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Farm input subsidies are widely used in Sub-Saharan African countries as a response to low adoption of fertilizers and seeds. While subsidy programs traditionally focused on helping farmers access inputs, new generation market smart subsidies additionally emphasize careful targeting, development of input supply systems, and complementary production and marketing support mechanisms. Ghana’s Planting for Food and Jobs (PFJ) initiative, launched in 2017, is one example of such an evolved subsidy program; yet, despite its scale and prominence, the current government monitoring and evaluation system is not well equipped to accurately assess its impacts. This paper triangulates evidence from multiple public sources and independent evaluations to develop a simple and effective impact assessment model for PFJ that can easily be adopted by the government. It can also be adapted to other contexts with minimal adjustment. Model results reveal that maize and rice production levels are more than 40 percent higher than they would have been in the absence of PFJ, thus contributing significantly to food and calorie availability in Ghana. However, there is much room for efficiency improvements that would increase the return on investment-currently, program benefits roughly equal public and private costs of the program. In this regard, several recommendations are made relating to beneficiary targeting, crowding out of commercial input sales, input use efficiency, marketing support to farmers, and improvements in the monitoring and evaluation system, all of which have relevance for other countries implementing or considering similar programs.

Globally, countries have resorted to social distancing, travel restrictions and economic lockdowns to reduce transmission of COVID-19. The socioeconomic costs of these blunt measures are expected to be high, especially in sub-Saharan Africa where many live hand-to-mouth and lack social safety nets. Social Accounting Matrix multiplier model results show that Ghana’s urban lockdown, although in force for only three weeks in April 2020, has likely caused GDP to fall by 27.9% during that period, while an additional 3.8 million Ghanaians temporarily became poor. Compared to the government’s revised GDP growth rate of 1.5% for 2020, the model predicts a contraction of 0.6 to 6.3% for 2020, depending on the speed of the recovery. The US$200 million budgeted for Ghana’s Coronavirus Alleviation Program will close only a small part of the estimated US$ 2.3 billion GDP gap between the fast recovery scenario and government’s revised GDP trajectory.

As COVID-19 spread across the globe in early 2020, governments had to make difficult policy choices to balance the socioeconomic costs of social distancing and lockdown measures, on the one hand, and the human costs of increased morbidity and mortality of an unchecked pandemic, on the other. The challenge was particularly daunting for developing countries with their often illequipped and underfunded health systems coupled with general skepticism about the effectiveness of economic restrictions to curb viral spread, especially in densely populated informal urban communities (The Economist 2020). Poorer developing country populations also tend to be less resilient to income shocks, while the social protection measures needed to mitigate against income losses are costly. With developing country governments already heavily indebted before the pandemic (Onyekwena and Ekeruche 2019), and with further anticipated losses in tax revenues due to COVID-related economic restrictions, their ability to finance palliative measures without sacrificing much-needed, longer-term public investments has remained a major concern.

Micro- and macroeconomic evidence suggest that the promotion of agricultural diversification in agriculture-based developing countries is beneficial. At the microeconomic level, increased agricultural diversification promotes human nutrition and raises household incomes, while allowing farmers to adapt to the challenges posed by climate change. Using Malawi as a case study, we analyzed the recent patterns and determinants of farm level crop diversification in order to better understand how policies impact on diversification and how they can be better formulated or implemented to effectively promote diversification. The study used descriptive and econometric approaches to study crop diversification. Data from two nationally representative household surveys, which covered cropping seasons in 2004/05 and 2010/11, show that crop diversification has deteriorated nationally in different Agricultural Development Divisions (ADDs), although beneficiaries of the widely-implemented Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP) have become more diversified. The study also found that crop diversification varies significantly across agro-ecological zones. Results also indicate that deliberately targeted policies lead to more commercially orientated crop diversification. We conclude that further crop diversification could be promoted among different types of farmers with the aim of contributing to economic growth, risk reduction, and nutrition security in Malawi.

Highlights • Evaluates the efficacy of export restrictions to promote food security and industrial growth in developing countries. • The use of an economywide framework is an advancement over traditional partial equilibrium approaches. • Highlights inconsistency between stated policy goals and outcomes due to behavioral responses, especially in the longer run. • Advocates for more liberal export policies to support private sector-led economic transformation in developing countries., Restrictions on staple or cash crop exports are frequently imposed in developing countries to promote food security or industrial development. By diverting production to local markets, these policies tend to reduce prices and increase domestic supply of food or intermediate inputs in the short term, to the benefit of consumers or manufacturers, which make them attractive to policymakers. However, in the long term, export restrictions discourage agricultural production, which may ultimately negate the short-term gains. This study assesses the economy-wide effects of Malawi’s long-term maize export ban, which was only recently lifted, and a proposed oilseed export levy intended to improve food security and support local processing industries, respectively. We find that maize export bans only benefit the urban non-poor, while poor farmers’ incomes and maize consumption levels decline in the longer run. The oilseed export levy also fails to achieve its long run objectives: even when tax revenues are used to further subsidize food processors, their gains in value-addition are outweighed by declining agricultural value-addition. More generally, these results show that while export restrictions may have the desired outcomes in the short run, production responses may render the policies ineffective in the medium to long run. Ultimately, such restrictive policies reinforce a subsistence approach to agriculture, which is inconsistent with the stated economic transformation goals of many Sub-Saharan African countries.

