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A two-country model of oligopoly in general equilibrium is used to show how changes in market structure accompany the process of trade and capital-market liberalization. The model predicts that bilateral mergers in which low-cost firms buy out higher-cost foreign rivals are profitable under Cournot competition. As a result, trade liberalization can trigger international merger waves, in the process encouraging countries to specialize and trade more in accordance with comparative advantage. With symmetric countries, welfare is likely to rise, though the distribution of income always shifts towards profits. Copyright 2007, Wiley-Blackwell.

Nach der Erschütterung der Weltfinanzmärkte wird die Liberalisierung von Märkten auch grundsätzlich kritisiert. Sind die Fehlentwicklungen auf den Finanzmärkten der marktwirtschaftlichen Wirtschaftsordnung anzulasten? Wie stellt sich die aktuelle Finanzkrise in historischer Perspektive dar?

While there are a number of theoretical arguments in favour of capital account convertibility, or free cross-border capital mobility, in the real world cross-border trade in financial assets can in fact reduce welfare due to the effects of domestic distortions. The following paper examines the causes of the Asian financial crises of the late 1990s in this light and presents some of the lessons that would be instructive for a more effective implementation of capital account convertibility.

In the 1990s currency crises arose in different regions, e.g. in Mexico, East Asia, Russia, Brazil and Ecuador, to mention only the most important ones. What are the main factors which may trigger such events? How does globalisation and deregulation of financial markets influence the emergence of a currency crisis? What forms of crises exist? Are they driven by fundamental imbalances in a country or are they caused by self-fulfilling mechanisms involving herd behaviour and destabilising speculation? To what extent do such crises reflect implicit governmental and international guarantees which may cause moral hazard and adverse selection, thereby increasing the risk behaviour of enterprises and banks?

Die Hauptkritik der Globalisierungsgegner zielt auf die internationalen Finänzmärkte. Welche Bedeutung haben die Finanzmärkte für die Weltwirtschaft? Was wird im einzelnen kritisiert? Ist die Kritik gerechtfertigt?

We analyze whether or not the globalization of capital, disciplines governments and improves governance. We demonstrate that globalization affects governance, by increasing a country's vulnerability to sudden capital flight. This increased threat of capital flight can discipline governments and improve governance and welfare by placing countries in a golden straitjacket. However, globalization may also overdiscipline governments - resulting in a perverse impact on governmental incentives that catalyzes (mis)governance. Accordingly, the paper suggests a novel (and qualified) role for capital controls. Finally, we provide some suggestive evidence consistent with the predictions from our theoretical framework.

Financial markets that function well are crucial for the long-run economic growth of a country. This paper, in the first instance, looks at how the financial development of an economy can be measured. It then traces the financial development of India through the 1990s to the present, assessing the development of each segment of financial markets. In doing so, it highlights the dualistic development of the financial sector. Finally, the paper makes an attempt to offer an explanation of this dualistic development and proposes a road map for the future development of financial markets in India.

This paper analyzes the role and scope of macroprudential policy in preventing financial instability in the context of East Asian economies. It analyzes the behavior of the housing market in a dynamic setting to identify some of the factors responsible for the volatility of housing markets and their susceptibility to boom-bust cycles, which it identifies as a key source of financial imbalances in these economies. It then discusses the causal nexus between price and financial stability and the roles and complementary nature of macroprudential and monetary policies in addressing aggregate risk in the financial system. The paper identifies currency and maturity mismatches, which contributed to the 1997 - 1998 Asian financial crisis, as ongoing concerns in these economies although the high levels of reserves in the region now act as a buffer.

