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In Japan, Prime Minister Suga announced in October 2020 a new goal of “carbon neutrality by 2050.” However, the energy/climate policy issued by the government after the announcement did not show any major changes in the current targets or policies. At this rate, there is a very high possibility that “carbon neutral by 2050” and the current “46% reduction by 2030 compared with 2013” pledge will become nothing but a mere political slogan. In February 2021, the “Energy Conversion for the Future Research Group” published “Report 2030: A Roadmap to 2030 for Green Recovery and Carbon Neutrality in 2050” as a Japanese version of the Green New Deal. This is an alternative to the government’s current energy/climate policies. This report presents a roadmap to the year 2030 which clarifies Japan’s essential aims and actions to be realized by 2030 in order to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Specifically, the report draws a systematic roadmap for investment, economic benefits, greenhouse gas emission reduction benefits, air pollution control benefits, unemployment measures, and financial resources by 2030. This chapter provides a concrete picture of Japan’s ideal green recovery by conveying the essence of the report as well as global trends.

The energy products of oil and gas majors have contributed significantly to global greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and planetary warming over the past century. Decarbonizing the global economy by mid-century to avoid dangerous climate change thus cannot occur without a profound transformation of their fossil fuel-based business models. Recently, several majors are increasingly discussing clean energy and climate change, pledging decarbonization strategies, and investing in alternative energies. Some even claim to be transforming into clean energy companies. Given a history of obstructive climate actions and “greenwashing”, there is a need to objectively evaluate current and historical decarbonization efforts and investment behavior. This study focuses on two American (Chevron, ExxonMobil) and two European majors (BP, Shell). Using data collected over 2009–2020, we comparatively examine the extent of decarbonization and clean energy transition activity from three perspectives: (1) keyword use in annual reports (discourse); (2) business strategies (pledges and actions); and (3) production, expenditures and earnings for fossil fuels along with investments in clean energy (investments). We found a strong increase in discourse related to “climate”, “low-carbon” and “transition”, especially by BP and Shell. Similarly, we observed increasing tendencies toward strategies related to decarbonization and clean energy. But these are dominated by pledges rather than concrete actions. Moreover, the financial analysis reveals a continuing business model dependence on fossil fuels along with insignificant and opaque spending on clean energy. We thus conclude that the transition to clean energy business models is not occurring, since the magnitude of investments and actions does not match discourse. Until actions and investment behavior are brought into alignment with discourse, accusations of greenwashing appear well-founded., 大手石油会社による「クリーンエネルギーへの移行」という誓約は、 実際のビジネスモデルや投資行動と矛盾している. 京都大学プレスリリース. 2022-02-28.

Achieving temperature targets under the Paris Agreement requires urgent measures to curb construction of coal-fired power plants (CFPPs) and expediate the retirement of existing assets. As the world's fourth largest coal consumer, Japan's efforts to reduce coal usage are critical for international climate mitigation. Policies introduced after the Fukushima nuclear disaster have led to a rapid increase in solar. However deregulation of the electricity market has also prompted a rush of new CFPP constructions by new market entrants and incumbent utilities. In parallel, Japanese state agencies and industry are actively exporting CFPP technologies to developing countries. Although these domestic and international actions harbour serious consequences for global climate mitigation efforts, greater understanding of the factors driving Japan's coal dependency is needed to limit further lock-in of future carbon emissions. Filling this gap, this study critically examines narratives employed by actors in government and industry to sustain Japan's domestic and international coal industry. Our analysis shows how Japan's fossil fuel regime is employing recurring narratives to promote continuation of the current coal-based energy system and to mobilise further investments in high-efficiency coal power technologies. We conclude by recommending various policy pathways and institutional reform measures aimed at encouraging wider diffusion of renewable electricity sources while reducing coal dependency.

Carbon lock-in hampers the realisation of sustainable energy systems. It occurs when carbon-intensive technologies, markets and institutions co-evolve and become wedded to historical trajectories despite environmentally superior technologies being available. Multiple material and non-material causes are discussed in literature on socio-technical or energy transitions and carbon lock-in. However, these are yet to be synthesised into a comprehensive framework to guide the empirical identification of lock-in factors. Also, empirical understanding into how various causes of lock-in can interact is limited. To deepen understanding into the various types of socio-technical lock-in affecting energy transitions, we develop an encompassing analytical framework accounting for material, human, non-material and exogenous factors. In addition to carbon lock-in and path dependency, we synthesise diverse literature encompassing sustainability transitions, energy policy, innovation and firm management, economics and political economy. The resultant framework provides a finer-grained and more comprehensive understanding of lock-in than previous studies. Using Japan as a case study, we then apply this framework with two questions in mind: (i) What factors are contributing to the perpetuation of coal power in Japan? and ii) What opportunities emerge to overcome these? The empirical analysis is informed by triangulated data involving 46 semi-structured interviews and diverse documents. Our findings reveal a wide array of interacting factors that contribute to the perpetuation of coal-power in Japan and several emerging opportunities to tackle these. They also demonstrate our framework’s utility as a heuristic that scholars could apply to other cases to increase empirical understanding into the multiple causes of socio-technical lock-in.

