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The Paris Agreement reinvigorated the use of carbon markets as a means to confront climate change. Both domestic and multi-jurisdictional mechanisms directed at carbon credit creation and trading were endorsed. In particular, a new measure was proposed to replace the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (and Joint Implementation) at the end of the Protocol’s second compliance period in 2020. With carbon market measures increasingly likely to take centre stage Japan’s Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) takes on renewed interest. Under this mechanism Japanese businesses can generate carbon credits from projects that reduce foreign emissions. As such, the measure borrows from the CDM but seeks to address its inadequacies. Although Australia’s current emissions reduction policy is domestically focused it might be expected that cost considerations will necessitate a reconsideration of this policy. The opportunity for Australian entities to instigate cheaper emissions reductions in foreign jurisdictions which might count towards their, and the country’s, reduction obligations could see a policy of embracing or replicating Japan’s JCM. This paper explores the operation of the JCM. It concludes that should the Australian government alter its policy in the foreshadowed 2020 review and move to recognize foreign credits then it could adapt its Emissions Reduction Fund (and safeguard mechanism) to accept credits generated from the JCM. Alternatively, it could implement an Australian version of a JCM.

The Paris Agreement proposed a new measure to replace the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (and Joint Implementation) at the end of the Protocol’s second compliance period in 2020. The Japanese government has developed the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) with the inadequacies of the CDM in mind. The JCM, therefore, deserves close study. In a previous paper the author outlined the features of the JCM. This paper draws on interviews with government officials, consultants and corporate participants to assess the practical application of the JCM. It concludes that for the program to better achieve its full potential from an environmental perspective it would be preferable for JCM credits to be of value. Furthermore, although the JCM also has diplomatic and commercial mandates these ends are substantially achieved by the complementary funding program for JCM projects. Moves to better interline the two programs, with an emphasis on funding criteria that makes reference to a project’s cost of emissions abatement, should enhance the environmental effectiveness (of the two programs) provided priority is given to this criterion over other (diplomatic/commercial) criteria. The introduction of an emissions trading scheme in Australia in the future (or extension of the current safeguard mechanism) would be expected to provide a market for carbon credits generated from offset schemes. Given that the current Australian offset scheme is solely domestic focused a case could be made to also introduce at that time a JCM type scheme that awarded credits to Australian entities engaged in foreign joint ventures achieving low cost emissions reductions.

In 2005 the EU’s ETS became the first mandatory scheme to be implemented. The 2012 Australian ETS was based on the EU precedent and the plan, before the Australian ETS was repealed, had been to link the two regimes. The EU scheme suffered a serious setback early on when the market price for EU units collapsed below that considered necessary to motivate the intended emission reductions. During the last decade the EU’s institutions have struggled to settle upon solutions to rehabilitate the ETS but, eventually, during 2018, signs of a sustained price increase appeared. For Australia, and other jurisdictions, the EU experience illustrates some pitfalls to avoid when establishing an ETS and provides lessons for ETS design.

A review of the tax changes in the Australian Federal Budget May 2018 as they apply to individuals and SMEs.

The “technological revolution” is influencing almost all aspects of our lives. Certainly the law has not been immune from its influence. Legal practice in Australia is currently undergoing a major disruption. Tax law has been at the vanguard of this phenomenon. The massive amount of regulation and data that is a feature of tax practice rendered it an early candidate for technological intrusion. This paper explores the inroads by technology into Australian tax practice in the last two decades. While initial activities focused on enforcement and compliance, with the development of machine learning and artificial intelligent the age of the smart computer assistant has arrived. The first tax case to consider the implications of a “not so smart” computer has also had to be decided.

Australians are amongst the highest per capita emitters of carbon on Earth. The evidence is now clear that climate change will terribly impact all living things. As the window of opportunity to prevent this closes the country prevaricates on the need to act, rather deferring the cost to future generations.