The paper analyzes the financial crisis of through the lens of market failures and regulatory failures. We present a case that there were four primary failures contributing to the crisis: excessive risk-taking in the financial sector due to mispriced government guarantees; regulatory focus on individual institution risk rather than systemic risk; opacity of positions in financial derivatives that produced externalities from individual firm failures; and runs on the unregulated banking sector that eventually threatened to bring down the entire financial sector. In emphasizing the role of regulatory failures, we provide a description of regulatory evolution in response to the panic of 1907 and the Great Depression, why the regulation put in place then was successful in addressing market failures, but how, over time, especially around the resolutions of Continental Illinois, Savings and Loans crisis and Long-Term Capital Management, expectations of too-big-to-fail status got anchored. We propose specific reforms to address the four market and regulatory failures we identify, and we conclude with some lessons for emerging markets.

This paper explores the impact of financial liberalization on the migration of high skilled labor from 46 countries to the OECD, taken at five year intervals over the period 1985-2000. Using an exploratory factor analysis, we are able to distinguish between two dimensions of financial liberalization, namely the robustness of the markets and their freedom from direct government control. We find that a standard deviation improvement in the robustness of the source country financial sector magnifies the extent of brain drain by a factor of about four percentage points on the average. However, a corresponding increase in the freedom of the source country financial sector from government control has a modest negative impact on the emigration of high skilled labor and the effect is not statistically significant. Further, the impact of improved financial sector robustness on selection is more pronounced for non-OECD economies than for OECD nations, which experience virtually no impact on skilled emigration.

One of the reasons behind the financial crisis in 1997 was excessive dependence of Asian economies on commercial banks for domestic financing. Banks were the major source of corporate financing because the other major source, bond markets, was underdeveloped and small. On the other hand, the 2008 global financial crisis led to constraints in acquiring local currency and foreign currency liquidity in the corporate sector, as foreign banks withdrew investments from Asia. Furthermore, Asia needs large quantities of capital (US$750 billion per year for 2010-2020) to develop infrastructure connectivity within and across its economies. Local and regional capital can be channeled for long-term infrastructure projects and other productive investment through bond markets. At this juncture, to enhance bond financing, it is important to examine factors that promote effective development of bond markets. This study attempts to identity the major determinants of bond market development in Asian economies, through examining its relationship with selected key financial and economic factors, and to provide policy recommendations for further developing Asian bond markets. Major determinants for bond market development in Asia include the size of an economy, the stage of economic development, the openness of an economy, the size of the banking sector, and the interest rate spread.

Notwithstanding incumbency advantages and network effects enjoyed by the United States (US) dollar, considerations about the stability of its value have led Asian countries to fear they are holding their foreign exchange reserves in a depreciating currency. At the same time, it pays for the regional countries to adjust their reserve currency composition to match the point of reference of their exchange rate policy. This paper examines empirically which regional currency or currencies seem to matter for exchange rate determination in Asia beyond the very short term. To this end, we employ country-specific Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models to compare the relative impact which fluctuations in the Asian Currency Unit (ACU), yuan, and yen separately have on movements of Asian currencies. Contrary to recent evidence based on daily data, we found monthly exchange rates variations in the region are more heavily influenced by the cumulative effect of key Asian currencies than by the yuan or the yen individually within the sample period we used. To the extent that exchange rates in the region shift over time from benchmarking the US dollar towards a broad range of Asian currencies, Asian central banks will find it more attractive to cross-hold Asian bonds. This calls for the development of deep private markets in such assets, as well as institutional prerequisites for internationalizing key regional currencies.

This paper takes stock of recent research dealing with the degree to which the trilemma choices of Asian countries facilitated a smoother adjustment during the global crisis of 2008-2009, and the way the region has been coping with the adjustment to the postcrisis challenges. We point out that emerging Asia has converged to a middle ground of the trilemma configuration: limited financial integration, a degree of monetary independence, and controlled exchange rate buffered by sizable international reserves. This configuration, with the proper management of balance sheet exposure and public finances, facilitated a smoother adjustment of emerging Asia to the crisis, and was instrumental in inducing the rapid resumption of growth. The swings of financial flows, from large deleveraging of foreign positions in 2008 to the renewed inflows in 2010, validate the insight of the public finance approach to financial integration: the gains from deeper financial integration should be balanced against the costs of growing exposure to turbulences. A key lesson of the crisis is the need to apply a comprehensive cost/benefit approach to prudential policies, to the regulation of external borrowing and of domestic financial intermediation, and to the accumulation and use of international reserves. We illustrate these results in the context of the challenges facing emerging Asia's adjustment during the global financial crisis, and the postcrisis policy stance dealing with the renewed inflows of capital.

