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Jurisdiction is foundational to the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely for this reason that subject matter jurisdiction, the species of judicial power that gives a court authority to resolve a dispute, has today come to the center of a struggle between corporate litigants and the regulatory state. In a pronounced trend, corporations are using jurisdictional maneuvers to manipulate forum choice. Along the way, they are wearing out less-resourced parties, circumventing hearings on the merits, and insulating themselves from laws that seek to govern their behavior. Corporations have done so by making creative arguments to lock plaintiffs out of court and push them into arbitration, and failing that, to lock plaintiffs into federal court rather than state court, or to punt federal cases to administrative agencies that may lack the power or will to resolve the underlying issues in the case. These efforts have largely been successful. This Article offers a panoramic view of how over recent decades federal courts have acquiesced in a corporate-driven effort to leverage jurisdictional doctrines to their unique private advantage, and contends that together, these doctrinal changes constitute an inflection point in U.S. law and procedure. We argue that corporate adjudicatory practice has slanted judicial power in favor ofderegulatory efforts that undermine legal commitments to equality, dignity, and participation. The shifts in jurisdiction, which may seem to be merely technical and apolitical, are a core part of the architecture of what we call the oligarchic courthouse--one where courts as public institutions transform their procedures to meet private, corporate interests at the expense of public goals, thereby cementing economic power and translating it into concentrated political power that undermines the possibility of robust democratic life. The trends we describe in federal subject matter jurisdiction resonate with earlier corporate battles at the turn of the twentieth century. But the construction of today's oligarchic courthouse holds implications for democracy that are not simply a reprise of earlier corporate efforts. To show the scope of the implications, the Article steps back and clarifies why jurisdiction matters to democracy. Drawing on law and social mobilization literature, we argue that jurisdiction functions as a political resource that facilitates opportunities for democratic contestation and both reflects and shapes the openness and closedness of the state. Having centered jurisdiction in a larger account of democracy, we explore how the oligarchic courthouse, by entrenching economic power and narrowing participatory options for workers, consumers, and other less-resourced litigants, can be nested in a larger account of democratic decline in the United States., TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION I. JURISDICTIONAL SHIFTS A. Lock Out: Arbitration 1. 'Contracting' Around Court Jurisdiction 2. Aggregate Litigation and Restricted Judicial Power 3. Winnowing Appellate Jurisdiction B. Lock In: [...]

Under 28 U.S.C. [section] 1782(a), parties to foreign legal proceedings can obtain discovery orders from United States federal courts. In other words, if a foreign party needs physical evidence located in--or testimony from a person residing in--the United States to support their claim or defense, they can ask a district court to order the production of that evidence. For almost two decades, [section] 1782(a) practice has operated as a procedural Wild West. Judges routinely consider [section] 1782(a) applications ex parte--that is, without giving the parties subject to the resulting discovery orders a chance to oppose them--and grant those applications at a staggering rate: more than 90% of the time. In its June 2022 decision in ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., the Supreme Court transformed [section] 1782 jurisprudence for the worse. The Court held that private arbitral tribunals do not fall under [section] 1782(a)'s scope and that, as a result, parties cannot obtain discovery for use in foreign private arbitration under the provision. This Note argues that, after ZF Automotive, [section] 1782(a) jurisprudence contains two dangers: (1) it subjects some parties to burdensome discovery orders with few procedural safeguards, and (2) it prevents parties who have chosen to arbitrate rather than litigate from obtaining discovery entirely. This Note contributes to existing scholarship by proposing structural changes that would improve [section] 1782(a) practice. Specifically, it argues that courts cannot root out the procedural flaws that plague [section] 1782(a), and that, consequently, Congress should enact a new and improved [section] 1782 to address these manifold problems., TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION I. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF [SECTION] 1782(A) PRACTICE A. The Evolution of [section]l 782(a)'s Text B. Notable Omissions from [section] 1782(a) C. Intel Corp. [...]

