Search

Background and objectivesTelemedicine bridges the gap between care needs and provider availability. The value of telemedicine can be eclipsed by long wait times, especially if patients are stuck in virtual waiting rooms. UCSD Tele-Untethered allows patients to join visits without waiting in virtual waiting rooms. Tele-Untethered uses a text-to-video link to improve clinic flow, decrease virtual waiting room reliance, improve throughput, and potentially improve satisfaction.MethodsThis institutional review board (IRB)-approved quality improvement pilot (IRB #210364QI) included patients seen in a single vascular neurology clinic, within the pilot period, if they had a smartphone/cell phone, and agreed to participate in a flexible approach to telehealth visits. Standard work was disseminated (patient instructions, scripting, and workflows). Patients provided a cell phone number to receive a text link when the provider was ready to see them. Metrics included demographics, volumes, visit rates, percentage seen early/late, time savings, and satisfaction surveys.ResultsOver 2.5 months, 22 patients were scheduled. Of those arriving, 76% were "Tele-Untethered" and 24% were "Standard Telemedicine." Text-for-video link was used for 94% of Tele-Untethered. Fifty-five percent were seen early. There was a 55-minute-per-session time savings.ConclusionThis UCSD Tele-Untethered pilot benefitted patients by allowing scheduling flexibility while not being tied to a "virtual waiting room." It benefited providers as it allowed them to see patients in order/not tied to exact times, improved throughput, and saved time. Even modest time savings for busy providers, coupled with Lean workflows, can provide critical value. High Tele-Untethered uptake and use of verbal check-in highlight that patients expect flexibility and ease of use. As our initial UCSD Tele-Untethered successes included patient flexibility and time savings for patients and providers, it can serve as a model as enterprises strive for optimal care and improved satisfaction. Expansion to other clinic settings is underway with a mantra of "UCSD Tele-Untethered: Your provider can see you now."

How does implicit bias contribute to explicit prejudice? Prior experiments show that concept knowledge about fear versus sympathy determines whether negative affect (captured as implicit bias) predicts antisocial outcomes (Lee et al.). Concept knowledge (i.e., beliefs) about groups may similarly moderate the link between implicitly measured negative affect (implicit negative affect) and explicit prejudice. We tested this hypothesis using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2008 Time Series Study (Study 1) and Project Implicit (Study 2). In both studies, participants high in implicit negative affect reported more explicit prejudice if they possessed negative beliefs about Black Americans. Yet, participants high in implicit negative affect reported less explicit prejudice if they possessed fewer negative beliefs about Black Americans. The results are consistent with psychological constructionist and dynamic models of evaluation and offer a more ecologically valid extension of our past laboratory work.

When people support voter identification (ID) laws, who do they imagine they are keeping in and out of the voting booth? We investigated this question across three studies. First, using a traditional survey approach, we found support for voter ID laws was associated with beliefs that ID requirements reduce illegal voting by both Black and White people to the same degree. Because explicit surveys are vulnerable to social desirability concerns, in the following two studies, we utilized an indirect measure, reverse correlation, to investigate mental images of those who try to vote illegally (Study 2) and mental images of those who should and should not get to vote (Study 3). The findings of these studies suggest that support for voter ID laws is associated with racially biased perceptions of illegal voters and who should get to vote. Critically, these biased perceptions may be underestimated by traditional explicit survey approaches.

The present research proposes and tests the “hedonic risk hypothesis” that affective experiences of pleasure provide a common currency that people use to equate economic and hedonic inequality. As a result, economic inequality can increase risk-taking in pursuit of pleasure even in noneconomic domains. Study 1 showed that higher economic inequality at the state level was associated with people in those states spending more time pursuing pleasure. Studies 2–4 were experiments, which demonstrated that when people perceive inequality in other people’s hedonic experience, they become riskier in their pursuit of pleasure for themselves. The relationship between inequality and risk-taking in pursuit of pleasurable experiences was moderated by upward social comparisons. Both monetary and hedonic inequality caused participants to become riskier in their pursuit of pleasure. The findings suggest a psychological pathway by which systemic effects of income inequality may affect individual health and social outcomes.

The Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) is a measure of implicit evaluations, designed to index the retrieval of evaluative knowledge under automatic conditions. The AMP effect consists in participants evaluating neutral target stimuli more positively when preceded by positive primes and more negatively when preceded by negative primes. After multiple tests of intentionality in past work, Hughes et al. (2022) newly probed the role of awareness in the AMP effect and found that AMP effects were larger when participants indicated that their response was influenced by the prime than when they did not. Here we present seven experiments (six preregistered; total N = 2,350) further investigating the nature of this awareness effect. In Experiments 1–4, the awareness effect was robust but highly variable as a function of procedural changes and stimulus valence. Critically, Experiments 5–7 provided evidence for an alternative explanation of the awareness effect, namely that awareness can be the outcome, rather than the cause, of evaluative congruency between primes and responses: Awareness effects emerged even under conditions that made it impossible for awareness to contribute to AMP effects, including when participants judged influence awareness for third parties or primes were presented post-hoc, following influence judgments. Finally, increasing evaluative strength of the primes increased participants’ tendency to misattribute AMP effects to the influence of target stimuli. Together, these findings support the construct validity of the AMP as a measure of implicit evaluations by suggesting that AMP effects are unintentional and can create awareness effects rather than vice versa.

As economic inequality grows, more people stand to benefit from wealth redistribution. Yet in many countries, increasing inequality has not produced growing support for redistribution, and people often appear to vote against their economic interest. Here we suggest that two cognitive tendencies contribute to these paradoxical voting patterns. First, people gauge their income through social comparison, and those comparisons are usually made to similar others. Second, people are insensitive to large numbers, which leads them to underestimate the gap between themselves and the very wealthy. These two tendencies can help explain why subjective income is normally distributed (therefore most people think they are middle class) and partly explain why many people who would benefit from redistribution oppose it. We support our model’s assumptions using survey data, a controlled experiment, and agent-based modeling. Our model sheds light on the cognitive barriers to reducing inequality.

In the United States, both economic inequality and political conflict are on the rise. We investigated whether subjective socioeconomic status (SSS) may help explain why these dual patterns emerge. We hypothesized that higher SSS may increase naïve realism—the belief that one perceives the world as it is, rather than as interpreted through one’s own knowledge and beliefs—regarding political issues. Using a representative sample of the American electorate, we found that higher SSS predicted more political naïve realism toward those from a different political party (Study 1). The remaining experiments examined the causal relationship between SSS and political naïve realism (Studies 2–5). We extended these findings by investigating whether SSS influenced participants’ willingness to exclude those with contrary views from a vote (Studies 4 and 5). Together, these studies demonstrate that SSS enhances political naïve realism and can lead to the exclusion of others with contrary opinions.

Is anti-Black racial discrimination due to “a few bad apples”? Or, is there a larger pattern of widespread discrimination? This question about the distribution of discrimination is fundamental for understanding the causes of discrimination and for choosing effective solutions; yet we know surprisingly little about how discrimination is distributed. The current paper explores the distribution of discrimination using meta-analytic data and simulations from experimental studies in two critical contexts: hiring and housing. The meta-analysis revealed that anti-Black discrimination is found in more than 80% of studies. Simulations of widespread anti-Black discrimination using a normal distribution were more consistent with the experimental data on racial discrimination than were simulations of concentrated anti-Black discrimination using a Pareto distribution. These findings help address the perennial question about the distribution of discrimination and offer a rigorous quantitative method to refine the debate between concentrated and widespread accounts going forward.

Cesario argues that experiments cannot illuminate real group disparities because they leave out factors that operate in ordinary life. But what Cesario calls flaws are, in fact, the point of the experimental method. Of all the topics in science, we have to wonder why racial discrimination would be uniquely unsuited for investigating with experiments. The argument to give up the most powerful scientific method to study one of the hardest problems we confront is laughable.

Violent encounters between police and Black people have spurred debates about how race affects officer decision-making. We propose that racial disparities in police–civilian interactions are amplified when police interact with Black civilians who are encountered in groups. To test this possibility, we analyzed New York City stop and frisk data for over 2 million police stops. Results revealed that Black (vs. White) people were more likely to be frisked, searched, arrested, and have force used against them. Critically, these racial disparities were more pronounced for people stopped in groups (vs. alone): Being stopped in a group led to a 1.7% increase in racial disparities for frisks, a 1% increase for searches, a 0.3% increase for arrests, and a 1.7% increase for use of force. Moreover, these disparities held even when we controlled for a potential proxy of effective policing: discovery of illegal contraband. We conclude that groups amplify racial disparities in policing.