Is the harmonization of financial regulatory regimes possible in East Asia? Focusing on corporate governance, which many see as a critical part of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and which is also seen as unresponsive to calls for change, this paper argues that such harmonization is possible, but that it will not be according to the best practices advocated by the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and other international organizations. At present, actors generally feign compliance with these international rules and standards. But this creates potential long-term problems by allowing distortions to persist and accumulate over time. By identifying the key actors that determine regulatory outcomes, this paper points to an alternative regulatory framework that would be adopted more comprehensively. This alternative framework is a compromise between the best practices advocated by international organizations, and the domestic political realities of East Asia.

Asian economic regionalism has emerged from a bottom-up process, driven by market forces in the absence of a grand plan for regional integration. While the financial crisis of 1997-98 triggered new regional cooperation initiatives, more recently several Asian political leaders have formulated proposals for the creation of a regional economic community, suggesting the possible start of a top-down approach. Based on the results of a survey of Asia's opinion leaders conducted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 2010, this paper discusses how Asia's institutional architecture for economic and financial integration is taking shape, suggesting the need to strengthen existing institutions that promote Asian regionalism and to create new ones. While the focus of the paper is on monetary and financial integration, the analysis also covers other integration pillars such as trade and investment, connectivity and infrastructure, and regional public goods. It suggests the need to create new institutions in support of Asian regionalism and to adopt a broad perspective in moving towards the formation of a region-wide economic community based on strong political commitment and grassroots participation.

Reform of financial regulation is a priority on the international agenda. At the call of the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G-20), a number of new international standards have been issued, most notably Basel III. As a member of the G-20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is now on a faster track in adopting international standards. However, the key issue for the PRC - as well as many other emerging markets - is to how to keep focused on the domestic policy agenda while adopting the new global standards. Fortunately, the PRC's financial system has proved resilient to the recent financial crisis. As a result, banks in the PRC find it quite easy to meet the new Basel III capital and liquidity standards. Basel III is only part of an effective regulatory framework. While phasing in Basel III, the PRC needs other prudential tools such as a new provision ratio, in addition to the provision coverage ratio. Activity restriction will be another effective tool with the potential to prevent banks from becoming too complicated for bankers to manage and for the regulator to supervise. As we work hard to improve the effectiveness of the regulatory system at both the global and national level, we should remind ourselves of the importance of keeping the balance between enhanced regulation and promoting financial innovation - without the pendulum swinging too far.

This paper provides evidence for a significant relation between international financial markets' integration and output volatility. In the framework of a threshold model, it is shown empirically that this relation depends on country's financial risk. Financial risk indicates a country's ability to pay its official, commercial and trade debts. In countries with low financial risk, financial openness decreases output volatility, while, in countries with high financial risk, financial openness increases output volatility. Extensive robustness checks confirm this result.

This paper provides an overview of the Reserve Bank of India's approach to macroprudential regulation and systemic risk management, and reviews lessons drawn from the Indian experience. It emphasizes the need for harmonization of monetary policy and prudential objectives, which may not be possible if banking supervision is separated from central banks. It also notes that supervisors need to have the necessary independence and flexibility to act in a timely manner on the basis of available information. Macroprudential regulation is an inexact science with limitations and needs to be used in conjunction with other policies to be effective.

