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1. Can We Commit Future Managers to Honesty?

Author

Nicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini, Julie Rosaz, and Jason F. Shogren

Subjects
commitment, lying, In-group bias, managers, honesty, Oath, Psychology, BF1-990
Abstract

In a competitive business environment, dishonesty can pay. Self-interested executives and managers can have incentive to shade the truth for personal gain. In response, the business community has considered how to commit these executives and managers to a higher ethical standard. The MBA Oath and the Dutch Bankers Oath are examples of such a commitment device. The question we test herein is whether the oath can be used as an effective form of ethics management for future executives/managers—who for our experiment we recruited from a leading French business school—by actually improving their honesty. Using a classic Sender-Receiver strategic game experiment, we reinforce professional identity by pre-selecting the group to which Receivers belong. This allows us to determine whether taking the oath deters lying among future managers. Our results suggest “yes and no.” We observe that these future executives/managers who took a solemn honesty oath as a Sender were (a) significantly more likely to tell the truth when the lie was detrimental to the Receiver, but (b) were not more likely to tell the truth when the lie was mutually beneficial to both the Sender and Receiver. A joint product of our design is our ability to measure in-group bias in lying behavior in our population of subjects (comparing behavior of subjects in the same and different business schools). The experiment provides clear evidence of a lack of such bias.

Published
2021
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3. Promoting socially desirable behaviors through persuasion and commitment: Experimental evidence

Author

Cécile Bazart, Mathieu Lefebvre, Julie Rosaz, Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier (CEE-M), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)-Institut Agro Montpellier, Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Université de Montpellier (UM), Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC) (BSB), Centre de Recherche sur l'ENtreprise [Dijon] (CEREN), ANR-10-IDEX-0002,UNISTRA,Par-delà les frontières, l'Université de Strasbourg(2010), ANR-10-LABX-0079,AMSE,Aix-Marseille School of Economices(2010), and ANR-11-IDEX-0001,Amidex,INITIATIVE D'EXCELLENCE AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITE(2011)

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, Commitment, Communication, Persuasion, Voluntary contribution mechanism, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods/H.H4.H41 - Public Goods, General Social Sciences, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D9 - Intertemporal Choice/D.D9.D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving, Applied Psychology
Abstract

International audience; Through a series of experiments, this paper tests the relative efficiency of persuasion and commitment schemes to increase and sustain contribution levels in a Voluntary Contribution Game. The design allows us to compare a baseline consisting of a repeated public good game to four treatments of the same game in which we successively introduce a persuasion message, commitment devices, and communication between subjects. Our results suggest that these non-monetary procedures significantly increase cooperation and reduce the decay of contributions across periods.

Published
2022

4. Management of common pool resources in a nation-wide experiment

Author

Jean-Christian Tisserand, Astrid Hopfensitz, Serge Blondel, Youenn Loheac, César Mantilla, Guillermo Mateu, Julie Rosaz, Anne Rozan, Marc Willinger, Angela Sutan, Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC) (BSB), Centre de Recherche sur l'ENtreprise [Dijon] (CEREN), emlyon business school (EM), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management (GRANEM), Université d'Angers (UA)-Institut Agro Rennes Angers, Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), ESC Rennes School of Business (ESC [Rennes]), Universidad del Rosario [Bogota], Gestion Territoriale de l'Eau et de l'environnement (UMR GESTE), École Nationale du Génie de l'Eau et de l'Environnement de Strasbourg (ENGEES)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier (CEE-M), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)-Institut Agro Montpellier, Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Université de Montpellier (UM), Funding by the European Researcher's Night consortium. Angela Sutan acknowledges PARI funding from Bourgogne Franche Comté region. Further Astrid Hopfensitz acknowledges IAST funding from the French National Research Agency (ANR) under the Investments for the Future (Investissements d'Avenir) program, grant ANR-17-EURE-0010 and through JCJC grant ANR-15-CE33-0005-01., ANR-17-EURE-0010,CHESS,Toulouse Graduate School défis en économie et sciences sociales quantitatives(2017), and ANR-15-CE33-0005,SINT,L'intelligence sociale: experiences et théories concernant les agents économiques(2015)

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, Experiment, Science Popularization, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation/Q.Q2.Q23 - Forestry, Large Sample, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C93 - Field Experiments, Common Pool Resource, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation/Q.Q2.Q22 - Fishery • Aquaculture, General Environmental Science
Abstract

