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This article proposes three responses to the anti-war statements made recently by Pope Francis. The first one recapitulates the very foundations of the prevalent legal and ethical approaches to the issue of war—laid by the most influential Christian thinkers of all times, revisited on several occasions by their followers, and ultimately confirmed in the fairly recent documents articulating Catholic war ethics. The second discusses the specific mode of Francis's apparent repudiation of the doctrine of just war, implying the essential equalisation of the moral status of either warring party—even in the case of conflicts initiated and sustained by undeniable and unprovoked acts of aggression. The third examines the reasonableness and moral soundness of the Pope's implied belief in the impermissibility of an attacked political community's (unintendedly) exposing its members to the enemy's violence without having a substantiated prospect of (relatively swift) military success of its defensive undertaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I examine how the proportionality principle shapes state responses to a cyberattack. I do so by investigating variation in the effects of the principle of proportionality on the state response. The variation accounts for four types of state response. First, if states respond to a first strike in a proportionate manner, they are in compliance with the principle, and attackers are likely to take it as an indication of willingness to honor the principle. Second, states may react to attackers with an excessive response in violation of the principle, which would force attackers to react as or more harshly. Third, states may accidentally make a proportionate response when they in fact seek to impose excessive harm on attackers. Finally, states may generate an excessive response by error when they in fact seek to comply with the principle. Related Articles: Glen, Carol. 2021. "Norm Entrepreneurship in Global Cybersecurity." Politics & Policy 49(5): 1121–45. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12430. Glen, Carol M. 2014. "Internet Governance: Territorializing Cyberspace?" Politics & Policy 42(5): 635–57. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12093/full. Zeng, Jinghan, Tim Stevens, and Yaru Chen. 2017. "China's Solution to Global Cyber Governance: Unpacking the Domestic Discourse of 'Internet Sovereignty.'" Politics & Policy 45(3): 432–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12202. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction to the special themed issue on likelihood of success in the just war tradition introduces the problems associated with this prudential jus ad bellum principle, and summarizes the key findings and arguments of the articles in the issue. It concludes that the likelihood of success must be understood organically and cohesively, within the larger tradition, with a special emphasis on the practical applications for justice to which the just war is dedicated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cyber warfare represents a new form of conflict in today’s world. Unlike earlier traditional armed conflicts, cyber warfare is different in terms of means, methods, techniques, and actors. Cyber warfare takes place in virtual space through the use of information and communication technologies. The actors may be states, but also individuals who can inflict significant damage on their opponents. The consequences of cyber attacks may not be immediately apparent, but can manifest much later. Similarly, the outcome of a cyber attack can be material damage or the loss of human life. Since cyber operations can take place not only during conflicts but also in peacetime, the concept of cyber aggression is often present. States are aware of the new cyber threats and are developing their defensive and offensive capabilities, adopting strategies and doctrines addressing these issues. However, there is no international agreement that regulates the open issues related to cyber warfare, as there is no consensus among states on how to regulate it. There are attempts to apply the rules of international humanitarian law that govern armed conflicts to the realm of cyber warfare. Consensus within the international community has not been reached, leaving this area unregulated. The paper aims to examine the possibility of applying the rules of international humanitarian law, specifically the rules governing the right to use force in international relations (jus ad bellum) and the rules governing the conduct of parties in conflict (jus in bello), to cyber warfare.

