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In his seminal book, Philosophy of Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction, José Luis Bermúdez argues that David Marr's influential distinction between computational, algorithmic, and implementational levels of explanation cannot be used as a general framework for thinking about the levels of explanation in psychology and cognitive science. Bermúdez argues that Marr's tripartite distinction cannot be used for this task because it paradigmatically applies to subpersonal and lower-level modular cognitive processes, while the mind as a whole is characterized by non-modular higher-level cognitive systems. In this paper, I evaluate how plausible Bermúdez' s view is that the mind as a whole cannot be usefully understood from the Marrian perspective. Part of the evaluation will be based on the recent advancements in the active inference framework, suggesting that even non-modular personal processes can be computationally analyzed and algorithmically implemented. In this regard, I will argue that, under the active inference conception of the mind, Marr's distinction might indeed serve as a framework for understanding the different levels of explanation at which the mind and its processes can be analyzed.

In this presentation, I discuss various theoretical perspectives on self-deception, including the classical, deflationist, and more recent motivationalist accounts. The central claim put forward is that it is potentially impossible to classify the phenomenon of self-deception in a manner that remains completely impartial to theoretical frameworks.

Knjiga se bavi suvremenom raspravom o odnosu uma i tijela. Ova rasprava poprima svoj moderan oblik tijekom 17. stoljeća u radovima Renéa Descartesa. Stoga se u knjizi pregled ovih tema započinje razmatranjem znanstvene slike svijeta koja poprima novi oblik u Descartesovo vrijeme i načina na koji Descartes počinje razmišljati o prirodi uma i njegovom mjestu u svijetu. U knjizi se pokrivaju najvažnija stajališta u suvremenoj filozofiji uma i njihove argumente, odnosno protuargumente. Važna teza knjige je da su suvremene debate i dalje pod velikim utjecajem Descartesove argumentacije, naročito kada razmišljamo o prirodi svjesnih mentalnih stanja.

In the talk, we discuss what is the best way to approach the question of how to construe the concept of mental disorder within the psychiatric diagnostic manuals such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders (DSM). We argue that the perspective of conceptual engineering should be adopted. More specifically, we maintain that the explicationist methodology can be used to solve this issue. Based on this methodology we argue for a kind of harmful dysfunction conception of mental disorder.

In recent decades the reasons first approach to normativity has been very influential in metaethical discussions. This approach promised to provide a unified account of various normative phenomena with an ultimate goal of reducing normative facts to facts about reasons for belief or action. The reasons first approach construes reasons as facts that count in favor of something. However, it often leaves open what these facts are supposed to be, how they get their normative status, and how we determine what counts in favor of what. Indeed, some prominent authors adopt a primitivist view ac-cording to which reasons as considerations that count in favor are primitive facts that cannot be explained in other terms. However, from a naturalistic perspective, the reasons first approach raises several puzzles. First, such an approach relies on intuitions about reasons, without giving principled grounds for determining them. This leaves open the question where these intuitions come from and how they can be justified? Second, are these reasons facts only normatively fundamental and primitive or they can be reduced to other non- normative facts? If so, which non-normative facts they would relate to? Third, this approach does not answer the question whether and in what sense non-human animals could possesses normative reasons. I argue that turning to a capacity first approach to reasons and rationality, may provide advancement on these fronts. According to the capacity first approach, facts about reasons should be explained in terms of our capacities for epistemic and practical rationality. This approach presupposes that facts about normative reasons can be explained in terms of the capacity of reason whose proper function is determined by the principles of rationality. I argue that this approach is attractive from a naturalistic perspective for the following reasons. First, it can connect the narratives about normative reasons with naturalistic accounts of our reasoning and rational capacities. Second, it can provide a naturalistically plausible explanation of what determines proper functions of the capacity of reason and how consequently reasons emerge. Third, it can answer the question whether animals and cognitively less sophisticated creatures have reasons for action and in what sense this might be the case.