Tanzania's National Food Reserve Agency has a mandate to ensure food security through procuring, reserving and recycling grain (primarily maize) in a cost†effective manner. This mandate excludes a price stabilization role. Procurement prices, based on production costs, are often set above market prices to encourage production. Several disbursements channels exist: grain provided free or at a discount to targeted vulnerable households; subsidized sales to millers; and sales to prisons or nongovernmental aid programs, typically at market†related prices. Given the perception that these activities are distortive, we use time†series econometrics to model maize price dynamics in select wholesale markets to capture the Agency's market impact. We find that its pricing strategy had an insignificant impact on prices during 2010/11–2014/15 despite a fairly significant presence in at least some regional markets. We recommend that the Agency reconsiders offering a price premium on procured maize or selling maize at discount to millers, as limited market spill†over effects imply the benefits are captured by only a few, even though its practice of providing subsidized or free maize to vulnerable people is not in question. Furthermore, current storage capacity expansion plans are not required and inconsistent with its food security mandate.

In this paper we analyze the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the policies adopted to curtail the spread of the disease in Nigeria We carry out simulations using a multiplier model based on the 2018 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Nigeria, which includes supply-use tables for 284 goods and services The pandemic's global reach and impact on the global economy combined with the response policies in Nigeria represent a large, sudden shock to the country's economy The SAM multiplier model is well-suited for measuring the short-term direct and indirect results of this type of shock because the SAM represents both the structure of the economy and the interactions among economic actors via commodity and factor markets Our analysis focuses on the five-week lockdown implemented by the federal government across the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja and Lagos and Ogun states from late March to early May 2020, the federal lockdown for Kano from mid-April, and the state-level lockdowns that were implemented from mid-April for around seven weeks in Akwa Ibom, Borno, Ekiti, Kwara, Osun, Rivers, and Taraba states We estimate that during the lockdown periods Nigeria's GDP suffered a 34 1 percent loss due to COVID-19, amounting to USD 16 billion, with two-thirds of the losses coming from the services sector The agriculture sector, which serves as the primary means of livelihood for most Nigerians, suffered a 13 1 percent loss in output (USD 1 2 billion) Although primary agricultural activities were excluded from the direct restrictions on economic activities imposed in the lockdown zones, the broader agri-food system was affected indirectly because of its linkages with the rest of the economy We estimate that households lost on average 33 percent of their incomes during the period, with the heaviest losses occurring for rural non-farm and for urban households The economic impacts of COVID-19 include a 14-percentage point temporary increase in the poverty headcount rate for Nigeria, implying that 27 million additional people fell below the poverty line during lockdown Lastly, we consider economic recovery scenarios as the COVID-19 policies are being relaxed during the latter part of 2020 Our findings have implications for understanding the direct and indirect impacts of COVID-19, for policy design during the recovery period, and for planning future disease prevention measures while protecting livelihoods and maintaining economic growth

This paper has been written for the 2020 ECAMA Lakeshore Conference. It extends and updates the initial results of modeling undertaken by IFPRI to assess the short-run impacts of COVID-19 control measures on the Malawian economy. We also consider the short-run effects of external shocks associated with disruptions in trade and tourism, investment, and remittance flows on the Malawian economy, as well as two medium- erm paths assuming either faster or slower recovery during the remainder of 2020 and 2021. Using a SAM multiplier model, we estimate GDP declines by around 16.5 percent during April/May 2020 due to social distancing measures. This leads to around 1.6 million people, mainly in rural areas, temporarily falling into poverty, although urban households suffer the largest income losses.

This Report describes the initial results of modeling undertaken by IFPRI to assess the short-run impacts of the COVID-19 control measures on the Malawian economy. We also consider the short-run effects of external shocks associated with disruptions in trade, investment, and remittance flows on the Malawian economy, as well as two medium-term paths assuming either faster or slower recovery during the remainder of 2020. This analysis has been undertaken in order to inform the policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Malawi and represents a first pass attempt to measure the short-term economic impacts of COVID-19 on the Malawian economic. It should be noted that, unlike NPC (2020) our estimates of the economic impact of the COVID-19 on the Malawian economy do not extend beyond 2020 and do not try to set a value on loss of life or life-years. They do, however, allow for detailed breakdown of the direct and indirect impacts of COVID-19 on different sectors and sub-sectors of the Malawian economy.

