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Predictions of the distribution of groundfish species are needed to support ongoing marine spatial planning initiatives in Canadian Pacific waters. Data to inform species distribution models are available from several fishery-independent surveys. However, no single survey covers the entire region and different gear types are required to survey the range of relevant habitat. Here, we demonstrated a method for integrating presence–absence data across surveys and gear types that allows us to predict the coastwide distributions of 65 groundfish species in British Columbia. Our model leverages data from multiple surveys to estimate how species respond to environmental gradients while accounting for differences in survey catchability. We find that this method has two main benefits: (1) it increases the accuracy of predictions in data-limited surveys and regions while having negligible impacts on accuracy when data are already sufficient, and (2) it reduces uncertainty, resulting in tighter confidence intervals on predicted occurrences. These benefits are particularly relevant in areas of our coast where our understanding of habitat suitability is limited due to a lack of spatially comprehensive long-term groundfish surveys.

This chapter studies the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). After almost a decade since the end of World War II, the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand once again enjoyed a formal strategic alliance in the Asia-Pacific. The eventual creation of the SEATO in early 1955 complemented the short-term ambitions of all four Western powers in the region. Nevertheless, diplomatic bargaining preceding signature and ratification led to compromises that diluted the usefulness of the security alliance. The United States continued to limit commitments to joint planning after the implementation of the treaty. SEATO was therefore smaller, weaker, and less integrated than originally envisaged. The organization also lacked the necessary military and economic infrastructure to be effective, which helped encourage Australia and New Zealand to focus on regional rather than British Commonwealth interests, shifting focus away from the Middle East and Mediterranean and toward the “near north.”

By directly challenging existing accounts of post-World War II relations among the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, this book is a significant contribution to transnational and diplomatic history. At its heart, the book examines why strategic cooperation among these closely allied Western powers in the Asia-Pacific region was limited during the early Cold War. The book probes the difficulties of security cooperation as the leadership of these four states balanced intramural competition with the need to develop a common strategy against the Soviet Union and the new communist power, the People's Republic of China. It exposes contention and disorganization among non-communist allies in the early phase of containment strategy in Asia-Pacific. In particular, it notes the significance of economic, racial, and cultural elements to planning for regional security and highlights how these domestic matters resulted in international disorganization. The book shows that, amidst these contentious relations, the antipodean powers Australia and New Zealand occupied an important role in the region and successfully utilized quadrilateral diplomacy to advance their own national interests, such as the crafting of the 1951 ANZUS collective security treaty. As fractious as were allied relations in the early days of NATO, the book demonstrates that the post-World War II Asia-Pacific was as contentious, and that Britain and the commonwealth nations were necessary partners in the development of early global Cold War strategy.

This chapter details how, following the arrival of a new U.S. administration in 1953, the British government resumed its efforts to improve its position in the Asia-Pacific. The United Kingdom again sought membership in the ANZUS Treaty but also offered an alternative in the form of a Pacific security pact. This larger alliance would provide a more comprehensive global defense umbrella that would allow the British government to continue to prioritize the defense of its preferred regions. The United States rejected such proposals, fearing that any Pacific security pact would inevitably involve greater contributions to the region and risked drawing it into the defense of other territories. United States policymakers and diplomats again used the concept of race to defend British exclusion, however, rather than stressing strategic or economic concerns. In contrast to the events of the preceding year, the United States reacted more forcefully against British efforts and adopted rougher diplomacy with Australia and New Zealand. Formal cooperation between all four powers in the Asia-Pacific looked unlikely by the close of 1953.

This chapter discusses events in Malaya and Korea, which, when viewed together, help explain progress toward closer cooperation throughout the Asia-Pacific. The United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand slowly developed elements of strategic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region following crises in Malaya and Korea between 1948 and 1951. The extent of cooperation varied between states and rarely reflected purely strategic concerns. Whereas New Zealand supported the United Kingdom in the Malayan Emergency, the United States and Australia were initially far more cautious in offering assistance. Although the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand did support the United States in the Korean War, their efforts also reflected attempts to build closer strategic relations, generate diplomatic capital, and restrain their superpower ally from escalating the conflict. In both instances, all four states held different assumptions about the causes and management of conflict. Divergent national interests therefore weakened a coherent and united response to the Communist challenge from the Western powers.

This chapter presents a broad survey of events from the end of World War II through to the early years of the Cold War. During the course of World War II, the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand established unprecedented levels of strategic cooperation. Such cooperation, however, should not obscure the existence of significant and persistent differences during and after the conflict. All four states held different views about the future of security and economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. The chapter then contrasts U.S., British, Australian, and New Zealand national interests as well as regional objectives in the Asia-Pacific to show that postwar relations between all four states were not always conducive to future cooperation. Indeed, differences in national interests, military capabilities, economic preferences, domestic-political contexts, and security concerns repeatedly undermined cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. These competing national interests would come to weaken and confuse their response to the rising Communist challenge in the Asia-Pacific.

This chapter examines the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). United States policymakers increasingly recognized the importance of Japan in the Cold War. Indeed, the Truman administration concluded that the recovery of Japan was strategically and economically essential for the security of the Asia-Pacific region. Imperative to achieving such ambitions was ending formal occupation by Allied forces and providing a Japanese peace treaty that would allow for its full economic and industrial recovery. However, U.S. plans encountered considerable opposition. The United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand resented a new commercial challenger in the region and feared a Japanese military revival. As all were signatories to the Japanese instruments of surrender, their support was essential to secure the two-thirds majority required to end formal occupation. The United States' desire for a Japanese peace treaty provided Australia and New Zealand with the opportunity to push for their longtime goal of a security treaty with the United States. Following negotiations, the ANZUS Treaty emerged in February of 1951. The United States, however, excluded the United Kingdom from this newly formed security pact. Washington also brushed aside London's efforts at drafting its own Japanese peace treaty, instead pushing forward a more lenient agreement that largely reflected U.S. wishes.

