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On the basis of the expectancy-value theory of achievement, this paper aims to examine the relative contributions of gender-stereotype endorsement and gender identification on expectancies for success in STEM fields. In a sample of 880 Croatian primary school pupils of approximately 12 years of age, stereotyped beliefs about gender-appropriateness of STEM-related professions (stereotype endorsement) and self-perception as a typical representative of one's gender (gender identification) were first assessed. Participants also reported their expectations for success in each of the STEM-related professions previously used for establishing stereotype endorsement. Stereotype endorsement and gender identification separately interacted with gender to predict expectancies for success in STEM-related professions. Higher levels of stereotype endorsement and gender identification fostered stereotype-consistent expectancies for success in STEM fields (higher expectancies for boys than for girls). Implications are discussed in terms of strategies to encourage girls to engage in STEM-related careers.

The aim of the present study was to examine, for the first time, the level of gender-stereotyped beliefs about STEM-related school subjects among Croatian primary school students and to explore how stereotyped beliefs can be predicted from prior achievement in STEM school subjects and students' STEM interests. Eight hundred and eighty primary school students (442 girls and 438 boys) completed a paper-and-pencil questionnaire in their own classrooms (data used in the study are extracted from a larger STEM research project). The measures of interest in this study were stereotype endorsement, interest in STEM-related school subjects, and school marks in these subjects. Results suggest that regardless of prior school achievement, students who have stereotype-consistent interests in school subjects tend to show stronger stereotype endorsement than others. Male gender and prior achievement in STEM-related school subjects were also positively related to stereotype endorsement. These results are discussed in light of the existing literature and some practical implications are considered.

When a good idea is discovered, who gets credit for it? This is an important question in science, the arts, law, and everyday life. We suggest that people have intuitions about credit ownership that depend on three factors: (i) whether the idea suggests the discoverer is competent; (ii) whether the discovery elicits gratitude toward the discoverer; (iii) who the first individual to come up with the idea is. We test these intuitions in three vignette experiments with UK participants, in the context of priority disputes in science. In Experiment 1, participants find a discoverer less competent and award less credit to them for a scientific idea if they perceive that the discoverer could have plagiarized another discoverer, but attributions of credit are also shown to differ from attributions of competence. In Experiment 2, participants are more grateful toward, and award more credit to a discoverer who makes their discovery public. In Experiment 3, participants are more biased toward the first discoverer in terms of credit attribution than in terms of competence attribution or feelings of gratitude. In conclusion, we suggest that intuitions of credit ownership help explain the popularity and endurance of the priority rule in science, by which all the credit of a discovery is supposed to go to the first discoverer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study investigates how group-cooperation heuristics boost voluntary contributions in a repeated public goods game. We manipulate two separate factors in a two-person public goods game: i) group composition (Selfish Subjects vs. Conditional Cooperators) and ii) common knowledge about group composition (Information vs. No Information). In addition, we let the subjects signal expectations of the other's contributions in the experiment's second phase. Common knowledge of Selfish type alone slightly dampens contributions but dramatically increases contributions when signaling of expectations is allowed. The results suggest that group-cooperation heuristics are triggered when two factors are jointly salient to the agent: (i) that there is no one to free-ride on; and (ii) that the other wants to cooperate because of (i). We highlight the potential effectiveness of group-cooperation heuristics and propose solution thinking as the schema of reasoning underlying the heuristics. The high correlation between expectations and actual contributions is compatible with the existence of default preference to satisfy others' expectations (or to avoid disappointing them), but the stark end-game effect suggests that group-cooperation heuristics, at least among selfish players, function ultimately to benefit material self-interest rather than to just please others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]