In this paper, we explore a proposal for a biocognition-informed recategorization of antisocial personality disorders aimed at differentiating accountable from not accountable offenders. We argue that we should not use syndrome-based categories for this task. These categories, as those used in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), are based on observed behaviour and inferences about unobservable characteristics and personality traits without aetiological considerations. Such categories have delivered small or no advances in treatment, they have low validity, they cover heterogeneous groups of people, include comorbidity, with low prospects of integration with neuroscience, genetics, and neuropsychological paradigms. In the paper we explore the prospects of a Research domain criteria (RDoC) type of approach for the legal case and discuss some of the conceptual problems it must address.

In the talk I provide an overview of the role of philosophy in cognitive sciences and how the development of cognitive sciences has influenced philosophical accounts of the mind.

The notion of harm has been a recurring and a significant notion in the characterization of mental disorder. It is present in eminent diagnostic manuals such as DSM and ICD, as well as in the discussion on mental disorders in philosophy of psychiatry. Recent demotion of harm in the definition of mental disorders in DSM-5 shows a general trend towards reducing the significance of harm when thinking about the nature of mental disorders. In this paper, we defend the relevance of the notion of harm in the characterization of mental disorder against some of these attacks. We approach this issue by using the method of conceptual explication pioneered by Rudolf Carnap. Within this framework, we argue that keeping the notion of harm not only helps to discriminate what is pathological from the nonpathological but also prevents potential misuses of psychiatric authority.

The notion of harm has been a recurring and a significant notion in the characterization of mental disorder. It is present in eminent diagnostic manuals such as DSM and ICD, as well as in the discussion on mental disorders in philosophy of psychiatry. Recent demotion of harm in the definition of mental disorders in DSM-5 shows a general trend towards reducing the significance of harm when thinking about the nature of mental disorders. In this paper, we defend the relevance of the notion of harm in the characterization of mental disorder against some of these attacks. We approach this paper through the perspective of someone devising a diagnostic manual and ask ourselves what the definition in the manuals should look like. To answer this we use the method of conceptual explication pioneered by Rudolf Carnap. This methodology is akin to the conceptual engineering approaches as it aims to shape the concept according to the relevant theoretical and practical considerations. Through the lens of the explicationist methodology, we defend a two-stage picture of mental disorder that contains an objective, science-based component in terms of biological dysfunction and an evaluative component in terms of harm. Moreover, we focus on the harm component and defend it against some recent attacks by arguing that it not only helps to discriminate what is pathological from the nonpathological but also prevents potential misuses of psychiatric authority.

The prediction error minimization framework (PEM) denotes a family of views that aim at providing a unified theory of perception, cognition, and action. In this paper, I discuss some of the theoretical limitations of PEM. Despite its ability to illuminate some aspects of the formation of self-deceptive beliefs, it appears that PEM cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of self-deception because its cognitive ontology does not have a separate category for motivational states such as desires. However, it might be thought that this objection confuses levels of explanation. Self-deception is a personal level phenomenon, while PEM offers subpersonal explanations of psychological abilities. Thus, the paper examines how subpersonal explanations couched in the PEM framework can be thought of as related to personal level explanations underlining self- deception. In this regard, three views on the relation between personal and subpersonal explanations are investigated: the autonomist, functionalist, and co-evolutionary perspective. I argue that no matter which of the three views is used to think about the relation between PEM and personal level explanations, the PEM paradigm faces serious explanatory limitations when it comes to explaining self-deception.

