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This paper is concerned with when, if ever, deceptive sex should be criminalised. It defends the idea that it is necessary to distinguish between deceptions that will generally be punishable from those that will not and puts forward a novel framework for carrying out this task. Based on the concept of identity nonrecognition, this framework also offers a new way of understanding what makes certain kinds of deceptive sex wrongful. After setting out this framework, I analyse each of the deceptions that is most often carried out within 'ordinary' contexts, explaining why only some of these should generally be punished. The paper concludes by suggesting that identity nonrecognition has the potential to inform criminalisation debates more generally, and that its relevance extends beyond discussions about deceptive sex. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through specific, historical, interchanges and the more diffuse molding of our ‘Western’ social imaginary, the Judaic-Christian tradition has helped shape several of the criminal law’s culpability concepts, including guilt, blame and reconciliation. In doing so, it has contributed towards the inherent moral grammar of our criminal justice thinking. By considering perennial questions, such as the importance of consciousness and intentionality in determining culpability, and the importance of culpability within the architecture of criminal liability more broadly, this article argues that re-engaging with the religious underpinnings of these debates is important and worthwhile, particularly in an age marked by the desire to secularise the criminal law and to become ‘emancipated’ from religious thinking. It concludes by suggesting that this re-engagement yields important insights regarding the tensions that permeate our criminal justice practices and points towards ways in which these might potentially be reconciled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through specific, historical, interchanges and the more diffuse molding of our ‘Western’ social imaginary, the Judaic-Christian tradition has helped shape several of the criminal law’s culpability concepts, including guilt, blame and reconciliation. In doing so, it has contributed towards the inherent moral grammar of our criminal justice thinking. By considering perennial questions, such as the importance of consciousness and intentionality in determining culpability, and the importance of culpability within the architecture of criminal liability more broadly, this article argues that re-engaging with the religious underpinnings of these debates is important and worthwhile, particularly in an age marked by the desire to secularise the criminal law and to become ‘emancipated’ from religious thinking. It concludes by suggesting that this re-engagement yields important insights regarding the tensions that permeate our criminal justice practices and points towards ways in which these might potentially be reconciled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the possible influence of changes in Scottish religious culture and theological orthodoxy on the development of Scots criminal law. It explores various aspects of the criminal law, including the attribution of criminal responsibility. It also provides an overview of historic Scots criminal law by considering its sources.