The paper discusses the reform of capital regulation of banks in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/2009. Whereas the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision seems to go for marginal changes here and there, the paper calls for a thorough overhaul, moving away from risk calibration and raising capital requirements very substantially. The argument is based on the observation that the current system of risk-calibrated capital requirements, in particular under the model-based approach, played a key role in allowing banks to be undercapitalized prior to the crisis, with strong systemic effects for deleveraging multipliers and for the functioning of interbank markets. The argument is also based on the observation that the current system has no theoretical foundation, its objectives are ill-specified, and its effects have not been thought through, either for the individual bank or for the system as a whole. Objections to substantial increases in capital requirements rest on arguments that run counter to economic logic or are themselves evidence of moral hazard and a need for regulation.

The failure to spot emerging systemic risk and prevent the current global financial crisis warrants a reexamination of the approach taken so far to crisis prevention. The paper argues that financial crises can be prevented, as they build up over time due to policy mistakes and eventually erupt in slow motion. While one cannot predict the precise timing of crises, one can avert them by identifying and dealing with sources of instability. For this purpose, policymakers need to strengthen top-down macroprudential supervision, complemented by bottom-up microprudential supervision. The paper explores such a strategy and the institutional setting required to implement it at the national level. Given that the recent regulatory reforms that have been undertaken to address systemic risks are inadequate to prevent and combat future crises, the paper argues that national measures to promote financial stability are crucial and that the Westphalian principles governing international financial oversight should be rejected. The paper proposes that while an effective national systemic regulator should be established, strong international cooperation is indispensable for financial stability.

This paper argues that trade and capital account reforms within autocracies underlie the primacy of foreign currency procurement. A longitudinal comparison of four countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan) in the Middle East and North Africa region shows a historical sequencing of reforms. In the 1960s and 1970s, the foreign exchange scarcity was managed primarily by rising restrictions, accumulation of debt and a number of unilateral country-specific strategies, including broader economic openings (infitah) and isolated capital account liberalizations. However, IMF-friendly reforms (orthodox trade liberalization) only became a political option in the context of the extreme fiscal scarcity of the 1980s and 1990s, after the failure of these earlier policies and the drying up of alternative unconditional finance. Additionally, the time differences regarding when orthodox reforms are implemented within autocracies mainly relate to global and regional cycles of different external windfall gains. These findings complement recent debates about the rush to free trade in at least two regards. First, they point to distinct causal mechanisms depending on the type of political regime (for example, autocracy versus democracy), explaining the beginning of trade and capital account liberalizations among developing countries. Second, they reveal the conditional historical influence of neoliberal ideas among structurally similar autocracies. Im Papier wird argumentiert, dass die Reform von Außenwirtschaftsbarrieren innerhalb von Autokratien dem Primat der Devisenbewirtschaftung unterliegt. Ein historischer Vergleich von vier Staaten (Marokko, Tunesien, Ägypten und Jordanien) in der Region Nahund Mittelost verweist auf eine historische Sequenz von Reformen. In den 1960er und 1970er Jahren reagierten die untersuchten Staaten auf Devisenknappheit mit steigenden außenwirtschaftlichen Regulierungsniveaus, externer Verschuldung und einer Reihe von unilateralen länderspezifischen Strategien, wie ökonomischer Öffnung (infitah) und selektiver Liberalisierung des Zahlungsverkehrs. IWF-induzierte Reformen (orthodoxe Außenwirtschaftsliberalisierung) wurde darauf folgend erst im Kontext extremer fiskalischer Krisen in den 1980ern und 1990ern opportun, nachdem diese früheren Reformen gescheitert und alternative nicht-konditionale Finanzierungsformen ausgetrocknet waren. Zeitliche Unterschiede bei der Implementierung orthodoxer Reformen lassen sich daher am besten mit Blick auf global und regional unterschiedliche Zyklen externer staatlicher Renteneinnahmen verstehen. Diese Erkenntnisse ergänzen aktuelle Debatten in Bezug auf die Determinanten von außenwirtschaftlicher Liberalisierung in mindestens zwei Aspekten: Erstens wird auf unterschiedliche kausale Mechanismen in Abhängigkeit vom Regimetyp (z. B. Autokratie versus Demokratie) verwiesen, um den Beginn von Außenwirtschaftsliberalisierung in Entwicklungsländern zu erklären. Zweitens wird auf den kontextuellen historischen Einfluss der neo-liberalen Beratungspraxis innerhalb strukturell ähnlich aufgebauter Autokratien aufmerksam gemacht.