Tax revenues are forecast to increase from 23.5% of GDP in 2015-16 to 25.1% of GDP by 2019-20. Expenditures are expected to fall from 25.8% to 25.2% of GDP over the same period. Over the four year period the government's nominal tax receipts are forecast to increase by 30%. Tax receipts will amount to $500 billion by 2019-20. Whilst much of the increase is predicated on growth new tax measures will also need to contribute, and in a big way. The government plans to collect an additional $28 billion each year!

[Extract from presentation] Introduction • The growth of Islamic Finance • The Shariah • The prohibitions • The structures • The tax implications • The opportunity • The Australian response

Australians are amongst the highest per capita emitters of carbon on Earth. The evidence is now clear that climate change will terribly impact all living things. As the window of opportunity to prevent this closes the country prevaricates on the need to act, rather deferring the cost to future generations.

The content of the ethical obligations attached to tax advice (“tax ethics”) may be in the process of undergoing a quantum change from that dominated by the interests of clients to reflecting a balancing with broader interests. It will be demonstrated that there is significant support for this change and, indeed, that there are numerous reasons why the profession should embrace a wider ethic in the provision of advice. From one perspective this debate as to the ethical approach that should be adopted by tax practitioners may only be part of a subterfuge adopted by the opposing parties in the tax collection arena. If one accepts the rule of law thesis that law is determinable then any discretionary scope for tax practitioners is largely diminished with an attendant decline in the significance of tax ethics.By contrast an interminable law thesis gives centre stage to the tax ethics debate. If, as is suggested, the impetus is away from a client centred ethos towards tax practitioners adopting a moral position them this presents numerous issues that need to be addressed. Firstly, what is meant by embracing a moral position and, in particular, what moral foundation is advice to be tested against? Secondly, how is the moral practitioner to guard against confusing motivations with after-the-fact justifications? Thirdly, inherent in the proposition that it is in the interests of society that taxpayers comply with the spirit of the law is the assumption that the law has been fashioned in the public interest. The Parliamentary process can be demonstrated to be a flawed and parochial process. Where does this leave the tax practitioner who is not satisfied that the spirit (or even meaning) of the law is in the public interest?This leads on to a fourth consideration. What is the role of the tax practitioner where they are of the opinion that the government will not spend all or part of the tax revenue in the public interest? Is tax advice that furthers a program of civil disobedience justified or even mandated?Finally, what are the ethical obligations of the tax administrator? If the taxpayer's advisers are required to frame their advice in the public interest then does a similar obligation rest on tax administrators and, if so, what are the implications for tax collection?

As part of its response to climate change the 1997 Kyoto Protocol envisages a global scheme with national emissions trading schemes (“ETS”) linked to form an international market for carbon. In 2010 the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (“TMG”) established an ETS. This regime has some unique features that differentiate it so raising the question as to whether it could be effectively linked to other regimes. This is a particularly important issue given that the TMG regime is being promoted to other municipal governments as a blueprint for an ETS.The principles called into play in considering whether regimes can be linked are well developed. This paper explores these principles in the context of the TMG regime to identify if any barriers to linkage may exist and, if so, what “fixes” might be available to facilitate linkage.

The rule of law imperative, so often espoused by industrialised nations, is under siege as tax systems attempt to interface with an ever increasingly complex and globally focused business environment. Compliance by taxpayers and enforcement by the tax administrator has become progressively problematic.Various policy responses have evolved. Attempts to rewrite and simplify taxation legislation have met with limited success. The development of tax intermediaries, an industry devoted to assisting taxpayers to comply has provided some relief. Novel approaches to tax administration have also featured.A particular of approach that has been adopted by a number of industrialised nations has been to move the tax administrator from a command and control posture to a more sophisticated and responsive form of regulation. The OECD has recently endorsed such an approach terming it the “enhanced relationship” model. For the last decade a derivation on this initiative has been championed in Australasia under the banner of “responsive regulation”. Pursuant to this model, the administrators’ approach reflects the posture adopted by the taxpayer. Thus, the focus is on extending assistance to compliant taxpayers and punishing recalcitrant taxpayers. It is thought that this model most effectively encourages voluntary compliance by taxpayers and thereby enhances the efficiency of tax administration.A feature of responsive regulation is for the tax administrator to form community partnerships with other stakeholders in the taxation system. Accordingly, tax administrators describe their relationship with intermediaries as collaborative or a partnership. An “enhanced relationship” in the OECD’s terms. This is in contrast to historical precedents where typically the relationship has been cast as adversarial.The notion of tax intermediaries, or more particularly tax practitioners, forming a partnership or enhanced relationship with tax administrator presents theoretical concerns. In particular, issues relating to conflicts of interest, lack of transparency, consistency in application and regulatory capture are conceivable. These concerns have been borne out by research in the Australasian environment. Whilst the partnership or enhanced relationship approach to tax administration may be worthy of consideration by other countries in the region the model demands further development and, especially in the Asian context, may need to cater for cultural nuances.