It has been argued that dignity was recognised in Clubb v Edwards ('Clubb'j as an Australian constitutional value. This means that Australia must confront the well-recognised confusion and criticisms concerning dignity as a legal concept. It is widely claimed that the meaning of dignity remains either indeterminate or incoherent, or both. This article argues that the meaning of dignity can be sufficiently determinate and coherent. The route to this conclusion is not to insist on a single formula across jurisdictions and contexts such as autonomy, equality or non-fungibility. Instead, drawing on the dominant conceptions, I propose a holistic four-dimensional approach to dignity. Guided by this definition, I offer an investigation into and explanation of the meaning of Australian constitutional dignity in Clubb., CONTENTS I Introduction II Four-Dimensional Dignity A Dignity Is Contingent B Different Conceptions of Dignity 1 Dignity as Worth or Dignity as Intrinsic Value (a) Examples 2 Dignity as Freedom [...]

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 578 II. MERGER INVESTIGATIONS 578 A. The Legislative Scheme and History of Merger Investigations: The Role of California v. Frito-Lay and the Enactment of the [...]

In recent years, several highly-publicize d episodes of police violence have inspired calls to reform our nation's municipal police departments. On university campuses, scholars and students alike have joined voices in support of this goal. But despite the popularity of police reform as a topic of advocacy, legal scholars have largely failed to critically examine the police forces that patrol their own campuses. This oversight is a dramatic one, as campus police forces operate at nearly nine-hundred of our nation's institutions of higher learning and collectively employ almost fifteen-thousand officers nationwide. To ensure that this significant portion of the American policing enterprise does not escape scrutiny, this Comment offers legal scholars and students a multifaceted analysis of modern campus policing. First, it catalogues the various state laws that enable campus policing operations and offers a new taxonomy to model their jurisdictional powers. The upshot is that, in most states, campus police have the power to arrest, detain, and use force both on- and off-campus. In many states, these powers are extended to campus police employed by private institutions, creating public-private partnerships that empower unaccountable school employees with one of the most closely-guarded powers in American law--the general police power. To demonstrate how these powers are used in practice, this Comment then presents a case study of campus policing at the University of Pennsylvania. At Penn, school-sponsored police officers patrol a district that extends beyond campus and into the neighboring streets of University City, where they interact with members of the public who are unaffiliated with Penn but who work or live nearby. Despite this fact, Penn's internal disciplinary system--as well as many of the complimentary services offered by Penn's police department--are available only to Penn-affiliates, not to the public. This differential treatment of school-affiliates and the unaffiliated public, and two other campus policing trends, are critiqued in the Comment's final Part. In addition to pairing these critiques with recommendations for appropriate reform, this Comment demonstrates how campus policing might act as a site for imagining more humane police forces in the municipal context, and encourages scholars to agitate for greater oversight of their own institution's police forces as a means toward actualizing that vision., INTRODUCTION 1773 I. THE LAW OF CAMPUS POLICING 1777 A. A Brief History of Campus Police 1778 B. Campus Policing's Legal Foundations 1780 1. Statutory Grants of Power 1781 a. [...]

Defendants force courts to decide whether to use judicial time and resources to hear a case when they either flee or refuse to submit to jurisdiction. Judges in the United States possess an exceptional discretionary power to deny access to the courts in these circumstances through the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The fugitive disentitlement doctrine developed as federal common law and permits courts to exercise discretion in declining to hear appeals or motions from defendants classified as fugitives from justice. Historically, the fugitive disentitlement doctrine was intended to prevent courts from wasting resources adjudicating cases when a defendant has fled and remains a fugitive from justice. While traditional fugitives remain subject to the doctrine, modern courts now also apply fugitive disentitlement to foreign defendants with tenuous connections to United States jurisdiction. United States federal prosecutors can leverage the doctrine to circumvent the principle of the presumption against extraterritoriality, a legal doctrine that presumes laws do not apply outside United States borders. Consequently, as long as the government can secure an indictment, fugitive disentitlement requires that foreign defendants travel to the United States and submit to its jurisdiction. Absent an appeals process, foreign defendants must submit to United States jurisdiction and may be forced to travel great distances to defend themselves in United States courts any time a U.S. prosecutor levels charges. Allowing foreign defendants to challenge the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine furthers the purposes of justice and due process. This Comment argues that the United States Supreme Court should adopt the Second Circuit's approach to fugitive disentitlement, which allows a defendant to challenge fugitivity through the collateral order doctrine as an exception to the final judgment rule., INTRODUCTION Muriel Bescond worked in Paris, France as a Societe Generale SA's (1) treasury desk lead during the LIBOR scandal. (2) The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is determined through [...]