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Indonesia's largest Sunni Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), has embraced moderation and tolerance of religious minorities, under the leadership of religious pluralists. Academic works on Indonesia's Islam have often attributed hostile and exclusive attitudes toward religious minorities, especially toward Shi'a, to groups under influence of Wahhabism. Observers of Indonesia's Islam in the past decade, however, have witnessed increasing violence against religious minorities by NU members using similar rhetoric to that deployed by Wahhabi-inspired groups. What accounts for the emerging trend of intolerance? Specifically, what motivates certain NU members to engage in persecution of minorities? This paper shows that the power struggle within the organization primarily motivates rank-and-file individuals to mobilize the masses by using anti-minority rhetoric with the aim of jeopardizing the moderate leadership and advancing their own standing. Among the emerging opponents of the pluralist leadership are disciples of Sayyid Muhammad Alawi al-Maliki (1944–2004) in Mecca. Despite the moderate teaching of al-Maliki, some disciples who seek influence beyond the organization are increasingly using anti-Shi'a rhetoric to mobilize the masses in this electoral democracy. The paper explores their historical trajectory, and then analyzes development after the democratization as well as the limitations that prevent them from expanding their influence at the national level.

Mass mobilization has often had a significant impact in Indonesian politics. Even without state power or financial resources, those who are capable of mobilizing the masses have continued to play a crucial role in politics. Nevertheless, the predominant literature on Indonesian politics has long underestimated the social actors' power even after Suharto's demise in 1998. According to them, powerful oligarchic domination has characterized Indonesian politics. In contrast to this account, there is a growing literature that demonstrates cases in which social actors and organizations exert significant influence on the elites and articulate changes in policies by leveraging voting power in direct elections. The focus of these studies, however, is largely limited to political negotiations during elections. This paper examines much broader efforts on the part of social actors to achieve policy change. In fact, such actors are not only utilizing the voting power of elections but also making good use of the judicial system, notably, a judicial review of the constitutional court. Through an analysis of the oil and gas policy after 1998, this paper demonstrates the various strategies that social actors deploy to achieve policy change as well as influence Indonesian politics.

This article examines a case of religious intolerance against Shi'as that took place from 2011 to 2013 in the Sampang Regency in Madura Island, Indonesia. Many observers of the growing religious intolerance in Indonesia attribute the outbreak of violence to the conservative element of the central government and the weak judicial system in the nascent democracy. Those accounts, however, do not explain how exactly a particular non-state group can legitimize violence in the public eye and the court in the first place. Legitimizing violence and escaping from legal punishment requires strong support from the local elites holding the state's power. It argues that non-state actors can legitimize violence against the minority if they can present themselves to the political elites as "representatives" of the majority before the direct election. In the case of the Sampang Regency, successive attacks against the Shi'a residents were provoked and aggravated by the local religious authorities called kiais. The article demonstrates how the intolerant elements of kiais that managed to forge alliances with the incumbent Sampang regional head, police, prosecutors, and court judges succeeded in persecuting the Shi'as. The case illustrates the way in which intolerant groups make good use of democratic political freedom and the direct election for their own sake.

Indonesia's largest Sunni Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), has embraced moderation and tolerance of religious minorities, under the leadership of religious pluralists. Academic works on Indonesia's Islam have often attributed hostile and exclusive attitudes toward religious minorities, especially toward Shi'a, to groups under influence of Wahhabism. Observers of Indonesia's Islam in the past decade, however, have witnessed increasing violence against religious minorities by NU members using similar rhetoric to that deployed by Wahhabi-inspired groups. What accounts for the emerging trend of intolerance? Specifically, what motivates certain NU members to engage in persecution of minorities? This paper shows that the power struggle within the organization primarily motivates rank-and-file individuals to mobilize the masses by using anti-minority rhetoric with the aim of jeopardizing the moderate leadership and advancing their own standing. Among the emerging opponents of the pluralist leadership are disciples of Sayyid Muhammad Alawi al-Maliki (1944–2004) in Mecca. Despite the moderate teaching of al-Maliki, some disciples who seek influence beyond the organization are increasingly using anti-Shi'a rhetoric to mobilize the masses in this electoral democracy. The paper explores their historical trajectory, and then analyzes development after the democratization as well as the limitations that prevent them from expanding their influence at the national level.