AI-enabled systems will steadily infiltrate resort-to-force decision making. This will likely include decision-support systems recruited to assist with crucial deliberations over the permissibility of waging war. Potential benefits abound in terms of enhancing individual and institutional capacities for cognition, analysis, and foresight. Yet, I argue that we have reason to worry. Our interaction with these systems – as citizens, political and military leaders, states, and formal organisation of states – would also court significant risks. Specifically, reliance on decision-support systems that employ machine-learning techniques would threaten to undermine our adherence to international norms of restraint in two distinct ways: (i) by creating the reassuring allusion that these AI-driven tools are able to replace us as responsible agents; and (ii) by inserting unwarranted certainty and singularity into complex jus ad bellum judgements. I will refer to these challenges as the 'risk of misplaced responsibility' and the 'risk of predicted permissibility', respectively. If unaddressed, each proposed risk would make the initiation of war appear more permissible in particular cases and, collaterally, contribute to the erosion of hard-won international norms of restraint. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we focus on the scholarly and policy debate on autonomous weapon systems (AWS) and particularly on the objections to the use of these weapons which rest on jus ad bellum principles of proportionality and last resort. Both objections rest on the idea that AWS may increase the incidence of war by reducing the costs for going to war (proportionality) or by providing a propagandistic value (last resort). We argue that whilst these objections offer pressing concerns in their own right, they suffer from important limitations: they overlook the difficulties of calculating ad bellum proportionality; confuse the concept of proportionality of effects with the precision of weapon systems; disregard the ever-changing nature of war and of its ethical implications; mistake the moral obligation imposed by the principle of last resort with the impact that AWS may have on political decision to resort to war. Our analysis does not entail that AWS are acceptable or justifiable, but it shows that ad bellum principles are not the best set of ethical principles for tackling the ethical problems raised by AWS; and that developing adequate understanding of the transformations that the use of AWS poses to the nature of war itself is a necessary, preliminary requirement to any ethical analysis of the use of these weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ukraine's war of self-defense against Russia is one of the clearest examples of a nation fighting a just war in recent history. Ukraine is clearly entitled to defend itself, and Russia is clearly obligated to cease hostilities, withdraw troops, and make repair. In light of this, some of the most salient moral questions related to Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine involve the international community; namely, what moral duties it has toward Ukraine, especially in light of Russia's extreme and pervasive human rights abuses. The first section of the essay argues that there is a pro tanto moral duty to intervene militarily in Ukraine to stop Russian human rights abuses and ensure that Ukraine achieves a military victory. This duty is grounded in duties of rescue, promissory obligations, and reliance obligations, as well as duties to nations' own citizens and to the international community. The second section of the essay argues that the most relevant consideration in determining whether there is an all-things-considered duty for the international community to intervene militarily in Ukraine is Russia's nuclear coercion and the associated risk of nuclear war. This section highlights the nuclear risks involved in compliance with Russian nuclear coercion, which I argue have been neglected in prominent discussions. The moral stakes involved in this determination are very high, and succumbing to Russian nuclear coercion in the face of massive human rights violations would set a dangerous precedent. Any course of action should be guided by a thorough analysis of all the risks involved, both nuclear and moral. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has challenged the ideals of peace that I and many other left-wing critical intellectuals hold dear. By the end of the 18th century, Immanuel Kant argued that the realist law of peoples and the idea of just war should be superseded by the idea of perpetual peace, and, fortunately, the principled opposition to war was institutionalized in the United Nations in the 20th century. However, when the aggressor has already taken possession of huge swathes of territory, calls for peace may be suspected of ideological bias. The right to defend yourself is almost universally recognized, but a military counter-offensive to reconquer lost territory is not merely defense but itself aggression, and thus an act of war. Many of us, however, want to support such efforts in Ukraine, and what is worrying is that this places us on a slippery slope, reopening the possibility of justifying war. As I will argue, this is nevertheless the path we must take, thus accepting the possible justification of war and the possible justification of specific activities and armaments but not others. We should take more seriously the justice of war, with all the specific normative challenges that this implies.

The article advocates for a multidisciplinary approach to the challenges surrounding nuclear weapons and the implementation of the proportion and distinction IHL principles. It also examines the relationship between nuclear deterrence policies and IHL norms. To this end, it traces the historical development of IHL from the Roman law codification of jus ad bellum and jus in bello to the contemporary IHL institutions of the law of Hague and the law of Geneva. It also highlights the role of the Martens Clause as a safety net for humanitarian protection and reviews the existing legal instruments on nuclear weapons, such as the NPT, the TPNW and the ICJ advisory opinion. The study's outcome underlines the need for more comprehensive and binding legal mechanisms to regulate nuclear weapons in a way that is in accordance with IHL and human rights.