International audience; Dilemmas related to the use of environmental resources concern diverse populations at local or global scales. Frequently, individuals are unable to visualize the consequences of their actions, where they belong in the decision-making line, and have no information about past choices or the time horizon. We design a new one-shot extraction game to capture these dynamic decisions. We present results from a nationwide common pool resource experiment, conducted simultaneously in eleven French cities, involving a total of 2813 participants. We examine, for the first time, the simultaneous impact of several variables on the amount of resource extracted: the local vs. the national scale of the resource, the size of the group (small vs. big), the low vs. high recovery rate of the resource, and the available information. We show that individuals significantly reduce extraction levels in local as compared to national level dilemmas and that providing recommendations on sustainable extraction amounts significantly improves the sustainability of the resource. Overall, women extract significantly less, but care more about preserving the local resource; older participants extract significantly more resources but extract less from the national resource. Our experiment also fulfills a science popularization pedagogical aim, which we discuss..

Published
2022

5. Other-Regarding Preferences and Giving Decision in a Risky Environment: Experimental Evidence

Author

Mickael Beaud, Mathieu Lefebvre, Julie Rosaz, GARNIER, Laurent, Adaptation locale dans un environnement à risque - - RISKADAPT2017 - ANR-17-CE02-0011 - AAPG2017 - VALID, Aix-Marseille School of Economics - - AMSE (EUR)2017 - ANR-17-EURE-0020 - EURE - VALID, Laboratoires d'excellence - Entrepreneurship - - Entreprendre2010 - ANR-10-LABX-0011 - LABX - VALID, INITIATIVE D'EXCELLENCE AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITE - - Amidex2011 - ANR-11-IDEX-0001 - IDEX - VALID, Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier (CEE-M), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)-Institut Agro Montpellier, Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Université de Montpellier (UM), Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre de Recherche sur l'ENtreprise [Dijon] (CEREN), Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC) (BSB), ANR-17-CE02-0011,RISKADAPT,Adaptation locale dans un environnement à risque(2017), ANR-17-EURE-0020,AMSE (EUR),Aix-Marseille School of Economics(2017), ANR-10-LABX-0011,Entreprendre,Entrepreneurship(2010), ANR-11-IDEX-0001,Amidex,INITIATIVE D'EXCELLENCE AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITE(2011), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 (CEE-M), and Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)

Subjects
Dictator games, Background risk, Laboratory experiments, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D64 - Altruism • Philanthropy, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty, [SHS] Humanities and Social Sciences, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences
Abstract

International audience; We investigate whether and how an individual giving decision is affected in risky environments in which the recipient's wealth is random. We demonstrate that, under risk neutrality, the donation of dictators with a purely ex post view of fairness should, in general, be affected by the riskiness of the recipient's payoff, while dictators with a purely ex ante view should not be. Furthermore, we observe that some influential inequality aversion preferences functions yield opposite predictions when we consider ex post view of fairness. Hence, we report on dictator games laboratory experiments in which the recipient's wealth is exposed to an actuarially neutral and additive background risk. Our experimental data show no statistically significant impact of the recipient's risk exposure on dictators' giving decisions. This result appears robust to both the experimental design (within subjects or between subjects) and the origin of the recipient's risk exposure (chosen by the recipient or imposed on the recipient). Although we cannot sharply validate or invalidate alternative fairness theories, the whole pattern of our experimental data can be simply explained by assuming ex ante view of fairness and risk neutrality.

Published
2022

7. Promoting Socially Desirable Behaviors: Experimental Comparison of the Procedures of Persuasion and Commitment

Author

GATE Working Paper Series, Cécile Bazart, Mathieu Lefebvre, and Julie Rosaz

Subjects
Microeconomics, Persuasion, media_common.quotation_subject, Commitment strategy, Public good, Psychology, Baseline (configuration management), media_common, Term (time), Test (assessment)
Abstract

In a series of experiments, we test the relative efficiency of persuasion and commitment schemes to increase and sustain contribution levels in a Voluntary Contribution Game. The design allows to compare a baseline consisting of a repeated public good game to, respectively, four manipulation treatments relying on: an information strategy, a low commitment strategy, a high commitment strategy and a promise strategy. We confirm the advantages of psychologically orientated policies as they increase the overall level of contribution and for some, that is commitment and promises, question the decreasing trend traditionally observed in long term contributions to public goods.