The approach to administering the taxation laws by the New Zealand Internal Revenue Department (“IRD”) is founded on the responsive regulation model. Pursuant to the model the IRD describes its relationship with the profession as collaborative or even a partnership. The model has been borrowed from the Australian initiatives. However there is evidence is that the partnership model has been very patchy in its application, both over time and depending upon the IRD operatives involved. Subjective attitudes and external influences appear to have a significant impact upon the nature of the relationship. This evidence suggests that the partnership model in both New Zealand, and Australia, may be appropriately viewed as dynamic, with the relationship molded more by the environment than by managerial design.

Global initiatives to reduce emissions can be categorised as either regulatory measures or measures that seek to place a price on carbon. Most jurisdictions employ a combination of the two with pricing measures generally preferred by economists. Where carbon is priced this is typically achieved by imposing a carbon tax and/or an emissions trading scheme (“ETS”).Australia introduced a nationwide ETS from 1 July 2012 with California (and Quebec) following suit from 1 January 2013. The Australian ETS was set to link with that of the European Union (“EU”) from 1 July 2014 and linkage with New Zealand was also being explored. Meanwhile California and Quebec linked 6 months earlier. The first tentative steps towards a global carbon market seemed to be underway.However political expediency was to see the Australian opposition party rally against the ETS and, with its subsequent election to government, repeal the regime. The prime mechanism to achieve Australia’s emissions reductions commitment is now an emissions reduction fund (“ERF”). Under this scheme the government holds “reverse auctions” whereby the cheapest emissions reduction proposals put to it by industry are funded. Under a “safeguard” measure large emitters are to remain subject to emissions caps with default (possibly) leading to fines where credits cannot be sourced elsewhere. Thus carbon pricing and (limited) trading will still feature under the revised Australian regime.The circumstances leading to the implementation and then demise of the Australian ETS and its replacement with the ERS are explored in this paper. Both the former ETS and ERS will be compared with the Californian ETS. It will be observed that a myopic focus on domestic emissions is a feature of both the Californian and new Australian regimes. Whilst political expediency and, possibly, environmental integrity concerns might motivate this dislike of foreign credits one effect is that emissions reductions are likely to come at a much higher cost and the regimes fail the opportunity to assist in curtailing developing world emissions. On the flip side, both regimes are then quarantined from the mistakes and market failures of the global market. With the expectation that the Australian ERS experiment will be short lived the prospect is that Australia will again embrace an ETS. This might serve as an opportunity to reorientate the focus on international linkage from Europe to California.

[Extract] Introduction *The growth of Islamic Finance *The Shariah *The prohibitions *The structures *The tax implications *The opportunity *The Australian response

In 1998, the OECD issued a report announcing an initiative to eradicate harmful tax practices world wide. Non-OECD states with preferential tax regimes were labelled tax havens and the focus of the report soon became these countries.The tax havens’ primary response has been to point to the absence of a level playing field. As a result, the OECD’s initiative evolved to focus on the need for tax regime transparency and international information exchange agreements.This placed the initiative in accord with other international initiatives directed to similar ends. Faced with overwhelming international pressure, all but five of the tax havens have committed to co-operate. The critical issue now is as to how the principles of transparency and information exchange will be embraced.This paper argues that a proper balance between the rights of nations and of taxpayers must be maintained. This proposition is illustrated by reference to the relationship between Australia and the tax haven Vanuatu. A way forward for these two countries that acknowledges the commercial value of the information sought by Australia and contains protections for taxpayers is outlined. This proposal could serve as a blueprint for the implementation of tax havens’ commitments to the OECD.