This paper reviews recent state interventions in financial crises and draws lessons for crisis management. A number of areas are identified where crisis management could be strengthened, including with regard to the tools and instruments used to involve the private sector in crisis resolution (with a view to reducing the recent enhanced role of official bailouts and the associated moral hazard), to allow for the orderly resolution of systemically important financial firms (to make these firms safe to fai), and with regard to achieving better integration with ex ante macroprudential surveillance. The paper proposes the establishment of high level systemic risk councils (SRCs) in each country with responsibility for overseeing systemic risk in both tranquil times and crisis periods and coordinating the activities of key government ministries, agencies, and the central bank.

Capital flows to emerging market economies (EMEs) have been characterized by high volatility since the 1980s. In recent years (especially since 2003), although gross as well as net capital flows to the EMEs have increased, they could not be absorbed domestically. Overall, savings have flowed uphill from EMEs to advanced economies, challenging the conventional view that capital flows to EMEs are always beneficial through augmentation of their resources leading to greater investment. Full capital account liberalization can impart avoidable volatility and have an adverse impact on growth prospects of EMEs. Available evidence is strongly in favor of a calibrated and well-sequenced approach to opening up the capital account and its active management, along with complementary reforms in other sectors. Greater caution is needed in the liberalization of debt flows. Despite much advice to the contrary, most EMEs manage their capital accounts actively to cushion their economies from undue volatility, including interventions in the foreign exchange markets accompanied by sterilization. Sound macroeconomic and financial policies - accompanied by prudent capital account management, greater exchange rate flexibility, purposive use of prudential regulation, and continued financial market development practiced by most Asian EMEs over the past decade - have cushioned their economies from the current global financial crisis that started in 2007. They have successfully achieved a virtuous circle of continuing growth, low and stable inflation, and financial stability. How these elements can be best combined will depend on the country and on the period: There is no one size fits all. Such a discretionary approach does put a great premium on the skill of policymakers and can run the risk of markets perceiving central bank actions becoming uncomfortably unpredictable. Such risk is mitigated by a record of successful management.

The present analysis sheds light on the setting up a regional rating agency in Asia in the wake of recent financial crisis. We investigate the policy facing a financial regulator while evaluating whether or not to admit new entrants into the credit rating market. In an incomplete contracting framework, we show that an impartial financial regulatory body (represented by a benevolent supranational organization) can facilitate credit ratings of high quality by allowing for the entry of new rating agencies on a non-single basis than it does for a mere single entry. This finding is caused by increased competition among the rating agencies, which induces higher quality of rating services even should rating agencies still exert below their maximum level of efforts.

This paper seeks to add to the current debate about financial development and growth in the emerging world by looking at how different financial systems evolve: how and why financial structures change during various stages of development, how best to measure them, and seeing what practical policy lessons can be drawn from historical experience. Some financial structures may be better suited to growth at certain stages of development but they may be less well suited in other circumstances. In the search for optimal financial structure, rather than attempt to adopt another country's particular structure it may be more fruitful for today's emerging world to concentrate more on addressing the needs of savers and borrowers in each individual system. A major lesson for the emerging world from past financial development is that there are risks involved in transitioning from one framework to another. Too fast a change increases the danger that all the necessary regulatory, supervisory and educational changes may not keep pace with the financial changes. This can increase the susceptibility to instability and reduce resilience to shocks.