Published
2019

8. Mise en place d'une expérience avec le grand public : entre recherche, vulgarisation et pédagogie

Author

Fabrice Le Lec, Eva Raiber, Marianne Lefebvre, Angela Sutan, Cesar Mantilla, Emmanuel Peterle, Jean-Christian Tisserand, Serge Blondel, Mélody Leplat, Francois Cochard, Astrid Hopfensitz, Cécile Bazart, Alexandrine Bornier, Julie Rosaz, Emmanuel Petit, Joëlle Brouard, Nicolas Jacquemet, Guillaume Péron, Marc Willinger, Youenn Loheac, Fabio Galeotti, Guillermo Mateu, Anne Rozan, Alexandre Flage, Mohamed Ali Bchir, Xavier Hollandts, Adam Zylbersztejn, Nathalie Chappe, Marie Claire Villeval, Mihaela Bonescu, Hayyan Alia, Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Brest business school (BBS), Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC) (BSB), Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), École Nationale du Génie de l'Eau et de l'Environnement de Strasbourg (ENGEES), Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management (GRANEM), Université d'Angers (UA)-AGROCAMPUS OUEST-Institut National de l'Horticulture et du Paysage, Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) (CRESE), Université de Franche-Comté (UFC), Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC)-Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Kedge Business School (CRCGM et IFGE), Kedge Business School (Kedge BS), Toulouse School of Economics (TSE-R), Université Toulouse Capitole (UT Capitole), Université de Toulouse (UT)-Université de Toulouse (UT)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université de Bordeaux (UB), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (EA 3190) (CRESE), Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC)-Université de Franche-Comté (UFC), Laboratoire Chrono-environnement - UFC (UMR 6249) (LCE), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Franche-Comté (UFC)-Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC), Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université d'Angers (UA), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Université d'Angers (UA)-AGROCAMPUS OUEST, Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de l'Horticulture et du Paysage, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Économie Industrielle et Économie Comportementale, Centre de recherche en économie et management ( CREM ), Université de Caen Normandie ( UNICAEN ), Normandie Université ( NU ) -Normandie Université ( NU ) -Université de Rennes 1 ( UR1 ), Université de Rennes ( UNIV-RENNES ) -Université de Rennes ( UNIV-RENNES ) -Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( CNRS ) -Université de Caen Normandie ( UNICAEN ), Université de Rennes ( UNIV-RENNES ) -Université de Rennes ( UNIV-RENNES ) -Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( CNRS ) -France Business School ( FBS ), France Business School-France Business School, Brest business school ( BBS ), Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC) ( BSB ), Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée ( LAMETA ), Université Montpellier 1 ( UM1 ) -Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 ( UM3 ) -Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques ( Montpellier SupAgro ) -Institut national de la recherche agronomique [Montpellier] ( INRA Montpellier ) -Université de Montpellier ( UM ) -Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( CNRS ) -Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier ( Montpellier SupAgro ), École Nationale du Génie de l'Eau et de l'Environnement de Strasbourg ( ENGEES ), Groupe de Recherche ANgevin en Economie et Management ( Granem ), Université d'Angers ( UA ) -AGROCAMPUS OUEST-Institut National de l'Horticulture et du Paysage, Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC ( CRESE ), Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté ( UBFC ) -Université de Franche-Comté ( UFC ), Laboratoire Chrono-environnement ( LCE ), Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté ( UBFC ) -Université de Franche-Comté ( UFC ) -Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( CNRS ), Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique ( GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne ), École normale supérieure - Lyon ( ENS Lyon ) -Université Lumière - Lyon 2 ( UL2 ) -Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 ( UCBL ), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] ( UJM ) -Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( CNRS ), Kedge Business School ( CRCGM et IFGE ), Kedge Business School, Toulouse School of Economics ( TSE ), Toulouse School of Economics, Paris School of Economics ( PSE ), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne ( CES ), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( CNRS ) -Université Panthéon-Sorbonne ( UP1 ), Université d'Angers ( UA ), Université de Bordeaux ( UB ), and Institut National de l'Horticulture et du Paysage-AGROCAMPUS OUEST-Université d'Angers (UA)

Subjects
Event (relativity), 05 social sciences, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C93 - Field Experiments, Library science, 050109 social psychology, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, 050105 experimental psychology, Replication (computing), expérience, Popular education, JEL: A - General Economics and Teaching/A.A1 - General Economics/A.A1.A11 - Role of Economics • Role of Economists • Market for Economists, JEL : C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C93 - Field Experiments, pédagogie, [ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances, 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences, Sociology, JEL : A - General Economics and Teaching/A.A1 - General Economics/A.A1.A11 - Role of Economics • Role of Economists • Market for Economists, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance, grand public, vulgarisation
Abstract

International audience; We present the implementation of an economic experiment conducted simultaneously in 11 French cities, with over 2700 participants, during four uninterrupted hours, during a popular-science event held in September 2015. Our goal is both to provide a roadmap for a possible replication and to discuss how the discipline can invest in new fields (science popularization, popular education, public communication).; Nous présentons la mise en place d'une expérience lors d'un évènement grand public national, de manière simultanée dans 11 villes françaises, en septembre 2015. L’expérience a impliqué plus de 2700 participants et a duré quatre heures ininterrompues. L’objectif de cet article est à la fois de fournir une feuille de route pour une éventuelle réplication et de penser à la manière dont la discipline peut investir des terrains nouveaux (vulgarisation, pédagogie populaire, communication grand public).