Implicit racial bias remains widespread, even among individuals who explicitly reject prejudice. One reason for the persistence of implicit bias may be that it is maintained through structural and historical inequalities that change slowly. We investigated the historical persistence of implicit bias by comparing modern implicit bias with the proportion of the population enslaved in those counties in 1860. Counties and states more dependent on slavery before the Civil War displayed higher levels of pro-White implicit bias today among White residents and less pro-White bias among Black residents. These associations remained significant after controlling for explicit bias. The association between slave populations and implicit bias was partially explained by measures of structural inequalities. Our results support an interpretation of implicit bias as the cognitive residue of past and present structural inequalities.

Although most antiracism protests of 2020 were peaceful, at times, there was extreme use of force. Drawing on research that groups amplify intergroup threats, we test whether use of force is perceived as particularly justified against groups of Black people protesting racism. In Study 1, White Americans perceived a group of Black people peacefully protesting racism to be more threatening and more deserving of use of force than the same Black people protesting individually. Notably, when the protest topic did not threaten the racial hierarchy (i.e., environmental protection), Black groups (vs. individuals) no longer amplified perceived threat nor support for force. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated that this tendency for groups to amplify intergroup threat was stronger among White Americans motivated to maintain the status quo (i.e., social conservatives). We conclude that Black groups protesting racism activate intergroup threats with implications for support for using force against them.

Supplemental Material, sj-docx-1-spp-10.1177_19485506211015049 for Economic Inequality and the Pursuit of Pleasure by Jason W. Hannay, B. Keith Payne and Jazmin Brown-Iannuzzi in Social Psychological and Personality Science

Implicit bias refers to automatically evoked mental associations about social groups. The idea has been influential across the social sciences as a way to explain persistent racial disparities amid changing self-report attitudes. Most research has treated implicit bias as an individual attitude. However, evidence suggests that it is neither a stable individual difference nor a strong correlate of individual behavior. Moreover, the individual-focused approach can lead researchers to neglect systemic racism as a cause of persistent disparities. We argue that implicit bias can be considered a cognitive reflection of systemic racism in the environment. In this view, implicit bias is an ongoing set of associations based on inequalities and stereotypes in the environment. As such, implicit bias changes when contexts change.

Background: The authors draw upon their experience with a successful, enterprise-level, telemedicine program implementation to present a "How To" paradigm for other academic health centers that wish to rapidly deploy such a program in the setting of the COVID-19 pandemic. The advent of social distancing as essential for decreasing viral transmission has made it challenging to provide medical care. Telemedicine has the potential to medically undistance health care providers while maintaining the quality of care delivered and fulfilling the goal of social distancing. Methods: Rather than simply reporting enterprise telemedicine successes, the authors detail key telemedicine elements essential for rapid deployment of both an ambulatory and inpatient telemedicine solution. Such a deployment requires a multifaceted strategy: (1) determining the appropriateness of telemedicine use, (2) understanding the interface with the electronic health record, (3) knowing the equipment and resources needed, (4) developing a rapid rollout plan, (5) establishing a command center for post go-live support, (6) creating and disseminating reference materials and educational guides, (7) training clinicians, patients, and clinic schedulers, (8) considering billing and credentialing implications, (9) building a robust communications strategy, and (10) measuring key outcomes. Results: Initial results are reported, showing a telemedicine rate increase to 45.8% (58.6% video and telephone) in just the first week of rollout. Over a 5-month period, the enterprise has since conducted over 119,500 ambulatory telemedicine evaluations (a 1,000-fold rate increase from the pre-COVID-19 time period). Conclusion: This article is designed to offer a "How To" potential best practice approach for others wishing to quickly implement a telemedicine program during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Patterns of discrimination are often complex (i.e., multiplicative), with different identities combining to yield especially potent discrimination. For example, Black men are disproportionately stopped by police to a degree that cannot be explained by the simple (i.e., additive) effects of being Black and being male. Researchers often posit corresponding mental representations (e.g., intersectional stereotypes for Black men) to account for these complex outcomes. We suggest that complex discrimination can be explained by simple stereotypes combined with threshold models of behavior—for example, “if someone’s threat level seems higher than X, stop that person.” Simulations provide proof of this concept. We show how gender-by-race discrimination in both promotions and police stops can be explained by simple stereotypes. We also explore race-by-age discrimination in police stops, in which racial disparities are greater for young adolescents. This work suggests that complex behaviors can sometimes arise from relatively simple cognitions.