This paper investigates the spread of what started as a crisis at the core of the global financial system to emerging economies. While emerging economies had exhibited some resilience through the early stages of the financial turmoil that began in the summer of 2007, they have been hit hard since mid-2008. Their deteriorating fortunes are only partly attributable to the collapse in world trade and sharp drop in commodity prices. Things were made worse by emerging markets' exposure to the turmoil in global finance itself. As 'innocent bystanders,' even countries that had taken out 'self-insurance' proved vulnerable to the global 'sudden stop' in capital flows. We critique loanable funds theoretical interpretations of global imbalances and offer an alternative explanation that emphasizes the special status of the U.S. dollar. Instead of taking out even more self-insurance, developing countries should pursue capital account management to enlarge their policy space and reduce external vulnerabilities.

Asia faces very large infrastructure funding demands, estimated at around US$750 billion per year for energy, transport, telecommunications, water, and sanitation during 2010-2020 (ADB/ADBI 2009). Asia has large savings, significant international reserves, and rapid accumulations of funds that could be utilized for meeting these infrastructure investment needs, but Asian markets have failed to use available resources to channel funding into highly needed infrastructure projects. This paper explores issues and challenges in financing infrastructure for seamless Asian infrastructure connectivity and for other high priority development financing needs, and seeks methods and instruments to help direct Asian and international resources to cost-effectively and efficiently support infrastructure and other development needs. The paper discusses three important topics: First, what are the lessons for Asia from the European Union's experience of developing and integrating financial markets and using development banking institutions to support infrastructure investment? Second, how can Asian public and private resources, such as pension funds, social security funds, sovereign wealth funds, and private portfolio funds contribute to infrastructure development across Asia? Third, can Islamic financial markets provide funds for Asian infrastructure development? Finally, the paper makes recommendations regarding financing options and how Asian financial markets and infrastructure companies could be further developed and integrated to mobilize Asian and other regions' savings for financing priority infrastructure projects in the region.

The recent crisis was characterized by massive illiquidity. This paper reviews what we know and don't know about illiquidity and all its friends: market freezes, fire sales, contagion, and ultimately insolvencies and bailouts. It first explains why liquidity cannot easily be apprehended through a single statistics, and asks whether liquidity should be regulated given that a capital adequacy requirement is already in place. The paper then analyzes market breakdowns due to either adverse selection or shortages of financial muscle, and explains why such breakdowns are endogenous to balance sheet choices and to information acquisition. It then looks at what economics can contribute to the debate on systemic risk and its containment. Finally, the paper takes a macroeconomic perspective, discusses shortages of aggregate liquidity and analyses how market value accounting and capital adequacy should react to asset prices. It concludes with a topical form of liquidity provision, monetary bailouts and recapitalizations, and analyses optimal combinations thereof; it stresses the need for macro-prudential policies.

In this paper, we examine capital account openness and exchange rate flexibility in 11 Asian economies. Asia has made slow progress in de jure capital account openness, but has made much more progress in de facto capital account openness. While there has been a gradual increase in exchange rate flexibility, most Asian economies continue to have largely inflexible exchange rates. This combination of advancing de facto capital account integration without greater exchange rate flexibility has led to procyclical monetary policy, when capital flows are procyclical. This paper emphasises the need for a consistent monetary policy framework.

Remittances have greatly increased during recent years, becoming an important and reliable source of funds for many developing countries. Therefore, there is a strong incentive for receiving countries to attract more remittances, especially through formal channels that turn to be either less expensive or less risky. One way of doing so is to increase their financial openness, but this policy option might generate additional costs in terms of macroeconomic volatility. In this paper we investigate the link between remittance receipts and financial openness. We develop a small model and statistically test for the existence of such a relationship with a sample of 66 mostly developing countries from 1980-2005. Empirically we use a dynamic generalized ordered logit model to deal with the categorical nature of the financial openness policy. We apply a two-step method akin to two stage least squares to deal with the endogeneity of remittances and potential measurement errors. We find a strong positive statistical and economic effect of remittances on financial openness.

