to SPE rather late in life. I am a facilities engineer by background, and most of the time in my early career at Shell I associated SPE with drilling and production and reservoir engineering. But, on the other hand, I was aware that SPE existed, and I became aware that there was information being published in JPT on facilities-related topics, most of it probably associated with the Offshore Technology Conference. The other thing that I was aware of was that facilities engineers were treated almost like second-class citizens in the oil industry in those days. The emphasis in career development was on people who had downhole and drilling experience, rather than people who had project and surface experience. In those days, facilities were not very big or very expensive; they were a small part of the overall development cost. Therefore, it was easier to get ahead if you were a downhole specialist rather than a project specialist. I got to thinking that, since my bosses belonged to SPE, it would be a good idea for me to belong as well. There was really no technical society for facilities engineers. There were other societies that you could belong to, but they were not really focused on providing the kind of information exchange that facilities engineers needed. It looked like the only logical place for facilities was within SPE. What was your first involvement with the Society? My first activity was as a technical editor, doing peer review of papers that were facilities-oriented. There were not that many of us who had the capability of reviewing these papers, so it started very slowly. In the early 1980s, Roger Hite, who was with Shell at the time, had done a quick study and determined that there were a lot of facilities engineers at Shell but none of them belonged to SPE. So SPE put together an ad hoc committee on facilities engineering to try to determine if this was something that SPE should worry about, and I served as Chairperson of that committee. We discovered that about 25% of the engineers within the oil companies represented on the committee were facilities engineers, so, basically, we were not providing much service to this group.

Summary This paper discusses two techniques for sizing oil/water separators. Droplet-settling theory, based on Stokes' law governing water-droplet movement through a continuous oil phase, is used to develop sizing equations for both horizontal and vertical separators. Retention-time theory, which calculates theoretical fluid-retention time within the separator by relating liquid flow rates to vessel geometry, is also presented. Published separator data comparing vessel sizes to allowable capacities are analyzed using both sizing techniques.

Proposal This paper presents the results of a breakout session on the role of the industry's technical knowledge, or "backbone", in speeding the acceptance of new technology. The session occurred at the SPE Applied Technology Workshop on Accelerating Technology Acceptance held March 15-16, 2005. Addressed was the issue of whether it is necessary for operating companies to have their own core staff of technical experts to provide this knowledge, or whether the existence of such a group could actually hinder the acceptance of new technology which was "not invented here". The role of consultants and embedded service company engineers as a means of providing this technical backbone is discussed. The paper also discusses the state of the industry's current efforts and concepts needed for hiring, training and motivating sufficient quantity and quality of technical staff in both operating and service companies. The role of the corporate CEO and top executive staff in this effort is highlighted. The current perceived gap that exists between top executive staff's stated strategic objectives and the actions taken through organizational filters which may inhibit accomplishing these objectives is discussed, as are recommendations for closing this gap.

Newly developed compact separation technology may be an attractive alternative to conventional separation methods in certain oil and gas applications. The purpose of this paper is to compare the new compact separators to conventional separation methods and explore the possible applications of this new technology. The size of conventional separators is based on liquid retention time, droplet or settling velocity for gas, and, for three-phase separators, water droplet settling time in the oil phase. Compact separators perform the same function as conventional separators but require a smaller shell. They have great potential where cost savings due to smaller size and lower weight are greater than the cost of more complex equipment. Both the benefits and problems associated with using compact separation techniques for downhole processing, subsea processing, and surface facilities will be discussed in this paper. It is necessary for a design engineer to understand the benefits and detriments of using compact separators so that this new technology may be used effectively in the production of oil and gas.

Introduction In the past 2S years, there has been a growing awareness of the need to identify, evaluate and manage risks associated with offshore drilling and producing operations. Such risksinclude blowouts, fires and explosions and ship collisions. The effort to manage risks has increased greatly since the1988 Piper Alpha accident in the North Sea and the 1989 South Pass Block 60 accident in the Gulf of Mexico. In the North Sea, there is a specific requirement of the regulatory bodies to manage risks by assuring that facilities are designed and operated to a level of risk that is " As Low as Reasonably Practicable" (ALARP). To achieve ALARP, it is necessary that operators examine not only risks associated with hardware systems but to also evaluate the effect of management systems on reducing the probability of accidents or mitigating their consequences. On the surface, this is an eminently reasonable concept. Certainly, if the risk of loss of life can be substantially reduced by a marginal increase in cost, we would all agree that it would be prudent to make the additional investment. We can also agree that there are perhaps some designs and operations that could theoretically carry such a high risk of loss of life that the risk is clearly not reasonable and either thedesign must be changed or the project should not be implemented. On the other hand we probably can also agree that there is some level of risk which is so low that no further analysis of alternatives to reduce this risk needs to be conceived and evaluated. The problem with this theoretical approach, however, is in the implementation of the concept to real life situations. Just as would-be O. J. Simpson jurors and various legal pundits might disagree as to what constitutes a 'reasonable doubt" ora "preponderance of evidence," what is a 'reasonable risk" and what mitigation steps are '''practicable" can lead to a wide difference of interpretation between knowledgeable evaluators if such persons could be found. For this reason, the offshore oil and gas industry and the regulatory bodies concerned with North Sea operations have evolved a working hypothesis based on calculations of the risk of loss of life. In most cases, if the calculated estimatesfor the risk of loss of life on a North Sea offshore platform is higher than 10−3 per year, the risk is considered to be clearly unreasonable and mitigation is required. If the potential loss is less than 10−5 per year, then the level of risk is considered to be "ALARP" and no further analysis is required. If the risk is calculated to be between −3 and −5, further mitigation is required, unless it can be shown by quantified risk assessment (QRA) that the cost is too high (and thus not 'reasonably practicable') compared to the computed monetary benefit of the reduced risk of the loss of life. For this type of analysis, it is necessary to establish the value of a life, and although there is room for a wide variance in this number, the industry seems to have settled on a number of approximately $2 million.