Most countries exempted agri-food systems from “lockdown” policies introduced in early 2020 to curb the COVID-19 outbreak. Yet these policies had economywide implications, implying that even exempted sectors were indirectly affected by disruptions to supply chains and falling consumer demand. After its first confirmed case, Nigeria's federal and state governments implemented lockdowns across most cities and states. This included closing all borders and many non-essential businesses. Nigeria also faced declining remittances and export demand caused by the global recission. We estimate the economywide impacts of these lockdown policies and global shocks using a multiplier model of Nigeria calibrated to a 2018 social accounting matrix. We simulate Nigeria's 8-week lockdown (March–June), as well as “recovery” scenarios until the end of 2020. Simulations draw on information from official data, policy announcements, and interviews with government agencies and private sector and industry groups. Findings indicate that total GDP fell 23% during the lockdown. Agri-food system GDP fell 11%, primarily due to restrictions on food services. Household incomes also fell by a quarter, leading a 9% points increase in the national poverty rate. Given the scale of these economic losses, our recovery scenarios indicate that, even with a rapid easing of restrictions and global recovery, Nigeria is unlikely to escape a deep economic recession. We conclude that, while food systems were exempt, they were not immune to the effects of COVID-19. Protecting food supplies should be a priority alongside government efforts to address the health consequences of the pandemic.

While storage losses at the farm are often assumed to be an important contributor to presumed large postharvest losses in developing countries, reliable and representative data on these losses are often lacking. We study farmers’ storage decisions and self-reported storage losses for grains based on two large-scale household surveys conducted in major agricultural areas in Ethiopia. We show that a relatively large share of grain production is stored by farm households for own consumption and that storage technologies are rudimentary. Farmers’ self-reported storage losses amount to an average of 4 % of all grains stored and 2 % of total harvest. These storage losses differ significantly by socioeconomic variables and wealth, as well as by crop and humidity. We further see strong spatial heterogeneity in storage losses being significantly higher in southwest Ethiopia. Efforts to scale up the adoption of improved storage technologies to reduce storage losses at the farm level should consider these characteristics.

Domestic and international supply and demand shocks are an important driver of NRP fluctuations through their impacts on relative border or domestic prices. The East African Community (EAC) is a regional intergovernmental organization, formed in 2000 between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, and today consisting of the founding members together with Burundi, Rwanda and South Sudan. Since 2010 cooperation has consisted of a common market and a customs union, with duty-free intra-regional trade and a...

For developing countries, whose governments are faced with volatile world food prices, the appropriate policy response hinges on who are the likely winners and losers. Therefore, it is necessary to predict the impact of higher commodity prices on different subgroups of society. We compare the results of a method that is popular with policy makers because of its parsimony and ease of interpretation with the results of a more complex and data-intensive general-equilibrium model. Using historical prices between 2008 and 2011 for Uganda, we find that both methods predict high prices benefit poor rural farmers, but more so if a more elaborate model is used.

We estimate the impact of Malawi Farm Input Subsidy Programme using an economywide approach. We find potentially substantial net benefits with indirect benefits accounting for about two-fifths of total benefits. Due to these indirect benefits, the cut-off

Prioritizing public investments requires information on relative returns that is difficult to derive from disparate evaluation studies. This article presents a ‘hybrid’ approach that combines ex post evaluation data with an economywide model for experimenting ex ante with alternative investment portfolios within a consistent, structural framework. The approach is used to evaluate rural investments in Uganda. Agricultural research and extension services are found to be more effective at promoting economic growth and poverty reduction than either rural feeder roads or irrigation infrastructure. This suggests that the government’s recent shift in emphasis from extension services to irrigation may potentially reduce the overall benefits of its agricultural investment plan.

With the recent discovery of crude oil reserves along the Albertine Rift, Uganda is set to establish itself as an oil producer in the coming decade. Total oil reserves are believed to be two billion barrels, with recoverable reserves estimated at 0.8–1.2 billion barrels. This is comparable to the level of oil reserves in African countries such as Chad (0.9 billion barrels), Republic of the Congo (1.9 billion barrels), and Equatorial Guinea (1.7 billion barrels) but far short of Angola (13.5 billion) and Nigeria (36.2 billion) (World Bank 2010). Using a conservative reserve scenario of 800 million barrels, peak production, likely to be reached by 2017, is estimated by the World Bank to range from 120,000 to 140,000 barrels per day, with a production period spanning 30 years. A more optimistic scenario in this study is based on 1.2 billion barrels and sets peak production at 210,000 barrels per day (see Wiebelt et al. 2011). Although final stipulations of the revenue sharing agreements with oil producers are not yet known, government revenue from oil will be substantial. One estimate, based on an average oil price of US$75 per barrel, puts revenues at approximately 10–15% of GDP at peak production (World Bank 2010). The discovery of crude oil therefore has the potential to provide significant stimulus to the Ugandan economy and to enable it to better address its development objectives, provided oil revenues are managed in an appropriate manner.