The self-reference task (SRT) is an evaluative learning paradigm that uses the positive valence of the self to change the attitude towards new and neutral stimuli. In this contribution, we present evidence regarding the possibility of changing the attitudes towards the self, following a modified SRT. In three independent research studies, we provided participants in experimental groups with an SRT that paired the self with highly positive pictures. After the completion of the modified SRT, participants in the experimental group reported significantly higher explicit self-esteem (in all studies) and more positive self-views (Study 1 and Study 2), as compared with a control group. In the second study, students completed the modified SRT each day for two weeks. The participants in the experimental group reported more positive explicit self-esteem and higher psychological well-being (e.g., higher academic engagement and lower academic burnout), as compared to the control group. However, Study 3 did not provide evidence regarding the effect of the modified SRT on self-reported mental health. Our results suggest that asking individuals to relate the self with another stimulus can be used in both directions to transfer valence from the self to external targets, and from external targets to the self.

Negative affect toward outgroup members has long been known to predict discriminatory behavior. However, psychological constructionist theories of emotion suggest that negative affect may not always reflect antipathy for outgroup members. Rather, the subjective experience depends on how negative affect is conceptualized as specific discrete emotions (e.g., fear vs. sympathy). Our current research integrates theories of implicit bias with psychological constructionist theories of emotion to understand the implications of negative affect toward outgroup members. Across 3 studies, we find evidence that conceptualization of negative affect toward Black Americans as sympathy, rather than fear, mitigates the relationship between negative affect and fear of Black Americans on self-report and perceptual measures, and reduces racial bias on a psychophysiological measure. These studies provide evidence that conceptualization of negative affect can shape reactions to outgroup members. We discuss the implications of these findings and ground them in theories of implicit bias, social cognition, and affective science. (PsycINFO Database Record

Categorizing people into groups is fundamental to stereotype formation. Thus, across four studies, we hypothesize that perceiving people in the context of groups (vs. alone) will amplify the application of existing stereotypes. Consistent with hypotheses, our first two studies demonstrate that Black people in groups (vs. the same Black people viewed alone) are perceived as more representative of Black people in general (Study 1), and more representative of negative stereotypes of Black people (Study 2). Similarly, Study 3 finds that positive stereotypes of Asian people (i.e., “hard-working” and “good at math”) are perceived as more representative of Asian people in groups than those same Asian people viewed alone. Finally, Study 4 demonstrates that increased stereotyping of groups is driven by attributes associated with groups (i.e., proximity) rather than the number of exemplars. We conclude that groups are not only integral to the formation of stereotypes, but also to their application.

Liberals and conservatives currently struggle to reach political agreement on policy proposals. While political polarization is closely associated with this phenomenon, the precise psychological mechanisms via which polarization works to affect political compromise remain to be fully explored. Across five studies (N = 1236; 2126 total individual observations), we uncover one such mechanism by exploring a novel and robust bias that emerges at the crossroads of policy trade-offs and partisanship. We call it the Partisan Trade-off Bias. When interpreting policy trade-offs, both Democrats and Republicans view the unintended but unavoidable side effects of policies proposed by contrapartisans as wanted and intended. Yet they do not attribute intentionality to the very same types of side effects of policies proposed by copartisans. We provide evidence for this bias across four types of policy trade-offs, including taxes, environmental regulation, gun control, and voting rights. Importantly, we show that the partisan trade-off bias is a unique contributor to decreased willingness to accept policy deals from contrapartisans, thus reducing the chances of reaching political agreement. Our studies suggest that the partisan trade-off bias is a product of the lack of trust in contrapartisans. In an experimental study, we manipulate trust and decrease the magnitude of this bias, showing evidence for our proposed mechanism and revealing a potential intervention to foster political compromise.