Global initiatives to reduce emissions can be categorised as either regulatory measures or measures that seek to place a price on carbon. Most jurisdictions employ a combination of the two, with pricing measures generally preferred by economists. Where carbon is priced, this is typically achieved by imposing a carbon tax and/or an emissions trading scheme (ETS).Australia introduced a nationwide ETS from 1 July 2012, with California (and Quebec) following suit from 1 January 2013. The Australian ETS was set to link with that of the European Union from 1 July 2014 and linkage with New Zealand was also being explored. Meanwhile, California and Quebec linked six months earlier. The first tentative steps towards a global carbon market seemed underway.However, the Australian Opposition party rallied against the ETS and, with its subsequent election to government, repealed the regime. The prime mechanism to achieve Australia’s emissions reductions commitment is now the emissions reduction fund (ERF). Under this scheme, the government holds “reverse auctions” whereby the cheapest emissions reduction proposals put to it by industry are funded. As a “safeguard” measure, large emitters are to remain subject to emissions caps with default (possibly) leading to fines where offsets cannot be sourced elsewhere. Thus, carbon pricing and (limited) trading will still feature under the revised Australian regime.The circumstances leading to the implementation and then demise of the Australian ETS, and its replacement with the ERF, are explored in this article. Both the former ETS and ERF will be compared with the Californian ETS, widely regarded as operating successfully since its commencement six months after Australia’s ill‑fated ETS. It will be observed that a focus on domestic emissions is a feature of both the Californian and new Australian regimes. While political expediency and, possibly, environmental integrity concerns might motivate this dislike of foreign credits, one effect is that emissions reductions are likely to come at a much higher cost and the regimes fail the opportunity to assist in curtailing developing world emissions. On the flip side, both regimes are then quarantined from the mistakes and market failures of the global market. With critics suggesting that the Australian ERF experiment may be short lived, there is a prospect that Australia might again embrace an ETS. This could serve as an opportunity to reorientate the focus on international linkage from Europe to California.

Drawing upon the theory of responsive regulation, in the 1990’s the Australian Commissioner of Taxation expressed the partnership model of tax administration. Shortly afterwards, the New Zealand Inland Revenue Commissioner joined this shift, to what has been caste as, the way forward in meeting the demands upon a tax administration in a modern, open democratic society. After something like a decade since the adoption of this new model of tax administration, it is appropriate to review its history, the challenges that have been encountered and also to reflect upon the prospects of the partnership model. The purpose of this paper is to undertake this task and to suggest avenues for further critical reflection upon the operation of the partnership model with a view to its enhancement.The first part of this paper identifies and elaborates upon the two models of tax administration that are evident in the recent Australian and New Zealand history – the adversarial model and the partnership model. The second part of the paper reviews the drivers which prompted the paradigm shift in New Zealand and Australia from an adversarial model to a partnership model. The third part of the paper identifies tensions within the partnership model and discusses the practical emanations of these tensions, evident in the operation of the partnership model.

The Australian and Japanese Governments have both introduced a tax consolidation regime effective fiscal year 2002103. The two regimes have many similarities. In particular, they both mandate 100 per cent ownership as the threshold for consolidation, consolidation is voluntary but if elected all eligible companies must consolidate, and intra-group transactions are largely ignored. The regimes have been held out as reducing both tax liabilities and compliance costs, removing double taxation, enhancing corporate restructuring, and providing greater commercial flexibility and competitiveness. However, the Australian corporate sector remains cautious, primarily because of concerns over the compliance costs associated with the transition to the new regime and the potential loss of existing tax credits and losses. Whilst these transitional issues are less of a concern to Japanese companies, in the absence of existing rules permitting the transfer of tax attributes, a Japanese surtax of 2 per cent over the first two years of consolidation has to be weighed against the apparent benefits of the regime. A comparison of the two regimes also reveals a very different approach to the treatment on consolidation of inherent gains and losses.