The United Nations (UN) proposed the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 17) in 2015, together with The Paris Agreement endorsed by 195 signatories and state parties, to address sustainable development-related issues through ambitious and dynamic actions. The transition of the energy system is at the heart of greenhouse gas (GHGs) mitigation which is required to achieve those goals and the electric sector is the core of energy system of interest while the GHG with the largest contribution to rising temperature is carbon dioxide. However, in addition to being centrally relevant for carbon emissions, the electric sector is also an important water consumer. This study applied a hybrid life cycle assessment (LCA) model with the disaggregated electric sector to investigate the impacts on carbon emission and water consumption of the energy transition in Japan under the Sixth Strategic Energy Plan. The results indicate that the electricity mix under the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) scenario can cut 50% of existing carbon emissions while intensifying the water consumption by 36% from the life cycle perspective in which 30% are foreign water footprints. The Kaya identity analysis confirmed this conclusion and explained the impacts of four driving factors (population, economy, electricity intensity, and electricity mix) qualitatively and quantitatively showing that the development of technologies and continuous efforts in energy saving can provide a substantial contribution to sustainable development. The results confirmed that the efforts proposed by Japan’s NDC for emission reduction through an energy transition in the electric sector can meet the expectation of achieving the Paris Agreement goals but will also pose greater challenges to the future global water demand in the energy system and regional water stress.

Continued investments in coal-fired power plants (CFPPs) and coal mining are incompatible with the Paris Agreement. As a major investor of both upstream coal mining and downstream CFPP construction, Japanese firms play a large role in sustaining the international coal market. Yet since mid-2018 numerous Japanese companies have announced a range of coal divestment policies. This situation, however, has not been unexamined by scholarship. Additionally, divestment literature outside Japan has focused overwhelmingly on financial institutions rather than the roles of other industry players driving the coal market. To address this gap, this paper examines four industries comprising Japan's international coal market (trading companies, electric utilities, plant equipment manufacturers and financial institutions) to empirically assess the extent of divestment behaviour and identify drivers and barriers. The empirical data reveal a slowdown, but not a cessation, of new and existing coal-related investments. Results also show that the extent of divestment trends can be largely explained by commercial factors, although institutional and structural factors are also at play. These findings have important policy implications.

Whether China's Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emission reduction target “to peak around 2030” is “fair, ambitious and adequate” or not depends on how much emphasis be placed on the historical responsibilities. However, China's peak in coal consumption may come earlier than expected, thereby advancing the peak of CO2 emission to come before 2030. In fact, the calculation based on the recent data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China released indicates that its coal consumption and CO2 emission (from fossil fuels) have almost flatted in 2014. Moreover, National Bureau of Statistics of China has upwardly adjusted the data for energy consumption and coal consumption in 2013, which led to confusion in its interpretation. Although it is difficult to say anything definite at this moment, the issue of upward adjustment of statistical data until 2013 and the recent declining trend of coal consumption and, possibly CO2 emission (from fossil fuels) can be discussed separately. All things considered, it seem...

This article assesses Japan's carbon budgets up to 2100 in the global efforts to achieve the 2 °C target under different effort-sharing approaches based on long-term GHG mitigation scenarios published in 13 studies. The article also presents exemplary emission trajectories for Japan to stay within the calculated budget. The literature data allow for an in-depth analysis of four effort-sharing categories. For a 450 ppm CO2e stabilization level, the remaining carbon budgets for 2014–2100 were negative for the effort-sharing category that emphasizes historical responsibility and capability. For the other three, including the reference ‘Cost-effectiveness’ category, which showed the highest budget range among all categories, the calculated remaining budgets (20th and 80th percentile ranges) would run out in 21–29 years if the current emission levels were to continue. A 550 ppm CO2e stabilization level increases the budgets by 6–17 years-equivalent of the current emissions, depending on the effort-sharing category. Exemplary emissions trajectories staying within the calculated budgets were also analysed for ‘Equality’, ‘Staged’ and ‘Cost-effectiveness’ categories. For a 450 ppm CO2e stabilization level, Japan's GHG emissions would need to phase out sometime between 2045 and 2080, and the emission reductions in 2030 would be at least 16–29% below 1990 levels even for the most lenient ‘Cost-effectiveness’ category, and 29–36% for the ‘Equality’ category. The start year for accelerated emissions reductions and the emissions convergence level in the long term have major impact on the emissions reduction rates that need to be achieved, particularly in the case of smaller budgets. Policy relevance In previous climate mitigation target formulation processes for 2020 and 2030 in Japan, neither equity principles nor long-term management of cumulative GHG emissions was at the centre of discussion. This article quantitatively assesses how much more GHGs Japan can emit by 2100 to achieve the 2 °C target in light of different effort-sharing approaches, and how Japan's GHG emissions can be managed up to 2100. The long-term implications of recent energy policy developments following the Fukushima nuclear disaster for the calculated carbon budgets are also discussed.