Negative attitudes and discrimination against Latinos exist in the dominant U.S. culture and in healthcare systems, contributing to ongoing health disparities. This article provides findings of a pilot test of Yo Veo Salud (I See Health), an intervention designed to positively modify attitudes toward Latinos among medical trainees. The research question was: Compared to the comparison group, did the intervention group show lower levels of implicit bias against Latinos versus Whites, and higher levels of ethnocultural empathy, healthcare empathy, and patient-centeredness? We used a sequential cohort, post-test design to evaluate Yo Veo Salud with a sample of 69 medical trainees. The intervention setting was an academic medical institution in a Southeastern U.S. state with a fast-growing Latino population. The intervention was delivered, and data were collected online, between July and December of 2014. Participants in the intervention group showed greater ethnocultural empathy, healthcare empathy, and patient-centeredness, compared to the comparison group. The implicit measure assessed four attitudinal dimensions (pleasantness, responsibility, compliance, and safety). Comparisons between our intervention and comparison groups did not find any average differences in implicit anti-Latino bias between the groups. However, in a subset analysis of White participants, White participants in the intervention group demonstrated a significantly decreased level of implicit bias in terms of pleasantness. A dose response was also founded indicating that participants involved in more parts of the intervention showed more change on all measures. Our findings, while modest in size, provide proof of concept for Yo Veo Salud as a means for increasing ethno-cultural and physician empathy, and patient-centeredness among medical residents and decreasing implicit provider bias toward Latinos.

Implicit bias, which refers to mental associations that can lead to unintentional discrimination, has become a focus as many organizations and institutions try to reduce disparities and increase inclusiveness. Many forms of implicit bias training are aimed at changing individuals’ implicit biases. This approach treats implicit bias as a trait-like attribute of the person. Recent theoretical advances in understanding implicit bias, however, suggest that implicit bias may not be a stable attribute of individuals. Instead, implicit bias may better characterize social environments than people. Understanding implicit bias as a cultural phenomenon, rather than a fixed set of beliefs, has important policy implications. Most notably, the best approaches for reducing the harm of implicit bias should aim at changing social contexts rather than changing people’s minds. Here, we highlight some considerations of this new understanding of implicit bias for policy makers aiming to reduce disparities and increase inclusion.

Three studies examine how subtle shifts in framing can alter the mind perception of groups. Study 1 finds that people generally perceive groups to have less mind than individuals. However, Study 2 demonstrates that changing the framing of a group from "a group of people" to "people in a group," substantially increases mind perception-leading to comparable levels of mind between groups and individuals. Study 3 reveals that this change in framing influences people's sympathy for groups, an effect mediated by mind perception. We conclude that minor linguistic shifts can have big effects on how groups are perceived-with implications for mind perception and sympathy for mass suffering. (PsycINFO Database Record

Supplemental_Analyses_5.2.2020 for A Privileged Point of View: Effects of Subjective Socioeconomic Status on Naïve Realism and Political Division by Jazmin L. Brown-Iannuzzi, Kristjen B. Lundberg, Aaron C. Kay and B. Keith Payne in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Supporting Information, per_1861_sm_t3 for An Inkblot for the Implicit Assessment of Personality: The Semantic Misattribution Procedure by Sava Florin A., MaricuΤoiu LaurenΤiu P., Rusu Silvia, Macsinga Irina, Vîrgă Delia, Cheng Clara Michelle and Payne B. Keith in European Journal of Personality

Two decades of research have documented a robust racial bias in the perceptual identification of weapons and the decision to shoot in laboratory simulations. In this chapter, we review the advances that have been made in understanding the causes, correlates, and psychological processes contributing to race biases in threat perception across different experimental paradigms. We begin by offering a psychological definition of bias, and considering how it may differ from folk concepts of bias. We discuss the contributions of this work to the broader field of implicit attitudes research. Most implicit bias research uses experimental tasks as measures of underlying attitudes. In contrast, research on racial bias in threat perception has focused on biased behaviors rather than attitudes. As a result, progress has been made in understanding not only automatic threat reactions but also the cognitive control processes that moderate the expression of automatic reactions in overt behavior. This literature has helped integrate research on implicit bias with research on executive control in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Moreover, this research has served as a test bed for developing quantitative models of social biases, including the use of signal detection theory, multinomial models, and diffusion models. We discuss the relationships among these different classes of models, and what each can contribute to understanding biased threat detection. We consider the complexities in linking findings from well-controlled laboratory experiments to field studies on actual police use of force. We end by considering questions about the rationality of racial biases, and argue that the rationality of a behavior cannot be understood as an empirical question apart from normative judgments of the behavior.