Published
2017

9. Quitting and peer effects at work

Author

Julie Rosaz, Marie Claire Villeval, Robert Slonim, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), University of Sydney, School of economics, The University of Sydney, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), and Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
Labour economics, peer effects, Economics, Applied psychology, jel:D83, feedback, jel:J81, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness, Task (project management), Margin (machine learning), 050207 economics, Quits,peer effects,communication,feedback,experiment, media_common, 050205 econometrics, 050208 finance, jel:C91, experiment, communication, Social distance, quits, peer effects, communication, feedback, experiment, 05 social sciences, 1402 Applied Economics, 1403 Econometrics, Working time, Public relations, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Work (electrical), 8. Economic growth, Effort, JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers/J.J6.J63 - Turnover • Vacancies • Layoffs, Peer effects, Psychology, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Economics and Econometrics, media_common.quotation_subject, JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor/J.J2.J28 - Safety • Job Satisfaction • Related Public Policy, Wage, Quitting, Affect (psychology), JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor/J.J2.J21 - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure, Unit (housing), jel:J63, jel:J28, 0502 economics and business, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, Productivity, JEL: M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M5 - Personnel Economics, Quits, business.industry, Work (physics), Work period, JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J8 - Labor Standards: National and International/J.J8.J81 - Working Conditions, Demographic economics, business
Abstract

While peer effects have been shown to affect worker's productivity when workers are paid a fixed wage, there is little evidence on their influence on quitting decisions. This paper presents results from an experiment in which participants receive a piece-rate wage to perform a real-effort task. After completing a compulsory work period, the participants have the option at any time to continue working or quit. To study peer effects, we randomly assign participants to work alone or have one other worker in the room with them. When a peer is present, we manipulate the environment by giving either vague or precise feedback on the co-worker's output, and also vary whether the two workers can communicate. We find that allowing individuals to work with a co-worker present does not increase worker's productivity. However, the presence of a peer in all working conditions causes workers to quit at more similar times. When, and only when, communication is allowed, workers are significantly more likely to (1) stay longer if their partner is still working, and (2) work longer the more productive they are. We conclude that when workers receive a piece-rate wage, critical peer effects occur only when workers can communicate with each other.

Published
2016

10. Biased Information and Effort

Author

Julie Rosaz, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Dao, Taï, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), and Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior, Economics and Econometrics, bias, information,feedback,bias,motivation,experiment,biais,expérience, Context (language use), feedback, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness, Profit (economics), information, Microeconomics, Information asymmetry, motivation, Order (exchange), Economics, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, experiment, business.industry, Principal (computer security), Public relations, JEL: M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M1 - Business Administration/M.M1.M12 - Personnel Management • Executives, Executive Compensation, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, General Business, Management and Accounting, expérience, Risk analysis (engineering), business, biais
Abstract

Working paper GATE 2010-25; International audience; We study the impact of information manipulation by a principal on the agent's effort. In a context of asymmetric information at the principal's advantage, we test experimentally the principal's willingness to bias (overestimate or under-estimate) the information she gives to her agent on his ability in order to motivate him to exert more effort. We find that i) principals do bias information, ii) agents trust the cheap-talk messages they receive and adjust their effort accordingly. Therefore, biased messages improve both the agent's performance and thus the principal's profit. This, however, does not increase efficiency. We also find that over-estimation occurs much more often than under-estimation. Making the signal costly in an additional treatment reduces this effect.