Prediction error minimization framework (PEM) denotes a family of theories and models that aim to provide a unified account of perception, cognition, and action. According to some of its supporters, PEM’ ambitions are very broad, aiming to account for “perception and action and everything mental in between”. In this talk I will discuss some of the theoretical limitations of the PEM paradigm. As a case study I will use self- deception. It appears that PEM cannot adequately account for self-deception because it reduces its cognitive ontology to constructs such as precisions, predictions, and prediction errors without a separate category for motivational states such as desires. In the talk I will discuss a potential response to this objection that is based on a distinction between personal and subpersonal levels of explanation. Self-deception is a personal level phenomenon, while PEM offers subpersonal explanations of cognitive function. So, to claim that PEM is unable to explain self- deception might be based on a confusion between the levels of explanation. It will be discussed how the plausibility of this response depends on the construal of the relation between personal and subpersonal levels of explanation. There are at least three views on the relation between personal and subpersonal explanations: the autonomist, the functionalist, and the co- evolutionary perspective. Taking into account these perspectives, I discuss a potential dilemma for PEM with respect to its (in)ability to explain self-deception. On the one hand, adopting the autonomist perspective might insulate PEM from the objection, but at the cost of extremely limiting its ability to shed light on personal level phenomena. Adopting the functionalist or co- evolutionary perspective, on the other hand, leaves PEM open to the objection that it cannot appropriately explain self-deception and similar forms of motivated reasoning.

Advancements in the neurocognitive science of individuals with antisocial personality disorder might be of great significance for the application of insanity and similar defences in Law (Malatesti & McMillan 2010). However, so far, the investigation of whether psychopathic offenders or other individuals with antisocial personality disorders should be exculpated has reached stumbling blocks (Jalava & Griffiths, 2017 ; Jurjako & Malatesti, 2018). In this lecture, to overcome these difficulties, we motivate and frame a proposal for a biocognition- informed recategorization of antisocial personality disorders aimed at differentiating accountable from not accountable offenders.

The harm usually associated with psychopathy requires therapeutically, legally, and ethically satisfactory solutions. Scholars from different fields have, thus, examined whether empirical evidence shows that individuals with psychopathic traits satisfy concepts, such as responsibility, mental disorder, or disability, that have specific legal or ethical implications. The present paper considers the less discussed issue of whether psychopathy is a disability. As it has been shown for the cases of the responsibility and mental disorder status of psychopathic individuals, we argue that it is undecided whether psychopathy is a disability. Nonetheless, based on insights from disability studies and legislations, we propose that interventions to directly modify the propensities of individuals with psychopathic tendencies should be balanced with modifications of the social and physical environments to accommodate their peculiarities. We also suggest how this social approach in some practical contexts that involve non-offender populations might be effective in addressing some of the negative effects of psychopathy.

The paper discusses whether the prediction error minimization paradigm (PEM) can adequately account for self-deception. The problem seems to be that PEM, because it reduces its cognitive ontology to constructs such as precisions, predictions, and prediction errors without a separate category for motivational states, cannot account for motivationally biased reasoning. The paper discusses a potential response to this problem that is based on the distinction between personal and subpersonal levels of explanation.

We conceptually develop a biocognitively based categorisation of antisocial individuals with the aim of making more precise assessments of their legal responsibility.

U ovom radu bavim se određivanjem uvjeta koji su potrebni za ispravno karakteriziranje pojave samoobmane. Deflacionisti smatraju da se pojava samoob- mane može karakterizirati kao vrsta motivacijski pristranog formiranja vjerovanja. Njima se upućuje prigovor selektivnosti kojim se tvrdi da prisutnost želje da nešto bude slučaj i relevantnih afektivnih stanja nije dovoljno da proizvede samoobmanjujuće vjerovanje. Nasuprot tome, intencionalisti argumentiraju da se rješenje sastoji u uvođenju pojma namjere. Prema njima, samoobmana uključuje namjerno iskrivljavanje vlastitog procesa formiranja vjerovanja. U radu branim tvrdnju da se intencionalisti također suočavaju s problemom selektivnosti. Stoga je upitno može li se taj prigovor koristiti kako bi se odredilo koja je teorija samoobmane superiornija. Nadalje, argumentiram da je ograničavanje psihološkog objašnjenja na motive djelatnika odgovorno za otpornost problema selektivnosti. U tom kontekstu kao dodatni eksplanatorni faktor ističem crte ličnosti koje uz motive igraju važnu ulogu u psihološkom objašnjenju ljudskog ponašanja. U ostatku rada istražujem na koji način ovakvo proširenje eksplanatornih faktora može bolje zahvatiti pojedine slučajeve samoobmane.