Supplemental Material, Brown-Iannuzzi_Online_Appendix for A Privileged Point of View: Effects of Subjective Socioeconomic Status on Naïve Realism and Political Division by Jazmin L. Brown-Iannuzzi, Kristjen B. Lundberg, Aaron C. Kay and B. Keith Payne in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

In a cross-sectional study of youth ages 8–15, we examined implicit and explicit gender stereotypes regarding math and language abilities. We investigated how implicit and explicit stereotypes differ across age and gender groups and whether they are consistent with cultural stereotypes. Participants (N = 270) completed the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) and a survey of explicit beliefs. Across all ages, boys showed neither math nor language implicit gender biases, whereas girls implicitly favored girls in both domains. These findings are counter to cultural stereotypes, which favor boys in math. On the explicit measure, both boys’ and girls’ primary tendency was to favor girls in math and language ability, with the exception of elementary school boys, who rated genders equally. We conclude that objective gender differences in academic success guide differences in children’s explicit reports and implicit biases.

Evaluative conditioning procedures change people’s evaluations of stimuli that are paired with pleasant or unpleasant items. To test whether influence awareness allows people to resist such persuasive attempts, we conducted three experiments. In the first two experiments featuring low levels of influence awareness (N1 = 96, N2 = 93) we manipulated the degree of control people have in expressing their attitudes, by providing participants in one condition with the option to “pass” rather than respond, when they felt influenced in their evaluations of conditioned stimuli. In the third experiment (N3 = 240) we manipulated the level of influence awareness by using a warning instruction similar to the one found in prior controllability studies, while giving everyone the option to pass the evaluation when they felt influenced. All studies found that participants often failed to use the skip option to exert control over conditioned preferences. In some cases, this may be because participants failed to notice the pairings, but in most cases because participants lacked awareness that the pairings could influence them. Even when explicitly warned that the pairings could influence them, participants seemed to believe that they were not vulnerable to such effects.

Can implicit bias be changed? In a recent longitudinal study, Lai and colleagues (2016, Study 2) compared nine interventions intended to reduce racial bias across 18 university campuses. Although all interventions changed participants’ bias on an immediate test, none were effective after a delay. This study has been interpreted as strong evidence that implicit biases are difficult to change. We revisited Lai et al.’s study to test whether the stability observed reflected persistent individual attitudes or stable environments. Our reanalysis ( N = 4,842) indicates that individual biases did not return to preexisting levels. Instead, campus means returned to preexisting campus means, whereas individual scores fluctuated mostly randomly. Campus means were predicted by markers of structural inequality. Our results are consistent with the theory that implicit bias reflects biases in the environment rather than individual dispositions. This conclusion is nearly the opposite of the original interpretation: Although social environments are stable, individual implicit biases are ephemeral.

Psychological research has devoted considerable attention to the relationship between the multiple category dimensions that can be extracted from faces. In the present studies, we investigated the role of experience and learning on the way the social perceiver deals with multiple category dimensions. Specifically, we tested whether learning which of 2 dimensions is the most relevant to the task at hand influences the encoding and retrieval of both task-relevant and irrelevant dimensions. In our studies, participants went through several cycles, each consisting of a study and a test phase. We manipulated the structure of the tests such that participants were probed on only 1 category dimension (age or gender), despite viewing faces of both category dimensions in all study phases. We hypothesized that when participants were repeatedly tested on 1 dimension, they would proactively control their attention toward that specific dimension and away from the nonrelevant dimension. Five studies demonstrated that: (a) participants learned which dimension was test-relevant such that they gradually became faster and more accurate on that dimension; (b) when the gender dimension was test-relevant, participants were faster and more accurate retrieving information concerning the target faces' gender than age, while the opposite did not happen when the age dimension was test-relevant; and (c) this dominance of the gender dimension is mainly caused by the inhibition of the age dimension. Implications about the importance of previous experience and control for research on social categorization in general and research examining the interplay between gender and age are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Experiences of discrete emotion play important roles in a variety of psychological domains. Yet, current measures of discrete emotion face significant limitations. Biological and behavioral measures often do not capture subjective experiences related to discrete emotions, while self-reports are susceptible to reporting biases. An indirect measure of discrete emotions would help address the limitations of existing measures; however, few such measures exist. Across 4 studies, we offer an indirect measure of discrete emotion. Our results provide evidence that our measure can distinguish between participants' experiences of same-valenced emotions (Study 1), is relatively less susceptible to deliberate attempts to suppress emotional responses (Studies 2 and 3), and is also relatively less susceptible to the influence of social norms (i.e., gender stereotypes) in self-reported discrete emotions than an explicit measure (Study 4). Overall, these findings demonstrate that our measure of discrete emotions can capture discrete emotional responses above and beyond affective valence, is indirect, and measures affective processes contributing to discrete emotional responses. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Despite growing workforce diversity, organizational attention, and social pressure (e.g, #MeToo), inequalities along axes of race, gender, class, sexual orientation, and ability remain a persistent...

