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The study examines relations between adolescent employment and three aspects of higher education: beginning an undergraduate degree, completing the degree and type of institution (more prestigious university versus less prestigious college). Our research adds a new dimension to the concept of adolescent employment: the contribution of the adolescent's earnings to household income. This dimension links the earnings of the adolescent, as reflected in his/her salary, with parental socioeconomic status, as reflected in family income. Analyzing administrative data from the Israel National Insurance Institute for the cohort of 1991, which includes information for ages 12–28 (2003–2019), we found that adolescent employment per se does not usually affect higher education attainment, but there is a negative relation between the adolescent's income share and higher education, even after controlling for household income in early adolescence. Engaging in the debate on the consequences of employment during adolescence for later life outcomes, our study reveals that this depends on the centrality of the adolescent's contribution to family income. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study contributes to the theoretical and empirical debate on how adolescent employment affects later labour market resources. Specifically, we view such employment as having a complex relation with labour market outcomes in young adulthood, depending on the specific resource examined: the likelihood to be employed and the earnings level. Focusing on Israeli millennials, we used administrative longitudinal data from the Israel National Insurance Institute with respect to a representative sample of the 1991 cohort, covering ages 12–28. Findings show that while employment during adolescence increases the likelihood of working in young adulthood, once employed, it decreases earnings, suggesting that adolescent employment has relations of both inclusion and exclusion with respect to the labour market resources of young adults. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decade, egg freezing has evolved from being an experimental medical technology to become a commercial enterprise, accompanied by heated feminist debate. This study examined the views of Danish and Israeli female students regarding the financing of social egg freezing (SEF) (self, state, employer or family), and their correlation with country and feminist identity. A total of 569 female students (283 from Denmark and 286 from Israel) completed a questionnaire composed of closed and opened-ended questions on SEF financing under different circumstances (e.g. career advancement, lack of a partner, lack of money). The majority of female students in both countries supported SEF self-financing. They wanted to keep fertility choices in the private domain, in part by separating the bodies of women from the state and the employer. We conclude that SEF exemplifies a neoliberal and gendered responsibilisation of women's reproductive futurity, yet self-identification as a feminist was found to be correlated with stronger support for state financing. In contrast, we found no correlation between feminist identity and support for company-sponsored egg freezing. Our findings suggest a relationship between holding a feminist worldview and public policy preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our study seeks to compare attitudes towards family life and gender roles between Generation X and Generation Y, focusing on the ages of 18-29, a period regarded as that of emerging adulthood. Most of the academic scholarship on this issue focuses on Western and Anglo-American individuals, their values and perceptions. By contrast, our article explores questions of gender roles and family life among Generations X and Y in the Middle Eastern country of Israel, utilizing the perspectives of the Second Demographic Transition and the Stalled Gender Revolution. Using the 1994, 2002, and 2012 waves of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) module on Family and Gender Roles, our findings indicate that Israeli Gen Y young adults tend to report more conservative perceptions regarding family and gender roles than their Gen X counterparts. This is generally explained by a higher level of religiosity among Israeli young adults from Gen Y. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]