The study of the social impact of psychopathy should be and has been paired with investigations of the relevant ethical and legal dimensions. So far, empirical studies have mostly considered such responses within the scope of the criminal justice system (Kiehl and Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013). Consequently, the focus of earlier ethical and legal research was on how emotional and cognitive impairments that are correlated with psychopathy may affect the legal and moral accountability of the psychopathic offender (Kiehl and Sinnott- Armstrong, 2013 ; Malatesti & ; McMillan, 2010). A review of the literature indicates that the various emotional and cognitive peculiarities of psychopaths do not undermine their criminal responsibility (Jurjako and Malatesti, 2018). Relevant for this context is the multifaceted nature of psychopathy and its intricate relationship with antisocial behaviour that introduces an additional layer of complexity in the interpretation of empirical findings (Brazil et al., 2018). Recently, however, researchers have begun investigating the impact of community- dwelling individuals with elevated psychopathic tendencies in other settings besides that of criminal justice, such as in the corporate world (Babiak et al., 2010 ; Babiak and Hare, 2006 ; Boddy, 2011). In this paper, we will take an empirically informed philosophical perspective to reflect on so far neglected legal/ethical issues that arise from the latter research. We will consider whether community dwelling psychopaths have disabilities that legally or ethically would recommend specific responses. Although the emotional and cognitive disturbances seen in psychopathy have no definite implications for their moral or legal accountability, these disturbances are likely to play central roles in explaining their interpersonally maladaptive behaviors (Blair et al., 2005 ; Koenigs and Newman, 2013). These behaviors, even if not necessarily criminal, affect how other people perceive psychopathic individuals and respond to them (Lilienfeld, 2013). Specifically, if the emotional and cognitive impairments related to psychopathy are regarded as disabilities they might even grant special protective rights, as in the case of other disabilities (United Nations, 2006). For instance in the workplace, individuals with psychopathic tendencies might have a right not to be discriminated against and, instead, to have appropriate surrounding conditions that would minimise the possibility to harm others. To establish whether core psychopathic traits constitute a disability that should ground certain rights in non-clinical contexts, we will consider two issues. The first one is normative, and requires clarifying when a cognitive or emotional impairment can be labeled a disability (Shoemaker, 2010 ; Wasserman et al., 2016). We will argue that an impairment is a disability that grants special protective rights if it is i) not remediable and ii) affects the autonomy of the person. Autonomy refers to the ability of a person to act in accordance with personal reasons and motives. The second issue is whether the available scientific evidence on emotional and cognitive impairments are sufficient for drawing the conclusion that psychopaths indeed suffer disabilities of this kind. We will argue that currently available neuropsychological evidence does not warrant thinking that psychopathic individuals suffer from irremediable autonomy affecting cognitive and emotional disabilities. Accordingly, psychopathic individuals should not be granted special rights like other individuals with disability.

In this lecture, we provide an overview of the insanity defense as encoded in the Western legal tradition and discuss its philosophical aspects. Especially those pertaining to the role of mental disorder in determining the criminal responsibility of an offender.