[Extract] On 2 May 2010 the Government released the long awaited Henry Tax Review and announced its initial response. Of the 138 Henry reform proposals a few were taken up, some rejected outright and the majority left for future consideration. This paper focuses on the main proposals, both adopted and foreshadowed, that will impact on the SME market. The paper will not deal with the social security and resources tax reforms.

The approach to administration of the Australian tax system has, over time, fluctuated between an adversarial and a co-operative approach. Currently, consistent with a move to a responsive regulatory strategy, the Australian Tax Office (“ATO”) has expressed its desire for a co-operative partnership style relationship with the tax advising profession. The profession is seen, in its view, as a critical leverage point to promote voluntary compliance with the tax system by the bulk of taxpayers. The advent of a partnership style relationship between the ATO and the tax profession raises many issues, primary of which is whether the desire to establish this relationship is mere rhetoric employed by both parties in the pursuit of their divergent interests. In fact, the very existence of these opposing interests raises the possibility of ethical conflicts that need to be carefully managed by both parties to the partnership. The ATO is to be commended for the humane and practical way in which the evidence in this case shows its officers dealt with persons who are in difficulties. That attitude indeed probably produces more actual cash into the Treasury than any other approach. It will occur from time to time that some taxpayer will abuse that approach. It may also be that the laws … nowadays operate unfairly against the ATO. I hope that neither of these last two points will operate to change the general attitude. Justice Young in Dean-Willcocks v FCT (2004) NSWSC 1058 10 November 2004) at para 88.

Countries around the globe are currently struggling with the seemingly conflicting goals of maintaining the integrity of their company / shareholder tax regime whilst not presenting a disincentive to both inward and outward investment. In this regard, the standard adopted by most deveoped nations, the imputation system, is proving difficult to adapt to the pressures of a global economy. Imputation systems can generate a particularly perverse taxation result in circumstances where a country is merely a conduit for the flow of foreign source income and also in so called triangular situations. Whilst many countries have enacted special conduit relief provisions, few have tackled the problems presented by triangular taxation. Reforms to a country's imputation regime necessary to tackle triangular taxation are comprehensive, complex and problematic. In fact the current worldwide trend is towards credit and exemption regimes partly because of issues such as conduit and triangular taxation. This is to be contrasted with the Australian and New Zealand experiment. It is suggested that notwithstanding the trade-off in equity (and possibly revenue), the adoption of an alternative company/shareholder taxation regime may be preferable to attempting to amend the imputation system.

In both his 2013 and 2014 annual reports the Australian Inspector-General of Taxation wrote of the need to consider the adoption of a taxpayers’ bill of rights in Australia. Whilst a charter of taxpayer rights has been a feature of ATO administration for almost two decades it does not provide a legal remedy for an aggrieved taxpayer. In the absence of constitutional protection for fundamental rights, and the inapplicability of Australian human rights legislation to taxation matters, the courts have been reluctant to extend legal protections to taxpayers. If neither the Taxation Administration Act 1953 nor the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 are applicable then, typically, taxpayers are left to the vagaries of the ATO’s internal dispute resolution procedures or to attempt to convince the Ombudsman, and now Inspector-General, of the merits of their case.It is notable that in Europe there is a body of jurisprudence on the application of the European Convention on Human Rights to taxation matters by virtue of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”). It is proposed to examine these developments to identify if there are any lessons for Australia as we (again) consider the need for, and possible framework of, a taxpayers’ bill of rights. The various articles of the Convention that impact on tax matters will be outlined together with the approach by the ECtHR to interpreting these articles. These principles will then be applied to recent Australian controversies (which otherwise lacked a legal remedy) using as a reference the ECtHR tax jurisprudence. The aim will be to gauge whether an appropriate resolution would have been achieved in these matters had these articles been incorporated into Australian law. It will be demonstrated that, in many cases, with some amendment or re-interpretation, these articles would have provided a legal solution. The paper adds to the chorus of the need to enshrine taxpayer, if not citizen rights, in a legally enforceable document.