Throughout the world’s long tradition with war, it has often been raised as a question whether any war was worth waging, and if so, when and how? The reply to this philosophical maze of extreme convictions differs depending on whom you ask. In this present article, we tackled the ideological differences that lead to the discrepancies between answers given by Russia and the United States of America. For this, we took as primary sources the speeches of 24 February 2022 that Vladimir Putin and Joe Biden made on Russia’s immediate involvement in Ukraine. We tried to look for dialogic clash over the choice of diction as a major ideological stance, relying on Michael Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism and his notions of hidden polemics and parody to illustrate the condemnation of the war on one end and its justification on the other. The aim was to extrapolate the themes tackled and their sequence by referring to the just war theory in its three divisions jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum which together structure the ancient practice of the art of war in its distinct phases. Biden and Putin heavily bid on these notions to give their viewpoints legal and ethical legitimacy and convince the international community of their just causes. Through this study, we found that the presidents stylized their speeches to follow each other’s, giving responses in an implicit and tacit manner, which we uncovered as hidden polemics in their styles of diction. We have also discovered that both presidents evoked their nemesis’ violation of the just war theory and defended their own just cause and respect for international regulation. This study falls within the field of discourse analysis that is a key element in understanding politics on the levels of presidential speeches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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1. IntroductionIn recent years, one of the old, yet controversial doctrines of the law of neutrality -called "unwilling" and "unable"[1] doctrine- has been reformulated in the jus ad bellum discourse, according to which some states may use force in self-defense against non-state terrorist actors operating within the territory of host states based on the unwillingness or inability of the territorial state to control them. The unwilling or unable doctrine has one of the lowest standards with which it determines when non-state terrorist organizations can legally be attacked in third states based on the right of self-defense,[2] even though the legality of such use of force against non-state actors in weak host states, without the consent of the host state, is unclear. In the context of legal positivism, this article seeks to prove whether the current sources of international law allow states to recourse to the unwilling or unable doctrine in the host state. Since these concepts have not been mentioned in any legal document (besides Article 17 of the Rome Statute and the 1951 Refugee Convention) or even international case law, it is not clear whether it is possible to accept such use of force in international law despite its prohibition in the UN Charter, denying its legitimacy by most publicists, very little occurrence of it in the practice of states and subjectivity of the concept of unwillingness or inability. The International Court of Justice and some scholars also deny the legality of the use of force in an ineffective host.This article seeks to critically examine and demonstrate the evolution of the use of force in the name of self-defense against non-state actors in the territory of host states, which is justified by the unwilling and unable doctrine. The purpose of this research is not only to identify the unwilling and unable doctrine but also to offer a practical solution to the challenges regarding extra-territorial self-defense against non-state terrorist organizations.Research Question(s)This article, by examining de lege lata, seeks to verify whether treaties, customary laws, and international judicial practice allow states to legally resort to the unwilling and unable doctrine in another state (the host state). In other words, has the unwilling and unable doctrine become a part of international law (as it exists)? Moreover, does the doctrine provide a legitimate way to use transnational self-defense against non-state actors, particularly in a situation where the host state is willing to repress the non-state actors but is unable to do so? Based on which criteria is it determined that the host state is unwilling or unable to fight the threat posed by the non-state actors? Finally, is it possible for the acting state to make this decision unilaterally or does the host state also play a role in this regard? MethodologyThe article has used descriptive and analytical research methods. The necessary data has been collected through the library research method by reference to relevant books, essays, and international judicial decisions. FindingsThis article shows that although the right to self-defense in ineffective host states may be desirable in light of the contemporary security and safety threats, the existing data about the doctrine is incomplete and has many gaps. The "unwilling" and "unable" doctrine presents a significant challenge to the “rule of law” in international law. This doctrine based on self-judgment theories in international law and providing exceptions to the jus ad bellum regime, not only leads to the instability of this regime, but also its legal justifications are a serious attack on the fundamental legal concepts that are generally accepted in international law. This article, with a legal positivist look, believes that any resort to the "unwilling and unable” doctrine is subject to the following criteria: an armed attack according to Article 51 of the Charter, lack of control of the host state over its