Conceptualisations of mental disorders assign different roles to biological genetic or neural factors in the categorisation of these conditions. Syndrome based accounts, that inform many diagnoses in classificatory systems such as the DSM (American Psychiatric Association 2013) or the ICD (World Health Organization 1993), categorise mental disorders in terms of symptomatic behaviours and mental states and personality traits. In these accounts, thus, the identity of a certain mental disorder does not depend on its neural or other biological aetiology or correlates. Proposals for biological and neurocognitive (for short biocognitive) based classification of mental disorders aim, instead, at grounding the categorization of mental disorders on genetic, neurological, or neurocomputational mechanisms. The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) is a notable example of this proposal (Insel et al. 2010 ; Insel and Cuthbert 2015 ; Lilienfeld 2014) However, there has been some opposition to biology-based classifications of psychiatric disorders. A significant instance of this resistance is in a recent BBS target paper (2018) by Denny Borsboom, Angélique Kramer and Annemarie Kalis, who argue that the RDoC type approaches are overly reductionist, empirically unsuccessful for advancing psychiatric practice, and theoretically unsound. In this paper, we want to highlight and criticise some of the misgivings that motivate such a resistance to biocognitive based classifications. We argue that most of these doubts derive from a misunderstanding of the commitments that guide the RDoC type approaches. The principal of these misunderstanding is that these approaches involve a reductionist programme. We argue, instead, that they might be considered as involving a plea for revisionary reductionism. We use antisocial personality disorder (from now on ASPD) and psychopathy as a case study to illustrate the notion of revisionary reductionism and support our reasoning. In our discussion ASPD and psychopathy play several roles. First, we use these categories to show that in assessing issue of psychiatric classification we should distinguish between what confers the mental illness status to a condition and the explanatory mechanisms that account for it. Second, they are good example of current psychiatric classification because they capture a genetically and neurobiologically heterogeneous group of people. Given such a heterogeneity, applying RDoC to this type of disorders cannot be straightforwardly reductionistic. Third, and relatedly, the case of ASPD and psychopathy show that nosology in psychiatry might benefit, in accordance with what we call revisionary reductionism, from reconceptualizing mental disorders along their biocognitive dimensions. Fourth, we illustrate how a revision of ASPD or psychopathy that are grounded on biocognitive data and hypotheses promises more effective treatment than the current classification. Finally, we conclude that given that RDoC type of approach can be fruitfully applied in the case of ASPD and psychopathy, then it might be fruitfully applied to other psychiatric categories as well. References (just to the target article) Borsboom, Denny, Angélique Cramer, and Annemarie Kalis. 2018. ‘Brain Disorders? Not Really… Why Network Structures Block Reductionism in Psychopathology Research’. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, January, 1–54. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17002266.

Recently, some have advocated anchoring the classification of antisocial individuals in genetic, biological, and cognitive mechanisms (e.g Blair 2015 ; Insel & Cuthbert 2015). These proposals have attracted ethical and conceptual criticisms from philosophical quarters (cf. Jurjako et al. 2018). From a philosophical stance, we will defend the biocognitive approach to classification from an objection advanced by Borsboom et al. (2018), who maintain that RDoC- type approaches are untenable because they imply biological reductionism, that they think is incompatible with their Network model. According to this latter approach, causal connections between behaviourally individuated symptoms, inferred mental states, and personality traits are fundamental for the classification of mental disorders. We respond that, at least in the case of antisocial and psychopathic populations, Borsboom ea. overlook that integrating biological and cognitive data in categorisation is important due to the large amount of heterogeneity seen in such cohorts (Brazil et al. 2018). By endorsing a philosophical view, that we call revisionary reductionism, we argue that current syndrome-based categorisations of psychopathy (e.g. the PCL-R) could be revised or partly replaced by groupings based on cognitive, biological and behavioural differences. We maintain that revisionary reductionism has serious prospects to improve classification and treatment of antisocial individuals. References: Blair, R. J. R. (2015). “Psychopathic traits from an RDoC perspective.“ Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 30: 79–84. Borsboom, D., A. Cramer, and A. Kalis. 2018. “Brain Disorders? Not Really… Why Network Structures Block Reductionism in Psychopathology Research.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1-54 Brazil, I. A., J. D. M. van Dongen, J. H. R. Maes, R. B. Mars, and A. R. Baskin-Sommers. 2018. “Classification and Treatment of Antisocial Individuals: From Behavior to Biocognition.“ Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 91: 259–77. Hare, R. D. 2003. The Hare Psychopathy Checklist - Revised. Second Edition. 2nd ed. Multi-Health Systems. Insel, T. and B. Cuthbert. 2015. “Brain Disorders? Precisely.” Science 348: 499-500. Jurjako, M., L. Malatesti, and I. A. Brazil. 2018. “Some Ethical Considerations about the Use of Biomarkers for the Classification of Adult Antisocial Individuals.” International Journal of Forensic Mental Health. https://doi.org/10.1080/14999013.2018.1485188