This article examines sec. 1-3 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 to determine whether it is likely to achieve its goal, and argues that a simple amendment to the provision might improve its chance of success.

Japanese culture and society harbours particular strengths and weaknesses. These are, in turn, reflected in its institutions, including its universities. The author is a frequent visitor to Japan and is currently the visiting professor in Australian cultural studies at Tokyo University. This paper reflects on the author's experience of Japanese universities from the perspective of someone with in excess of 20 years experience as an Australian academic. Whilst not purposively controversial some of the observations may be uncomfortable. Some may also be naive as the author does not profess to understand the inner workings of Japan's tertiary sector. However the objective is to highlight some aspects of the system that to an outsider are in need of critical reflection. The tertiary education system in Japan epitomises the cultural paradox: the challenge of transforming or internationalising conservative institutions steeped in tradition.

In 2010 the Japanese Government made substantial commitments to the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. In particular it proposed a 25% reduction on 1990 levels by 2020 and an 80% reduction by 2050. At the forefront of this policy was to be an additional (carbon) tax on fossil fuels, strategies to promote renewable energy (in particular a feed-in tariff) and an emissions trading scheme. Notoriously there was to be greater reliance on nuclear energy. Subsequent events conspired to derail these plans. The Fukushima power station disaster forced the Government to reconsider nuclear power. Continued global economic uncertainty, together with the damage to the economy caused by the March 2011 tsunami, resulted in the deferral of the introduction of the emissions trading scheme.Meanwhile on July 1, 2012 the Australian Government introduced a hybrid carbon tax/emissions trading scheme putting it at the cutting edge of climate change response using fiscal measures. However the path to the introduction of this regime was not easy and its future is not assured. Whilst Australia had been active in negotiating the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and an early signatory, during the subsequent decade the Liberal coalition Government refused to embrace a price on carbon, the centerpiece of the Protocol, even questioning the science on climate change. With the election of a Labor Government in 2007 the Kyoto Protocol was promptly ratified and an emissions trading scheme proposed. However the proposal met neither the expectations of environmentalists nor industry and in 2010 it was shelved upon failing to pass through Parliament for a third time. Although it seemed that the impetus had been lost, with the toppling of a Prime Minister later that year and a Federal election resulting in Labor forming a coalition with the Greens, momentum again swung in favour of an emissions trading scheme.Meanwhile the Liberal coalition Opposition remains divided as to the approach it would adopt if it wins government in the elections scheduled for late 2013. Having dismissed one party leader for promoting an emissions trading scheme, the current policy of the party is that it would repeal the Government’s scheme and focus on emissions reduction strategies requiring other than a fiscal response. There may be political economy lessons for the rest of the world, including Japan, in how the carbon tax / emissions trading scheme was designed and implemented in Australia. This paper explores the developments in Australia. It is hoped that Japanese policy analysts might find the Australian experience informative.

[Extract] In one dramatic moment in 2011, Japan;s national strategy to curb carbon emissions was thrown into chaos. At the 2010 UN climate change conference Japan committed to reducing its emissions by 25 per cent (relative to 1990 levels) by 2020 and 80 per cent by 2050. While these reductions were, in part, to be achieved through an emphasis on clean energy, the lynchpin of the program was to be its reliance on nuclear energy and the introduction of a price on carbon at the national level. But the triple disasters in March 2011 not only saw the closure of the country's nuclear reactors but the difficult economic conditions that followed made it impossible for the government to contemplate introducing a carbon price. So it was no surprise when the government subsequently admitted that its pledges were no longer viable.