After analyzing the different reasons why the financial system and also the regulatory framework induced procyclicality, this paper reviews the experiences of three countries which have introduced dynamic provisioning as a regulatory tool to limit procyclicality. The case of Spain - the country with the longest experience - is reviewed, as well as those of Colombia and Peru - countries that have recently adopted dynamic provisioning. A number of policy lessons are drawn from that comparison.

This paper extends our previous paper (Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito 2008) and explores some of the unexplored questions. First, we examine the channels through which the trilemma policy configurations affect output volatility. Secondly, we investigate how trilemma policy configurations affect the output performance of the economies under severe crisis situations. Thirdly, we look into how trilemma configurations have evolved in the aftermath of economic crises in the past. We find that trilemma policy configurations and external finances affect output volatility mainly through the investment channel. While a higher degree of exchange rate stability could stabilize the real exchange rate movement, it could also make investment volatile, though the volatility-enhancing effect of exchange rate stability on investment can be cancelled by holding higher levels of international reserves (IR). Greater financial openness helps reduce real exchange rate volatility. These results indicate that policymakers in a more open economy would prefer pursuing greater exchange rate stability and greater financial openness while holding a massive amount of IR. We also find that the crisis economies could end up with smaller output losses if they entered the crisis situation with more stable exchange rates or if they continue to hold a high level of IR and maintain greater exchange rate stability during the crisis period. Lastly, we find that developing countries are often found to have decreased the level of monetary independence and financial openness, but increased the level of exchange rate stability in the aftermath of a crisis, especially for the last two decades. This finding indicates how vulnerable developing countries, especially emerging market ones, are to volatile capital flows as a result of global financial liberalization.

The recent financial crisis has shown that financial innovation can have devastating systemic impacts. International standard setters' and national regulators' response has been a global concerted effort to overhaul and tighten financial regulations. However, at a time of designing stricter regulations, it is crucial to avoid a backlash against financial inclusion. In this chapter, we argue that greater financial inclusion presents opportunities to enhance financial stability. Our arguments are based on the following insights: Financial inclusion poses risks at the institutional level, but these are hardly systemic in nature. Evidence suggests that low-income savers and borrowers tend to maintain solid financial behavior throughout financial crises, keeping deposits in a safe place and paying back their loans. Institutional risk profiles at the bottom end of the financial market are characterized by large numbers of vulnerable clients who own limited balances and transact small volumes. Although this profile may raise some concerns regarding reputational risks for the central bank and consumer protection, in terms of financial instability, the risk posed by inclusive policies is negligible. In addition, risks prevalent at the institutional level are manageable with known prudential tools and more effective customer protection. The potential costs of financial inclusion are compensated for by important dynamic benefits that enhance financial stability over time through a deeper and more diversified financial system. In the following pages, we present the current state of financial inclusion globally. We also explore some trends in financial inclusion and what the most effective policies are to favor it. In doing so, we suggest that innovations aimed at countering financial exclusion may help strengthen financial systems rather than weakening them.

This paper investigates the prevailing financial regulatory structures and impact of the current financial turmoil on banking performance in four Asian economies: the People's Republic of China (PRC); Hong Kong, China; Singapore; and Taipei,China. Both the PRC and Hong Kong, China operate under a fragmented financial regulatory structure, while Singapore and Taipei,China have integrated structures. We examine the role of an integrated financial regulatory structure in helping financial institutions mitigate the impact of the financial crisis, using financial indicators of banks' capital structure and operating performance in these four economies between 2003 and 2008. Our analysis of the indicators reveals that banking performance under a fragmented financial regulatory structure is not worse than under integrated regulation. This implies that financial regulatory structure is not the main reason why Asian financial institutions suffered only limited losses from the current global financial crisis. However, given the growing complexity of the global financial system, and the relative weakness of current financial regulatory structures in Asia, this paper suggests that East Asian governments should refer to the Lamfalussy Process in the European Union and set up an Asia Financial Stability Dialogue to facilitate policy coordination for regional financial sector stability and development.