Self-deception is a process of acquiring a motivationally biased belief. This type of belief formation is usually considered to be epistemically irrational because it is based on affective and motivational factors. There are two general views on the nature of self-deception. Intentionalists think that a proper explanation of self-deception requires that a self-deceiving person has an intention to acquire a belief that is false or at least contrary to the available evidence. By contrast, antiintentionalists think that intentions are not necessary for explaining self-deception. They see self-deception as a type of motivated reasoning where an agent’s belief forming processes are biased by non-epistemic factors, such as emotions and desires. Antiintentionalists offer a simple and intuitive explanation of how people form self-deceptive beliefs. However, some intentionalists indicate that unlike other kinds of motivated reasoning, self-deception is characterized by a specific selectivity. Not every strong desire that p be the case will cause an agent to start believing that p is the case. This is the so called selectivity problem for antiintentionalists. The question is why some desires bias people’s belief forming processes, while others do not. According to intentionalists only those belief-desire pairs that rationalize forming an intention to acquire a belief can explain why particular cases of self- deception occur. Thus, they argue that intentions are necessary to explain self-deception. In this paper, I investigate whether intentionalists really have the upper-hand with respect to the selectivity problem. I argue that postulating intentions does not solve the selectivity problem. Furthermore, I argue that antiintentionalists might respond to the selectivity problem by expanding their explanatory tool-box beyond the narrow belief-desire psychology. In this regard, I indicate that formulating a proper explanation of self-deception, besides the desiderative profile of a person and her reasoning style, might require including a reference to the agent’s particular character traits.

Conceptualisations of mental disorders assign different roles to biological genetic or neural factors in the categorisation of these conditions. Syndrome based accounts, that inform many diagnoses in classificatory systems such as the DSM (APA 2013) or the ICD (WHO 1992), categorise mental disorders in terms of symptomatic behaviours and mental states and personality traits. In these accounts, thus, the identity of a certain mental disorder does not depend on its neural or other biological aetiology or correlates. Proposals for biological and neurocognitive (for short biocognitive) based classification of mental disorders aim, instead, at grounding the categorization of mental disorders on genetic, neurological, or neurocomputational mechanisms. The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) is a notable example of this proposal (see e.g. Insel and Cuthbert 2015 ; Lilienfeld 2014). The network approach to mental disorders is a recent proposal that offers a more nuanced view on the role that biological factors should have in the conceptualisation of mental disorders (Borsboom 2017). The core assumption of this account is that mental disorders should be conceptualised as networks of causally interacting symptoms. Denny Borsboom, and colleagues(Borsboom, Cramer, and Kalis 2018), argue that this approach is incompatible with a reductionist characterisation of mental disorders as “brain disorders” and, more than that, it shows why this type of reductionism is untenable. Although they are keen to assign some explanatory role to biological factors within their account, they think that causal connections between behaviourally individuated symptoms, inferred mental states, and personality traits are fundamental for the classification of mental disorders. In this paper, without considering whether the network approach is correct, we investigate, from a philosophical perspective, the role that biological factors should have in it. Our main line of reasoning is that Borsboom et al. do not recognise that difficulties in the integration of biological and neurological information in the classification of mental disorders, as they are currently conceptualized in DSM 5 or ICD 10, is also due to the heterogeneity of those categories of mental disorders and associated symptoms. It seems that they exclude without reason a significant role that biological factors should have within their proposal. We think that such a role could be spelled out by means of a plausible interpretation of the current biocognitive- based attempts at classification of mental disorders. Borsboom et al. appear to interpret some eminent instances of these attempts (e.g., Insel and Cuthbert 2015) as endorsement of the type of explanatory reductionism that they criticise. However, we think that there are interpretative grounds and, more importantly, theoretical reasons for thinking that these attempts might be underpinned by what we call revisionary reductionism. Revisionary reductionism is the view that current syndrome- based classifications of disorders, as those codified in the diagnoses in DSMs and ICDs, and those involved in the network approach could be revised or partly or completely replaced by individuating, amongst individuals that satisfy them, cognitive, genetic, neurobiological and even behavioural differences that might enable better treatment, prediction and explanation.