The 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami, and the consequent accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, have had consequences far beyond Japan itself. Reactions to the accident in three major e...

Japan’s INDC toward post-2020 greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions is at the level of a reduction of 26% by fiscal year (FY) 2030 compared to FY2013 (18% reduction compared to FY1990). After the accident of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in 2011, the GHG emission in Japan soared due to the increase of the power generation by the fossil fuel-powered station. However, in 2014, GHG emission declined due to the decrease of electricity consumption and improvement of the CO2 intensity and power generation. Current governmental energy/climate policy, which becomes the basis of the INDC, requires the industry sector to implement less energy conservation and GHG emission reduction measures compared to other sectors such as commercial, transport and household, which may result in the introduction of the specific policy such as carbon pricing to those sectors. Prioritization of nuclear power and coal-fired power as base-load power-generation technologies is also the characteristics of the current governmental policy. Since the framework to control the coal-fired power plants is voluntary in nature and the future of the nuclear power is uncertain, there is a possibility that Japan cannot achieve the INDC targets. In that case, Japan will rely on the international credits such as from the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM).

Several multilateral initiatives on acid rain control were advocated in the 1990s, and extended through multiple channels in East Asia There is, however, little coordination between those initiatives. The geopolitical make-up of the region has also hampered further progress in regional cooperation on the issue.

China has had an enormous growth of energy and electricity consumption during the last decades. This has been fuelled primarily by using domestic coal resources. Until 1997, annual construction of power stations averaged around 15 GW which was not sufficient to alleviate the demand surplus. Forecasts envisaged continuation of this growth. The majority of power stations is small scale and reather inefficient. Local air pollution is becoming very strong and is increasingly seen as a politi-cal issue. Foreign investment in the power sector has been hampered by bureaucracy and unclear competencies. On the demand side, energy efficiency has improved markedly in the last two dec-ades, albeit from a very low basis. Due to the economic transformation, many proven incentives for efficiency improvement cannot be used any more. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) opens a host of possibilities to link foreign investment in the energy supply and demand sectors with projects that enhance efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. All big industrial countries have been very keen on climate policy coop-eration with China. While the official Chinese negotiation position towards the CDM and climate policy in general has been extremely cautious, many government bodies show great interest. The Asian financial crisis, which led to an electricity oversupply in 1998, gives the possibility to retire the most inefficient power plants. China wies in den letzten Jahrzehnten ein enormes Wachstum des Energie- und Stromverbrauchs auf. Es wurde hauptsächlich durch heimische Kohleressourcen gespeist. Bis 1997 belief sich der jährliche Zubau an Kraftwerksleistung auf ca. 15 GW, aber selbst das reichte nicht aus, um den Nachfrageüberhang abzubauen. Die Mehrzahl der Kraftwerke ist klein und ziemlich ineffizient. Die lokale Luftverschmutzung wird sehr stark und zusehends als politisches Problem angesehen. Ausländische Investitionen im Energiesektor sind durch bürokratische Hürden und unklare Kompetenzverteilung behindert worden. Auf der Nachfrageseite ist die Energieeffizienz in den letzten Jahrzehnten stark verbessert worden, allerdings von einer sehr niedrigen Ausgangslage. Aufgrund der ökonomischen Transformation können viele bewährte Anreize zur Effizienzsteigerung nicht mehr eingesetzt werden. Der CDM eröffnet vielfältige Möglichkeiten zur Verbindung von Direktinvestitionen in Energieangebot und - nachfrage. CDM-Projekte erhöhen die Effizienz und verringern Treibhaus-Gasemissionen. Alle großen Industrieländer sind sehr an Klimaschutzkooperation mit China interessiert. Während die offizielle chinesische Verhandlungsposition bezüglich des CDM und Klima-Politik im allgemeinen sehr zurückhaltend ist, sind viele Regierungsinstitutionen sehr stark am CDM interessiert. Die Asienkrise, die 1998 zu einem Angebotsüberhang im Stromsektor führte, ermöglicht die Abschaltung der ineffizientesten Kraftwerke.