The importance of tax intermediaries in the efficient administration of a tax system has been acknowledged in the OECD's "enhanced relationship" model. This paper reports on research conducted in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom focusing on the determinants of the relationship between the tax administrator and tax practitioners. It is hoped that the analysis will stimulate input from conference participants on the dynamics at play in their jurisdictions

[Extract] My approach to teaching tax: • Dealing with the detail • Dealing with the complexity • Dealing with the numbers • Dealing with the philosophical and ethical dimension • Keeping their eyes open • Keeping it real

Getting published is the name of the game but how to get started? Once up and running as an early career researcher you may seek to add another dimension to your research in the form of policy/jurisprudential analysis or empirical research. Both streams can take the legally trained scholar out of their comfort zone, arguably more so with empirical research involving surveys and statistical analysis. But there is an alternative form of empirical research utilising semi-structured interviews that can be both more flexible and insightful than the use of surveys. This paper canvasses the lessons for researchers drawn from the author's experience. In particular, it explores the semi-structured interview methodology focusing on issues associated with its implementation.

In considering how tax administrators should relate to tax intermediaries, one approach has been to move tax administrators from a command and control posture to a more sophisticated form of regulation, as recently endorsed by the OECD's "enhanced relationship" model. The tax administrators in Australia and New Zealand have recognized the significance of their relationship with the tax profession in seeking to maximize voluntary compliance. These tax administrators have espoused their relationship with the profession as being a partnership (the partnership model). This article explores the experiences of Australia and New Zealand with the partnership model.

The traditional methodology employed by the judiciary in tax cases leads to narrow definitional debates separate from a consideration of policy and principle. With each new case we expect a resolution of fundamental issues and some clarity. But this is rarely achieved and the uncertainty and ambiguity associated with our tax laws compounds. We need to depart from the traditional methodology and embrace an approach in which the judiciary expressly acknowledges policy considerations when deciding hard tax cases. Thus our legal witchdoctors need to embrace a new methodology. Such an approach can be demonstrated by reference to recent general anti-avoidance cases.

[Extract] The deductibility of continuing expenses after the relevant business has ceased has given rise to a string of cases. Decisions such as AGC (Advances) Ltd v FC of T 75 ATC 4057 and Placer Pacific Pty Ltd (in liq) v FC of T 95 ATC 4459 have upheld a principle that the expenses remained deductible on the basis that the "occasion" of the outgoing was to be found in the prior business operations.

[Extract] Since the early 1980s the Government has manipulated the tax system to encourage the accumulation of funds in pension or superannuation funds. Initially the taxation regime was very favourable but the tax concessions have gradually been reduced. However the grandfathering of these concessions has created a highly complex tax regime. Superannuation support by employers is compulsory, currently to the extent of 8% of salary, but to be 9% from 1 July 2002. Contributions are often paid into large funds controlled by professional investment managers. However it is possible to structure a superannuation fund so that the members can manage the investment. Most commonly employers will establish a superannuation fund thereby enabling them more control over the investment. Naturally there are stringent prudential and preservation requirements.

A reflection on the main decisions of Justice Hill on Part IVA is instructive in identifying how the Part might be appropriately interpreted. Unfortunately, as his Honour identified in his final comments on Part IVA, its application may have been extended beyond that thought to be its original ambit. His legacy on Part IVA may be the need for a rethink in our approach to identifying unacceptable tax avoidance.

The hierarchy of the Australian Tax Office (ATO) presents a picture of the ATO being in a partnership with the tax profession. It is suggested that the relationship is, or should be, one of co-operation with the aim to maximize voluntary compliance with the tax system by taxpayers. Such a model is in contrast to the traditional adversarial model and questions arise as to whether such a relationship is workable. The partnership model presents ethical conflicts, the possibility of regulatory capture and issues of transparency. In any event it is not clear whether the rhetoric of the ATO hierarchy is, in fact, implemented in practice. To test whether a partnership style relationship does exist between the ATO and the profession, the limits of the relationship and how it might be improved, the views of the profession and employees within the ATO need to be considered. With the prospect of an extended interview program a pilot program was conducted interviewing a sample of the profession. The experiences in conducting these interviews are instructive for establishing a methodology for any wider program. Furthermore, the observations of the, admittedly small and arguably unrepresentative, sample provided some evidence that the implementation of the partnership model remains problematic. In particular, observations were made to suggest that current structures within the ATO may inhibit the organisations ability to embrace, at all levels, a partnership style approach. Also, it might be that the profession does not share the same view as to its obligations within the partnership as does the ATO.