The insanity defence is intensely debated. On one side, it is considered an expression underlying the practical motivations (Robinson, 1998) and the moral integrity (Meynen 2016) of the criminal law. On the other side, the very existence and the specific components of this defence have been criticised (Meynen, 2016). A recent legal ethical debate has focussed on the issue whether the mental illness clause should be included in the formulation of the insanity defence (Slobogin, 2015). Several formulations of the legal criteria for the insanity defence contain, in fact, two elements (Simon & Ahn- Redding, 2006). One is the presence of certain incapacities when committing the act. Let us call it the incapacity clause. The other is the mental illness clause that requires that these exculpatory incapacities are due to a mental illness (or disorder or disease). In this paper we offer a balanced argument to motivate (re-)thinking about the mental illness clause in the insanity defence. We maintain that we should not take for granted that the insanity defence includes an illness clause. Depending on other safeguards in a legal system, we argue that a balanced decision should be made to either include or exclude the clause. However, our main line of argument is that any attempt at removing this clause from legal formulations of insanity defences should offer alternative ways to preserve some advantages that we think follow from including the mental illness clause. We offer three principal arguments to highlight these advantages. References Meynen, G. (2016). Legal Insanity: Explorations in Psychiatry, Law, and Ethics (Vol. 71). Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44721-6 Robinson, D. N. (1998). Wild beasts & idle humours: the insanity defense from antiquity to the present. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Simon, R. J., & Ahn-Redding, H. (2006). The insanity defense, the world over. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Slobogin, C. (2015). Eliminating mental disability as a legal criterion in deprivation of liberty cases: The impact of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on the insanity defense, civil commitment, and competency law. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 40, 36–42. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlp.2015.04.011

The prediction error minimization (PEM) framework comprises a family of views that provide a unified account of perception, cognition, and action. In the paper, I use self-deception as a case study for exploring the limits of the PEM framework. The argument goes as follows. Self- deception presupposes the belief-desire psychology. PEM seems to eschew the concept of desire. Thus, PEM cannot capture standard cases of self- deception. However, some authors argue that intentions are necessary for explaining self- deception. It seems that PEM has resources to capture intentions, at least construed as beliefs about what one will do. I dispute the claim that intentions are necessary for self- deception. Moreover, I explore in what way this discussion indicates that a proper explanatory framework for capturing high-level phenomena such as self- deception requires reliance on psychological constructs (e.g. personality traits) that seem to outstrip the conceptual framework of the PEM paradigm.

Conceptualisations of mental disorders assign different roles to biological genetic or neural factors in the categorisation of these conditions. Syndrome based accounts, that inform many diagnoses in classificatory systems such as the DSM (American Psychiatric Association 2013) or the ICD (World Health Organization 1993), categorise mental disorders in terms of symptomatic behaviours and mental states and personality traits. In these accounts, thus, the identity of a certain mental disorder does not depend on its neural or other biological aetiology or correlates. Proposals for biological and neurocognitive (for short biocognitive) based classification of mental disorders aim, instead, at grounding the categorization of mental disorders on genetic, neurological, or neurocomputational mechanisms. The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) is a notable example of this proposal (Insel et al. 2010 ; Insel and Cuthbert 2015 ; Lilienfeld 2014) However, there has been some opposition to biology-based classifications of psychiatric disorders. A significant instance of this resistance is in a recent BBS target paper (2018) by Denny Borsboom, Angélique Kramer and Annemarie Kalis, who argue that the RDoC type approaches are overly reductionist, empirically unsuccessful for advancing psychiatric practice, and theoretically unsound. In this paper, we want to highlight and criticise some of the misgivings that motivate such a resistance to biocognitive based classifications. We argue that most of these doubts derive from a misunderstanding of the commitments that guide the RDoC type approaches. The principal of these misunderstanding is that these approaches involve a reductionist programme. We argue, instead, that they do not invovle any kind of crude version of reductionism.