The ongoing global economic crisis has punished Asian economies severely, despite the fact that its origins derive from outside the region. The global economic crisis was transmitted through real and financial channels, underscoring how vulnerable the region is to external shocks. This paper explores the microeconomic origins of the financial crisis and endeavors to ascertain how crises might be mitigated in the future through better regulation, supervision, and institution-building. Moreover, it makes the case for closer economic cooperation in order to internalize key externalities associated with modern global finance. This cooperation, in turn, should take place at the appropriate level, with incentives for cooperation at the global, regional, and subregional levels. It explores the potential for the creation of an Asian Financial Stability Board and deepening other initiatives in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)+3 and ASEAN forums. However, it stresses that the most important financial reforms in Asia will need to take place at the national level.

This paper discusses the role of state intervention for prevention, containment, and resolution of financial crises based mainly on the Korean experience during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Crises in emerging market and developing economies tend to be more complicated than those faced by advanced economies because they are twin crises: financial and currency crises. Such crises require the development of a comprehensive strategy covering the stabilization of the domestic financial market and the foreign exchange market, closely coordinated responses by different government bodies, an extraordinary effort for financial restructuring, and the introduction of a new regulatory framework. This effort should be based on an effective crisis management team of experts given a clear mandate with well defined power; strong political support; effective communication with the market players, both domestic and foreign; and sufficient mobilization of public funds. In this regard, this paper emphasizes the importance of building a reliable information base, prompt actions, orchestrating political consensus, and a balanced approach to restructuring and regulation among different types of financial institutions. The paper also highlights the need for a new international financial architecture matching the rapid integration into the global market of the financial markets of emerging and developing economies while their currency remains non-convertible.

This paper analyzes the influence of financial integration on institutional quality. We construct a dynamic political-economic model of an autocracy in which a ruling elite uses its political power to expropriate the general population. Although financial integration reduces capital costs for entrepreneurs and thereby raises gross incomes in the private sector, the elite may counteract this effect by increasing the level of expropriation. Since de facto political power is linked to economic resources, financial integration also has long-run consequences for the distribution of power and for the rise of an entrepreneurial class.

The paper discusses the reform of capital regulation of banks in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/2009. Whereas the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision seems to go for marginal changes here and there, the paper calls for a thorough overhaul, moving away from risk calibration and raising capital requirements very substantially. The argument is based on the observation that the current system of risk-calibrated capital requirements, in particular under the model-based approach, played a key role in allowing banks to be undercapitalized prior to the crisis, with strong systemic effects for deleveraging multipliers and for the functioning of interbank markets. The argument is also based on the observation that the current system has no theoretical foundation, its objectives are ill-specified, and its effects have not been thought through, either for the individual bank or for the system as a whole. Objections to substantial increases in capital requirements rest on arguments that run counter to economic logic or are themselves evidence of moral hazard and a need for regulation.

We employ parametric and non-parametric cointegration to investigate the extent of integration between African stock markets and the rest of the world. Long-run correlation estimates imply very low association between the two. The two distinct cointegration approaches confirm the latter through recursive estimation. The implication is that global market movements may have little impact on Africa. However,we argue that including African assets in a mean variance portfolio could be beneficial to international investors.

It is widely believed that the practice of securitization is one of the causes that led to the 2007-08 financial crisis. In this paper, I show that securitized products such as collateralized debt obligations (CDO) are particularly vulnerable to systematic risk and tend to show higher tail risk. These characteristics, in turn, are closely associated with joint failures and systemic risk. In order to achieve greater stability of the financial system, it is important to prevent the recurrence of the collapse of specific markets as this may lead to the collapse of other components of the financial system. From this perspective, the financial regulations that should be applied to these problematic financial products and their relation to possible systemic risks are discussed.