territory, proof of inability and unwillingness of the host state by the victim state, act of the victim state with the consent and cooperation of the host state, giving the host state a reasonable time to effectively deal with the non-state actor, and the inability of the host state based on duty of due diligence, lack of cooperation by the host state and refusal to accept international assistance. ConclusionAccording to the above, the inevitable conclusion is that it’s very difficult to balance the unwilling or unable doctrine with the jus ad bellum regime. This doctrine lacks both a legal underpinning and a clear, distinct content. The criteria for the unwillingness and inability, the legality of self-defense, and the permissibility of resorting to force in an ineffective host state do not have a valid basis in either treaty law or customary international law; It is not mentioned in Article 51 of the UN Charter, nor have the states accepted it sufficiently. The International Court of Justice and the most highly-qualified publicists have also refused to recognize such use of force. Due to the change in the nature and power of terrorist organizations, the rules in this field remain unclear and this field is replete with legal uncertainty. It is not surprising that the UN charter is not able to provide clear answers for these situations.Despite the relative success of the jus ad bellum regime in preventing armed conflicts between states, the mentioned doctrine undermines the legal framework regulating prohibition on the use of force and poses a threat to the UN Collective Security System. The doctrine distorts the concept of imminence and damages the definition of armed attack[3] 3 enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter by lowering the threshold for the justifiable use of force in self-defense. It also destabilizes the fundamental principle of necessity in self-defense. Finally, by providing weak governing standards for the victim state may make unilateral decisions as to the necessity of the use of force, in spite of the disapproval or unwillingness of the host state, the doctrine extremely over-privileges the interests of the powerful states at the expense of the rights and interests of typically weaker host states. Consequently, it should be acknowledged that the doctrine created to address the limited and specific threat of transnational terrorism cannot be a justification for weakening the regime designed to maintain international peace and security.If we apply this doctrine, any state will be allowed to start military operations simply on the pretext of the host state’s inability to suppress a terrorist group. Accepting to such a view by the international community and allowing to create this new legal order will lead to a fundamental change in the UN system if it is not completely damaged. By granting discretion to any state to adopt unilateral actions in the war on terror, through the unwilling and unable test, it simply ignores some fundamental provisions of the Charter (Article 39) and challenges the entire Collective Security System of the Charter. Creating unwritten exceptions to the principle that prohibits the use of force not only causes problems for the integrity of international law but also leads to disorganization in international law.Finally, within the framework of the lex lata, the only point that can be said regarding self-defense against attacks by non-state actors in situations, lower than the threshold that the ICJ has stated in the Nicaragua case, is that such actions are undoubtedly illegal. In the framework of the Lex ferenda, we believe that the customary law is evolving regarding the applications of Article 51 of the UN Charter, defensive action in the territory of target states, and the use of force against non-state actors in host states. Even in the light of Lex ferenda, it cannot be said that the unwilling and unable doctrine is currently an established rule of international law.[1]. Ashley Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense”, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 52, (2012), at 483,505.[2]. Sjöstedt Britta, “Applying the Unable/Unwilling State Doctrine – Can a State Be Unable to Take Action?”, Heidelberg Journal of International Law, Vol. 77, (2017), at 39.[3]. Craig Martin, “Challenging and Refining the Unwilling or Unable Doctrine”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 52, (2019), at 460.

Referring to the classical tenets of the “just war” theory, the author also analyses its modern versions. While the research the author arrives at the conclusion that some political scientists have modernized the theory of “a just war” according to the modern times. For instance, due to the existence of new actors on the international arena, there were created a new version, which allows to include non-state actors for the analysis (which consequently led to abolition of such principles as legitimacy of authorities, “last resort” criteria and also led to the implementation of the preventive actions) as well as the principles just post bellum. It is interesting to note that some political scientists associate the theory of “a just war” with the issue of global leadership of the USA. Throughout the history the participants and the aims of the wars have undergone serious changes, so that nowadays they do not sound “just” (for example, theory of punitive war). Analyzing in detail the postulates of the theory of “just war”, the author turns to historical events - the “Arab Spring”, the confrontation between the USA and the USSR, modern information wars. The author arrives at the conclusion that the use of the theory of “just war” for the analysis of modern events remains relevant, however, requires the introduction of new postulates in the norms of the theory, in particular, the addition of the principles of jus ad bellum and jus post bellum.

