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Introduction 1624 I. Complicity, in Liberal and Christian Thought 1628 A. Complicity in Liberal Thought 1629 B. Complicity in Christian Thought 1633 II. Compelled Hosting 1635 A. FAIR Versus Farmers [...], Because liberalism is concerned with individual freedom, it finds that one person is responsible for the conduct of another only under very narrow circumstances. To a large extent, the law reflects this narrow conception of complicity. There is however one glaring exception to the law's general resistance to complicity claims: where one actor becomes connected to another's act through a pecuniary contribution, the law's liberalism falls away. Money forges a cognizable association no matter how tenuous the causal connection and no matter the subsidizer's attitudes toward the subsidized act. For example, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court recognized complicity arising from an employer-subsidized health plan, even though the employer had no role to play in the ways its employees chose to spend their healthcare dollars. Pecuniary association explains material support cases where donors to the peaceful wing of an advocacy group can nonetheless be guilty of the crime of supporting a foreign terrorist organization if the group has a violent wing; after all, money is fungible, and no matter that the donor might oppose the group's violence. Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, where an employee successfully contested his union dues, even though they were not going to fund the union's political activity, can be understood on similar grounds. The first aim of this piece is to trace the law's divergent approaches to shared responsibility. On the one hand, the law's atomism generally constrains complicity. But the doctrine tells a very different story where money is the means of association. I aim to draw out this divergence across numerous doctrinal areas, including compelled hosting, campaign finance, public accommodations, and school choice. Given that religion pervades many complicity claims, a second aim of the piece is to survey Christian conceptions of complicity to see if they share secular law's special solicitude for money. Two findings emerge. First, Christian concerns with purity--along with the inevitable intermingling with the profane that market interactions involve--prompt a heightened focus on pecuniary association. But, second, the understanding of the evil of pecuniary complicity in Christian thought is far more defensible than the one embodied in secular law.

In an often-neglected episode from book 6 of Edmund Spenser's Faerie Queene, the beautiful courtly lady Mirabella rejects the love of numerous suitors and thereby causes their death. For her [...]

THIS ARTICLE CONSIDERS THE PARTICULARS of legal imagination in two sixteenth-century English poetic texts: 'Myne Olde Dere En'mye' by Thomas Wyatt (ca. 1530s) (1) and 'Lovers Accusation at the judgment [...]

This essay situates the Man of Law's Tale and its teller within a dynamic framework of fourteenth-century English jurisprudence and political history, and, by so doing, it casts new light [...]

ESSAY CONTENTS INTRODUCTION I. THE FLY-BOTTLE II. THE TROUBLES III. THE WAY OUT IV. HOUSE RULES V. PROMISES VI. PLAYING GAMES VII. CAN WE LEAVE THE FLY-BOTTLE? VIII. SHOULD WE [...], For more than forty years, jurisprudence has been dominated by the Hart-Dworkin debate. The debate starts from the premise that our legal practices generate rights and obligations that are distinctively legal, and the question at issue is how the content of these rights and obligations is determined. Positivists say that their content is determined ultimately or exclusively by social facts. Anti-positivists say that moral facts must play a part in determining their content. In this Essay, I argue that the debate rests on a mistake. Our legal practices do not generate rights and obligations that are distinctively legal. At best, they generate moral rights and obligations, some of which we label legal. I defend this view by drawing analogies with other normative practices, like making promises, posting rules, and playing games. And I try to explain why it looks like legal practices generate distinctively legal rights and obligations even though they do not. I conclude with some thoughts about the questions that jurisprudence should pursue in the wake of the Hart-Dworkin debate.

Abstract: This article examines what has changed in Russian law since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Among the accomplishments are the emergence of constitutional jurisprudence, the development of commercial [...]

Justice does not exist! Human Rights do not exist. What matters is jurisprudence. This is the invention of Law.... The challenge is to create and not to make Human Rights [...]

The article provides an account of the emergence of the common law jurisprudence over blasphemy arguing that the blasphemy laws first developed in Rex v. Taylor had an explicitly secular purpose. Rex v. Taylor had a much more profound role in the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence and Lord Chief Justice Hale's opinion is an early and influential example of the constitutional view that religion and government need to be separate for a peaceful social order.

For at least the past several decades, judges around the world have been looking beyond their own states' jurisprudence to international law and the decisions of foreign courts in order [...]

In this research note/replication, we apply the construct of jurisprudential regimes as described in our recent article to the jurisprudential area of search and seizure. Given the centrality of this area of Supreme Court decision making in the core studies supporting the attitudinal model, replicating our analysis of the jurisprudential regime construct in this area provides an important test of the concept. Our results produce strong support for the proposition that post-Mapp decision making can be separated into distinct regimes, with a set of important cases decided in 1983-1984 demarcating the regimes. The predictors of decisions in the two periods are consistent with the types of changes one would expect the regime shift to produce. Our findings challenge the attitudinalists' proposition that there is at best negligible statistical evidence that law influences Supreme Court decision making. Keywords: judicial behavior; search and seizure; U.S. Supreme Court; jurisprudential regime

INTRODUCTION I. THE INABILITY TO REPLACE AN ABSENT OR RECUSED JUSTICE II. THE WIDESPREAD AND LONGSTANDING PRACTICE OF AFFIRMANCE BY AN EQUALLY DIVIDED COURT HAS BEEN ENDORSED BY CONGRESS III. [...]

I. INTRODUCTION Predictably Incoherent Judgments (1) is an impressive work: It guides us both to rethink the acceptability of the processes by which we generate legislative punishments, punitive damages, and [...]

Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 738 (2001). Textualism's revival illuminated the judicial imagination at play behind the search for congressional intent through legislative history. (1) Brickwood [...]

The agreement of people in calculation is not an agreement in opinions or convictions. --Ludwig Wittgenstein (1) INTRODUCTION The protagonists battle on. Trumpeting right answers, (2) foundations, (3) and truth, [...]