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In this paper, I present the punishment called cyberbanishment. This sanction refers to the old-fashioned punishment of forbidding a person to be present in specific places, but instead of physical locations this sanction concerns digital spheres. The proposition of introducing cyberbanishment is based on a few observations. First, the current practices of punishment are problematic, and there is a need for alternative punishments. Second, this form of sanction may be a proper response to crimes committed online, like hate crimes or punishable threats. Third, the online sphere becomes more important each year, and this was even amplified by the recent pandemic. The development of virtual realities and metaverses could contribute to this trend. Fourth, as an instrument imposed by courts, cyberbanishment may increase judicial control over the limitations of constitutionally protected freedoms in the online world, which is currently decided mainly by the platforms themselves.

At least in some legal systems, the law protects police officers performing their duties from attacks. It could be said that an additional “layer” of protection, which is not rooted in the fact that police officers are humans, is linked to the process of performing police duties. Similarly to any other robot, police robots are not humans. However, they can perform police duties. Thus, should police robots warrant that additional “layer” of protection resulting from the fact that they perform police duties? In this paper, I aim to answer this question.

Nobody should profit from crime; this fundamental moral principle is uncontroversial. At the level of public declaration, few people are likely to disagree with this statement; however, controversies arise when the implementation of this principle is under discussion. Numerous provisions exist that aim to strip criminals of the proceeds from their crimes, but not all aspects of this issue are immediately apparent. For example, a significant question is how to treat profits that a criminal makes from activities including recounting stories about their criminal activities, publishing books describing their actions, or creating YouTube videos presenting details about their crimes. Such profits are either treated as legitimate or are targeted by complicated legal methods of deprivation. The view presented in this paper could facilitate the ability to strip criminals from these forms of profit. This article argues that revenue accruing from knowledge gained from association with crime should be treated as indirect proceeds of crime and, as such, should be forfeited.

Robots are becoming more visible parts of our life, a situation which prompts questions about their place in our society. One group of issues that is widely discussed is connected with robots’ moral and legal status as well as their potential rights. The question of granting robots rights is polarizing. Some positions accept the possibility of granting them human rights whereas others reject the notion that robots can be considered potential rights holders. In this paper, I claim that robots will never have all human rights, even if we accept that they are morally equal to humans. I focus on the role of embodiment in the content of the law. I claim that even relatively small differences in the ontologies of entities could lead to the need to create new sets of rights. I use the example of Neanderthals to illustrate that entities similar to us might have required different legal statuses. Then, I discuss the potential legal status of human-like robots.

Uncontrolled access to information on the Internet has many advantages, but it also leads to the phenomenon of fake news. Fake news is dangerous in many spheres, including that of health. For example, we are facing an increase in the amount of vaccine hesitancy. This has been w considered by the World Health Organization in 2019 as one of the greatest threats to public health. This specific phenomenon is linked with the spread of information on the Internet around that issue. In this paper, I discuss a proposition of new crime, which has the aim of fighting medical fake news by stopping its spread. This proposition should be considered only if other non-criminal measures are inefficient. The proposal is "Whoever publicly disseminates information evidently discrepant with medical knowledge is subject to a penalty."

This paper addresses the following question: “Should violence against robots be banned?” Such a question is usually associated with a query concerning the moral status of robots. If an entity has moral status, then concomitant responsibilities toward it arise. Despite the possibility of a positive answer to the title question on the grounds of the moral status of robots, legal changes are unlikely to occur in the short term. However, if the matter regards public violence rather than mere violence, the issue of the moral status of robots may be avoided, and legal changes could be made in the short term. Prohibition of public violence against robots focuses on public morality rather than on the moral status of robots. The wrongness of such acts is not connected with the intrinsic characteristics of robots but with their performance in public. This form of prohibition would be coherent with the existing legal system, which eliminates certain behaviors in public places through prohibitions against acts such as swearing, going naked, and drinking alcohol.

Whether or not we call a love-like relationship with robots true love, some people may feel and claim that, for them, it is a sufficient substitute for love relationship. The love relationship between humans has a special place in our social life. On the grounds of both morality and law, our significant other can expect special treatment. It is understandable that, precisely because of this kind of relationship, we save our significant other instead of others or will not testify against her/him. How as a society should we treat love-like relationships humans with robots? Based on the assumption that robots do not have an inner life and are not moral patients, I defend the thesis that this kind of relationship should be protected by criminal law.

Countries that have judicial discretion in their legal system usually struggle with sentencing disparities. This is no different in Poland. The current study examined whether extralegal factors such as age, sex, education, marital status, number of children, and having a job impact sentencing disparities. We examined court files from 13 district courts in Poland for two offenses: drug possession and drunk driving. Our findings show that sex, age, and number of children have no or little effect on outcomes, whilst marital status and employment status have small to medium effects on sentencing. The clearest result pattern to emerge from our analyses is that defendants with tertiary education are treated more leniently than those with primary or lower secondary education.

Sentencing disparities are widely covered in the literature on common law countries. In comparison, the literature on sentencing disparities in civil law countries is less extensive, and the literature is even more scarce in post-communist countries. Nevertheless, sentencing disparities exist in all of these countries. One of the goals of the 2015 criminal law reform in Poland was to limit sentencing disparities. This study compares trial outcomes from before and after the reform. We examine files from district courts in 13 cities in Poland for two offences: drug possession and drunk driving. Our findings demonstrate that there are significant differences in sentencing across courts, even in courts that are situated in the same city. The reform has changed the structure of the punishments but has not radically reduced sentencing disparities.

This paper was written by four lecturers, who are employed at different universities located in Poland's two largest Cities: Warsaw and Cracow. Two of these universities are financed by the government and the other two are financed from students' fees. Our paper critically examines the history of clinical legal education in Poland. It also assesses the economic, legal and social background to the differences and similarities between clinical legal education and legal practice. Furthermore, the paper explains how learning outcomes have led to law clinics becoming a pedagogical and professional treasure trove for individual clinical students and the wider law faculty. The results of this research will demonstrate the invaluable role of learning outcomes to clinical education and professional development. Therefore, the paper will suggest that the methodology of clinical legal education can be employed as a model for Polish higher education.

Dozór elektroniczny funkcjonuje w polskim systemie prawnym od 2007 roku, nowelizacją prawa karnego z 2015 roku zmieniono jednak całkowicie jego przeznaczenie. Obecnie wykorzystywany jest przy wykonywaniu kary ograniczenia wolności oraz przy środkach karnych i środkach zabezpieczających - wcześniej stanowił głównie sposób wykonywania krótkoterminowych kar pozbawienia wolności. Przepisy o dozorze elektronicznym stały się częścią k.k.w. i wprowadziły podział na trzy rodzaje dozoru: stacjonarny, zbliżeniowy oraz mobilny. W artykule omawiane są poszczególne rodzaje dozoru, wraz ze wskazaniem problemów, które mogą się pojawić w toku funkcjonowania nowych przepisów. Electronic surveillance is functioning in the Polish legal system since 2007, however, an novelisation of the criminal law of 2015 completely changed his usage. Nowadays electronic surveillance is used for the purpose of punishment of restriction of liability and for criminal and safety measures. Previously a main usage was connected with short-term imprisonment sentences. The provisions on electronic surveillance become part of the Executive Penal Code. There is division into 3 types of electronic surveillance: stationary, proximity and mobile. This article discusses various types of electronic surveillance and indicates some problems that may arise during the functioning of the new provisions.