Muhariplerin eşitliği ilkesi, uluslararası insancıl hukukun temel ilkelerinden biridir. İnsancıl hukuk kurallarının bir silahlı çatışmanın tüm taraflarına, onların silahlı çatışmaya müdahil olma nedenlerine bakılmaksızın eşit olarak uygulanması manasına gelmektedir. Kökeni yüzyıllar öncesine dayandırılan bu ilkenin hem içeriği hem de geçerliliği zaman zaman tartışma konusu olmaktadır. Bu tartışmalardan biri de 1945 Birleşmiş Milletler Şartı ile devletlerin bir silahlı çatışmaya müdahil olmaları meşru müdafaa durumları haricinde yasaklandığında ortaya çıkmıştır. Uluslararası toplumun, jus cogens niteliği atfedilen bu yasağı ihlal eden taraf ile ona karşı kendini savunmak zorunda kalan tarafa artık eşit yaklaşmadığı sonuç olarak da ilkenin eskidiği ya da terk edildiği öne sürülmüştür. Bu çalışmada bu iddia uluslararası toplumun büyük çoğunluğunun taraflardan birini desteklediği 2022 Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı üzerinden ele alınmaktadır.

The article analyzes the issues of the legitimacy of war, the relationship between war and morality in the context of different ethical concepts. It is shown that the somewhat ‘fashionable’ notion of the ethics of war is actually problematic and does not clearly express the peculiarities of the relationship between war and morality. Analyzing the main conceptual discourses about war, it is argued that in some of them the acceptance of the legitimacy of war does not make sense with the logic of the watershed between war and morality. Analyzing the 44-day War separately for the first time in the context of the principles of the conception of just wars, it is argued that Azerbaijan’s military aggression against Artsakh was actually accompanied by a gross violation of many of these principles, despite the propaganda efforts of the Azerbaijani side to claim the opposite.

This paper disputes Uwe Steinhoff's view that a jus ad bellum requirement of necessity can be merged with a condition of proportionality. It argues that the proposed merger detracts from a conceptual and moral understanding of the structure and rationale of both the necessity and the proportionality considerations applicable in a range of moral contexts, including those of war and so-called lesser evils cases, where these conditions are intended as action-guiding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this contribution, I defend the standard list of jus ad bellum principles. In The Ethics of War and the Force of Law: A Modern Just War Theory, Uwe Steinhoff endorses only three principles of jus ad bellum (right intention, just cause, and proportionality) and claims that the others are redundant. I argue that, although fundamentally all jus ad bellum principles can be reduced to proportionality, in practice it is vital to retain the main jus ad bellum criteria as separate principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Selective conscientious objection, a refusal to participate in a specific war due to reasons of conscience, has recently gained attention. A combatant confronted with such a decision needs guidance to help decide whether and how to object. Furthermore, those judging a combatant's objection or failure to object need guidance. After introducing the prima facie duty override criteria, I will apply the criteria to the case of selective conscientious objection. Ultimately, I argue that the jus ad bellum criteria rebranded as the prima facie duty override criteria can help provide guidance regarding selective conscientious objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the principles of just war theory are ambiguous, with too many exceptions justifying a cycle of violence that puts children at risk. This is undertaken through a cultural legal analysis of Neon Genesis Evangelion, particularly its presentation of child soldiers. The children within the narrative were conscripted into an armed galactic conflict where human survival relied on an adolescent hero. Neon Genesis Evangelion reveals the ambiguities of just war theory’s first limb, jus ad bellum, by highlighting excessive exceptions. The circular violence in the narrative depicts a model of violence that impacts children. This analysis contributes to the discourse on just war theory in the contemporary atmosphere of fractured global relationships.