Introduction In 1993 the API published API RP 75, "Recommended Practices for Development of a Safety and Environmental Management Program for OuterContinental Shelf (OCS) Operations and Facilities," (SEMP). As a parallel effort and incorporated into RP 75 by reference, API RP 14J. "Recommended Practice for Design and Hazard Analysis for Offshore Production Facilities, " was developed to provide more detailedguidance into two of the eleven elements of SEMP; Safety and Environmental Information, and HazardsAnalysis. The RP 14J Committee, after some deliberation, felt these issues should not be addressed in isolation, and included tutorial information on safety concepts including basic facilities design concepts, hazard mitigation and evacuation concepts, and layoutconsiderations. Thus, the two documents taken together, have the potential to impact engineering consultant in several ways:change designs from what was considered acceptable in the past,increase effort required to document that the designs meet safety requirements,increase the effort required to check a design and formalized this process into a "hazard analysis,"decrease the effort that would have been required to conform to "Safety Case" type requirements, which were being considered prior to the development of these documents,increase the effort required to specify and inspect new equipment, andprovide training materialto design engineers to assure that safety is designed into the facility from the outset rather than relying on hazard analysis to find design errors once a phase of design is complete.. This paper discusses each of these potential impacts and concludes that the biggest impact on engineering consultants is that SEMP results in much less work for engineering consultants than would have had to be performed if one of the alternate schemes for assuring adequate safety had been adopted by regulatory bodies. That is, while there has been some marginal increase for engineering services on specific new projects and to document adequacy of existing facilities as a result of SEMP, the net effect is less work for engineering companies to implement these recommendations than would have been required if SEMP had not been developed.. On the other hand, by focusing attention on the human factors of managing safety and away from those factors (hardware design and construction) which are normally associated with the province of most engineering consultants, these documents should increase safety. In addition, by being more cost effective than the alternative schemes that had been under discussion, SEMP should allow reserves to be developed that would not otherwise have been possible and thus, in the long run, increase opportunities for engineering consultants.. Changes to "Acceptable" Designs RP 14J provides a wealth of material as to what constitutes good design practices. Section 2 describes the basic principles involved in containing hydrocarbons, preventing ignition, preventing fire escalation, andproviding for personnel protection and escape. Detailed recommendations in each of these areas are made in Section 3, 4 and 5 as shown in Table I. In particular, specific recommendations are made for the design of vent, flare and emergency relief systems.

Summary The general theories governing, produced-water treating equipment design are presented and qualitative conclusions drawn from the resultant equations. The design and use of various common components used in offshore produced-water treating systems are discussed. Introduction The engineer charged with designing an offshore produced-water treating and disposal system is faced with an almost insurmountable problem. While the endpoint is fixed for the design, usually little is known about the quality of the water that must be treated. The basic data set forming the basis of the current U.S. discharge guidelines is contained in a 1974 study conducted for the Offshore Operators Committee (OOC). Each type of final treating device was analyzed separately with specific conclusions drawn for pits, tanks, flotation systems, plate coalescers, fibrous media coalescers, and loose media coalescers. The report concluded: "Flotation units and loose media coalescers were found to produce the lowest mean effluent oil concentrations of the processes studied. Flotation is a widely used process and is applicable almost universally. Loose media coalescers were not selected to represent exemplary performance because of operating problems at many locations." The validity of this conclusion concerning loose media coalescers subsequently was verified by an in-depth study conducted by the OOC. The U.S. EPA analyzed these data, plus additional data furnished from industry and from EPA-conducted field verification studies, and arrived at their interim guidelines of 48 mg/L. The derivation of discharge quality based on exemplary performance of flotation systems does not imply that the installation of a flotation system will necessarily meet this criterion. In determining "exemplary" flotation systems the EPA eliminated many data. For example, in the original OOC study, about 25 % of the flotation systems analyzed had mean effluent-oil concentrations in excess of 48 mg/L. Thus, any water treating system that includes a flotation unit must be designed carefully for the conditions expected at that particular facility. Similarly, it is not necessary to install a flotation unit in each water treating system. The EPA-specified effluent limitations can be achieved with less sophisticated equipment under certain circumstances. W.L. Berry states: " Not all treatment processes are applicable at all locations. Performance of water treatment systems is not only a function of retention time, design parameters, use of chemical coagulants…but is also influenced by a number of factors most of which the operator has little or no control over including: water characteristics, crude type and solubility, degree of entrained oil emulsification, sizes of the entrained oil droplets, and suspended solids concentrations and characteristics. [Because of these factors,] if identical treatment systems are installed at two different locations, the average produced-water effluent oil content may be quite different." JPT P. 276^