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Megastudy project to investigate the effectiveness of honesty oaths on reducing dishonest behavior. This procedure details how treatments are rated and selected for final inclusion.

Beyond the many choices and challenges humans face during the pandemic lies a constant cognitive trade-off: Those who excessively absorb news against uncertainty run the risk of impaired cognitive functions.

Wer der Ungewissheit angesichts der Pandemie mit übermäßigem Konsum von Informationen begegnet, strapaziert seine kognitive Kapazität über Gebühr.

Milton Friedman has famously claimed that the responsibility of a manager who is not the owner of a firm is "to conduct the business in accordance with their [the shareholders'] desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible." In this paper we argue that when contracts are incomplete it is not necessarily in the interest even of money maximizing shareholders to pick a manager who pursues this goal. We show in a formal model and in a series of lab experiments that choosing a manager who has a preference to spend resources for social causes can increase employee motivation. In turn, ex-post losses in shareholder value may be offset by ex-ante gains in performance through higher employee motivation.

In this thesis I experimentally investigate prosocial and ethical behavior in economic interactions. The thesis consists of three experimental research papers that have a broad range of research questions on social responsibility, ignorance and cheating. With these experiments I aim to better understand when and why people behave ethically and/or prosocially and which consequences it has on their own and other players’ payoffs, and on overall efficiency. The results from the three experimental studies suggest that (i) donations to charity by employees are rewarded in an experimental setting, and the effect is driven by reciprocal concerns; (ii) there is a significant fraction of people who decide not to know about negative consequences of own actions, and the sorting of social agents of a low type into ignorance drives self-interested behavior of ignorant agents; and (iii) if the possibility of being exposed as a liar is small, the tendency to lie increases with incentives, indicating that some people have positive and finite costs of lying. Furthermore, when the participants lie, they lie to the full extent, which suggests that the intrinsic cost of lying is fixed.