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When analyzing international bargaining, rationalist scholars often focus on those communicative processes that lead to obvious self-binding and which can be incorporated as costs in formal models, including such indices as sunk costs or tied hands; conversely, constructivists argue that semeosis and discursive interaction alone can generate a distinctly normative space in which bargains can be struck. This paper attempts a partial reconciliation of these positions in regard to a specific form of diplomatic interaction by focusing on the need to create focal points in mixed bargaining games and the unique capacity of speech acts, uttered by leaders to address both domestic audiences and leaders of other states, to create foci around which they can make agreements. Strategic interaction, as analysts since Schelling have noted, is necessarily perceptive; players must understand the terms of the game and their roles within it. At the same time, in mixed games, players will attempt to frame the interaction (and its attendant focal equilibria) in ways that benefit themselves. Yet, unlike others, we argue that such framings do not necessarily require mutually perceived credible commitments to create foci; instead, the illocutionary force of speech itself provides a means of ?ordering? interaction and generating an analytically distinct range of uniquely available equilibria. Hence, those actors with greater illocutionary capacity are better able to order interaction and, potentially, move the bargaining space in their favor. This paper develops an outline of a theory of this illocutionary capacity as well as a rudimentary model of interaction among leaders and domestic publics that demonstrates the effects of strategic framing in the generation of focal points. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an attempt to provide a unified theoretical explanation for the emergence and the spread of nationalism in the post-Revolutionary Europe. By focusing on the political processes that led to the emergence and spread of nationalism, this paper also aims to address a number of serious problems that have bedeviled the study of nationalism. One common problem in the recent work on nationalism is that most scholars, intentionally or unintentionally, treat nationalism as a historical necessity; this tendency, in turn, leads to functionalist and deterministic, even teleological, arguments. I address this problem by introducing variation to the dependant variable, that is, by making the historically informed argument that by the late 18th century and early 19th century nationalism as a political doctrine faced strong competition from alternatives such as socialism, and more importantly for the purpose of this paper, [cosmopolitan] republicanism. Therefore, I suggest that explaining the emergence of nationalism requires providing an explanation why it was nationalism and not its competitors that became the dominant political doctrine in the world politics.A second common problem in the literature on nationalism is that most theories either neglect the role of human agency (so that, in this line of argument, nationalism emerges as a result of larger-than-life macrohistorical forces) or attribute too much agential powers to particular actors such as rulers or the so-called ?elites? (who, in turn, almost single-handedly ?create? nationalism and shape the society according to their liking). In the ?soft? model I develop, which can also be seen as an ?analytical narrative?, I address the question of agency by highlighting the role played by the relevant political actors as well as relationships among them and the society. This paper also addresses a third problem that troubles the study of nationalism, which is the tendency of scholars to see the emergence of nationalism as a process independent from the interstate competition. In contrast with the arguments which maintain that particular nationalisms (say, German nationalism) emerged ?internally?, I argue that nationalism emerged not in a limbo but during a period in time when the European states were engaged in fierce competition with each other. Thus it is essential to incorporate the effects of interstate conflict on the emergence of nationalism into our theories in a systematic fashion. In a nutshell, I suggest that the political doctrine we now know as nationalism was by no means a historical necessity following from the industrial revolution, spread of print capitalism, or modernization at large. Rather, nationalism, at least in the form that is recognizable to us, emerged as a result of the corruption and manipulation of the Republican and cosmopolitan ideals (which animated the French Revolution) by way of the strategies employed by the rulers of the European states. In this reading, to be precise, not only that nationalism was not ?created? from scratch by state-led initiatives, but also the decision to disseminate the ideals of nationalism was forced upon the leaders of the European states ? nationalism, which necessarily entailed the principle of accountability of the rulers to the ?nation? (however it is defined), was not sought by the leaders but constituted a ?lesser evil? for the rulers of Europe who were facing threats to their political survival in the midst of political turmoil. Nationalism was selected, nurtured, and shaped by the rulers of the European states partly because of the ever-present interstate competition and partly because of the opportunities and threats posed to the Westphalian state system by the sudden burst of popular energies resulting from the French Revolution... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The so-called Westphalian state and the nation-state, as far as the principle of territorial sovereignty is concerned, are two different species. Recognition of the sources and consequences of the differences between these two state species, which is largely absent in the current international relations (IR) scholarship, not only allows for a more sober analysis of the interstate wars over territory, but also provides new insights about the relationship between interstate conflict and the emergence of the doctrine of nationalism. IR theories, in general, focus on the interactions among the ?modern-states?. Modern-state, as an ideal type, is in turn assumed to have emerged as a result of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), where the princes of Europe agreed upon the principle of mutual recognition of each others? sovereign authority over demarcated territories. The common practice in the literature, in turn, is to treat the Westphalian state as the dominant unit in the world politics since the mid-17th century. In this reading, the current international politics revolves around the political organizations [read modern-states] whose constitutive properties are built on the template of the Westphalian state. However, such characterization is only half-true and largely misleading for analyzing the interstate conflicts over territory; for it ignores the fact that the principle of sovereignty necessarily has two components: one external, the other internal. In the Westphalian state system, the external component was established as a result of princes? mutual recognition of each others? right to absolute jurisdiction over demarcated territories. The internal component of territorial sovereignty, on the other hand, dictated that it was the prince (and no other domestic actor(s)) who was the sovereign. The ruler, in other words, was not accountable to any higher authority with regards to his management of the state territories. Princes of Europe not only could exchange territories for money or as dowries for royal brides, but also did not face retribution from any internal or external authority for losing a piece of territory as a result of interstate warfare (a factor making them rather risk-acceptant as far as territorial gambles were concerned).The emergence of the doctrine of nationalism, a process partly endogenous to the conflicts among the Westphalian states, however, while leaving the external component of territorial sovereignty rather intact, completely transformed the internal component: it was no longer the Prince but the People who was the sovereign; and the prince was, ideally, an agent of the principle, the nation. This change in the legitimizing principle of governance necessarily bound the political fate of the rulers to the consent of the populace. As the people living inside the borders of a state became more attached to the state territories with the increasing prominence of the doctrine of nationalism, the rulers of the nation-states became more and more responsive to the preservation of these territories for their own sake. The change in the internal component of sovereignty, therefore, by way of transforming the rulers? sensitivities toward state territories, transformed the conduct of interstate politics as far as wars over territory were concerned. In this reading, a significant change in the internal constitution of the states drastically transformed the interstate system itself by changing the dynamics of interactions, leading to what Robert Gilpin once dubbed as ?systems change?. This paper tackles the question of this systems change; that is, the transformation of the Westphalian state system into the nation-state system... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]