It seems to be a commonplace that the notion of mental disorder is at least partly value- laden. According to this line of thought, a condition that a person has is not a disorder if it is not harmful to that person. The relevant notion of harm can be spelled out in many ways. It usually refers to something that negatively affects a person’s well-being. However, philosophy of psychiatry lacks a consensus on what constitutes a person’s well-being and when it is sufficiently reduced by a condition to merit the label of mental disorder. In addition, it is not clear what kind of considerations can legitimately qualify a harmful condition as a mental disorder. I will approach this issue using the model of internal reasons as developed by Bernard Williams and others after him. The investigation will be twofold. First, I investigate how much the model can illuminate the normative aspect that harm imports to the notion of a disorder. In general, we can say that judging that some condition is harmful involves the judgment that it is undesirable. On Williams’ view, this claim is explicated in terms of rational routes ; I have a reason not to desire to be in some condition only if I would reach that desire by rational deliberative route from my initial desires. This notion of a practical reason captures some aspects of the role the notion of harm plays in psychiatry. For instance, one of the major reasons why homosexuality was removed from the second edition of the Diagnostic statistical manual of mental disorders (in 1973) is because it normally does not cause subjective distress to a person. Second, applying the internal reasons model to mental disorders exposes some of the often-noticed weak points of this model of reasons. For instance, it might have problems capturing the undesirability of disorders that involve profound lack of insight. Accordingly, no amount of rational deliberation, without making the conditional fallacy, could lead to the judgment that the condition is undesirable. In that case, however, I argue that the notion of a rational route could benefit from incorporating an objective notion of function that explains when capacities underlying rationality are malfunctioning. From this perspective, we can say that the condition is harmful because it is either judged by a person as undesirable or because it impairs capacities for rational thinking that are necessary for being an agent.

U radu razmatram je li potrebno fenomen samozavaravanja (eng. self-deception) objasniti oslanjajući se na pojam namjere ili se može objasniti pozivajući se samo na uzročno djelovanje konativnih stanja poput želja i emocija. Intencionalisti smatraju da je pojam namjere nužan za objašnjenje samozavaravanja, dok antiintencionalisti smatraju da nije. Jedan od važnijih argumenata intencionalista se oslanja na tzv. problem selektivnosti za antiintencionaliste. U radu razmatram može li se ovaj problem riješiti iz perspektive paradigme prediktivnog procesiranja.

Diagnoses of antisocial personality disorder, in classificatory systems as DSM or ICD, or psychopathy (Hare 2003) rely on behavioral tendencies and inferred personality traits. It has been argued that these diagnoses, misrepresenting the heterogeneity in antisocial populations, hinder the development of effective therapies. Instead, antisocial individuals should be classified by discovering the different underlying biomarkers of antisocial symptoms (Brazil et al., 2016). (See figure 1). In the paper, we address some ethical issues regarding the successful development of such biomarker- based classification of antisocial behavior.

Dominic Murphy in diverse pubblicazioni autorevoli ed influenti ha formulato e difeso ciò che egli chiama il modello medico forte della malattia mentale. Questo modello richiede di classificare le malattie mentali nei termini delle loro cause. Condividiamo questo progetto, e lo giustifichiamo con un argomento concernente i generi naturali. Sosteniamo, inoltre, che vi è una proposta di classificazione dei disturbi antisociali della personalità che è ben motivata e si accordano con il modello medico forte di Murphy. Notiamo che tale applicazione potrebbe richiedere rinunciare alla tesi di Murphy che lo status di malattia mentale si debba fondare su delle disfunzioni oggettive nei processi neurocognitivi. Riteniamo, tuttavia, che questo non rappresenti un ostacolo insormontabile alla costruzione di classificazioni dei disturbi antisociali della personalità che siano basate sulle cause.