This chapter assesses in detail the exclusion of Britain from the ANZUS Treaty, which embarrassed British policymakers and undermined many of the United Kingdom's interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Prime Minister Clement Attlee had initially accepted exclusion, but Winston Churchill's election to office in October of 1951 resulted in a concerted effort to gain membership. Although Australia and New Zealand remained sympathetic to an expanded treaty, both feared that pushing British membership too forcefully risked the United States dissolving the ANZUS Treaty. Despite enjoying a degree of recovery, economic limitations and ongoing commitments to Europe and the Middle East meant that the United Kingdom was unable to offer the antipodean states a credible alternative to existing arrangements. Australia and New Zealand consequently attempted to secure membership for Britain but prioritized ongoing cooperation with the United States. The major obstacle to British membership in ANZUS remained the United States. As far as U.S. policymakers interpreted matters, British inclusion provided few benefits and considerable economic and strategic drawbacks. Yet, U.S. officials preferred to use arguments about race and imperialism to justify British omission from the treaty. Ultimately, the United States remained committed to maintaining ANZUS in its existing form and rebuffed efforts by the antipodean powers to secure British inclusion.

This article explains the origins of the Australia–New Zealand–United States (ANZUS) Treaty by highlighting U.S. ambitions in the Pacific region after World War II. Three clarifications to the historiography merit attention. First, an alliance with Australia and New Zealand reflected the pursuit of U.S. interests rather than the skill of antipodean diplomacy. Despite initial reservations in Washington, geostrategic anxiety and economic ambition ultimately spurred cooperation. The U.S. government's eventual recourse to coercive diplomacy against the other ANZUS members, and the exclusion of Britain from the alliance, substantiate claims of self-interest. Second, the historiography neglects the economic rationale underlying the U.S. commitment to Pacific security. Regional cooperation ensured the revival of Japan, the avoidance of discriminatory trade policies, and the stability of the Bretton Woods monetary system. Third, scholars have unduly played down and misunderstood the concept of race. U.S. foreign policy elites invoked ideas about a “White Man's Club” in Asia to obscure the pursuit of U.S. interests in the region and to ensure British exclusion from the treaty.

As a signatory to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Canada has committed to establishing a network of marine protected areas (MPAs) that effectively conserves at least 10% of coastal and marine areas by 2020. Research shows that the most effective MPAs are large, well enforced, no-take, and designed as part of a network. Canada's Pacific MPAs, designated site-by-site, cover approximately 3% of Canadian Pacific waters. We investigated how these MPAs could effectively contribute to Canada's national network by analyzing the implementation of management intent through the application of fisheries closures and conducting a preliminary assessment of their size and spacing relative to scientific guidelines. Fisheries closures outside of MPAs were similarly assessed. Results showed that 90% of existing MPAs were intended to exclude commercial fishing, yet only 2.5% fully or partially met this goal, therefore management intent was not achieved. Further, existing MPAs were small, 75% less than 10 km2 in size...

With the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, superpower détente broke down. With it came a hardening of U.S. foreign policy towards Moscow. Efforts to implement a series of sanctions against Moscow are explored within this chapter and highlights how London decided to protect its narrow commercial interests against the wishes of Washington. This chapter also surveys Anglo-American cooperation and competition as it pertained to the boycott of the 1980 summer Olympic games, the Iranian hostage situation and the Trident nuclear weapons agreement between London and Washington.

This books draws on a wealth of recently declassified documents to reveal that relations between Britain and the United States were riven by far more antagonism than is generally believed. Jimmy Carter the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ reveals that even the special intelligence and nuclear relationships shared between London and Washington were not immune from the high level tension. Thomas Robb explores the competitive nature of the relationship during Carter’s presidency and provides an original interpretation to how both countries dealt with the breakdown of superpower détente; the subject of international human rights promotions and the Anglo-American nuclear and intelligence relationship.

This chapter contextualizes Jimmy Carter’s promotion of a human rights agenda coupled to efforts to maintain superpower détente. By doing so, this chapter highlights how London often fought to restrain the president’s promotion of human rights for a mixture of reasons predicated upon geopolitical assumptions and the need to maintain British commercial interests. All told, the advent of the Carter administration created considerable unease in British policy making circles.

In Britain we know how much we owe to America. We understand how close our countries are. America’s cause is, and always will be, our cause.1 We share a lot in common. Although our cars, or our automobiles, may drive on opposite sides of the highway, our people generally move in the same direction. And we share, or at least attempt to share, a common language. Sometimes we don’t succeed. But in the most important things, we do see issues and ideas, challenges, hopes, and expectations in the same way....

By 1978, Carter’s foreign policy was in a state of flux. Unsure of how to promote arms limitations agreements with the Soviet Union, balance the energy and economics difficulties that the United States, as well as tackle his increasingly difficult NATO allies, the president looked towards London and the government of James Callaghan for assistance. Carter found a willing partner in Callaghan but as this chapter demonstrates, there were considerable limits to just how useful London could prove in a time of economic malaise and decreased international power.