The international law on the use of force has emerged as a distinct yet central pillar of international law. Although it may be intuitively understood to be connected to the promotion of human rights, it cannot be said to have emerged exclusively or even primarily as a result of human rights concerns. The rise of international human rights law has tended, coming late to that debate as it were, to neglect questions of war, deferring to specialised regimes on a largely functionalist basis. This article asks instead how one might reimagine the international law of the use of force if one takes the axiological primacy of human rights in international law seriously. This will involve a critique of the emphasis on the mere humanitarian regulation of war and a human-rights rereading of both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello traditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the increasingly recurrent use of technology in the pursuit of military actions. The first part focuses on the methodology of targeted killings from a dual point of view. Firstly, with the analysis of the deaths of Qassem Soleimani and Ayman al-Zawahiri, where we highlight the challenges posed by drone strikes in third States in the framework of jus ad bellum. Secondly, regarding the technology itself. We describe the assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, carried out by an AI-powered weapon, leading us to reflect on the future of warfare and fully autonomous weapons systems. Finally, the second and last part examines the use of technology in cyberspace, emphasizing the obstacles it presents under the principle of distinction, inherent in the jus in bello regime. Overall, this analysis will depend on doctrinal methods, which allow ways of thinking about the international legal system. This specifically approach will be based on descriptive research questions that seek to describe the state of the art of the current legal framework in relation to specific situations. Hence, we conclude that the current legal framework needs to find a way to adapt when faced with a new warfare paradigm, without losing its essence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the issues of the legitimacy of war, the relationship between war and morality in the context of different ethical concepts. It is shown that the somewhat 'fashionable' notion of the ethics of war is actually problematic and does not clearly express the peculiarities of the relationship between war and morality. Analyzing the main conceptual discourses about war, it is argued that in some of them the acceptance of the legitimacy of war does not make sense with the logic of the watershed between war and morality. Analyzing the 44-day War separately for the first time in the context of the principles of the conception of just wars, it is argued that Azerbaijan's military aggression against Artsakh was actually accompanied by a gross violation of many of these principles, despite the propaganda efforts of the Azerbaijani side to claim the opposite. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can the global poor wage a just redistributive war against the global rich? The moral norms governing the use of force are usually considered to be very strict. Nonetheless, some philosophers have recently argued that violating duties of global justice can be a just cause for war. This paper discusses redistributive wars. It shows that the strength of these arguments is contingent on the underlying account of global distributive justice. The paper focuses on the "doing harm argument," under the assumption that the alternative "allowing harm argument" is a more difficult route to justify redistributive wars. After highlighting several preliminary problems, the paper breaks down and assesses in depth the "doing harm argument": the empirical premise, the rights violation that constitutes the wrong, liability and degrees of responsibility, and the conditions for justified self-defense. By drawing on principles reflected in criminal law, this paper argues that a general "doing harm argument" for redistributive wars is unconvincing, while a reinterpretation of that argument could theoretically give rise to a just cause for war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Alternative Politics / Alternatif Politika is the property of Alternatif Politika and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since the end of the world wars, the demise of the Cold War and the end of liberation wars in Africa, the changing character of warfare has given birth to uncertainties about how states will respond to acts of aggression in the face of ethics of war, or the moral rules of war. It has become difficult for states to conduct permissible self-defence and other-defence against non-state actors or sub-state groups, which do not have a sovereign (political and territorial integrity) to protect. In the face of this reality, it is not known how much knowledge military personnel world over have on ethics of war, what their attitude towards ethics of war is, and how they practice these ethics of war during war and operations other than war. Research was therefore conducted to assess knowledge of, attitudes toward and practices of the ethics of war of officers and soldiers of the Zambia Army. A mixed method research was undertaken using explanatory sequential approach. A sample of 420 participants was drawn from officers and soldiers serving in the Zambia Army. Questionnaires were used to collect quantitative data, while focus group discussions and interviews were undertaken to collect qualitative data. The findings from the focus group discussions and interviews provided depth and understanding about how the