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I. INTRODUCTION 627 II. SECTION 357 AND NONRECOURSE LOANS 629 III. RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR AN OVERPAYMENT 636 IV. WHAT IS A VALID AGREEMENT? 643 V. ANNOUNCEMENT 2003-37 & TREASURY'S [...], This Article explores the tax treatment of cross-collateral nonrecourse debt. When using the term cross-collateral debt, we are referring to nonrecourse debt that is connected with more than one piece of property. While tax issues concerning cross-collateralized properties can arise in several circumstances, the focus of this Article is on the tax treatment of a transfer of property subject to a cross-collateralized nonrecourse liability to a controlled corporation in exchange for stock that qualifies for some or all nonrecognition under [section] 351. The Article also discusses two other tax issues involving cross-collateralized nonrecourse liability--namely, cancellation of debt and determination of basis issues.

Table of Contents I. Introduction and the McKenny Case 438 II. Lyeth v. Hoey 441 III. The Clark Doctrine 447 A. Old Colony Trust 449 B. Annual Accounting 450 C. [...], The question has arisen in numerous cases as to the extent to which a settlement between arm's length parties is dispositive in tax cases of the claims on which the settlement is based. Another issue that often arises is whether the receipt of compensation for a tax payment that was incurred because of the negligence of the payor is excluded from gross income. While those two issues were central to the proper resolution of a recent case in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, McKenny v. United States, the court failed even to note one of those issues and did not resolve the other. The court's failure to deal with those two issues led it to reach an incorrect result. The two landmark cases establishing the doctrines that should have been applied in McKenny are the Supreme Court's decision in Lyeth v. Hoey and the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (now known as the Tax Court) in Clark v. Commissioner. Using McKenny as a springboard, this Article reviews the continued misapplication and sometimes disparagement of the Lyeth v. Hoey and Clark v. Commissioner reasoning. Clark, in particular, has been criticized by both academics and the Service. The Article reviews those criticisms and argues that they are unpersuasive. The Article concludes that both doctrines are valid and should have applied to find for the taxpayer in the McKenny case.

I. INTRODUCTION It would seem difficult to assess federal tax policy on marijuana without an accurate assessment of its health effects. Public perceptions of marijuana over the last century have [...], Congress enacted [section] 280E of the Internal Revenue Code in 1982 to punish businesses engaged in illegal drug trafficking, including marijuana. Section 280E denies all credits and deductions, including ordinary business expenses, from gross income of businesses illegally trafficking in a Schedule I or II controlled substance. This provision violates the principle that the tax code should foster a consistent treatment of income, regardless of source: and that the income tax is ill-used for punitive measures. Now that marijuana has been legalized in some form in at least 46 slates for therapeutic purposes, this federal tax penaltty transgresses principles offederalism. Recent scientific studies that have established the medical effectiveness of marijuana for certain conditions, further demonstrates that [section] 280E serves little legitimate purpose. Keywords: marijuana taxation, drug law, business deductions JEL Codes: I12, K32, K42, L65

A tax doctrine that is related to the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine, but yet different from that doctrine is variously referred to as the "substitute for ordinary income doctrine" [...]