〈特集〉現代東南アジアにおける宗教の越境現象―タイ，ミャンマーを中心に―

This article examines a case of religious intolerance against Shi'as that took place from 2011 to 2013 in the Sampang Regency in Madura Island, Indonesia. Many observers of the growing religious intolerance in Indonesia attribute the outbreak of violence to the conservative element of the central government and the weak judicial system in the nascent democracy. Those accounts, however, do not explain how exactly a particular non-state group can legitimize violence in the public eye and the court in the first place. Legitimizing violence and escaping from legal punishment requires strong support from the local elites holding the state's power. It argues that non-state actors can legitimize violence against the minority if they can present themselves to the political elites as "representatives" of the majority before the direct election. In the case of the Sampang Regency, successive attacks against the Shi'a residents were provoked and aggravated by the local religious authorities called kiais. The article demonstrates how the intolerant elements of kiais that managed to forge alliances with the incumbent Sampang regional head, police, prosecutors, and court judges succeeded in persecuting the Shi'as. The case illustrates the way in which intolerant groups make good use of democratic political freedom and the direct election for their own sake.

Mass mobilization has often had a significant impact in Indonesian politics. Even without state power or financial resources, those who are capable of mobilizing the masses have continued to play a crucial role in politics. Nevertheless, the predominant literature on Indonesian politics has long underestimated the social actors' power even after Suharto's demise in 1998. According to them, powerful oligarchic domination has characterized Indonesian politics. In contrast to this account, there is a growing literature that demonstrates cases in which social actors and organizations exert significant influence on the elites and articulate changes in policies by leveraging voting power in direct elections. The focus of these studies, however, is largely limited to political negotiations during elections. This paper examines much broader efforts on the part of social actors to achieve policy change. In fact, such actors are not only utilizing the voting power of elections but also making good use of the judicial system, notably, a judicial review of the constitutional court. Through an analysis of the oil and gas policy after 1998, this paper demonstrates the various strategies that social actors deploy to achieve policy change as well as influence Indonesian politics.

This paper analyzes the water privatization process in Jakarta, Indonesia, focusing on the changes in policy after the fall of Suharto in 1998, to show the strategic adaptation of domestic business elites to survive after the drastic transition period. During the Suharto era, business elites were able to accumulate capital by drawing patronage from former President Suharto. However, the democratization of the country led to Suharto's ouster and disordered the former interest structure, which was deeply entrenched in the Indonesian political economy. Today concessions in water privatization are no longer sustained by merely relying on the political authority. In Jakarta, the center of Indonesia's politics and economy, agreements with Suharto guaranteed private corporate interests with lucrative business relating to city development. Recently, however, private businesses, especially those managing public infrastructure, have become increasingly vulnerable to aggres sive public backlash and supervision by the regulatory bodies of the provincial government. Despite this increasing vulnerability, domestic business elites have succeeded in regaining their lucrative concessions by seizing opportunities and cooperating with the capitals of foreign countries. These business elites have successfully adapted to the changing democratic nvironment with sophisticated strategies and shrewd risk management.

This paper analyzes the water privatization process in Jakarta, Indonesia, focusing on the changes in policy after the fall of Suharto in 1998, to show the strategic adaptation of domestic business elites to survive after the drastic transition period. During the Suharto era, business elites were able to accumulate capital by drawing patronage from former President Suharto. However, the democratization of the country led to Suharto's ouster and disordered the former interest structure, which was deeply entrenched in the Indonesian political economy. Today concessions in water privatization are no longer sustained by merely relying on the political authority. In Jakarta, the center of Indonesia's politics and economy, agreements with Suharto guaranteed private corporate interests with lucrative business relating to city development. Recently, however, private businesses, especially those managing public infrastructure, have become increasingly vulnerable to aggres sive public backlash and supervision by the regulatory bodies of the provincial government. Despite this increasing vulnerability, domestic business elites have succeeded in regaining their lucrative concessions by seizing opportunities and cooperating with the capitals of foreign countries. These business elites have successfully adapted to the changing democratic nvironment with sophisticated strategies and shrewd risk management.