officers and soldiers felt about ethics of war. The findings of focus group discussions and interviews also helped to explain the findings from the quantitative data. Quantitative data were analysed at two levels. The first level of analysis comprised descriptive statistics in the form of frequency distribution tables, means and percentages. The second level involved inferential statistics by applying the chi-square test in order to determine the relationship, if any, between the independent variables and the dependent variables using the Statistical Packaging for Social Sciences. Further, the research used Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient to measure the strength and direction of association between two ranked variables. Analysis of qualitative data begun during the data collection exercise by arranging the field notes according to salient themes in relation to the objectives. This was followed by pinpointing, examining and recording patterns within the data collected The conclusion of the study showed that, at the time, the majority of the Zambia Army officers and soldiers were reasonably acquainted with the knowledge of ethics of war. The study further concluded that Zambia Army officers and soldiers held very strong and positive attitudes towards the ethics of war at the time. In addition, the officers and soldiers also widely accepted and supported the ethics of war, as they considered them beneficial. It was evident from the research that the Zambia Army soldiers and officers practiced the ethics of war extensively and regularly during both local and international operations. However, more needs to be done to increase knowledge levels.

This article analyzes the philosophy of international law of the Second, or Modern Scholasticism. The author of the article concentrates on the just war theory mainly developed by Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez. The objectives of the article are to clarify and classify the main principles of the above-mentioned theory as well as to grasp its relevance nowadays. In order to achieve these objectives doxographical, analytical as well as hermeneutical methods are applied. Based on them, the principles and rules of just war are divided into two fundamental types. The article comes to conclusion that these types correspond to the parts of contemporary just war theory entitled as jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Another significant conclusion is that the vast majority of the principles of just war presented in Modern Scholasticism (e.g. just cause of the war, adversary’s warning of intended offensive actions, the inviolability of ambassadors and peaceful population, prohibition on killing prisoners of war and hostages, the compliance of reparations with the damage caused before and during the war, the illegality of religious and confessional wars) are also relevant nowadays.

This paper argues that the principles of just war theory are ambiguous, with too many exceptions justifying a cycle of violence that puts children at risk. This is undertaken through a cultural legal analysis of Neon Genesis Evangelion, particularly its presentation of child soldiers. The children within the narrative were conscripted into an armed galactic conflict where human survival relied on an adolescent hero. Neon Genesis Evangelion reveals the ambiguities of just war theory's first limb, jus ad bellum, by highlighting excessive exceptions. The circular violence in the narrative depicts a model of violence that impacts children. This analysis contributes to the discourse on just war theory in the contemporary atmosphere of fractured global relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article advocates for a multidisciplinary approach to the challenges surrounding nuclear weapons and the implementation of the proportion and distinction IHL principles. It also examines the relationship between nuclear deterrence policies and IHL norms. To this end, it traces the historical development of IHL from the Roman law codification of jus ad bellum and jus in bello to the contemporary IHL institutions of the law of Hague and the law of Geneva. It also highlights the role of the Martens Clause as a safety net for humanitarian protection and reviews the existing legal instruments on nuclear weapons, such as the NPT, the TPNW and the ICJ advisory opinion. The study's outcome underlines the need for more comprehensive and binding legal mechanisms to regulate nuclear weapons in a way that is in accordance with IHL and human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the beginning of the seventh century, Islamic law has played an essential role in protecting the personal, economic, judicial, and political rights of civilians during armed conflict. Fourteen centuries before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was drafted in 1948, it had already initiated a human revolution consisting of a set of human principles. In addition, Islamic law has made a significant contribution to international humanitarian law (IHL). This paper focuses on two specific legal constructs in warfare: the definition of the combatant and the principle of distinction. This article comparatively examines how these two laws deal with different aspects of war that fall under jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. A comparative analysis of the various elements and aspects of just war theory in Islamic and contemporary international law provides a much deeper understanding of its limitations. We can safely conclude that there is a unique relationship between the Islamic law of war and IHL. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the role of neutrality in the Russo-Ukrainian war by analyzing the legal justifications offered by States with reference to the provision of weapons and economic assistance to the belligerents. The findings reveal that the law of neutrality has played a limited role as neutrality-based legal arguments were rarely utilized, even when they were available, either by countries supporting Ukraine or by those maintaining some impartiality towards the belligerents. The decision of a significant group of states to provide military and economic assistance to Ukraine was based on jus ad bellum arguments and rarely took into consideration the law of neutrality. Perhaps surprisingly, even the parties to the conflict seldom employed legal arguments related to neutrality. Permanent neutrals or countries traditionally adopting a policy of neutrality, on their turn, tend to limit the obligations of neutrality to their military dimension while remaining open to providing economic and humanitarian support. This diminishing relevance of neutrality law, amidst the ongoing crisis of the United Nations' collective security system, may lead to a legal order where third-party involvement in conflicts becomes more common. The authors maintain that the obsolescence of the law of neutrality is not yet complete, as occasional references to its rules still emerge, and many States have chosen not to take sides in the present conflict. Neutrality, however, as reflected in State declarations, appears to be interpreted more as a political choice rather than a legal obligation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the philosophy of international law of the Second, or Modern Scholasticism. The author of the article concentrates on the just war theory mainly developed by Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez. The objectives of the article are to clarify and classify the main principles of the above-mentioned theory as well as to grasp its relevance nowadays. In order to achieve these objectives doxographical, analytical as well as hermeneutical methods are applied. Based on them, the principles and rules of just war are divided into two fundamental types. The article comes to conclusion that these types correspond to the parts of contemporary just war theory entitled as jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Another significant conclusion is that the vast majority of the principles of just war presented in Modern Scholasticism (e.g. just cause of the war, adversary’s warning of intended offensive actions, the inviolability of ambassadors and peaceful population, prohibition on killing prisoners of war and hostages, the compliance of reparations with the damage caused before and during the war, the illegality of religious and confessional wars) are also relevant nowadays. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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At dawn on 3 January 2020 local time, the United States targeted and killed Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, which it claimed was an exercise of its right to self-defense. In this analysis, we will examine this operation through the system of jus contra bellum. The airstrike was conducted against a military official of a state, which differs from 'traditional' targeted killings, that mostly target members of non-state actors. We will pay particular attention to the antecedents of the attack, as well as the legal reasoning of the United States and the reactions of the international community. The case study will use a critical approach to analyze the claims made in support of the exercise of the US right of self-defense, in particular their lex lata justification. The study concludes that the targeted killing of General Soleimani was unquestionably illegal under the jus ad bellum regime of international law, as the United States was not the victim of an armed attack prior to the operation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This review essay aims to consider the law of neutrality, and whether it may be better situated within the jus ad bellum , the body of law governing the use of force, or the jus in bello , the body of law governing hostilities following the initial use of force. In doing so, the essay centres on the recent monograph by Constantine Antonopoulos on the subject of the law of neutrality, wherein the author assures us that despite the legal innovations of the last century, the law of neutrality has remained squarely within the modern jus in bello. The present writer takes a somewhat different approach, although appreciates the doctrinal allure of keeping the law of neutrality separate from jus ad bellum considerations, particularly in the context of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the legality of Western states providing weapons to Ukraine. It focuses on five areas of international law: (1) the jus ad bellum ; (2) the law of neutrality; (3) international humanitarian law; (4) state responsibility for complicity in internationally wrongful acts; and (5) international criminal law. It concludes that weapons transfers likely violate the law of neutrality, entitling Russia to respond with countermeasures; that Russia can lawfully target transferred weapons under IHL; and that weapons transfers could lead to state and individual responsibility if evidence comes to light that the Ukrainian military is using weapons previously supplied by the West to commit war crimes. By contrast, providing weapons to Ukraine does not violate the jus ad bellum because they are in service of Ukraine's right of self-defence against Russia and does not make the supplying states co-belligerents in Russia's international armed conflict with Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]