This dataset contains 4-millisecond snapshots of the GPS radio spectrum stored by wildlife tracking tags deployed on adult Southern Royal Albatross (Diomedea epomophora) in New Zealand. Approximately 60,000 snapshots were recovered from nine birds over two southern-hemisphere summers in 2012 and 2013. The data can be post-processed using snapshot positioning algorithms, and are made available as a test dataset for further development of these algorithms. Included are post-processed position estimates for reference, as well as test data from stationary tags positioned under various test conditions for the purposes of characterizing tag performance.

Objective: Implicit attitudes toward alcohol predict drinking among adults and adolescents. If implicit attitudes reflected associations learned through direct experience with drinking, then they would likely only predict drinking among individuals who have previously consumed alcohol. In contrast, if implicit attitudes reflected indirect experience through social messages, they might also then predict future drinking, even among individuals with no drinking experience. In this study, we tested whether implicit attitudes would predict initiation of drinking for the first time, and whether parents' and friends' norms toward alcohol would influence the development of implicit attitudes. Method: For this study, we followed 868 adolescents between the ages of 12 and 15 years for 3 years. Implicit attitudes were measured using the affect misattribution procedure (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005; Payne, Govorun, & Arbuckle, 2008). Explicit intentions to drink and the frequency of drinking and binge drinking were measured at each of 3 annual waves. Results: Implicit attitudes toward alcohol predicted future drinking behavior 1 year later, and effects were similar for adolescents who had previously tried alcohol and for those who had not. To understand what factors might shape implicit attitudes among participants without drinking experience, we examined the role of parental norms and friends' norms toward drinking. Parental approval of drinking predicted the development of more positive implicit attitudes, which in turn predicted later drinking. Conclusion: Implicit attitudes toward alcohol can develop in advance of direct experience drinking alcohol. Results have implications for the implicit processes underpinning adolescent drinking, and the processes by which implicit associations are learned.

Concerns about rising levels of economic inequality are widespread and cut across culture, political ideology, and social class. Not surprisingly then, in recent years, management research has beco...

In this symposium, we present some of the latest research findings in regard to economic inequality and the ways in which it is shaping beliefs and behaviors, both at the societal and the organizat...

Supplemental material, Vuletich_OpenPracticesDisclosure_rev for Stability and Change in Implicit Bias by Heidi A. Vuletich and B. Keith Payne in Psychological Science

Urbanization and exotic species are major threats to the conservation of forest-dependent wildlife species. Some emblematic species, indicators of habitat quality for the conservation of other species, might successfully be reintroduced within cities when habitat restoration and pest management programs are combined. We studied the landscape resource selection of juvenile kaka Nestor meridionalis tracked with Global Positioning System (GPS) units and released into the predator-free reserve of Zealandia in Wellington city, New Zealand. Kaka moved beyond the predator exclusion fence into urban suburbs. The home range size and areas of high use estimated using local convex hull (a-LoCoH) ranged from 20 to 240 ha and 2 to 21 ha, respectively. Using resource selection functions and model selection we found that native forest patches and urban areas close to the reserve were selected by kaka to establish their home ranges. At a lower scale of selection (i.e., selection of habitats within home ranges), kaka selected the same habitat, but not necessarily those close to the reserve. Native forest patches throughout the city can facilitate the dispersal of individuals, while the reserve provides protection and opportunities for supplementary feeding. Urban areas might have been selected due to the placement of feeders in private backyards. Survival of forest-dwelling species in cities requires careful urban planning and management to provide the necessary habitat patches, refugia, and food sources.