As part of its response to climate change the 1997 Kyoto Protocol envisages the employment of emissions trading schemes ("ETS") to provide a market based incentive to reduce emissions and to engage in carbon sequestration activities. Such schemes would also serve to encourage the creation of an industry focused on energy conservation and alternatives to energy production – so called "green" or "clean" energy. Whilst a number of jurisdictions have introduced ETSs there is no definitive model. In 2010 the Tokyo Metropolitan Government ("TMG") established an ETS and currently Australia has had a comprehensive nationwide regime in place since 1 July 2012. Notably the approaches adopted in the two jurisdictions have marked differences. It is proposed to compare the two regimes with a view to identifying lessons for ETS design and implementation.

The increase in the revenues of Arab nations arising from the surge in world oil prices, together with the withdrawal of Arab investment from the United States, presents an opportunity for Australia to increase its share of Arab investment. But Islamic investors are expected to invest only in financial products and structures that comply with shariah law, which prohibits returns in the nature of interest. This article explores whether Australia's income tax laws should be amended to facilitate greater Arab investment in the country.

Emissions reductions can be promoted through regulatory measures but most economists support placing a price on carbon as a complementary and, possibly, more effective measure. A pricing measure typically takes the form of either (or both) a carbon tax or an emissions trading scheme (ETS). Whilst both measures have their advantages and disadvantages an ETS might be preferred on the basis of the ability to set caps and link with other schemes. A number of ETSs are now operating around the globe but there is no one template. This paper will compare the different approaches adopted by the Californian and Tokyo ETSs with the Australian regime that operated for two years from 2012 until 2014 and the so-called emissions reduction fund (ERF) that replaced it. It will be demonstrated that fundamental points of difference reflected by these alternative arrangements are the extent to which the regimes focus on domestic rather than global emissions reductions and the primacy given to the market. The ETSs can also be contrasted to the voluntary nature of the ERF, at least as currently enacted, and how that system seeks to reward responsive businesses whilst the ETSs penalise non-responsive entities.

For most developed nations the last five years have ushered in difficult economic times. Not though for resource rich Australia which has sustained high economic growth courtesy of the unquenchable thirst of China for its minerals. However the benefits of the mining boom have not been evenly felt, giving rise to the description "two speed economy". In fact, the success of the mining industry has contributed to a dampening effect on some other sectors of the economy that have struggled in response to inflationary pressures, higher interest rates, skill shortages and the high Australian dollar, all a bi-product of the resources boom. Furthermore, peculiarities in the way that State mining royalties are calculated have not seen any substantial increase in Government revenues compared with soaring mining profits. Under the mantra "spreading the benefits of the boom" the Commonwealth Government stepped in to address this perceived structural flaw in the economy by proposing an additional tax on mining resource rents or "super profits" from 1 July 2012. In an extremely effective anti-tax campaign the industry was able to have the tax threat all but removed with the aid of the very community for whose benefit it had been conceived. In the process the industry succeeded in having the Prime Minister, who proposed the tax, dismissed by his own party and deceived the new leadership team into agreeing to a regime that in its first quarter of operation was not able to raise one cent of tax. At the same time the Government introduced an carbon tax / emissions trading scheme ("ETS") putting it at the cutting edge of climate change response using fiscal measures. However the path to the introduction of this regime was similarly not easy. Whilst Australia had been active in negotiating the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, during the subsequent decade the Liberal coalition Government refused to embrace a price on carbon. With the election of a Labor Government in 2007 the Kyoto Protocol was promptly ratified and an ETS proposed. However it met neither the expectations of environmentalists nor industry and in 2010 was shelved. Although it seemed that the impetus had been lost, with the toppling of a Prime Minister later that year and a Federal election resulting in Labor forming a coalition with the Greens, momentum again swung in favour of an ETS. There may be political economy lessons for the rest of the world in both how the mining tax was blunted and also how the ETS was designed and implemented in Australia.