Published
2012

11. Updating beliefs with imperfect signals: experimental evidence

Author

Béatrice Roussillon, François Poinas, Julie Rosaz, Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative (GREMAQ), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Université des Sciences Sociales (Toulouse 1), Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2), Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL), Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 (UPMF)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), Dao, Taï, École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Toulouse Capitole (UT Capitole), Université de Toulouse (UT)-Université de Toulouse (UT)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), and Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, Beliefs, 05 social sciences, Perfect information, 050109 social psychology, Sample (statistics), [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Signal, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, Experiment, Accounting, 0502 economics and business, Statistics, Econometrics, 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences, Imperfect, 050207 economics, Set (psychology), [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE, Beliefs,Imperfect Information,Experiment, Finance, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, Imperfect Information, Mathematics
Abstract

This article analyses belief updating when agents receive a signal that restricts the number of possible states of the world. We create an experiment on individual choice under uncertainty. In this experiment, the subject observes an urn, containing yellow and blue balls, whose composition is partially revealed. The subject has to assess the composition of the urn and form an initial belief. Then, he receives a signal that restricts the set of the possible urns from which the initial observed sample is drawn. Once again, he has to estimate the composition of the urn. Our results show that, on the whole, this type of signal increases the frequency of correct assessment. However, differences appear between validating and invalidating signals (i.e. signals that either confirm or disprove the initial belief). The later significantly increase the probability to make a correct assessment whereas validating signals reduce the frequency of correct estimations. We find evidences of lack of persistence in choice under uncertainty. The literature shows that people may persist with their choice even when they are wrong. We show that they may also change even if they are right.

Published
2010

12. Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment

Author

Julie Rosaz, Marie Claire Villeval, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Dao, Taï, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), and Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Subjects
media_common.quotation_subject, jel:D82, education, Lies,deception,self-image,guilt aversion,lie-aversion,evaluation,experiments, Task (project management), Terminology, deception, JEL: M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M5 - Personnel Economics/M.M5.M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects, health services administration, C91, ddc:330, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, self-image, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, lie-aversion, media_common, Supervisor, Lies, evaluation, jel:C91, evaluation, lie-aversion, guilt aversion, self-image, deception, lies, experiments, ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION, Earnings, M52, Stochastic game, Pareto principle, experiments, Deception, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Self-image, lies, D82, jel:M52, guilt aversion, Psychology, Social psychology, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, human activities
Abstract

Working paper GATE 2011-24; International audience; This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers' performance to the experimenter. The report is non verifiable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the supervisors, but at least one third of them bias their report. Both selfish black lies (increasing the supervisor's earnings while decreasing the worker's payoff) and Pareto white lies (increasing the earnings of both) according to Erat and Gneezy (2009)'s terminology are frequent. In contrast, spiteful black lies (decreasing the earnings of both) and altruistic white lies (increasing the earnings of workers but decreasing those of the supervisor) are almost non-existent. The supervisors' second-order beliefs and their decision to lie are highly correlated, suggesting that guilt aversion plays a role.

13. NORMES : NORmes sociales, Motivations Externes et internes, et politiques publiqueS

Author

Cécile Bazart, Dimitri Dubois, Kate Farrow, Lisette Ibanez, Alain Marciano, nathalie moureau, Rustam Romaniuc, Julie Rosaz, Sébastien Roussel, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), and ADEME

Subjects
prévention, motivations internes, motivations externes, Déchets Ménagers et Assimilés (DMAs), [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, politiques publiques
Abstract

Le travail envisagé dans le projet de recherche NORMES a deux objectifs. Premièrement, nous essaierons de mettre en évidence et de caractériser les motivations internes des agents économiques en matière environnementale en termes de comportements individuels. La question centrale sera ici celle de la manière dont les motivations internes conduit les individus à réduire leur pollution par exemple ou à accroître leur contribution à la protection de l'environnement; et, de voir leur application au domaine des Déchets Ménagers et Assimilés (DMAs). Deuxièmement, nous essaierons de voir comment il est possible de traduire ces résultats en termes institutionnels et décisionnels, et d’envisager comment de nouvelles normes sociales peuvent potentiellement apparaître. Ces normes sont les seules garantes d’une orientation durable des comportements.Ce projet qui vise à mieux comprendre les motivations des individus dans leurs comportements vis-à-vis des déchets, a permis de donner un certain nombre d'éléments de réponse aux questions suivantes.Quel type d’information peut pousser les individus à changer de comportements dans les domaines de la prévention et du tri des déchets? Quels sont les effets induits par ce type de communication? Quelle articulation prévoir entre motivations interne et externe?Comment peut on mettre en place une norme sociale, étant donné que celle de la prévention et celle du tri sont inégalement installées?Dans le cadre du projet nous avons organisé deux manifestations; une à vocation scientifique afin de réunir certains spécialistes sur les questions de l'économie de la gestion des déchets; et une autre à vocation plus opérationnelle qui a permis des discussions sur comment traduire les résultats de recherches en politiques efficaces.

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