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Nach viertägigen Verhandlungen wurde am 30. Dezember 2019 ein Vertrag über den Transit von russischem Gas durch die Ukraine unterzeichnet. Gazprom verpflichtete sich durch den Transitvertrag, im ersten Jahr 65 Milliarden Kubikmeter Erdgas und in den Folgejahren 40 Milliarden Kubikmeter nach Maßgabe der Ship-or-pay-Formel zu transportieren. Beide Seiten haben den Vertrag zu diesem Gaspaket als Kompromiss bewertet, wobei die meisten Bestimmungen als Erfolg für die Ukraine betrachtet werden können. Gazprom war zu Zugeständnissen genötigt, weil der Konzern ohne einen Vertrag nicht in der Lage gewesen wäre, seinen vertraglichen Verpflichtungen gegenüber Kunden in Europa nachzukommen. Die Verhandlungen - mit der Europäischen Kommission als Vermittler - waren angesichts der fundamental unterschiedlichen Interessen der beiden Seiten langwierig und hart. Die Ukraine wollte ihren Status als wichtiges Transitland behalten, während Russland mit dem Bau der Pipelines TurkStream und Nord Stream 2 bereits beträchtliche Anstrengungen unternommen hatte, um seine Abhängigkeit von ukrainischen Pipelines mehr und mehr zu verringern. Der Kompromiss wird zu einem neuen Modell der Transitzusammenarbeit zwischen den beiden Seiten führen, was die Stabilität in diesem Bereich bis 2024 gewährleisten dürfte.

Joint hydrogen energy projects are components of the comprehensive Russian-German energy cooperation which has been ongoing for more than five decades. Due to increasing demand for hydrogen resulting from Germany’s energy transition (Energiewende) and to the potential of the hydrogen sector in Russia and its focus on export, the fundamental interests of the two states are well aligned. In 2020, Moscow and Berlin stepped up their political dialogue in this field, and companies from Germany and Russia went on to conclude their first agreements. The new aspect of this cooperation with Berlin is also important to Moscow in political terms.

Expansion on the liquefied natural gas market has become one of the priority areas in Russia’s energy policy in recent years. This has been reflected in the statements made by government representatives and the many strategic documents that have been adopted recently. In particular, on 16 March this year the government approved a document entitled The Long-term Programme for the Development of Liquefied Natural Gas Production in the Russian Federationwhich envisages ambitious plans for further development in this area: an output of 80 to 140 million tonnes of LNG in 2035. The assumptions of the strategy fit in with the trend of regular increases in the production and export of Russian LNG which have been visible in recent years (from 11 to nearly 30 million tonnes in 2016–19). It can be concluded from these announcements that Russia is planning to increase its share in the global liquefied natural gas market to over 10%, and possibly even up to 20–30%. The expansion in this sector is also an argument for Moscow to strengthen its political and military presence in the Arctic. Increasing the Russian share on the European LNG market may also be a kind of remedy for Gazprom’s loss of influence in some EU countries.

Russian ships resumed laying the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) gas pipeline on the Baltic Sea bed in February this year. Russia’s goal is to complete the project and put it into operation as soon as possible. This coincided with media reports that representatives of Germany and the new US administration had been searching for compromise arrangements to determine the conditions for construction to be completed and operation to commence. These would include options for a moratorium on launching it but, above all, the creation of guarantees to maintain the limited transit of Russian gas through Ukraine or a ‘snapback’ mechanism enabling shutting off/limiting flows via NS2 in the event of problems with supplies or transit through Ukrainian territory. Berlin hopes to agree on the terms on which the US will tolerate the gas pipeline, or will at least play for time so that construction can be completed while the talks are underway and the certification necessary for its launch can be obtained. It is unclear what actions the Joe Biden administration will take regarding this issue. On the one hand, it has criticised the project but on the other, it has not imposed any sanctions that could stop its implementation as yet (19 March 2021) and it is striving to improve relations with Germany.

A deal for France’s Total to acquire a 10% stake in the Arctic LNG 2 project for US$2.55 billion was struck on 24 May during the International Economic Forum in Saint Petersburg. This project envisages the construction of a natural gas liquefaction plant on the Gydan Peninsula and is being implemented by Novatek, Russia’s largest private natural gas producer. In December 2017, the company launched the first production line of an LNG terminal on the Yamal Peninsula – the Yamal LNG project. In addition to this, Gazprom and Rosneft have confirmed their intention to implement their own LNG projects. The balance of the actions taken so far suggests that at present Novatek is the only Russian company to successfully implement new LNG projects in Russia. Apart from the LNG terminal operating since 2009 on Sakhalin Island (Sakhalin 2), other projects announced by Gazprom and Rosneft have not made it past the planning stage so far, and there is nothing to suggest that this might change in the coming years. The positive results of Novatek’s operation in the LNG sector are above all a consequence of the financial, administrative and political support it has received from the Russian government. It cannot be ruled out that the Arctic LNG 2 project will also be given similar preferential treatment. The state has offered numerous privileges to Novatek because the company’s owners, especially Gennady Timchenko, have close social and business contacts with Vladimir Putin. Even though the Russian government has not adopted a separate strategy on the LNG sector, many facts indicate that political support for Novatek’s projects is motivated not only by the desire to increase Russia’s share in the global LNG market, but is also a means to maintain balance between the competing groups of interest in the Russian energy sector. The recognition of Novatek’s dominant position in the Russian liquefied natural gas sector could be used by the government as an argument to maintain Gazprom’s pri